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Abstract
ENGAGING THE EIGHTIES: ETHICS, OBJECTS, PERIODS
by
Kevin L. Ferguson

Adviser: Distinguished Professor Nancy K. Miller
This dissertation examines a recent decade in American history whose unique
notion of self-periodization generated important questions of ethical engagement and
withdrawal. Situated during a time of an increasingly complex relationship between
literature and theory, thinkers in the 80s self-consciously shifted towards making claims
about their present moment which were based on the logic of rupture, and which thus
created an either-or logic of pessimism or optimism in response to this rupture. These
kinds of self-periodizing notions generally are collected under the rubric
“postmodernism,” and the first chapter deals with a transatlantic movement between
theorists such as Fredric Jameson and Jean-François Lyotard who imagine the threat of
rupture and what it suggests for individual subjects living in times mandated by so many
theorists as constituting a radically new epistemological model. To analyze this perceived
novelty in the American cultural landscape, the next three chapters focus on “objects of
knowledge,” a term borrowed from Michel Foucault to describe stereotypted models of
conduct: brats, surrogate mothers, and yuppies. The 80s’ vision of childhood was
crystallized by the notion of “Brat Packs” such as the literary one that included Jay
McInerney’s Bright Lights, Big City, discussed in Chapter Two. Building on that novel’s
construction of the brat’s role in relation to dying mothers, Chapter Three deals with the
important “Baby ‘M’” case, which, despite involving Biblical-era medical technology,
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was presented as a novel legal situation that refocused arguments about how to define
motherhood, particularly along the double line of a masculinist, postmodern “crisis of
legitimacy” and late-70s, psychoanalytically-informed feminist debates about mothering.
Chapter Four takes up the yuppie and demonstrates how that figure was associated at the
end of the decade with the recently-popularized serial killer, when both were represented
briefly in Hollywood cinema by the “Yuppie Psycho” film. Finally, as a counterpoint to
these objects of knowledge, Kathy Acker in Chapter Five models a literary practice of
“engaged withdrawal.” While postmodernism’s “catastrophic or redemptive” choice
provides only one model for social relations, Acker’s texts move past this, taking up the
interrelated questions of autobiography, of the woman writer, of mothering, and of
women’s history.
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Introduction
Engaging the Eighties: Subjects after Theory

“Any effort to characterize the present cultural moment is very likely to seem quixotic at
best, unprofessional at worst. But that, I submit, is an aspect of the present cultural
moment, in which the social and historical setting of critical activity is a totality felt to be
benign (free, apolitical, serious), uncharacterizable as a whole (it is too complex to be
described in general and tendentious terms) and somehow outside history. Thus it seems
to me that one thing to be tried--out of sheer critical obstinacy--is precisely that kind of
generalization, that kind of political portrayal, that kind of overview condemned by the
present dominant culture to appear inappropriate and doomed from the start.” (Edward
Said, in Foster’s The Anti-Aesthetic, 156)

Before examining specific instances of the intellectual and cultural history of
America during the 1980s, it is necessary to break ground for the political and ethical
stakes of the discussion by defining a few terms. The moment of this project is the 80s,
but since the subject (in both senses) of that decade has a much longer pedigree, the
central problem I grapple with is how I can “engage the eighties,” and what to me are
these 80s other than a play between the generic marker of my own childhood and the
sense that it was also a meaningful period of remarkable growth for others? Forced to set
aside my own relationship with the decade, it is difficult to see a way to state
convincingly that there is some unifying thesis at work--that it would be fair to label the
80s a coherent “period” and not simply a “decade.” If this is the case, then the 80s, like
other decades, may be no more than a collection of stories, among which we may pick
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those that best serve our individual sense of the moment. The problem with a decade of
such recent memory is that efforts to characterize the present or near-present require us
to set it off against other characterizations of what came before and what comes after; we
need a historical point upon which to pivot our analysis, to say that this story belongs to
a period and that one does not. For the 80s, as for other decades, much of this is covered
over by our numerological fascination with the wholeness of the number ten, but in
justifying this we need something more precise to point our finger at and say “here.” In
short, a mark to count as our break.
By our break I have in mind one different from the epistemological break held so
dear by many postmodern theorists, who in the 80s focused on a discontinuity with older
forms and styles variously grouped as modernism. Postmodernism serves as an umbrella
term for what comes after, and the many debates over the proper or improper use of that
word prove not only that it is a fluctuating category, but also that the meaning ascribed to
the break which makes postmodernism possible also has a fluctuating cultural value.
These two questions--has there been a break, and should one feel positively or negatively
about it--recur throughout postmodern theory and, more important, throughout American
culture in the 80s. But, is there a way of conceiving postmodernism that gets outside the
question of positivity or negativity, a way to grapple with the break without reifying it in
terms of this duality?
The figure who offered the most promise for coming to terms with such a problem
in the 80s is Michel Foucault. Reimagining his dormant project of “a history of the
experience of sexuality” (there was an eight year lapse following the 1976 French
publication of The History of Sexuality: An Introduction), Foucault in 19841 repeatedly
Foucault died of AIDS-related complications 25 June 1984; much of the work I discuss was published in
English posthumously. Rabinow and others have commented on the demarcations of the earlier periods of
Foucault’s thought--most notably a transition from structuralist to post-structuralist thought, and I believe
another turn was in evidence at the end of his life.
1
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turns to what he viewed as the key problem for Greco-Roman civilization: epimeleia
heautou in Greek, souci de soi in French, or “care of the self” in English. The process is
as follows: around the concept of the care of the self--an injunction central to one’s own
daily self-management, but also prior to one’s ability to master social relations with
others--springs a whole host of historically differentiated “techniques of the self”
(techniques de soi), which humans use in order to work on their “ethical substance,”
thereby finally transforming themselves and their lives into a “work of art.” The focus
throughout The History of Sexuality, but especially in the second and third volumes (and,
apparently, in the incomplete fourth volume), is on the type of work that one can do in
order to transform one’s form of self-relationship, neatly put in the title of an important
20 January 1984 interview: “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of
Freedom.” Paul Rabinow, one of Foucault’s American supporters, discusses the
complexity of this idea:
the mode of being to which Foucault was committed is captured in his ambiguous
formula “to release oneself from one self” (se déprendre de soi-même). . . .
Foucault is pointing to a certain self-distancing, and he advocated an exercise of
detaching and examining parts that need to be cared for and ultimately repaired or
replaced. Thus, the most adequate (or least inadequate) rendering might well be
“to disassemble the self, oneself”--a phrasing that highlights the material and
relational aspects of this exercise, and introduces a notion of the self as a formgiving practice that operates with and upon heterogeneous parts and forms
available at a given point in history. (xxxviii)
The problematic task of the concern of the self (not for the self) provides the motivation
for Foucault’s reworked project, and is not limited to a purely historical exercise (what
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forms of self-relationship existed in the past?), but rather extends itself as an overarching
philosophical question with implications for the 80s (what kind of progression of forms
between periods is there; what forms have been recently created?)
I would like to share Foucault’s starting point: “the proper task of a history of
thought, as against a history of behaviors or representations[, is] to define the conditions
in which human beings ‘problematize’ what they are, what they do, and the world in
which they live” (The Use of Pleasure 10). This goes much further than daily concerns
such as considering appropriate social behavior, managing one’s bearing, or picking a
career; humans “also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular
being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets
certain stylistic criteria” (Use of Pleasure 10-11). The second and third volumes of The
History of Sexuality are taken up with isolating illustrative moments when humans force
such a reinvention of themselves by creating networks of otherwise apparently
irreconcilable conditions. After finding themselves facing a new problematization of their
existence, the “techniques” that are developed to resolve this problematic then become
part of a civilization’s mode of existence, until a new problematization is broached and
the process repeats. In this, it is important to note that the techniques not only
“resolve,” but also “create” problematizations just as the self operates “with” and “upon”
these techniques. One example to illustrate this process is Foucault’s discussion of the
way Greek culture codified a paradoxical attitude towards sexual conduct by “stylizing”
dietetic regimen. The Greeks “never imagined that pleasure was in itself an evil . . . and
yet their doctors worried over the relationship between sexual activity and health” (Use
of Pleasure 97). So, rather than develop specifically religious or legal injunctions against
certain sexual practices (that is, a proscribed moral response), the Greeks built up around
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this problematization terms relating to “a certain way of caring for one’s body” “more
‘dietetic’ than ‘therapeutic’” (that is, a lived ethical response) (Use of Pleasure 97-98).
This “medical problematization of sexual behavior was accomplished less out of a concern
for eliminating pathological forms than out of a desire to integrate it . . . into the life of the
body” (Use of Pleasure 98). In this example, Foucault shows us a shifting series of
displacements of the problematization onto “techniques of the self” which are in service
to the “care of the self”--we see as a result not codes of living, but styles of living. By
focusing on the integration of these techniques of the self into the self, as opposed to a
strategy of elimination, Foucault stresses the ways in which problematizations are not
simply “problems” to be solved, but rather means by which an experience of “the life of
the body” can be negotiated and renegotiated.
Now, Foucault never writes to fix such moments; instead, “it’s always the relative
beginnings that [he searches] for, more the institutionalizations or the transformations
than the foundings or foundations” (Foucault Live 57). To that effect, one can see
Foucault’s distinct version of a historical work that opposes itself to the search for
representations or behaviors: “problematization doesn’t mean the representation of a preexistent object, nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It’s the
set of discursive or nondiscursive practices that make something enter into the play of the
true and false, and constitutes it as an object for thought” (Foucault Live 456-7). For
Foucault, problematization means both entering the archive to look at the “domain of
acts, practices, and thought” (Ethics 114), discursive and nondiscursive, by which humans
at various times have confronted the question of the truth of their existence, and also to
demonstrate this problematizing moment as neither resolved or resolvable, nor distinct
from other, object-based, kinds of historical work. Following this, Foucault’s
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methodology provides a preliminary point at which to grasp the question I began with:
how to make sense of the recent past, seeing the eighties as distinctly periodized as well
as continuous in history.
My awkward formulation in the last paragraph, “humans at various times,” is
meant in part to conceal one significant problem raised by entering the archive. While
Foucault in his study reconstructs a few centuries of “Greeks” and “Romans” (and
primarily male ones at that),2 I fumble here and elsewhere for the name of my own
subject, trying out such formulations as “the eighties,” “the 80s,” or “the 1980s,”
rejecting “Americans in the 1980s” or “the American Nineteen Eighties.” Likewise, for
Foucault the method of problematization is imbricated in the problem of periodization,
and Foucault must complicate his task by eschewing the notion of a periodizing break.
“One of the most destructive habits of contemporary thought,” he says in an interview
with Gerard Raulet, is “that the moment of the present is considered in history as the
break, the climax, the fulfillment, the return of youth, etc.” (Foucault Live 359).
Addressing the danger in this type of thinking for historical studies of the present,
Foucault also works to rectify other historians’ tendencies to consider past historical
moments as unitary--this generation distinct from that, this movement broken away from
that, these people anticipating those. Foucault enjoys beginning with such commonsense
arguments (e.g., the “repressive hypothesis” or the notion that Greek culture was
homosexual), and especially those arguments which institutionalize a contemporary
zeitgeist along teleological lines, which is another example of the privileging of the
present. “What right does my present have to speak of my past,” asks Roland Barthes
(Roland Barthes 121); Foucault twists the present’s assumed right over the past by
working continuously to turn “this development of a given into a question” (Ethics 118).
2

cf. Diamond and Quinby, and Jardine.
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After examining Foucault’s method of problematization, it seems the case that,
despite disavowing the rupturing break which would set the present apart from the past
and offer a narrative of periods, there is nonetheless a sense of a program in his historical
investigations, especially when the reader is invited to extrapolate from the historical
elements to his or her own “present day actuality” (more on this phrase momentarily).
Foucault predicates his emphasis on ethics and the self on an individual’s prior
constitution as an epistemological subject: “one could not form oneself as an ethical
subject in the use of pleasures without forming oneself at the same time as a subject of
knowledge” (Use of Pleasure 86). Yet, Foucault urges us to get away from the idea of
self-knowledge (and here I wonder how self-knowledge, history, and periodization align)
as a prerequisite for existing successfully:
we have been taught throughout the 20th century that one can do nothing if one
knows nothing about oneself. . . . [T]he important thing is: what is the art of
putting into a work what one does, for being what one is. An art of the self which
would be the complete contrary of oneself. To make of one’s being an object of
art, that’s what is worth the effort. (Foucault Live 318)
As he elaborates the “art of the self” in his later work, Foucault gives primacy to this idea
of an individual ethics artfully programmed around the subject’s initial epistemological
investigations. In “Subjectivity and Truth,” a written summary for a 1980-1981 course at
the Collège de France, which concerns much of the material of The Use of Pleasure,
Foucault more clearly expresses the relationship between a subject’s “techniques of the
self” and his or her epistemological questioning:
In short, it is a matter of placing the imperative to “know oneself” . . . back in the
much broader interrogation that serves as its explicit or implicit context: What
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should one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on the self? How
should one “govern oneself” by performing actions in which one is oneself the
objective of those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the
instrument they employ, and the subject that acts? (Ethics 87)
In this passage, Foucault recenters the philosophical subject into a cultured body, bringing
artistic and technological questions--at heart, questions of style--to bear upon an entire
range of actions, practices, thoughts, speech, and behaviors. If there is always work to do
on the self, if there is always another way of life, then every action, thought, instrument,
etc. is invested with and by the rather serious question: now what should I do? Here we
may begin to see more clearly the programmatic aspects of Foucault’s thought,3 especially
in the inherently transforming function of the techniques used or practiced; they are
“those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular
being” (Use of Pleasure 10). Later in The Use of Pleasure, Foucault notes the GrecoRoman subject’s desire “to make his life into an oeuvre that would endure beyond his
own ephemeral existence” (139), an idea which returns in those striking passages in the
later interviews, characterized by a sort of morose and sublime injunction: “one should
work on one’s suicide all one’s life” (Foucault Live 318). I cite this to demonstrate some
of the ways in which Foucault’s historical project, at once far removed from the American
1980s, nonetheless begins to overlap with similar concerns and anxieties expressed
therein. In particular is the development of theories of postmodernity and the resulting
From this perspective, the idea that these arts of existence come together to form a perfect way of life
seems to suggest a liberatory promise. Yet, Foucault will caution against this; it is not the case that one
can simply pick the “best” technologies of the self in order to achieve the “best” way of life. When an
interviewer talks of “a work of the self on the self that may be understood as a certain liberation, as a
process of liberation,” Foucault is quick to respond, “I would be careful on that score” (Foucault Live 433).
Elsewhere, he points out the same problem as he conceives it in terms of power: “liberation paves the way
for new power relationships, which must be controlled by practices of freedom” (Ethics 283-84).
3
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discussions (and, later, the so-called “culture war”) over the selfsame issues of individual
ethics, governmentality, and bodily use that Foucault discussed in light of the Ancients.
To connect the ways in which Foucault’s project works as a model for my own, I
must start with the claim that the 80s, while not necessarily qualitatively distinct as a
period (that is, not organized around specific totems or taboos, or images or politics
[“objects, behaviors, or representations” in Foucault’s terms]) is yet coherent in its
incoherencies. What binds the diverse theories about this age (collected here under the
rubric “postmodernism”) is that they each reflect a more vocal performance of the kinds
of problematization that Foucault analyzes. I am tempted to call this performance a sort
of meta-problematization, but that characterization seems to me to be too much a part of
those same postmodern theories, to which we could make the same criticism that Fredric
Jameson made of Jean-François Lyotard, that the latter only offers another form of what
he seeks to analyze. I have already illustrated one potentially false reading of Foucault’s
“program” for the period he was writing in--he was not expecting liberation in
problematization. This bears repeating in the context of Foucault’s political activities in
the 80s, but even more so in reference to his contemporaries’ programmatic
(re)structuring of the present (that is, the 80s) as a postmodern age with a newly
dominant style or mode or form.
In a 1983 interview, Foucault stresses that “the question I start off with is: what
are we and what are we today? What is this instant that is ours? Therefore, if you like, it
is a history that starts off from this present day actuality” (Foucault Live 411).
Interestingly, the obvious surface of the “present day actuality” tends to be scrubbed
from Foucault’s texts. For example, Discipline and Punish (1975, translated 1977), as
invested as it is in analyzing something as heady as “a historical ontology of ourselves in
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relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on
others” (Ethics 262), does not once make clear the identical struggle that Foucault was
engaged in during the book’s production, when he helped to form the prison activist
group Groupe d’Information de Prisons (GIP). To any who was aware of Foucault’s
political activities (and inactivities), this connection would be transparent, yet Foucault’s
textual restraint is remarkable, if not remarkably curious. In this, his work manages to
constantly straddle the contemporary and historical; in his texts, that which is now
historically impossible for us to understand (for example, a concept of sexuality not yet
fully moralized, or living in a “confining society” instead of a “control society”) is
doubled by those contemporary concerns he never plainly states (sexuality and AIDS, the
Prison Group struggle).
What is most intriguing is that Foucault does this during a time when so many
others, focused exclusively on the present or the near-present, were near-hysterical in the
public sphere; in the context of a history of the 80s, for example, it is interesting that
Foucault consistently manages to avoid that erstwhile unavoidable word “postmodern,”
even when asked point blank about it. Writing of antiquity, or of the 18th or 19th
centuries, Foucault rarely may have had reason to mention postmodernism or AIDS or
GIP, but the discursive practice around postmodernism, AIDS, or GIP is clearly in line
with what he would call a current problematization of the care of the self; Foucault’s
discussion of an ethical (not moral and not religious) shift in Greek and Roman private life
surely resonates with a shift in contemporary humans’ techniques of the self: while the
details vary, what is important is that we reconceive of the history of an ethics of the self
as process, and not attempt to reconstruct distinct historical subjects, fully-formed and
representative of some earlier principle of telos (with the consequent tact of just searching
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for historical remnants from earlier periods). The fact that Foucault never explicitly says
as much distinguishes him from his contemporaries. Rather than, say, utilize the notion
of the break in order to limn a clear historical period, Foucault insisted on connecting
histories together, and in doing so offered his readers a template for reconceiving their
own relationships to their selves, which also do not follow clear breaks or programs.4 By
telling us that “classical language had a term for designating . . . an ‘attitude’ which was
necessary to the ethics of pleasures[:] enkrateia” (Use of Pleasure 63), Foucault invites
his readers to ask what term contemporary language would use to describe its own
relationship to itself: postmodern, future-proofed, the new wave, transhuman, yuppie flu,
post-futurism, post-humanism, post-feminism?
I began that last list with the most important theoretical idea of the 80s:
postmodernism. But, before proceeding too far along these lines, I should mention the
commonplace about postmodernism--that one really only deals with postmodernisms.
While, as we shall see, postmodernism is a term used in the 60s and 70s (for example, by
author John Barth5 and about architect Robert Venturi6), serious debate really takes off
around 1984, and it is only at the end of that decade and the beginning of the 90s that we
see the dramatic increase in books with “postmodernism” in their titles. This is due both
to follow-on critics capitalizing on the new word’s success and focusing on particular
aspects of postmodernism (Brian McHale, Linda Hutcheon), and also to important
collections of previously published essays (such as Jameson). However, my interest lies
“I do not seek to detect, starting from various signs, the unitary spirit of an epoch, the general form of its
conscience: something like a Weltanschauung” (Foucault Live 35). “I have compounded them, I have
described clusters of relationships” (Foucault Live 36).
5
“Some critics have called this postmodernism, and that seems to me a useful term to describe it, so long
as it’s not a mindless atavism or regression which denies that the first half of the century has happened.
Put like that it sounds like a manifesto, but one invents one’s aesthetic as one goes along to describe what
one’s been doing” (Barth BR35).
6
cf. Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture (1966) and Learning from Las Vegas (1972), although
the word does not appear in these works.
4
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more in the effect of the word “postmodernism” than the cause. For many, the cultural
experience of the 80s is described by postmodernism, and postmodern theorists seem to
tell us about “the way things are”--they describe, observe, demonstrate from cultural
evidence a periodizing theory about the way the present is different from the past.
Postmodernism’s rapid success mediates our experience of the 80s; whether or not is is
“true,” postmodern theory thus forms an object against which one stands, pro or con. In
part due to the fact that much of the more academic postmodern theorizing, focusing on
capitalism (Jameson) or philosophy (Lyotard), make up a truly dense and diffuse set of
rhetorical arguments, the more crucial or timely aspects of culture (e.g., women,
patriarchy, or race) go untheorized in postmodern terms, although postmodernism
ostensibly covers everything. After Foucault, we can suggest that postmodernism’s pride
of place is due in part to what it does not or cannot handle, dealing only with those items
that are recuperable unto itself. So, rather than sort through the various postmodernisms
in an attempt to find a right or wrong one, I will leave it to the reader to consider, when I
use the word postmodern or -ism or -ity, whichever version they may accept as a
substitute for my own. Having said that, for completeness’s sake, the following
paragraph represents some more recognizable postmodern “talking points”:
The two most famous definitions are Jean-François Lyotard’s (“incredulity
toward metanarratives”) and Fredric Jameson’s (“the cultural dominant of the logic of late
capitalism”), although this may be due to the strikingly composed nature of their texts.
See also the way that Jameson reformulates his personal critical reading list in a sort of
semiotic square of the break included in his Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of
Late Capitalism (61). Discussing Lyotard, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Jencks, Tom
Wolfe, Manfredo Tafuri, and Hilton Kramer, Jameson categorizes them along three
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valences: anti-modernist/pro-modernist, anti-postmodernist/pro-postmodernist, and
progressive/reactionary (for example, Habermas is progressively pro-modernist and antipostmodernist). See also David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity, a strange
cousin to Jameson’s text which claims that postmodernism is related to “the emergence of
new dominant ways in which we experience space and time.” Another important
collection of names is found in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture,
edited by Hal Foster, with contributions by Jameson, Jean Baudrillard, Craig Owens, and
Edward Said among others; we read there Jürgen Habermas’ important claim (shared
somewhat by Marxist Alex Callinicos) that modernity is an incomplete project, and that
instead of giving up on it, we should learn from postmodern theory’s mistakes. On the
other side of this argument (that there has not been a break with modernity), are those
such as Ihab Hassan, whose The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern
Literature first gave us that famous list of differences between modernism and
postmodernism (purpose/play, design/chance, hierarchy/anarchy, etc.), and Andreas
Huyssen, whose After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism
wonderfully romanticizes by its title the claim that postmodernism basically attempts to
negotiate high art with mass culture. Two more categories of postmodern critics: those
concerned with the novel and readings of postmodernism in literature (Linda Hutcheon
and Brian McHale), and those concerned with the scene: Jean Baudrillard and Arthur
Kroker exemplify the more hyperbolic practices of this postmodern thinking; one might
defend them by claiming that they practice what they preach. And, as a final name drop,
Meaghan Morris’s The Pirate’s Fiancée: Feminism, Reading, Postmodernism.7

And, as a final footnote, I have left out all those anthologizing critics, who practice a more editorial,
although no less important, function: e.g., Steven Best, Douglas Kellner, Linda Nicholson, E. Ann
Kaplan, Jonathan Arac, and Steven Connor.
7

14
To segue onwards to what postmodernism as a periodizing hypothesis might
mean, I want to offer in Foucault another genealogy and an alternate method for
attempting to periodize the 80s. Rather than propose for the 80s a new list of
postmodern “techniques of the self” or a new mode of subjectivity, I want to investigate
what I have been suggesting is the 80’s own central problematization--the larger question
of postmodernism’s periodizing hypothesis. To get to this, I want to borrow Foucault’s
phrase “objects of knowledge,” by which he refers to figures that “were privileged objects
of knowledge, which were also targets and anchorage points for the ventures of
knowledge” (History 105). Foucault has in mind four figures central to his study of
sexuality: “the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the
perverse adult” (History 105). I want to adopt the same methodological approach for the
80s, and, investigating not sex but postmodernism’s problematization, focus in Chapters
Two through Four upon three objects of knowledge of the American 80s: the brat, the
surrogate mother, and the yuppie. While this discussion of Foucault may seem outside of
the primary theoretical landscape of the postmodern 80s (dominated as it initially was by
critics such as Jameson, Lyotard, and Habermas), it is my position that postmodernism’s
periodizing hypothesis, founded on the notion of the break, specifically involves the
subject’s ethical relationship with history, which Foucault allows us to get to. The figure
of the brat and the Brat Pack in Chapter Two focus on constructions of childhood and
maternity; Jay McInerney’s best-selling novel Bright Lights, Big City in particular
captures the brat’s matrophobic angst as he attempts to reinvent himself in 80s New
York City. The surrogate mother and the father who hires her in Chapter Three
dramatize the logic of paternity; the case of “Baby M” and the resulting legal maneuvers
and media spectacle dulled America’s sense of maternity by means of a legal fiction. And
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finally, the uneven strategies of wealth and gender become apparent in the rise of the
yuppie discussed in Chapter Four; the obverse of this is then expressed in popular films
and novels like Blue Steel and American Psycho, which seek to contain an earlier
excitement over wealth by contaminating the yuppie with the figure of the psycho killer.
Now, initially these objects of knowledge are a bit of an organizing fiction (and the
particular examples more popular than literary), yet for this reason I hope to show how
each demonstrates, in their own fictionality, the periodizing problem of the 80s. By
focusing on what is left out, or what cannot be spoken about the social types generated
by and in a periodizing of the present, each of the chapters will undermine the
persuasivity of ostensibly liberating postmodern subjectivity by highlighting the
unspoken refusals necessary to create these new objects of knowledge or new social
types.8 For example, Jay McInerney’s novel Bright Lights, Big City, which I examine in
Chapter Two, continually performs a willed ignorance to what is the protagonist’s central
trauma--the refusal to speak of mother loss and consequent matrophobia. Likewise, the
court opinino in the Baby M case in Chapter Three has a difficult time speaking the other
mother, Elizabeth Stern, who is doubly excluded by her husband and her gestational
counterpart, the surrogate mother Mary Beth Whitehead. And the unraveling of the
Yuppie success story discussed in Chapter Four avoids associating the yuppie’s power
with anything other than money, going to lengths to set aside the crucial gender relations
at play. So, while each of these objects of knowledge is flawed in its representation of an
actual, lived, sense of 80s subjectivity, as stereotypes, or public expressions of general
characteristics and trends, what each leaves out or works to minimize can provide us with

And we should mention here that some of these fictions are truly new to the 80s; for example the legal
invention of surrogacy allows some women access to the myths of motherhood, or the increase in financial
instruments allows Baby Boomers to pursue the myth of the American Dream on Wall Street.
8
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clues to the kinds of concerns and anxieties at work during this period.

9

Chapters One and Five, then, bracket our stereotypical objects of knowledge by
examining the cultural effects that the transmission of these narratives may have. To
begin to explain, let me cite Jean-François Lyotard: “Eclecticism is the degree zero of
contemporary culture; you listen to reggae; you watch a western; you eat McDonald’s at
midday and local cuisine at night; you wear Paris perfume in Tokyo and dress retro in
Hong Kong; knowledge is the stuff of TV game shows” (Postmodern Explained 8). While
Lyotard’s 1988 description of the eclectic subject has certainly been borne out by later
90s Generation X fiction and today’s technologically-prompted proliferation of global
commerce (trafficking itself as “multiculturalism”--could Lyotard have expected “fusion
cuisine” or the occasionally ridiculous “fashion forward” dressers of today’s magazines?),
there is a counterpart to the eclecticism of culture, and that is the degree zero of
eclecticism itself. By way of explanation I will turn to the American cinema, which in the
60s was absorbed by archetypes, in the 70s was intent on revising and destroying these
same myths, and in the 80s finds itself intrigued by the iconographic remnants of our
older styles. Most clearly, the forebears of later Gen X slackers’ world-weary style is on
display in science fiction films such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) or literature
such as Thomas Pynchon’s Vineland (1990). But to signal this catholic heterogeneity,
80s cinema also performs the obverse: we often see eclecticism reduced to its singularities.
Walter Hill’s New York gang film The Warriors (1979) exemplifies this. Each of the 50 or
so gangs featured in the film dress in a highly particular style, each member wearing
matching uniforms, makeup, and weapons. There is a cowboy-themed gang, a hip-hop
gang, a mime gang, a Black Panthers-style gang, a baseball gang, and so forth. The
Another point to mention here is that narratives around these objects of knowledge not coincidentally
revolve around family types, and especially maternal relations, providing an additional comparison between
these examples.
9
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Warriors gang does battle with each, and so while overall the film demonstrates a certain
visual eclecticism, its narrative nonetheless proceeds by means of a proud anxiety over
maintaining individualized group identity and keeping other styles at bay. We see this
repeated throughout 80s cinema, which can be read at a visual level as eclectic, but rather
often thematically reinforces one stylistic dimension at the expense of others.
Key examples of this are found in the films of John Hughes, which often take
place in or around high schools. Hughes uses teenagers to draw attention to the
postmodern failures of their parents and teachers, and his exclusive subject in the first half
of the decade--the suburban teenager with dysfunctional family--is evocative of a youth
culture dealing with yuppiedom. In films like Sixteen Candles (1984), The Breakfast Club
(1985), Pretty in Pink (1986),10 and Ferris Bueller’s Day Off (1986), adolescents enter a
complicated world not their own, whose contradictions and depthlessness they must
navigate. Hughes’s staging of such paradigms of adolescence expresses for adult filmgoers
both anxiety over their own moral failures as self-absorbed yuppies, as well as the
disruption of the social order by postmodern youth, wildly bent on a pastiched form of
rebellion redolent of 1950s culture, yet misplaced onto an otherwise tame suburban
landscape. In particular, his films The Breakfast Club and Ferris Bueller’s Day Off
perform a similar fracturing of contemporary eclecticism by positioning characters in
opposition to each other based on rigidly defined iconographies.
At its heart, postmodernism loves types, and Hughes obliges. The Breakfast Club
centers around students from each of five recognizable high school social groups--“a brain,
an athlete, a basket case, a princess, and a criminal”11--who are stuck together in Saturday
morning detention and must overcome their natural distaste for each other in order to have
10
11

Hughes’s protégé Howard Deutch directed this film, while Hughes wrote and produced.
Or, as the movie’s poster put it, “a brain, a beauty, a jock, a rebel, and a recluse.”
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a good time and to learn something about each other and themselves. Structured around
the principal’s requirement that they write an essay on “who you think you are” (a
voiceover reading of which begins and concludes the film), The Breakfast Club shows the
teens coming to the realization that they are less different than they imagined, that instead
they were brainwashed by the principal and the structure of high school to think of
themselves as representative of these rigidly defined stereotypical roles. As an indication
of the truth of this discovery, various of the characters pair off romantically and make
promises to be friends next Monday in the school’s hallways. This egalitarian fantasy of
high school life, generated by the student’s consciousness-raising detention period, is
highly appealing to each of the teens. Hughes later film Ferris Bueller’s Day Off offers a
more iconoclastic version of this basic setup. Shermer High School senior Ferris Bueller
(Matthew Broderick) fakes an illness in order to skip school and enjoy his day off in
Chicago with his best friend and his girlfriend. The villainous Dean of Students, Edward
R. Rooney, is out to catch the clever Bueller, who is undermining Rooney’s disciplinary
hold over the student body. The problem, though, is explained to Rooney by his
dimwitted secretary Grace, who notes Bueller’s popularity: “the sportos, the
motorheads, geeks, sluts, bloods, wastoids, dweebies, dickheads; they all adore him.”
This humorous list serves two purposes; first Grace points out how out-of-touch the
authoritarian Rooney is, (Hughes used this strategy earlier, the secretary’s role played in
The Breakfast Club by the omniscient janitor Carl), and second the list extends The
Breakfast Club’s quintet of eclecticism into quite bizarre territory--who exactly are the
“dickheads” and how do they get along with the “bloods”? One can only assume that
these social groups are recognizable to the cognoscenti (like Bueller), and that Shermer
High School’s stylistic options are becoming increasingly heterogeneous and complex
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(consider that the earlier The Breakfast Club was also set in the fictional Shermer High
School).
When we later juxtapose these popular manifestations of postmodernism with
male postmodern theorists such as Jameson, Lyotard, and Baudrillard (discussed in
Chapter One), we find that the 80s is especially open to a form of subject constitution
based upon a surface/depth model that ostensibly liberates individual subjects by first
reducing them to social types. Hughes’ teen films share with adult films such as Wall
Street (dir. Oliver Stone, 1987) and The Bonfire of the Vanities (dir. Brian DePalma,
1990) (set not in school cafeterias, but in boardrooms and courtrooms) the problem of
successfully navigating through an extremely fragmented social sphere by means of
imitation, while simultaneously retaining and developing a healthy individual self. Who
could heroically solve the problem posed by increasingly distanced and codified social
groups? The Breakfast Club, for example, gets around this by finding common ground for
all in a shared teen experience, while Ferris Bueller becomes, through his precocity and
awareness of the shortcomings of parents, a transversal figure, able to cut across multiple
social arrangements.12 The unsuccessful example of this navigation is Sherman McCoy in
Tom Wolfe’s The Bonfire of the Vanities (1987), a novel which also figures the 80s as
specifically a problem of urban sociability. As the Yuppie says to the New York Times
Editor, quoting Woody Allen: “I love being reduced to a cultural stereotype” (Holtzman
E20). Haynes Johnson, in his study of the Reagan era, Sleepwalking Through History,
likewise uses the yuppie as an example to comment that “the American penchant for
pop-culture definitions to characterize groups of citizens became a feature of the eighties”
(124). In Fear of Falling (1989), Barbara Ehrenreich, in a statement that could be applied
Otto from Alex Cox’s Repo Man (1984) is also key in this respect, as is Mookie in Spike Lee’s Do the
Right Thing (1989). These two films deserve to be examined more thoroughly alongside Hughes’s Brat
Pack cinema.
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directly to The Breakfast Club, quotes a U.S. News and World Report sidebar on
“Beatniks, Preppies, and Punkers: The Love Affair with Labels” to demonstrate how “in
the mass media, class often appeared to be a way of life, even a set of options adding
color and texture to an otherwise increasingly homogenous America” (201). This sense of
homogenization, and the middle class fear of falling, suggest more than ever that individual
“color and texture”--style--is a survival strategy as much as an aesthetic. This kind of
role-taking subjectivity and the faddish fascination with cultural types leads to problems
in terms of periodization, and especially postmodern theories’ formulations of the new
subject.
What many of the postmodern theorists I discuss in Chapter One fail to consider
is the vibrant ways in which cultural and media productions of our objects of knowledge
fall apart in the face of lived experience. The stratification of individuality (the “love
affair with labels”) is partly a result of what Ehrenreich “fear of falling,” but it is also a
product of theoretical statements about postmodernism. It would be easy to say that
periodizing statements made in the 80s do not accurately reflect life, but go some way
towards creating the world they describe--but this statement too is caught up in
postmodern practice, especially a Lacanian or linguistic notion of subject formation.
Rather, each of these constructions, these models of behavior or objects of knowledge, are
similar to postmodern theorists’ practice. If postmodernism is perceived as a stylistic
way of approaching the world, likewise our objects of knowledge need to be examined as
strategies and not particular subject types. The problem is how to conceive of
subjectivity in a world characterized by postmodernism, or rather by the necessity of
adopting a stance to postmodern theory’s increasingly hegemonic role in cultural analysis.
Gilles Deleuze expresses the negative side of this in a 1990 conversation with Toni Negri:
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“What we most lack is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, it’s been taken
from us” (Deleuze, Negotiations176). Fredric Jameson adds to this feeling, beginning his
study of postmodernism by noticing “an inverted millenarianism in which premonitions
of the future, catastrophic or redemptive, have been replaced by senses of the end of this
or that” (Postmodernism 1). The two poles of the catastrophic and redemptive run
through postmodern theorizing, but it seems to me that whether a critic is hesitant about
or embracing of postmodernism, this distinction ultimately closes off, for the 80s subject,
the potential to approach postmodernism without already being interpellated by it.
In Chapter One I want to show how a postmodernist conception of a break with
history constructs not specific political or economic or cultural conditions, but rather
political, economic, or cultural “styles” that exaggerate a discontinuity with their
predecessors. It is under this label of a style that postmodernism puts forth, in
Foucault’s terms, the clearest indicators of a suggested, programmed technique of self.
Postmodernist style is paradoxically at odds with itself; contributing an ostensibly
liberating narrative of subjectivity, postmodernism nonetheless simultaneously tends to
conservative effects. Against a narrative of postmodernity is Foucault’s version of prior
civilizations’ self ethics. I propose that the 80s, if it may successfully be periodized, can
be so in light of responses to the dominant ideology of postmodernism. What Foucault
remarked about the Ancient’s concern with the care of the self (their ethics of self) is
made even more relevant by postmodern strategies of heterogeneity and complexity.
That is, in light of such postmodern pronouncements as the “death of the subject,” the
“end of history,” a “waning of affect,” or a “crisis in legitimation,” the relation between an
individual’s epistemological self and his or her ethical self is even more fraught. This
anxiety is demonstrated most by theorizations of the historical break and specific
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considerations of the threat of past and future breaks: on the one hand, Hiroshima and
Auschwitz, on the other, Raymond Williams’ “Plan X” and Nuclear Criticism.
In order to discuss this problematization between the subject and knowledge, I
will in Chapter Five introduce the term “engaged withdrawal,” which I hope to propose
as a third possibility against the catastrophic or redemptive readings of postmodern
periodization, and especially the constitution of the notion of the break, which seems to
me to be the key sticking point for this conception of the 80s. Allow me to place the
latter part of the term in abeyance until then, and begin simply with a few remarks on
“engagement,” which addresses the ethical self in the 1980s. By “engagement” I mean the
question of the individual’s concern regarding an axis between the self and the socius.
Foucault explains this by opposing his form of political activity against Jean-Paul
Sartre’s. Foucault attacks in 1979 Sartre’s idea of the “committed intellectual” by
proposing “experience with . . . rather than engagement in . . .” (Ethics xix, ellipses in
original). The practice of engagement, as Foucault reads Sartre, becomes a problem when
the morality of actions supersedes their ethics. It is, in a sense, for Foucault better to be
than to do, and so by “engagement” I do not mean Sartre’s committed intellectual (with
his littérature engagée), but rather the forms and practices of one’s daily experiences in
their engagement with the quotidian. It is, after all, these practices and choices which
demonstrate one’s ethics of the self. Being aware of our forms of engagement or
withdrawal allows these choices to be separated from politics, which is another way of
reconceiving the individual as a node in a larger power network. While Foucault makes it
clear that concern with the care of the self inevitably precedes concern with the care of
others, “engagement” is a limit point for precisely that expression of the social field--the

23
success or failure in the use of one’s “techniques of the self” in relation to others. And
13

this is where postmodernism comes into play. According to many postmodern theorists,
the 80s were in particular a period of disengagement, indicated by a waning or flattening
of affect not unlike schizophrenia (Jameson), an inability to productively think
historically (Lyotard), or a type of expansion of hyperreal simulations (Baudrillard). On
the other hand, artistic works of high modernism that conflated high and low culture made
possible for the 80s an arguably wider range of socially acceptable behaviors, activities,
and styles. Descriptions of theoretical postmodernism, by grouping heterogeneity under
a new marker of style (even when set off as a historical development), deal insistently
with a paradoxical turn between proscription and permissiveness; while a postmodern
world, with its supposedly radical unloosening of a firm conception of the humanist
subject, is arguably a more accessible one for different, previously marginalized groups or
peoples (or, even, styles), ultimately this postmodern freedom turns on itself by a
conservatizing effect. There have, however, been ways of dealing with postmodernism
that are neither catastrophic nor redemptive, neither enthusiastic of nor dismissive of
culture, and this strategy I term engaged withdrawal. Kathy Acker, who I examine in
Chapter Five, in particular provides a model of this kind of thinking outside of binaries.
We can see how postmodernism manages to be the most obvious discursive
expression of the play between self-awareness and self-engagement in the 80s.
Deciphering the nondiscursive aspects of postmodernism is what initial postmodern
theorizing is about; rather than offer a contrary critique of what postmodernism means, I
will confine myself to the production and use of the word postmodernism by some

This prompts a simpler definition: engagement is the use or apparent use of one’s “techniques of the
self” in relation to others (which is to say, to the socius).
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dominant critics such as Fredric Jameson and Jean-François Lyotard, who reveal the
14

particularly rich negotiations of postmodernism and periodization (in a sense, the writing
of contemporary history--a tautology on one hand and a model on the other). For better
or for worse, disentangling a genealogy of the 1980s from a genealogy of theoretical
postmodernism is a central problem. The obviousness of the claim of those who who
take postmodernism as a given tends to obscures postmodernism’s discursivity; whether
it truly is or not, postmodernism presents itself (is presented) as the dominant strategy of
the 80s, although it is in fact (as nearly everyone also admits) simply one form or style or
logic. If postmodernism, whose boom occurs in the 80s, reigned as that decade’s
controlling theory, we must ask in what “speech from the present” can such an argument
be made? In other words, even if postmodernism were necessarily the “cultural logic” or
“dominant,” how can one distinguish between the rhetorical (with concomitant political,
social, and economic) strategies and the thing itself?

It is my intuitive sense that these two men are “dominant” critics of postmodernism, although I certainly
make that claim with the understanding that calling them “dominant” need not be read as calling them
“most successful,” or “coherent,” or “correct,” etc. A survey of “postmodern anthologies” of the sort
intended for undergraduate classroom use or introductory surveys tends to support my claim.
14
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Chapter One
Beginning from Ends: Postmodernism and Periodization
(Jameson/Lyotard/Coupure)

“Who are we in the present, what is this fragile moment from which we can’t detach our
identity and which will carry that identity away with itself?” (Foucault, Ethics xviii, 1979)15
“Oh, has the world changed or have I changed?” (Smiths, “The Queen is Dead,”1986)

I anxiously began the introduction by invoking a dilemma over a period versus a
decade, whose “bigger picture” elides the question of specificity. The “bigger picture” for
a study like this refers of course to those other decades not covered, and so brings to mind
a whole host of similarities and differences with the past: the 1980s are like the 1920s in
that they both featured an uncharacteristic display of wealth in the face of national
poverty (and had similar crashes on Wall Street); the 80s are unlike the 50s in that they
express differing attitudes about work or political activity. But these distinctions fall
quickly into generalities, upset by any number of counterexamples. One popular way of
distinguishing decades is to focus on technological or historical inventions, which stand in
as physical (spatial) representations for larger, more amorphous philosophical (timely)
changes. To mark the beginning of the 80s, for example, we may point to Ronald
Reagan’s inauguration (1980), the introduction of MTV (1981), the first space shuttle
mission (1981), IBM’s personal computer (1981), the VCR “format wars” and studio
court battles (early 80s), or AIDS (1981-82). And, if decades can ever be said to
properly end (rather than merely be replaced by a new one) we can mark the end of the
80s by such historical facts as the Wall Street crash (1987), the fall of the Berlin Wall
15

From “Pour une morale de l’inconfort,” his review of Jean Daniel’s The Era of Ruptures.
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(1989) and the Tiananmen Square protests (1989), or Clinton’s election (1992). We
would end up with a historical dating of something like 1982-1992 (American politics), or
1978 to 1989 (international politics) or, with unusual (and humorous) specificity,
Newsweek’s calculation (economics) of “six years, 11 months, and 15 days,” running
from Election Day 4 November 1980 to the Dow collapse of 19 October 1987 (Barol
41). Between these covers are a series of micro-expressions which encapsulate the
decade: Miami Vice (1984-89), “crack babies” (1984), the word “cyberpunk” (1983) or
DJ (1984), power dressing (1980), “future-proofing” (1983, cf. “planned obsolescence”),
and pop-n-locking (early 1980s). At this level of specificity, it seems that some event
has happened to enable us to imagine such a diverse group of fashions, newspaper
headlines, inventions, and stylistic freedom as representing a more coherent time. But,
again, how to extrapolate from these diverse instances an overarching style, or network, or
thesis?
Instead of polemicizing an alternative break against which to construct a more
coherent “Eighties,” I want to offer a period piece of historical thought: what sense can
we make of the recent past (and the recent past’s attempts to make sense of its own
present) while seeing that past as both distinctly periodized (“the eighties”) as well as
continuous with its immediate predecessors and followers (“the late twentieth century”
or “postwar America”)? In partial answer, one anti-argument is that the 80s does not
offer a new subject, does not mark a break with the past, that instead the 80s fails to
cohere along some new schema. But then this is also the interesting part: in its
retrospective incoherence (characterized by the incompatibility of all of the proposed 80s
themes with each other) it is possible to read the 80s instead as a bridging moment, a
smidge of throwaway culture to serve as downtime between the liberal fantasy of a post-
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68 promise of “freedom” and a present-day crisis on the left over squandered advances
(provoked by, and discussed as, a neoconservative revival, a return to the politics of the
80s). This “bridging moment” oscillates between a discursive conception of the 80s as a
time of unbridled substance--of material fluidity and abundance--and a contrasting notion
of the 80s as historical ephemera--as superficial and trashy. Not necessarily invented in
the American Eighties, but certainly best expressed during that decade, two competing
conceptions of the worth of the excessive material aspects of culture provoke a problem
that fits the older dilemma of subjectivity into the newer dilemma of activity. Expressed
otherwise, a question of ethics which is also a question of style: “what am I supposed to
be doing, and in what way should I do it?” If we can trace a shift from epistemology to
ontology during the 20th century, we can see in the 80s further evidence of a move
onward from ontology to ethics. The Eighties, then, as shorthand for a sampling of the
late twentieth century; a decade of much material substance, but of little perceived worth,
a decade which acts as if it were already resolved, and which in that act expresses a basic
underlying anxiety (to reenvision Candide’s decision): among all new possible styles or
modes, which to adopt today? Or (to quote Ihab Hassan), how to answer “the cry
around the world: ‘Who are we? Who am I?’” (“From Postmodernism” 6).16
To consider the asking of that question some two decades ago both privileges our
historical distance at the same time as it reveals the limitations of that distance; if this
were truly a period piece, it would likely be full of fiery rhetoric and more than its share
of what art critic Peter Schjeldahl recently called “the roaring spirit of a time that, after
the depressive seventies, had rediscovered the bliss of art, fashion, tremendous amounts
of money in rapid circulation, and other forms of concerted indulgence” (101). This
Questions like these of course rely on many non-80s sources, particularly Lacanian and feminist notions
of subjectivity, especially the mutability of identity. Judith Butler, for one, but also Gilles Deleuze.
16
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“concerted indulgence” strikes me as a particularly keen way of explaining the
construction of the time; we see an embarrassment in these kinds of more recent
reimaginings of the 80s prompted by the twentieth or twenty-fifth anniversaries of this or
that event. The indulgence--excessive, wealthy, fashionable--is in hindsight made worse
by the supposed shameful and guilty conspiracy with which it was executed--could we
really have been like that? But, as I think Schjeldahl points out, such a feeling may have
even then in part guided the “spirit of a time.” Whether or not one is enthusiastic (or
participatory in) these “concerted indulgences,” they do mark a clear example of what we
can call an increased sense of “presentness” in the eighties--a sense of the significance of
the contemporary or the recognition of the present-as-historical. After all, defenders and
detractors of popular culture alike can agree to a claim that today is unlike any other;
Christopher Lasch notes in 1979 that “to live for the moment is the prevailing passion. . .
. We are fast losing the sense of historical continuity” (4). It is this historical play--the
instant when the present moment becomes historically defined as past event--that returns
us to the central problem of periodization and re/imagining history.
The problem of periodization for the 80s is contained entirely by the use of the
word “postmodernism.” Postmodern theorists are dependent to some degree upon
formulating the loss of historical continuity which many of them simultaneously lament.
In this chapter, which focuses on the ethically debilitating effects of the prefix in the word
postmodernism, we see an alternation in the 80s between optimism and pessimism as
regards the contemporary landscape. In periodizing the present (and occasionally the
near future), postmodernism raises an ethical problem for our later objects of knowledge;
by emphasizing discontinuity and the break, it unmoors the subject’s access to history
and memory.

29
I. Origin Stories, Birth Narratives
The success story of the word postmodernism demands to be written, no doubt in
best-seller format; such lexical neoevents, in which the coinage of a neologism has
all the reality impact of a corporate merger, are among the novelties of media
society. . . . Why we needed the word postmodernism so long without knowing
it, why a truly motley crew of strange bedfellows ran to embrace it the moment it
appeared, are mysteries. (Jameson, Postmodernism xiii)

The mystery Fredric Jameson bemusedly poses in the introduction to his central
text of postmodernism, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, is in
guise another formulation of the question “how to periodize?” The introduction, written
in 1990 (the title essay initially appeared in New Left Review in 1984), reimagines the
decade in order to conceive how a single word could so rapidly achieve a level of success
in both intellectual and popular discourse. While Jameson’s book (itself a success, if not
a best-seller) is aimed squarely at academic audiences, presumably the populist “success
story” of the word could likely tell us just as much about the 80s as the theoretical
narrative does, notwithstanding (or perhaps due to), say, Ihab Hassan’s disapproving
take on the word’s success: “in any case, we can hardly imagine any other epoch
agonizing so much about itself, only to devise so clunky a moniker, so awkward a name as
postmodernism” (“From Postmodernism” 6). Postmodernism, often defined as a radical
breaking apart of traditional narrative structures, not-so-ironically ends up becoming the
central metanarrative for highbrow historical readings of the 80s in America; Jameson’s
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book is certainly required in that respect. While Jameson was neither the first nor the
17

last person to use the term “postmodernism,” his contribution was a particularly
electrifying one, bringing together as it did a number of otherwise fragmented discourses
(such as architecture, economics, and video art). As he puts it, perhaps the word was so
popular because it “seems to have been able to welcome in the appropriate areas of daily
life or the quotidian” (Postmodernism xiv). But, as Jameson suggests about his and
others’ versions of postmodernism, this metanarrative which intends to break apart
narratives had as a result a peculiarly promiscuous entrance. We (and here Jameson
unites us) needed this word to explain ourselves, but when we (and here Jameson divides
us) showed up to embrace it, the party turned out to be a rather mixed and mysterious
affair.
What is interesting about Jameson’s comment on the word postmodernism is that
it elides some of the issues of periodization that he will deal with, and also starts to show
how, for the 80s, heterogeneity can become the new homogeneity. In Philip Roth’s The
Counterlife (1986), Nathan Zuckerman longingly thinks of “America . . . where people
claim and disown ‘identities’ as easily as they slap on bumper stickers” (308). What
interests me most about postmodernism is that very sense of mutability, Jameson’s
kinky bedfellows each finding in the word postmodernism an object of/for affection. By
acting as a banner under which a number of differing theoretical positions can rally,
postmodernism has a theoretical imprecision (really, a failure of consensus) which
accordingly makes the term useful for popular or mass cultural representations of the
times. We can up the ante; not only is postmodern theory the dominant strategy of the
If book jacket blurbs count: “an encyclopedic grasp of modern culture” (Stuart Hall), “a timely riposte to
fashionable leftist pessimism” (Terry Eagleton), “a classic of late 20th-century Euroamerican critical
thought” (Ned Lukacher), “a fundamental, nonpareil text [of] not just the cultural but the political and
social implications of postmodernism” (Gilbert Adair).
17
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80s, but the word “postmodernism” itself affected the cultural landscape of the 80s more
than any other word, and more than any other idea (and, by extension, even more so than
the actual idea of the postmodern). When postmodernism, something that a few French
and Germans and Marxists argue about in highly philosophical language, appears in
Newsweek magazine,18 then we have a clear example of the impossibility of controlling
the embrace of Jameson’s strange bedfellows. What I mean to suggest by this is that
beyond the specific differences between individual, discursive articulations of
“postmodern theory,” there is a larger cultural articulation of “postmodernism” as an
umbrella term to describe strategies (discursive and nondiscursive) that create in the 80s
the self-aware sense of living in a new age. To imagine oneself in the 80s as a postmodern
subject requires a sense of difference and novelty (for both academic critics as well as
middlebrow individuals), and results in the assumption of a confused style which would
allow the strange bedfellows of history to lie down together.
To take a specific example, Todd Gitlin examines car commercials in Watching
Television (1986) in an effort to determine how much interplay there is between the
material examples of cultural events, critical commentary on the contemporary moment
and its anticipation of the future, and a society’s own awareness of itself. He asks,
borrowing Raymond Williams’s term, “are we in the presence of a clear-cut ‘structure of
feeling’ . . . that forecasts the common future as it colors the common experience of a
society just at or beneath the threshold of awareness?” (159). This problem is especially
evoked in car commercials and television shows like Miami Vice, which “suggest that the
highest destiny of our time is to become cleansed of depth and specificity altogether”
(139). Yet, it is not as simple as suggesting that car commercials lead to postmodernism
On six occasions in 1984 alone. Lance Olsen informs us that in “1980 21 articles appeared in major
American newspapers . . . that used the word ‘postmodern.’ In 1984 there were 116. In 1987 there were
287” (qtd. in Bertens The Idea of the Postmodern 12).
18
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or that postmodernism leads to car commercials. One problem I want to adopt from
Gitlin is “to understand what relation there is, if any, between the stylized blankness
growing in the culture and the actual state of feeling in American society today” (159).
Unwilling to believe that “the emphasis on surface; the blankness of the protagonist;
[and] his striving toward self-sufficiency to the point of displacement from the
recognizable world” (139) are characteristic of the lived experience of most Americans in
the 80s, Gitlin suggests that postmodern qualities like blankness are more of a coping
mechanism to handle contradictions created by the sixties, “a way of managing
contradictions by pretending we don’t care” (160). Whether this is true or not, at the
least “there is something revealing and disturbing in a culture many of whose most serious
talents propose to cast away feeling, to confine themselves to the surface, to beg
questions of purpose and authenticity” (160).
So, distinct from any academic discussion of the theoretical implications of
postmodernism would be a consideration of the problematization of a subject’s identity
that the word postmodernism provoked--whose postmodernism is this, and what
postmodernism is whose? In the gap between the epistemological injunction (know
thyself) and the ethical injunction (be thyself, but properly), the word postmodernism
provides a screen (or, for Jameson, a sheet?) upon which to perform and to judge that
performance. What could it mean to imagine oneself as a postmodern, or to think that one
could be or already has been “turned” postmodern, or that one lives, willy-nilly, in a new
postmodern environment which one must adapt to; these are the sorts of questions of
effect which critics like Jameson tend to avoid. Yet, these are the questions that best
characterize an 80s sense of engagement and the problem of imagining the present as a
newly definable, slightly futuristic time. Connecting the various threads of the
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postmodern critique I will discuss below--etymological narratives and the recourse to or
lack of a historical record, anxiety or paranoia over missing or misunderstanding the
significance of history or of the concept of the modern, the interlacing of contemporary
fashion and theory--is the problem of who “we” were yesterday, and what might make us
different today. Or, for a popular audience, to learn that we are different today requires
one to consider how and why we were different yesterday. For the average academic, the
“postmodernism” that Jameson limns is surely not the same “postmodernism” on display
on Late Night with David Letterman (1982-1993) or Saturday Night Live (1975-present);
however, for the average American, these two may seem indistinguishable. This is
noticeable in those proposals for ever newer, derisively labeled “posties”--postfuturism,
postfeminism, posthumanism, postcapitalism, post-Enlightenment, post-history, postmemory. While these later responses to the first post- of modernism indicate a
possibility for self-renewal and invention, the suddenness with which so many were
ready to give up on or give away history is troubling.
Rethinking the word postmodernism as a commodity with various user groups
draws attention to the fact that it can be simultaneously liberating and conservatizing; as
Linda Hutcheon points out, it is not unlike “writing sous rature: it makes you want to
have your historical referent and erase it too” (Poetics 145). I believe that we have an
example in the success of the word postmodernism of theory provoking culture.
Specifically, in the 1980s the historical reinvention of the word postmodernism (it is
indeed not, as Jameson claimed, a neologism), the theorizing of the break or coupure, and
the cultured stylization of philosophical postmodernism all belie the polemical arguments
made on behalf of the postmodern condition, both those popularized, ostensibly
liberating arguments about stylistic freedom, as well as the more academic, conservatizing
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ones about waning of affect or loss of history. To take but a few examples which give the
lie to postmodernist claims of a new kind of historical deafness or refusal of history, we
can consider novels such as Toni Morrison’s Beloved (1986), Susan Daitch’s L.C. (1986),
and Art Spiegelman’s Maus (1986, 1991). Each of these texts is commonly labeled
postmodernist, and indeed Maus and Beloved are even held up as exemplary in this
respect. Each is built upon a direct interrogation of the problem of rectifying theoretical
postmodernism’s claims about the inaccessibility of History with the author’s own
personal history or histories. These novels can be categorized as postmodern because
they experiment formally with tone and genre--Maus mixing high and low culture (and
forms), Beloved utilizing the ghost/gothic genre, L.C. a Nabokovian series of manuscripts-but ultimately the postmodern label fails in that there is not the least trace of ironic
distance to history, playful boredom, or flattened, affectless tone. Those strategies may
be possible with other people’s histories, but L.C., Maus, Beloved (and others like
Theresa Hak Kyung Cha’s Dictee [1982] and Maxine Hong Kingston’s Tripmaster
Monkey: His Fake Book [1989]) each must come back to their own characters’ central
historical tragedy in a manner that precludes the supposed distancing effect.
Conceiving postmodernism as both a confusion of the personal with history, and
as a kind of technique or strategy for dealing with this problem, we can see that this
provocation by the word postmodern and the discourse in response to that provocation
results in three distinct ways of handling this new technique of postmodernism, which I
will return to in future chapters: 1) the development of a new style of youthfulness
(codified by the “Brat Packs”), 2) a strategy for the circumvention of postmodern history
(a type of historical dodge exemplified in debates surrounding surrogate motherhood), and
3) the populist expression of a fear of a truly postmodern subject (yuppies). In order to
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prepare for these later chapters, I would like to spend a moment on the second of the
above--the “historical dodge”--which works best to illustrate the problems inherent in a
postmodern attempt to periodize the present. For example, there is the sense expressed
by Umberto Eco, who in “Correspondence on Postmodernism” remarks that “every age
reaches moments of crisis like those described by Nietzsche in the second of the
Untimely Considerations, on the harmfulness of the study of history. The sense that the
past is restricting, smothering, blackmailing us.” Likewise, Gianni Vattimo, discussed
below, similarly raises Nietzsche’s concept of “historical sickness”: “this excess of
historical consciousness prevents nineteenth-century European civilization from
developing a specific style of its own” (165). Like a history sous rature, the “historical
dodge” involves the development and prehistory of the word “postmodernism” by later
critics. “Postmodernism” is a word which manages to evoke and deny its history in one
phrase, and present postmodern effects likewise stand in isolated relation to the past and
future.
Whatever one may mean by “modern” (and here is the bulk of the disagreement
over the postmodern), the prefix “post” certainly seems to be a more stable signifier,
indicating clearly the key constitutive element and question of postmodernism: the break
or coupure. Signifying as it does by its prefix some sort of new present “after,”
discussions of postmodernism tend to be especially implicated in discussions of history;
the prefix “post” points, inherently, towards the past, although postmodernism is so
often viewed as being a moment of the present, or future present. For these reasons, it is
a trope among critics of the “postmodern” to first offer an origin story--an etymological
note on the post- of postmodernism; generally, the portmanteau nature of the word offers
a way of situating one critic from another (i.e., is “post” more important than “modern”
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and does it mean “after” or “beyond,” is the word hyphenated, are parts capitalized,
etc.).19 In these textual moments, for the most part glossed over or consigned to
introductory statements, there is a varying attitude towards history and the neologistic;
these authors are using a word with a historical record (that is, not a neologism of their
own invention), but each also feels that they are using it in a new way unrelated to prior
use. This oppositional stance legitimizes their project in the use of a word that has a
narrative history, while simultaneously disavowing the word’s etymological history.
These origin stories or birth narratives tend to operate in one of two ways:
offering fully historical readings as part of their argument (as is commonly the case with
those critics who “disagree” with the postmodern), or instead quickly gesturing towards
their central term’s prior use. For the former group, including such critics as Jürgen
Habermas and Alex Callinicos, historical arguments about the etymological history of
postmodernism, and its relation to modernity, are key to correcting other critics’
mistakes; by arguing “what” is or is not “post” about “modernism,” these critics seek to
show that in fact the postmodern does not exist, or does not exist as such. These
critiques tend to be both reactionary and farther reaching in their historical vision, tracing
the putative origins of the postmodern to what they argue are the true origins of
modernity. The second group of critics is characterized by their avoidance of a fully
developed origin story; for example, David Harvey claims, “I cannot remember exactly
when I first encountered the term postmodernism,” which he hoped would “lose its
allure” (viii). These kinds of throwaway references to the prior use of the word
Some of these variant spellings and parts of speech: “post-modern,” “post modern,” “Post Modern,”
“POSTmodernISM.” Consider also distinctions made between different forms--noun, adjective, verbal
noun--postmodern, postmodernism, postmodernity. As an aside, I could not successfully construct a
history of what I assumed was the later variant “pomo.” An 11 July 1982 Newsweek article “The Yakuza
Connection” has a baffling reference to the yakuza “obtaining pomo videocassettes” for smuggling
purposes, but surely this is a misprint for “porno”--another interesting lineage in light of Jameson’s “kinky
bedfellows.”
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postmodern are most intriguing, and show how postmodern theorists dislocate their
subjects’ present moment from a historical continuity.
The discrepancies between various critics’ origin stories were soon addressed; if
one could pinpoint the modern, and the earliest uses of “postmodern,” perhaps one could
lay to rest some of the dispute over the supposed break between the two movements.
The most extensive dating of postmodernism as a historical category has been done by
such literary historians as Hans Bertens, Douwe Fokkema, Margaret A. Rose, and, in
German, Wolfgang Welsch and Michael Koehler. Bertens, in Approaching
Postmodernism, a collection of papers delivered in 1984, provides a thorough historical
survey of the term “postmodern,” focusing on Charles Olson’s use of the term, and later
uses by Randall Jarrell (1946) and John Berryman (1948), in order to demonstrate how,
for critics like Irving Howe and Harry Levin, postmodernism “is essentially a
phenomenon of the American 50s” (“Postmodern Weltanschauung” 13). Next, Leslie
Fielder and Susan Sontag represent a counter-version of postmodernism in the 60s that is
more anti-modernist. Finally, Bertens, after moving through other various formulations of
postmodernism, finds that “in the 1970s Postmodernism became more and more an
inclusive term that gathered to itself all literary and cultural phenomena that could not be
classified as either Realist or Modernist” (“Postmodern Weltanschauung” 25). Bertens
expanded upon his initial overview of the use of postmodernism in The Idea of the
Postmodern: A History, looking more closely at the way in which the word had differing
meanings for various disciplines such as literature, dance, or photography (see also
Postmodern Theory by Best and Kellner which performs a similar operation).
“Postmodernism,” Bertens writes, “has meant differing things to different people at
different conceptual levels, rising from humble literary-critical origins in the 1950s to a
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level of global conceptualization in the 1980s” (The Idea of the Postmodern 10). This
“global conceptualization” caused by the increasing inclusivity of the term
postmodernism may render the word more useful to a wider variety of disciplines, but it
does so at the expense of any sort of rigor or precision. Margaret A. Rose, in The Postmodern and the Post-Industrial, thoroughly critiques such often-tangled misuses of the
term, using the hoariest way of solving the problem of origins: going to the dictionary.
Starting in her first chapter, “Defining the Post-modern,” with the Oxford English
Dictionary’s (OED) 1982 supplement, she thoroughly examines the OED’s citations,
which she views as misleading on a number of key points. While Rose wants to sort out
the various meanings of the central term, I intend to investigate the effect of this inclusive
sharing of the word postmodern.
The Oxford English Dictionary predates Bertens’ and Fokkema’s origin stories
(and apparently also Koehler and Welsch’s); its first recorded use of “postmodern” as an
adjective20 is from 1949, used in J. Hudnut’s Architecture and the Spirit of Man.
Hudnut’s book includes a section called “Post-modern house,” and this sentence, cited by
the OED: “He shall be a modern owner, a post-modern owner, if such a thing is
conceivable. Free from all sentimentality, fantasy, or caprice.” Hudnut’s throwaway
definition of the unsentimental postmodern subject--one who owns freely, without
illusion--seems in hindsight to precisely describe an 80s yuppie condo-buyer, yet one
would be hard-pressed to find, among the later critics of the postmodern, one to agree that
postmodern subjects lack a relationship with fantasy, or caprice, or sentimentality’s
sister nostalgia; these in fact are supposedly some of postmodernism’s constitutive
features. What Hudnut centrally expresses, though, is the idea that the man [sic] who
“postmodernism” as a noun: 1979, “postmodernist” as a noun: 1966, “postmodernist” as an adjective:
1965
20
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comes after modern man will be quite different; through the cultural expression of his
home ownership, through the type of home he purchases, he will be able to distinguish
himself from his neighbors. This kind of post-modern man is one who can make himself
postmodern if he so desires; as opposed to the later idea that postmodernism stems from
a break in the past, something that has already happened to someone.
Two more things are noteworthy about Hudnut’s statement; the first is his
reservation: “if such a thing is conceivable.” Now, a “post-modern owner” is certainly
conceivable (Hudnut, after all, conceived of it), but it also inconceivable in another sense.
Grammatically, Hudnut’s sentence equates the modern and post-modern owner; it is only
by the following tacked-on, incomplete sentence, coupled with the qualification of his
neologism, that the post-modern subject is defined. Following this origin story, the postmodern subject’s founding moment is a double one of desire and deception. The
difference between the modern subject and the postmodern one is based on the reader’s
permissiveness (that is, of the conceivability of the idea of a “post-modern”). Hudnut’s
sentence lines the two up neatly, separated by a mere comma, until his desire (if that is
conceivable) splits the modern subject apart; so long as he does not tax the bounds of
conceivability, the post-modern subject is here conceived.
The other point to make is that the male post-modern subject is first and foremost
a post-modern owner, a post-modern user. Now, Hudnut’s 1949 use of “post-modern”
as an adjective reflects the other initial citations the OED gives for the word, until Frank
Kermode, in 1966, changes from the “post-modern” period (or man or age) to, simply, the
“post-modernists.” The shift from an adjective and its qualification of a historical period
or subject of history to a noun mirrors the shift in the discourse of subjectivity prompted
by the “death of the universal subject” during which Kermode was writing. In other

40
words, it makes some sense for people to then stop talking about postmodern man or
postmodern ages, and to instead shift to a more seemingly unitary formulation (a whole
population of postmodernists). However, moving from a way of describing post-modern
things to a way of being (a “post-modernist”) sounds suspiciously like a reversal of the
supposed shift from ontology to epistemology. The post-modernist is you; no longer
distinct from your modern neighbor, you are now both postmodernists. This shifts back
again with those who use the term “post-modernism.” Now the way of being is
dominated by something external--no longer part of one’s self-definition, no longer a fulltime subject position, “post-modernism,” externalized, is something that acts upon the
subject, or something with which the subject must grapple.
There is one significant problem with this reading of the first usage of the adjective
“post-modern”: it is not the first usage. There is, indeed, an entire prehistory to the word
“post-modern” and its variants, uncovered by linguist Fred R. Shapiro’s recent work with
electronic storage databases like JSTOR, which he uses to antedate words. Shapiro has
no special interest in postmodernism, but uses it for its exemplary status as “the leading
fad and buzzword of contemporary humanistic activity” (“Prehistory” 331). Writing in
2001, Shapiro proves his point about the varying usages of the word postmodernism by
demonstrating that these earlier uses are not reactions to modern art or architecture, (as is
suggested, for example, in Hal Foster’s influential collection The Anti-Aesthetic and by
Jameson’s Postmodernism), but rather come predominantly from religious writings
(“Prehistory” 332). Shapiro shows that early appearances of the word postmodern share
little or nothing in common with later uses. Ironically, however, religion is precisely the
subject of a large majority of contemporary books on postmodernism (an unscientific
search for “postmodernism” on www.amazon.com, for example, shows that a third of the
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first dozen entries are books on postmodernism and religion). Admittedly Shapiro is a
layman whose expertise lies in linguistics, but the structure of his argument, including the
disavowal of specific conjunctions of postmodernism with other disciplines, in fact shares
much with 70s and 80s critics of postmodernism such as Jameson. Simply put, Shapiro’s
short piece encapsulates the two forms of origin stories discussed above: there is an
objective historical record with cultural value, but there is also an argument against this
record’s value, showing and simultaneously disavowing the importance of the word’s
prehistory. Shapiro’s piece, in both his method and the research he uncovers, shares
some of the central features of later 80s self-definitions of the postmodern: the futuristic
mixture with fantasy, a partially unrecoverable or mysterious prior history, and a
counterintuitively conservative (religious) impulse.
The earliest use of “postmodern” as an adjective that Shapiro finds is from 1929
in a pamphlet called “The Thermoelectric Formula: X Minus Y Equals Z,” published as
the first of a “Post-Modern Scientific Thought Series” (“Prehistory” 332). By pointing
out that it is “impossible to fathom” what the author Lucien Victor Alexis may have
meant by the word,21 Shapiro demonstrates the sense of fantasy that is shared by later
critics like Jean Baudrillard. The next issue published by Post-Modern Scientific
Thought, written by Alexis, is entitled “The Riddle of the Magnetic Field”; the Tom
Swift-like (1910-1941) quality of the titles of these pamphlets (and Shapiro’s and our
inability to “fathom” them) gives us the sense that it almost does not matter what
“postmodern” here means--the word itself nonetheless signifies a profound sense of
advancement. The sense of the postmodern as harbinger of the future (that is, the
emphasis on the “post”) is also echoed in the earlier uses of postmodernism and
Some of this is because Shapiro did not actually see the pamphlet; “only a single copy appears to exist
in any library, that residing at the New Orleans Public Library” (“Prehistory” 332).
21
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postmodernist (as noun) that Shapiro found. In these instances, however, they refer not
to fantastic quasi-futuristic science, but rather to a re-conservativizing theological
impulse. Reacting against “a progressive, predominantly Catholic theological movement
of the early twentieth century” (Shapiro, “Prehistory” 332), J.M. Thompson writes in a
1914 publication called Hibbert Journal, (“A Quarterly Review of Religion, Theology,
and Philosophy,” reminding us of the intertwining of the three at the beginning of the
century), that “the Post-Modernist is trying to find a scheme of forms which shall
express the real and directly felt values of spiritual things, not perverted and obscured by
their conventional embodiments” (qtd. in Shapiro, “Prehistory” 333); the post-modernist
will actually move beyond the caprices of religious modernism (which is another way of
saying newfangled religion). Rather than represent a radical future, this viewpoint sees
the present as being on the wrong track and Thompson’s post-modernist is one struggling
to restore us. This is the dystopic, religious version or vision of Post-Modern Scientific
Thought’s quasi-scientific utopia which is later repeated in some of Baudrillard’s more
ecstatic writings. Putting it along these lines illustrates one way in which the fantastic
(with its promise of a better tomorrow, or threat of an errant present) can get caught up
with the conservative.22
This point is made more clearly by the most interesting of the antedated
postmodernist texts, Postmodernism and Other Essays (how could Bertens or Fokkema
have missed such a work?). Published in 1926, Bernard I. Bell makes an argument for the
application of postmodernism to religion that may sound odd to contemporary students
of the postmodern: “Postmodernism will frankly admit the possibility of miracles. . . .
Postmodernism will readily and gladly acknowledge . . . the Incarnation. . . . The
Consider too, for example, a postmodern critic like Baudrillard or Kroker’s insistence on the “ecstasy” or
“frenzy” of 80s postmodernism; the rapture of culture replaces the rapture of religion.
22
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Postmodernist looks with more approval upon Roman Catholicism than he does upon
current Protestantism” (qtd. in Shapiro, “Prehistory” 333). With their religious focus,
such proclamations may appear to be far removed from later definitions of
postmodernism; however, stripped of its manifest content, Bell expresses strikingly
contemporary ideas. He writes, “Modernism has ceased to be modern. We are ready for
some sort of Postmodernism” (qtd. in Shapiro, “Prehistory” 333), and we can see in this
yearning a sense of desperation; since the modern has failed to be what it purports to be,
since the definition of the word “modern” no longer seems to fit the cultural form of
“modernism,” Bell desires something different, without any necessary sense of what
might replace the present. Recall Hudnut’s qualification: “if such a thing is conceivable.”
If there is not a ready definition of the postmodern to replace the modern with, if we see
in this postmodern prehistory a debunked origin story about modernism, then indeed we
may agree with Jameson’s own anxiety that “postmodernism, postmodern consciousness,
may then amount to not much more than theorizing its own condition of possibility”
(Postmodernism ix).
Jameson, in his introduction to Postmodernism, situates postmodernism as both
the fruition of a historical development and also a present, contemporary intervention. It
is difficult to imagine a less convincing argument for postmodernism than that it may
“amount to not much more than theorizing its own condition of possibility.” Yet, for
Jameson, postmodernism has, to switch from the bedfellows metaphor, an insidious,
diseased quality about it; if it creates itself by theorizing itself (a disembodied cogito ergo
sum?), then it continues to live through this cancerous theorizing. For example,
commenting on how narrative returns as “the narrative of the end of narratives” (what
Baudrillard calls “the end of endism” [“Pataphysics of the Year 2000”]), Jameson sees as
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another feature of postmodernism the fact that “virtually any observation about the
present can be mobilized in the very search for the present itself and pressed into service
as a symptom and an index of the deeper logic of the postmodern, which imperceptibly
turns into its own theory and the theory of itself” (Postmodernism xii). This dialectic,
“where the symptom has become its own disease (and vice versa, no doubt)”
(Postmodernism xii), is characteristic of Jameson’s clinical stance. The medical infects his
argument throughout the introduction; for example, he summarizes postmodern theory as
“the effort to take the temperature of the age without instruments” (Postmodernism xi).
Speaking of the failed promise of a “whole new culture to come to birth,” Jameson
remarks on “the delirium of some of its celebrants and apologists (whose euphoria,
however, is an interesting historical symptom in its own right)” (Postmodernism xii). The
rebirth symptoms are later more specifically identified with a disease--schizophrenia-with its “pathology distinctly referential” (Postmodernism xii). Jameson’s viral and
medical metaphors are not necessarily sustained themes in his critique, but they do share
with the earliest pre-postmodernists something of the awe of science and fear of the
doctor. Jameson’s postmodern symptom or disease, like the chicken and her egg, is best
described as a self-cannibalizing virus, a sort of play for immortality enmeshed in its own
question. In this, Jameson’s description of postmodernism matches his initial,
overarching definition, which centers around history and narrative, and focuses the
debates over postmodernism around the notion of the break or coupure.

II. Jameson / Coupure / Lyotard
More than any other aspect of postmodernism, the concept of an epistemological
break or rupture is the most telling expression of a cultural anxiety in the 1980s, and most
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clearly raises the problem of an ethical response to postmodernism. Let me elaborate that
now. The break figures prominently in a majority of theoretical discussions of
postmodernism because it involves past (history), present (politics), and future (ethics).
Jameson, in the early essays and chapters of Postmodernism, is concerned most with
dealing with the break, although that is not how he begins his text. The 1990
introduction, in fact, begins not with the break but with what the break may signify in
practice; he tentatively starts with this sentence: “it is safest to grasp the concept of the
postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten
how to think historically in the first place” (ix). It is an amusing feature of Jameson’s
style and stylistic position as auteur of postmodernism (with something of the doctor, as
we have seen) that he “safely” eases his readership in gently not with the problem of the
foundational, totalizing moment of postmodernism (the before and after of the post-), but
with the aftereffects, or state of affairs, of late twentieth century life--the age that forgot
the thought of history. This safe introduction, however, is not the starting point for
Jameson’s own thought; in his first program essay on postmodernism, “The Cultural
Logic of Late Capitalism,” printed earlier in 1984 and reworked here as the lead chapter,
he begins directly by taking “the temperature of the age.” The first paragraph reads:
The last few years have been marked by an inverted millenarianism in which
premonitions of the future, catastrophic or redemptive, have been replaced by
senses of the end of this or that (the end of ideology, art, or social class; the
“crisis” of Leninism, social democracy, or the welfare state, etc., etc.); taken
together, all of these perhaps constitute what is increasingly called
postmodernism. The case for its existence depends on the hypothesis of some
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radical break or coupure, generally traced back to the end of the 1950s or the early
1960s. (Postmodernism 1)
Again we see in Jameson’s postmodernism the contradictory, inverted dialectic of
thinking about history; instead of the expected prospectus of the future, we have a
retrospectus of the past. Yet, the argument continues, the focus is not on the past, but on
the passing of the past. The existence of postmodernism, itself in evidence not a thing so
much as the mourning of a thing, depends upon a break or cut whose radicality precludes
any sort of return (and Jameson returns repeatedly to this point when he elaborates upon
the pastiche/parody distinction and the compulsions of nostalgia).
In the following, much longer paragraph, Jameson enumerates an “empirical,
chaotic, and heterogeneous” list of what follows after the “high-modernist impulse,”
which marks either the death throes or senility of the “what came before” (my phrase).
His list includes specific figures such as Andy Warhol, John Cage, Philip Glass, Jean-Luc
Godard, and Thomas Pynchon, as well as categories like new wave music, the commercial
film, and photorealism.23 In a diagnostic moment, Jameson poses to himself another
formulation of the problem he began with; does such an “indefinite” list “imply any more
fundamental change or break than the periodic style and fashion changes determined by an
older high-modernist imperative of stylistic innovation” (Postmodernism 1-2)? This is
the position some take in response to Jameson; that the high-modernist imperative of
“make it new” results in cultural examples that look distinct from modernism, but are
really still operating under its rubric. In the 1984 essay Jameson manages to have it both
ways, arguing that, even were “the constitutive features of postmodernism . . . identical
Compare Lyotard’s list-making in the second paragraph of The Postmodern Condition: cybernetics,
informatics, telematics, paradoxology (3-4) and the list of “the tenor of the times” that begins The
Postmodern Explained: art historians, art critics, architects, philosophers, historians, theatrologists, and
(unable to resist naming him) Jürgen Habermas.
23
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with and coterminous to those of an older modernism” (and Jameson does not believe so)
they would nonetheless “remain utterly distinct in their meaning and social function” due
to a more complex argument about the positioning of postmodernism and global capital
(Postmodernism 5).
In these initial two paragraphs Jameson makes clear a number of things which will
frame later discussions of postmodernism and the break. First is Jameson’s starting
point--the collection of these essays into a book marks Postmodernism as both a
theoretical work tied to a longer tradition of Marxist criticism and a work of “present
history,” beginning with the “last few years.” The “inverted millenarianism” that
Jameson speaks of (a millenarianism shared by fellow Marxist Raymond Williams) on its
surface appears to gesture towards a populist conception of American 80s consciousness,
and Jameson explicitly returns to what he refers to as revolutionary changes (“news of . .
. a whole new type of society, most famously baptized ‘postindustrial society’ [Daniel
Bell] but often also designated consumer society, media society, information society,
electronic society or high tech, and the like” [Postmodernism 3]) and what I have been
calling liberatory strategies.24 In this, Jameson’s initial version of postmodernism is
anticipatory. Although his following chapters take up specific examples of the
codevelopment of postmodernism and the “cultural logic” of capitalism, beginning here
with the proposed break and the end it signals serves to create a sort of clean tablet, a
cause for the future. The “inverted millenarianism” of which he speaks means not that
the end is near, but rather that the end is here (indeed, just past). By bracketing the
catastrophic or redemptive (this postmodernism is not inherently “for” or “against” any
particular group), Jameson replaces the anticipation of fin-de-siècle global changes which
come regularly but rarely, and starts us off with the feeling that what the millennium
24

Even Lyotard speaks positively of the “society of the future” (Postmodern Condition xxiv).
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promises may have already happened; it is in this sense that Jameson is writing history
for the future. Finally, by beginning with the question of the break, which he poses and
abstains from answering, the reader is set up for the key role that the break will play in
future discussions of the postmodern. Jameson’s inaugural discussion puts the coupure
squarely as the key constitutive starting point, for without a break, how could there be a
postmodernism?
Jameson does try to find a way out of a totalizing conception of a before and after
strategy of the periodizing hypothesis. Midway through the 1990 introduction (and, I
suspect, thinking of his introduction to Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition), Jameson
considers the problem of speaking the unspeakable. His critique of Lyotard follows these
lines: how can one enunciate a narrative of the end of narrative, which would demonstrate
the “return of history in the midst of the prognosis of the demise of historical telos”
(Postmodernism xii)? Or, how can we have postmodernism as “a periodizing hypothesis,
and that at a moment in which the very conception of historical periodization has come to
seem most problematical” (Postmodernism 3)? Rather than solve this problem, Jameson
is content to mark it as yet another ineluctable feature of the periodizing hypothesis of
postmodernism, which nonetheless gets “nominated” post facto by the word
postmodernism, and by the question of the break:
The decision as to whether one faces a break or a continuity--whether the present
is to be seen as a historical originality or as the simple prolongation of more of the
same . . . is itself the inaugural narrative act that grounds the perception and
interpretation of the events to be narrated. . . . I have pretended to believe that the
postmodern . . . constitutes a cultural and experiential break worth exploring in
greater detail. . . . For the name itself--postmodernism--has crystallized a host of
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hitherto independent developments which, thus named, prove to have contained
the thing itself in embryo. . . . It thus turns out that it is not only in love,
cratylism, and botany that the supreme act of nomination wields a material
impact. (Postmodernism xii-xiii)
The nomination of postmodernism, father to the embryos of developing culture, has a
remarkably Aristotelian turn in its “material impact”; Jameson’s “supreme act” of
cratylistic25 nomination engenders culture. While he may only “pretend” to believe in the
postmodern coupure, he appears to take great pleasure in the material impact of this
pretense. He turns to the second person: “the appeal to experience . . . now recovers a
certain authority as what, in retrospect, the new name allowed you to think you felt,
because you now have something to call it that other people seem to acknowledge by
themselves using the word” (Postmodernism xiii). The shift to the second person is all
the more telling considering Jameson’s position as one of the foremost of the “other
people” who acknowledge the word, and thereby legitimate “your” use of it. Since you
now have something to call it, thanks to Jameson’s “supreme act of nomination,” you can
now understand yourself and your own present day. This is only one example of what
Jacques Derrida labeled “phallogocentrism,” and of the way that the complicated
arguments about postmodernism--it may not exist, but we nonetheless must use it (“for
good or ill, we cannot not use it” [Postmodernism xxii]) work to paradoxically
conservatize and liberate. Jameson’s nomination, making a stance towards
postmodernism inevitable, is inextricably tied to the way you behave and shall behave,
and for this reason alone remains particularly suspect.
Consider, for example, how Lyotard introduces the term in The Postmodern
“Cratylism,” after the Greek figure Cratylus, is not yet a word in English. I parse it as not
distinguishing words from the things they describe. Lyotard also mentions Cratylus in The Differend (37).
25
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Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979, translated 1984):

26

The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most highly
developed societies. I have decided to use the word postmodern to describe that
condition. The word is in current use on the American continent among
sociologists and critics; it designates the state of our culture following the
transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the
game rules for science, literature, and the arts. The present study will place these
transformations in the context of the crisis of narratives. (Postmodern Condition
xxiii)
Lyotard’s decision to call this condition of knowledge “postmodern” seems indicated
mostly by American fashion, but Lyotard is in a tough position, for (as Jameson points
out),27 he has the difficult task of narrating the end of narratives. Jameson, in his foreword
to The Postmodern Condition, takes a swipe at Lyotard: “meanwhile,” he writes,
the title of the book, with its fashionable theme of postmodernism provocatively
in evidence, opens up this subject matter, at least by implication, in the directions
of aesthetics and economics, since postmodernism as it is generally understood
involves a radical break, both with a dominant culture and aesthetic, and with a
This late translation introduced Lyotard’s work to America ahead of some of his earlier texts, such as
Just Gaming.
27
“Lyotard’s insistence on narrative analysis in a situation in which the narratives themselves henceforth
seem impossible is his declaration of intent to remain political and contestatory” (Jameson, foreword to
Postmodern Condition xx). To which we can imagine Lyotard responding:
Are “we” not telling, whether bitterly or gladly, the great narrative of the end of great narratives?
For thought to remain modern, doesn’t it suffice that it think in terms of the end of some history?
Or, is postmodernity the pasttime of an old man who scrounges in the garbage-heap of finality
looking for leftovers, non-senses, or paradoxes, and who turns this into the glory of his novelty,
into his promise of change? (Differend 135-6).
And, earlier, “If this is the case [that ‘recourse to narrative is inevitable’], it is necessary to admit an
irreducible need for history understood, as outlined above--not as a need to remember or to project (a need
for historicity, for accent), but on the contrary as a need to forget (a need for metrum)” (Postmodern
Condition 28). Or, “‘postmodern’ is probably a very bad term because it conveys the idea of a historical
‘periodization.’ ‘Periodizing’, however, is still a ‘classic or ‘modern’ ideal. ‘Postmodern’ simply indicates
a mood, or better a state of mind” (“Rules and Paradoxes” 209).
26
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rather different moment of socioeconomic organization against which its structural
novelties and innovations are measured. (vii)
To what extent does Jameson himself not constitute “the fashionable theme” on display
here by his own foreword? Jameson later continues,
thus, although he has polemically endorsed the slogan of a ‘postmodernism’ and
has been involved in the defense of some of its more controversial productions,
Lyotard is in reality quite unwilling to posit a postmodernist stage radically
different from the period of high modernism and involving a fundamental historical
and cultural break with this last. (xvi)
Wlad Godzich, in an afterword to The Postmodern Explained (1988, translated 1992),
disagrees, and rises to Lyotard’s defense, claiming that “theoretician of the postmodern
[was] a title thrust on [Lyotard] and certainly not self-imposed” (112). About that latter
book’s presumably still “fashionably provocative” title, Godzich writes that “the title of
the book has suggested to some a prank and perhaps even some impatience with the tenor
of the debate that has raged around the notion of the postmodern. It is dead earnest and
nothing if not patient” (109). Overall, one gets the impression that Lyotard uses the
“postmodern” merely out of convenience. Nearly everything else he wrote is about
language, about Wittgenstein’s project, or about Kafka or Joyce or modernity. If it is fair
to say that Lyotard was reluctant about being associated with the postmodern, it is so not
because Lyotard changed his mind, or disavowed his earlier book, but because his forays
into the postmodern always seemed to be occasional texts in the first place. Setting aside
The Postmodern Condition, written at the request of Quebec’s Conseil des Universités,
his other explicitly postmodern works are The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence,
1982-1985, in whose introduction the translators recount the difficulty of convincing
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Lyotard to publish these letters, and Postmodern Fables, whose own introduction by
Lyotard resignedly throws its hands in the air: “futility suits the postmodern . . . [b]ut
that doesn’t keep us from asking questions” (vii). Towards the Postmodern, a collection
of essays by Lyotard, turns out to be simply pre-postmodern, essays which perhaps
gesture or indicate towards the postmodern, but certainly do not move towards it. None
of these texts retain the authority of Lyotard’s “report on knowledge,” but even there we
saw his uncomfortability with the word.
But, to return to Jameson’s most lasting criticism, that Lyotard meta-narratively
critiques narrative unwittingly. Later is Lyotard’s famous one-sentence summary (he has
just spent some twenty lines explicating the term “modern”): “simplifying to the extreme,
I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives” (Postmodern Condition xxiv).
These narratives are of the objective, scientific type, but as he proves, one cannot judge
the validity of “narrative knowledge” by means of “scientific knowledge” and vice versa.
“Lamenting the ‘loss of meaning’ in postmodernity boils down to mourning the fact that
knowledge is no longer principally narrative. Such a reaction does not necessarily follow”
(Postmodern Condition 26). But, Lyotard continues, “most people have lost the
nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity.
What saves them from it is their knowledge that legitimation can only spring from their
own linguistic practice and communicational interaction” (Postmodern Condition 41).
These language games, which Lyotard proposes should be taught instead of mere language
content (Postmodern Condition 50), appear to represent a hopeful possibility for the
postmodern age (although “our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation
to rise from these inconsistencies, as did Marx” [Postmodern Condition xxiv]). For
Lyotard, the postmodern opens up strategies which are readily put at the service of a
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sinister agenda, albeit strategies that are hopelessly entangled in contradiction, and thus
perhaps still useful. Yet, this is not an entry point for intervention, for the “problem”
also problematizes its solution; as in Jameson’s viral metaphor, the inconsistencies that
would offer “a good ethico-political end” (Postmodern Condition xxiv), also subvert such
ends. Jameson and Lyotard then seem to agree upon the implacability of postmodernism-there is nothing but to face it. This recalls some of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s
position regarding their notion of freedom and lines-of-flight; “freedom” is not based on
academic knowledge, but on a floating-between, a transversal movement of language
games: “no one, not even the least privileged among us, is ever entirely powerless over the
messages that traverse and position him at the post of sender, addressee, or referent”
(Postmodern Condition 15).28 The question is no longer ‘is it true?’ but ‘what use is it?’
(Postmodern Condition 51). Likewise, postmodern science produces not the known, but
the unknown (Postmodern Condition 61); this is yet another move that means to displace
and to create more displacements in narrative, but hopefully allows for a microethics of
narrative, as opposed to a totalizing position. As Lyotard playfully put it in Postmodern
Fables (1993): “you’re not done living because you chalk it up to artifice” (vii).

III. The Event as Break: Derrida/Baudrillard
For later critics, Jameson’s discussion of the break marks one way of separating
postmodern critiques into two camps--those who see postmodernism as an aesthetics
that can be traced throughout history (such as Habermas and Anthony Giddens, or the
claim that Tristram Shandy, Cervantes, and Montaigne are postmodernist), and those
This seems a dubious claim, and although I am not aware of any specific critiques, one clearly exists,
despite Lyotard’s statement in the first sentence that his text is about “the most highly developed societies”
and that his key term originates on “the American continent” (Postmodern Condition xxiii). Jameson, in
the initial sentence of his foreword to The Postmodern Condition, labels the text “seemingly neutral”
(Postmodern Condition vii).
28

54
who see postmodernity as a historical or cultural moment against which to react
(Jameson, David Harvey, Andreas Huyssen) coming at a specific point in time and
representing a specific cultural-historical period.29 Jameson’s attitude towards the postbreak present is in keeping with his self-identification as “a relatively enthusiastic
consumer of the postmodern” (Postmodernism 298). On the other hand there is someone
like Jean Baudrillard, who claims, “I always kept my distance from culture--as well as
from theory. I maintained a position of distrust and rejection. . . . I don’t want culture; I
spit on it” (Forget Foucault 81). These examples of cultural attitudes are quite important
in terms of feelings about the break, and they get mixed up with a conception of the event
(usually catastrophic, not redemptive). Critics such as Baudrillard, Arthur Kroker, and
David Cook go so far as to see postmodernism’s break as a “radical discontinuity,”
something excessively foreign or strange, while those who argue against the break find
ways to paper over the gaps their contemporaries illustrate, stressing the similarities
between so-called postmodernism and modernism; for example, Habermas’ most
persistent point is that postmodernity is a misinterpretation of “the incomplete project
of modernity,” and that the break has yet to occur.
In his introduction to Jürgen Habermas’s The New Conservatism: Cultural
Criticism and the Historians’ Debate (1985, 1987), Richard Wolin takes the “pro-break”
postmodernists to task, agreeing that they
have been correctly characterized by Habermas as “young conservatives” insofar
as they have abandoned any hopes of conscious social change. Indeed, the word
“emancipation” seems to have been stricken from their vocabulary. Instead, their
aestheticist perspective is content to fall behind the achievements of modernity, a
standpoint Habermas likens to “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.” (xxv)
29
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Habermas, for our purposes, is most important for his refusal of the break, and his
persistent questioning of the contemporary imperative and fascination with such a break;
“those who use this ‘post’ want to set themselves apart from a past; they cannot yet give
a new name to the present, since we do not yet have answers for the identifiable problems
of the future. . . . Such gestures of hasty dismissal are suited to periods of transition”
(New Conservatism 3). To be more specific, Habermas’ problem with the “post-” is not
unlike the flip side of Jameson’s identification of the new term as some sort of materialist
lightning rod;30 Habermas finds that “the prefix that we encounter in such terms for
tendencies and points of view does not always have the same meaning. Common to the
-isms formed with the prefix ‘post’ is the sense of standing back from something. They
express an experience of discontinuity but take different attitudes toward the past that is
put at a distance” (New Conservatism 4). Instead, “post” means simply that things have
“developed further,” that they are coming to their logical conclusions, but not necessarily
the same or similar ones that are identified or warned against by other “postmodernists.”31
If Habermas seems to be a stickler, it is due to his fear, shared by others like Lyotard, that
there is a shoddiness in contemporary theory, which in its excitement over the present
moment may be ignoring significant evidence of a larger continuity with the past.
Habermas’s question in the lectures of The New Conservatism concerns the problems and
habits inherent when people consider, think, or philosophize the present moment, and
especially the need for and manner in which they first must make a theory of (or out of)
history. Especially interesting is the way he attributes desire to the postmodernists, who
Postmodernism, “like lightning striking from the superstructure back to the base, fuses its unlikely
materials into a gleaming lump or lava surface” (Postmodernism xiii).
31
Habermas’ own “origin story” is telling about his attitude: “at first the expression ‘postmodern,’ as it
was applied in America during the 1950s and 1960s to literary trends . . . was also used merely to
designate new variants within the broad spectrum of late modernism. ‘Postmodernism’ became an
emotionally loaded outright political battle cry only in the 1970s, when two opposing camps seized the
expression: on the one side the neoconservatives . . . and on the other side the radical critics of growth”
(The New Conservatism 4).
30
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“want to set themselves apart from a past.” This is undoubtedly part of the
postmodernists’ obsessive refusal of history, and raises yet again the question of the
effects of postmodernism’s periodizing hypothesis.
Anthony Giddens, in The Consequences of Modernity (1990) shares some of
Habermas’s concern with slowing down a rampantly irresponsible postmodern theory.
His key claim is that “rather than entering a period of post-modernity, we are moving into
one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radicalised and
universalized than before” (3). While Habermas may have objected to postmodern
theorists on the principle of their historical blindness, Giddens, as ominously signaled by
his title, is more concerned with a misrepresentation of the deleterious effects of
contemporary culture: “the world in which we live today is a fraught and dangerous one.
This has served to do more than simply blunt . . . the assumption that the emergence of
modernity would lead to the formation of a happier and more secure social order” (10).32
Echoing Derrida and Nuclear Criticism (see below), Giddens considers the listing of
contemporary disasters (including such “relatively small-scale events [as] the dropping of
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki”--events presumably not small for residents of
those cities); he finds “the risks involved are necessarily ‘unreal,’ because we could only
have clear demonstration of them if events occurred that are too terrible to contemplate”
(134). Giddens also agrees with Habermas that postmodernism is really about aesthetics
more than anything else; “post-modernism, if it means anything, is best kept to refer to
styles or movements within literature, painting, the plastic arts, and architecture. It
concerns aspects of aesthetic reflection upon the nature of modernity” (45). Carolyn
“Modernity, as everyone living in the closing years of the twentieth century can see, is a double-edged
phenomenon. The development of modern social institutions and their worldwide spread have created
vastly greater opportunities for human beings to enjoy a secure and rewarding existence than any type of
pre-modern system. But modernity also has a sombre side, which has become very apparent in the present
century” (Giddens 7).
32
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See’s interesting novel Golden Days (1987) is worth mentioning, as it offers an example
of these two strains; it is a post-apocalyptic, “unreal” novel that aestheticizes the postbreak by means of the remnants of the pre-break. Diamond specialist Edith Langley
starts her life over again in California, where she befriends televangelist Lorna Villanelle.
The two become close and successful friends in sunny Los Angeles, living the clichéd 80s
paradise, until nuclear war breaks out (the cover shows a champagne cork’s pop resulting
in a mushroom cloud). See, focusing on the women’s adaptability, handles the nuclear
event lightly; the men, after all, started it, and while they continue to be afraid and tell
tales of the apocalypse, the women, the “hardy laughers, mystics, crazies, who knew
their real homes” (196) manage to live on to see the Light ages. See implicitly critiques
the logic of the total nuclear event that Giddens expresses, finding instead a dual unreality
to life before and after the event.
Giddens himself speaks briefly of another of these texts which considers the
interlaced problem of the postmodern periodizing hypothesis and the imagination of
disaster--Raymond Williams’s Towards 2000 (1983). Giddens reads in Williams’s notion
of a new kind of politics called “Plan X” “the belief that much that goes on in the modern
world is outside anyone’s control, so that temporary gains are all that can be planned or
hoped for” (135). In Towards 2000, Williams revisits his 1959 essay forecasting what
Britain would look like in the 60s, and he envisions a tactical approach to the problems of
the present era:
a new hard line on the future: a new politics of strategic advantage. . . . I call this
new politics “Plan X” . . . it is different from other kinds of planning, and from all
other important ways of thinking about the future, in that its objective is indeed
“X”: a willed and deliberate unknown, in which the only defining factor is
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advantage. . . . [W]hat is new in “Plan X” politics is that it has genuinely
incorporated a reading of the future, and one which is quite as deeply pessimistic,
in general terms, as the most extreme readings of those who are now campaigning
against the nuclear arms race or the extending damage of the ecological crisis. The
difference of “Plan X” people is that they do not believe that any of these
dangerous developments can be halted or turned back. (243-4)
Williams’s Plan X is like a proleptic response to the unknown of the rupturing event, a
way to contain or manage the political implications of the absolute unknown of Giddens’s
“unreal” events, which are beyond contemplation and thus beyond responsible response.
The extreme pessimism of Plan X stands as a marker of the times for Williams, and for
him it is explicitly a form of thinking different from any other way of “thinking about the
future.” What we have seen so far, though, is that this thinking about the future is
invariably a thinking of the present. To be one of the “‘Plan X’ people” involves
imagining a pessimistic and anticipatory model of the irrecuperability of the disastrous
future event. The “‘Plan X’ people” live the finality of Jameson’s “inverted
millenarianism”; instead of replacing the foreboding future with “senses of the end of this
or that,” “‘Plan X’ people” replace it with the end of everything. At the risk of
psychoanalyzing the fictional Plan X people, renewed interest by feminists in Lacan and
Freud in the 80s provide a useful model for reading the Plan X’s people imagination of
disaster. Jane Gallop’s Reading Lacan (1985), for example, helpfully illuminates, in
psychoanalytic terms, the back and forth of a subject’s constitution as regards the event.
In Lacanian terms, this event is the mirror stage, during which the infant jubilantly
misrecognizes herself in the mirror as a coherent subject. Yet, as Gallop points out, it is
is also from this moment that the subject has the anxious sense of being the “corps
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morcelé,” the “violently nontotalized body image” of the “body in bits and pieces” (79).
The mirror stage appears to organize the disorganized body, “but actually, that violently
unorganized image only comes after the mirror stage so as to represent what came before”
(Gallop 80). Likewise, the organizing of the “‘Plan X’ people” seems to similarly
construct itself beyond and before the final event. The futuristic X, by which Williams
marks a “willed and deliberate unknown” is an organizing fiction that both precedes and
follows--is both cause and effect--of the future event; likewise Jameson’s cratylistic
nomination of postmodern sensibility precedes and follows the cultural evidence of
postmodern subjectivity.
As Steven Best and Douglas Kellner point out in Postmodern Theory: Critical
Interrogations (1991), a more moderate view of the break is shared by Foucault and
Jacques Derrida, although neither of those figures is particularly associated with the term
postmodernism. Foucault: “One of the most harmful habits in contemporary thought . . .
is the analysis of the present as being precisely, in history, a present of rupture”
(Foucault Live 359). Derrida: “I do not believe in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal
‘epistemological break,’ as it is called today. Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in
an old cloth that must continually, interminably be undone” (Positions 24). Best and
Kellner, who discuss Foucault and Derrida’s position in order to build their own (they’re
pro-break but pro-continuity),33 take issue with the way many postmodern theorists
“totalize and project a rupture or break within history that exaggerates the novelty of the
contemporary moment. . . . [B]oth assume that a possible future is already present”
(276). The sticking point for Best and Kellner seems to be this problem of exaggeration,
“While by definition postmodernity is discontinuous with or constitutes a break from previous
developments, we reject any periodizing analysis which emphasizes only discontinuity in favour of a
dialectical analysis which theorizes the lines of continuity and discontinuity in a transition from one
movement or period to another” (Best and Kellner 278).
33
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characterized by excessive rhetoric or hyperbole, in which the epistemological, or capital,
or cultural rupture that occurs must be perceived as radical; after all, one rarely speaks of
minor drifts or slight changes in temperature (especially so, as has been pointed out, when
one’s own career depends to a certain extent upon finding things to write about; the
Continental version of this is to be the more avant-garde). This exaggeration, which
Foucault or Derrida are careful enough to avoid in principle, is most certainly a
component of the “supreme act of nomination” of postmodernism as a periodizing
hypothesis, and this rests against Best and Kellner (and even, as he includes himself later,
Jameson) and their emphasis on continuity.
This discontinuous exaggeration, Peter Schjeldahl’s “concerted indulgence”
perhaps, raises another important quality of 80s America, and there is a punning reference
to this in William Gibson’s 1988 cyberpunk novel Mona Lisa Overdrive. Jameson
mentions Gibson by name at least twice in Postmodernism (indeed Gibson is the first
citation in the book, appearing in the third sentence).34 Jameson is describing how “the
postmodern looks for breaks, for events rather than new worlds, for the telltale instant
after which it was no longer the same; for the ‘When-it-all-changed,’ as Gibson puts it”
(Postmodernism ix). But, Jameson is just off with his quotation; Gibson’s expression for
the break (or, in the narrative of Mona Lisa Overdrive, when artificial intelligences became
self-aware) is simply “When It Changed.”35 One of the characters in Mona Lisa
Overdrive is an Artificial Intelligence named Continuity, and Gibson punningly has
Continuity provide help to other characters (“Continuity is continuity. Continuity is
Continuity’s job [259]) and has characters search for Continuity. Without over-reading
Jameson’s misreading, it strikes me that here is a clever turning point to get to the other
Jameson regrets not having a chapter on cyberpunk, “the supreme literary expression . . . of late
capitalism” (Postmodernism 419, n.1).
35
Interestingly, “When It Changed” is also the title of a 1972 short story by Joanna Russ.
34
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side of an ambivalence about the break. Misremembering Gibson as having written “when
it all changed” exemplifies Jameson’s theoretical maneuverings--another act of nomination
to crystalize the cratylistic (recall Jameson), another insistence of postmodern critics’
attraction to the scientific fantastic (recall Post-Modern Scientific Thought), and another
example of the (masculine?) faith in total destruction and change (recall Golden Days).
But a science fiction author like Gibson or Russ would never imply that it all changes;
their worlds are simply too complex, there are too many social groups for such an event
to occur.36 “When it all changed” is the most common, and most harmful, conception of
the break; it is striking that so many unproblematically associated the break with finality-with a total, permanent, and global rupture instead of as an event against which
individuals may or may not be affected, or may be affected in a multitude of distinct
ways. While the Bomb may have been another trope of the coupure in American 80s, it
was not accepted unproblematically in culture or theory. Rather than see its effect as
simply “unreal,” Jacques Derrida pursues nuclear war through the linguistic turn, labeling
it “fabulously textual.”
The momentary appearance of Nuclear Criticism in 1984 demonstrates this other
side of the coupure. In “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles,
seven missives),” which appeared in a 1984 special issue of Diacritics devoted to the
topic of Nuclear Criticism,37 Derrida argues that total nuclear war cannot be imagined as an
event or historical object, for if it occurred it would mean the end of history and of the
possibility of testimony; the end of history cannot be properly contained by history, in
that knowledge of the end of history cannot exist. In calling nuclear weaponry
The postapocalyptic theme in science fiction film and literature invariably returns to this--there is never
one subject after the Event (that would be a boring text), but always struggles between various groups.
Jameson’s unwritten cyberpunk chapter surely would have made this clear. See, for the 80s, Blade Runner
(Ridley Scott, 1982), The Road Warrior (George Miller, 1981), and Akira (Katsuhiro Otomo, 1987).
37
The special issue was connected to a conference held at Cornell University in April 1984.
36
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“fabulously textual,” Derrida means to bring it into the purview of students of language,
rather than allow it to remain in the hands of militarists, technicians, or politicians.
Derrida takes this further, arguing that a “nuclear strategy can never do without a
sophistry of belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text” (“No Apocalypse” 24); this is
what he means by calling nuclear war a “fable”--since total nuclear war has not occurred,
it is a “non-event,” “something one can only talk about” (“No Apocalypse” 23), “an
invention to be invented in order to make a place for it or to prevent it from taking place”
(“No Apocalypse” 28). Nuclear war is thus (for the moment, when it has not taken
place) susceptible to the textual strategies of the humanities. This explains the latter part
of Derrida’s title--missives and missiles are coterminous since the possibility of
conceiving of the uniqueness of a nuclear war (“its being-for-the-first-time-and-perhapsfor-the-last-time” [“No Apocalypse” 26]) depends not upon the threat to humanity, but
upon the threat to the archive of literature, the “total destruction of the basis of literature
and criticism” (“No Apocalypse” 26). He continues, “the only ‘subject’ of all possible
literature, of all possible criticism . . . [is] the remainderless and a-symbolic destruction of
literature” (“No Apocalypse” 28). Literature and criticism thus work incessantly to
recuperate the imagination of their own demise, they work to “assimilate that
unassimilable wholly other” (“No Apocalypse” 28).
Perhaps it is from this impulse that postmodern contradiction arises?
The problem that Derrida and the other critics in the Diacritics issue deal with is
again one of nomination. Derrida’s first missile, first missive concerns itself with speed,38
and more precisely the “speed race” in the beginning between word and act, as well as the
later speed race between those who see nuclear war as a new phenomenon and those who
See Paul Virilio, who also starts from speed, especially War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception
(1989).
38
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instead trace a movement always already at work. Slow down! Derrida urges, although
his title indicates full speed ahead. In its colloquium proposal, Diacritics labels Nuclear
Criticism “a new topic and an explicitation of what is already everywhere being done”
(“Proposal” 2).39 The “explicitation,” an explicit explication, evokes a specificity of detail
or a rigor of interrogation as regards the “recent criticism and critical theory and feeling
that without exception . . . recounts an allegory of nuclear survival” (“Proposal” 2), and
this sense is further conveyed by the Latin meaning of explicit as a noun: “here ends,”
used by scholars to signify the end of a book. And there an “explicitation” (the explicit
citation) of the nuclear, the citation of literature’s end, of “what is already everywhere
being done,” turns around on itself, and so this kind of academic “explicitation” passes
over the deep illogic of “thinking the event, the coming or venue of a first time which
would also be a last time” (“No Apocalypse” 30). This is the nucleus of criticism, the
nuclear question of criticism (and Derrida puns also upon “nu-clear criticism . . . mak[ing]
clear what is unclear [“No Apocalypse” 26]). “Postmodernism, postmodern
consciousness, may then amount to not much more than theorizing its own condition of
possibility,” said Jameson (Postmodernism ix), nominating nonetheless “postmodernism”
as the retroactive name of the “inaugural narrative act” of the break, which structures in
turn the possibility of the imagination of the break. Derrida likewise concludes “No
Apocalypse, Not Now” with the name. The name in which nuclear war is fought will be
a name that cannot survive the war, and so “that name in which the war would take place
would be the name of nothing, it would be pure name . . . with only the non-name of
‘name’ . . . beyond all genealogy . . . the Apocalypse of the Name” (“No Apocalypse”
30-1). Postmodern theory, if it can be said by its Americanness to reside near Nuclear
Another kind of definition of postmodernism, except “nuclear criticism” as a phrased field of study is so
less linguistically available for adoption.
39
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Criticism, does so around its own “condition of possibility,” whether theorized or actual.
The name of postmodernism is by this reason a false imagination of the “Apocalypse of
the Name,” albeit a necessarily imaginative one--a too fast explicitation perhaps of “what
is already everywhere being done.”
Moving past the ontological question, if you will, of the event of the break is the
epistemological one; if we are to believe Jameson, whether or not it truly happened, the
statement (repeated often enough) that it did so is enough to make it real and material for
any number of us (indeed, Derrida cites Freud on a related point). We see, for example, in
someone like Baudrillard an over-anxiety regarding Derrida’s argument; what if the break
has already occurred, but no one noticed? Or, if it is happening now, with or without
participation? Putting the break in the present distracts from the problems of
memorialization or history, and forces an anticipation of the event--the manifest
(material) sign of the next big shift (whether an “inverted millenarianism” or not). The
80s are filled with such indications: the eruption of Mount St. Helens (1980), the
Challenger explosion (1986), Chernobyl (1986), the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), AIDS
(1981), Reagan’s “Star Wars” (1983). A novel like Don DeLillo’s White Noise, published
in 1985 (portions appeared the year before in Vanity Fair), deals insistently with the
vacuity and blandness of contemporary, technologized suburban life and the ever-looming
Big Event (called here “The Airborne Toxic Event”), beyond which the characters can
only mimic an imagined, faked response. “Isn’t death the boundary we need,” one of the
protagonist’s colleagues asks; would life “have beauty and meaning without the
knowledge you carry of a final line, a border or limit” (DeLillo 229)? In White Noise, the
threat of disaster is mirrored by the presence of a drug, Dylar, which is taken to ease the
fear of dying. Dylar’s side effect is that its user, like an unwitting Cratylus, confuses
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words with the things they referred to (this Babelic theme is repeated in another
important text, Paul Auster’s City of Glass [1985]). In White Noise, there is continually
a false dichotomy laid between the event and its anticipation. This is true also of David
B. Feinberg’s Eighty-Sixed (1989), one of many AIDS narratives which breaks cleanly
and desperately into two parts--“1980: Ancient History” and “1986: Learning How to
Cry” (Tony Kushner’s Angels in America comes to mind as another).
Of course, for many of the critics I have been discussing the break is inextricably
tied to a slightly earlier time: the events of May ‘68. One of these is Jean Baudrillard,
whose ecstatic, often hyperbolic visions of America mirror the pre-postmodernist
religious writings I referred to earlier (cf. especially America: “I went in search of astral
America . . . the America of the empty, absolute freedom of the freeways . . . the America
of desert speed, of motels and mineral surfaces” [5]). In an interview conducted by
Sylvère Lotringer during 1984-85, “Forget Baudrillard,” Baudrillard muses on the meaning
of the events of May ‘68 and the way that it “managed to absorb its own continuity”
(Forget Foucault 105). And again, “May ‘68 was the first event that corresponded to
this inertial point of the political scene. Continuity disappears” (Forget Foucault 106).
In this example of the event, Baudrillard is unable to draw any conclusions since there
appeared to be no “post” to the activity; he labels it “an event which it has been
impossible to rationalize or exploit, from which nothing has been concluded. It remains
indecipherable. It was the forerunner of nothing” (Forget Foucault 114-15). What we can
glean from the events of May ‘68 is the way the break covers over itself; as much as he
positions himself against Foucault, Baudrillard shares in this something of the
ambivalence about what the event does or does not lead to. Yet Baudrillard’s concern-the discontinuity of the energy of May ‘68--can only be expressed by the pithy reversal,
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“when effects go faster than causes, they devour them” (Forget Foucault 114).
Baudrillard formulates this same process as a critical formulation; “it’s possible that
theory will implode, that it will absorb its own meaning, that it will end up at best
mastering its disappearance” (Forget Foucault 128) (and I wonder how Barthes’ “writing
degree zero” would fit with this?).
In America, Baudrillard places an ease of life as cause for the seeming unconcern
with the “finished form of the future catastrophe” (5) that he locates in the desert. “The
ease with which we now live . . . makes survivors of us all. If the bomb drops, we shall
neither have the time to die nor any awareness of dying” (America 42). This, though, is
actually all secondary in Baudrillard’s ironic formulation, for in America’s “hyperprotected society we no longer have any awareness of death,” since life is “so excessively
easy” (America 43). Baudrillard marks the Holocaust as the “anticipatory form of such a
condition” (America 43). The Holocaust “robbed” its victims of “power over their own
deaths” (America 43). But the Holocaust was only the beginning, the first in a “viral”
chain of events--“the explosions and the extermination (Auschwitz and Hiroshima) still
go on,” but in a “purulent, endemic form. . . . The end of history was precisely the
inauguration of this chain reaction” (America 43). Baudrillard rather unsympathetically
(if that category of emotion could be applied to Auschwitz or Hiroshima) locates the
beginning of the end of history as a retrospectively smaller event, since these two
historical moments constitute at heart a kind of attenuation to death, or the loss of power
over one’s own death. The two events--“the explosions and the extermination
(Auschwitz and Hiroshima)” (curiously reversed, and made singular, in parenthesis)-which constitute some of our knowledge of the threat of the end of history, in fact turn
out to be simply “slow, homeopathic doses” of “the contagion, the unfolding of the viral
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and bacteriological process” of the easy life (America 43). Baudrillard claims that such
“silent indifference to nuclear pathos” actually has a restorative function, in that it keeps
at bay the imagination of death which “brings the event closer” (“a great sign of hope and
a political fact of utmost importance” [America 43]); such silent indifference is of little
consolation in light of an otherwise nihilistic postmodern attitude, really defensible only
in terms of the aesthetics of the avant-garde.
Gianni Vattimo, in The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture (1985, translated 1988), renders this in terms of postmodernism’s
periodizing hypothesis. Vattimo’s translator, Jon Snyder, summarizes the argument:
“post-modernity is an experience of ‘the end of history,’ not the appearance of a
different, or newer, stage of history itself” (Vattimo xviii). Working with the concept of
“post-history” (first used, I believe, by Arnold Gehlen in a 1967 essay), by which he
means “the experience of ‘the end of history’” (xix), Vattimo demonstrates that the “crisis
of legitimation” or “breakdown of narrative” or “loss of historicity” in fact turns back in
upon itself, and, “seen in this light, progress no longer seems to lead anywhere except to
the creation of ‘conditions in which [more] progress . . . is always possible in an always
new guise’” (7). Due to this increasing production of progress, progress no longer retains
its meaning as “a forward movement in history and of the new as something qualitatively
different from what precedes it” and thus one arrives at the “end of history” (Vattimo
xix).40 Put this way, the end of history is not necessarily a negative thing; Vattimo “sees
the experience of the loss of history and historicity . . . as a ‘positive opportunity’ and a
‘field of possibility’ for late twentieth-century humanity. The end of history, then, is the
Tied into this argument is Vattimo’s other point about postmodernism, that it is not a progress over
modernism (which would not carry any meaning), but is “rather an experience of the end of metaphysics
and the end of history which accompanies the most advanced phases of modernity itself, up to and
including the end of modernity” (xlviii).
40
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beginning of something else” (xix). This is in keeping with Vattimo’s qualified, optimistic
outlook about postmodernism, which offers a set of strategies and examples of life in a
world which seems particularly malleable.
But Baudrillard fails “to choose and discriminate between the possibilities that the
post-modern condition offers us,” since he seems not to heed Vattimo’s advice to
recognize “post-modernity as a field of possibility and not simply as a hellish negation of
all this is human” (12). America, with its offhand dismissal of “the explosions and the
extermination,” is too caught up in the lure of the myth of the American West--deserts
and highways and a hyperreal “land of the ‘just as it is’” (America 28)--for me to take
Baudrillard seriously (or, this is a reaction: “just as it is” does not characterize my
experience). In America, Baudrillard offered a more lyrical solution to the problem of the
break which he had earlier developed in a European context. Given the various
formulations of anxiety over the break (whether it has happened or not, whether it
constitutes the end of history or the marker against which to render meaning to our own
present), it is interesting to consider the theme Baudrillard returns to most often: the
possibility of the unknown break or event, which he will call “dead points.” The dead
point is a term first elaborated in 1983’s Fatal Strategies, and comes up repeatedly for
Baudrillard.
The first question that Sylvère Lotringer asks Baudrillard in their 1984-85
interview is about the “series of liquidations” that Baudrillard’s work produces--the “end
of production, the end of history, the end of the political” (Forget Foucault 67). To
answer this, Baudrillard begins with the European thinker Elias Canetti, who won the
Nobel Prize in Literature in 1981. Baudrillard responds to Lotringer’s question by
beginning not with the end, but with an idea that “sounds a little like science fiction”
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(Forget Foucault 68). Baudrillard cites Canetti’s memoir The Human Province, published
in translation in 1978, to illustrate his sense of history:
It is possible, [Canetti] says--and he finds the idea rather painful--that starting
from a precise moment in time the human race has dropped out of history.
Without even being conscious of the change, we suddenly left reality behind.
What we have to do now, continues Canetti, would be to find that critical point,
that blind spot in time. Otherwise, we just continue on with our self-destructive
ways. This hypothesis appeals to me because Canetti doesn’t envisage an end,
but rather what I would hall [sic] an ‘ecstasy’, in the primal sense of the word--a
passage at the same time into the dissolution and the transcendence of a form.
(Forget Foucault 68)
Compare this to the following passage; Baudrillard begins “Pataphysics of the Year
2000,” from The Illusion of the End, with Canetti, quoting the following paragraph from
The Human Province as his epigraph:
A tormenting thought: as of a certain point, history was no longer real. Without
noticing it, all mankind suddenly left reality; everything happening since then was
supposedly not true; but we supposedly didn’t notice. Our task would now be to
find that point, and as long as we didn’t have it, we would be forced to abide in
our present destruction. (69)
Baudrillard uses Canetti in order to make a claim about the present mode of living and the
possibility for change in this particular age. Canetti’s “end” appeals to Baudrillard
because it is not an end, or rather because it is an end which may have already happened,
and the threat of which prompts a comprehension of that event. But for Canetti, the faith
in resurrecting the “dead point” is a way of undoing the pessimism of those like
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Williams’s “‘Plan X’ people.”
In Jane Gallop’s terms above, the event--the dead point--appears to precede the
end of history, but actually the violent image of death--the dead point which made history
(and thus mankind) unreal, only comes after the event “so as to represent what came
before” (Gallop 80). Baudrillard has a difficult time imagining the end of history. In its
place is something like Canetti’s dead point, which comes after to represent what came
before; what is actually already technically away from or outside history comes back as a
(post-) historical marker of that very same blind spot. Baudrillard’s paraphrase of
Canetti is more insistent than the original: “what we have to do now . . . would be to find
that critical point, that blind spot in time. Otherwise, we just continue on with our selfdestructive ways.” Canetti calls this “a tormenting thought,” as if it were a paranoid’s
vision; Baudrillard escalates it to ecstasy, to program. Science fiction films of the 80s are
full of metaphorizations of this kind of project. For example two very different, but
equally popular science fiction films from the 80s, James Cameron’s The Terminator
(1984) and Robert Zemeckis’s Back to the Future (1985), both feature, but from different
sides of the divide, travelers from the future who, as a matter of life and death, close the
break between present and future, and must seek the very “dead point” to which the rest
of humanity was blind and must remain blind.41
“Surreptitiously (as Canetti has it), it’s possible that everything is no longer real
or true. In any case we would no longer be in a position to decide that. . . . Suddenly,
there is a curve in the road, a turning point. Somewhere, the real scene has been lost”
(Forget Foucault 68-9). This is precisely the point upon which Lyotard stakes his claim;
to give up on history, to give up on the possibility of truth, plays for the shock of a kind
As I write this, two others also come to mind: The Adventures of Buckaroo Bonzai Across the Eighth
Dimension! (W.D. Richter, 1984) and Bill & Ted’s Excellent Adventure (Stephen Herek, 1989).
41
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of moral or ethical relativism which gave postmodernism such a bad name in the first
place.42 Sylvère Lotringer, in that interview, summarizes Baudrillard’s position: “history
survives its disappearance, but somewhere its spirit got snatched away” (Forget Foucault
68). It is difficult to find in Baudrillard’s fascination with the dead point any kind of
liberatory strategy to avoid “our self-destructive ways.” Besides taking Canetti into a
rather different context, Baudrillard attempts to take the rest of us with him. While we
have left history unwittingly, it is certainly there waiting for our return, waiting for us to
pick up where we last left off. The rapturing of an innocent past is as harmful as
disavowing it.

IV. Lyotard/After Auschwitz
Finally, the most complex negotiation of our three terms--periodization, break,
event--is offered by Jean-François Lyotard. While The Postmodern Condition: A Report
on Knowledge (1979, translated 1984) is his most popular statement about the
postmodern, his later text, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (1983, translated 1988),43
ultimately represents one of the most fruitful extensions of Lyotard’s claims about the
loss of narrative or historicity into the field of ethics, and contemporary thinking about
the possibility of history after the event. The fact that it is not about postmodernism,
and takes as its central example Auschwitz, helps Lyotard avoid, at least explicitly, the
problem of offering postmodernism as yet another periodizing hypothesis. Instead, at
the heart of The Differend, Lyotard examines the double bind of enunciating the
Lotringer asks, “I’ve often wondered how one could live theories like yours” to which Baudrillard
responds, “Somewhere along the line I stopped living, in Canetti’s sense” (Forget Foucault 80, 81).
43
Parts of the first two chapters of Lyotard’s work appeared in an issue of Diacritics in Fall 1984, a sort of
annus mirabilis for the opening up of postmodernism proper (and Yuppies--cf. Chapter 4) inaugurated in a
sense by Jameson’s “Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” (New Left Review), the
English translation of Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, and Foucault’s final publications.
42
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ineluctable, or of fitting language and language games into a political philosophy that takes
account of the truth-value of a statement about the break or event.
The Differend is written in an idiosyncratic style consisting of a prefatory
“Reading Dossier”; “Notices” on Kant, Levinas, Hegel, Stein, Aristotle, and Plato; and
built up carefully by means of the accretion of numbered, inter-indexed, Wittgensteinian
(or Barthesian--the “naive ideal . . . to attain a zero degree style” [Differend xiv])
fragments.44 Lyotard introduces the concept of the différend (left untranslated as
“differend”), which he defines as “a case of conflict . . . that cannot be equitably resolved
for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” (Differend xi). This
irresolubility is due to certain “phrases in dispute,” which come from different “phrase
regimens” and thus, in their heterogeneity, are only “linked” together in discourse, rather
than, as is typically assumed in law, act as equivalents. To demonstrate this problem, “to
bear witness to the differend” (Differend xiii), is to show “that the linking of one phrase
onto another is problematic and that this problem is the problem of politics” (Differend
xiii). The project of The Differend, as Lyotard succinctly puts it, is this:
given 1) the impossibility of avoiding conflicts . . . and 2) the absence of a
universal genre of discourse to regulate them . . . : to find, if not what can
legitimate judgment . . . then at least how to save the honor of thinking. (xii)
This, then, is a project about language and legitimacy, about arbitration and the consensus
of politics, and about the present moment, which, coming as it does on the heels of “the
‘linguistic turn’ of Western philosophy” and its correlative “decline of universalist
discourse,” demonstrates a certain “weariness with regard to ‘theory,’ and the miserable
slackening that goes along with it (new this, new that, post-this, post-that, etc.)”
“You really are reading a book of philosophy, the phrases in it are concatenated in such a way as to show
that that concatenation is not just a matter of course and that the rule for their concatenation remains to be
found” (Differend 129).
44
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(Differend xiii). Lyotard’s tone from the outset is one of intervention--“the time has
come to philosophize” (Differend xiii)--and at the moment he writes he is intent on
shifting the “slackening” of a rapturous theorizing over (certainly, although he does not
mention it by name) postmodernism to an understanding of the way in which events-breaks and moments that appear insurmountable--are part of a language system that sets
itself up around the “object of an Idea” (Differend xii).
Lyotard’s starting point is Faurisson, a Holocaust-denier who rests his denial on
what he sees as a lack of evidence--“to find a single former deportee capable of proving to
me that he had really seen, with his own eyes, a gas chamber” (Differend 3). Lyotard is
not immediately concerned, as others were, with the moral or historical value of such a
statement, but rather with its logical value, or rather, its legal value--the possibility of
arbitrating this claim, which rests as Lyotard demonstrates, on a logical implosion. The
opening of The Differend proceeds from Lyotard’s central witness to the differend,
Auschwitz:
1. You are informed that human beings endowed with language were placed in a
situation such that none of them is now able to tell about it. Most of them
disappeared then, and the survivors rarely speak about it. When they do speak
about it, their testimony bears only a minute part of this situation. How can you
know that the situation itself existed? (3).
The differend exists here in the impossibility of a survivor of the gas chambers to provide
specific witness of that event, for either no such survivor would exist (and thus there
would be no witness to the gas chambers), or a survivor’s evidence would be incomplete,
since he or she is alive to offer testimony (his or her very existence in turn refuting his or
her testimony about the gas chamber’s finality). This is what would technically be called
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a dilemma, and Lyotard analyzes the problem in terms of logic, but also more
45

importantly in terms of language, for the differend occurs not within one logical system or
language, but between differing “phrases.” Number 22 explains the problem: “the
differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be
able to be put into phrases cannot yet be” (Differend 13). I would linger on the way
Lyotard phrases this, for in its final verbal clause is the possibility of a potentially
redeeming, future linguistic manipulation. “In the differend,” Lyotard writes in Number
23, “something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able
to be put into phrases right away” (Differend 13). Herein lie the frustrations born of the
mistaken assumption of man’s ascent to language and the ease and mastery of speech.
What is so compelling about Lyotard’s argument is the way in which he attempts to place
the “phrases in dispute” into a system outside of a concept of humanism which centers
“language” as the privileged tool of “man.” In this, he rectifies his misuse of
Wittgenstein’s expression “language game” in The Postmodern Condition, where it there
seemed to imply that two opponents could play with language equally, or that language
was indeed an object outside of its user; “phrases in dispute” retains the combative or
miscommunicative quality of language, while making way for the case of the differend or
of the victim who is not yet able to bear sufficient witness to his or her injury. “The
Stakes” of The Differend as he calls them, are to “defend and illustrate philosophy in its
differend,” rather than to just throw the towel in on the whole mess (Differend xiii).
To return to The Differend’s beginning, why Auschwitz? Many of the critics we
have considered favor the nuclear metaphor as representative of the potential, but always
imagined “X” event beyond which history ceases. But in what way does Auschwitz
“The mechanism consists in applying to two contradictory propositions, p and not-p, two logical
operators: exclusion (either . . . , or) and implication (if . . . , then). So, at once [(either p or not-p) and (if
p, then not-p)]” (Differend 6, ellipses in original).
45
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work as a better example? One answer is that Faurisson, and French historian Pierre
Vidal-Naquet’s response to him, provides a timely example of the dangerous relativism to
be found at the end of the age of ends (perhaps at the narrative of the end of narratives).
But Lyotard’s interest goes farther back; on the copyright page, we find that he delivered
a version of Chapter 4 (“Results”) in French in 1980 as a talk called “Discussions, ou
phraser ‘Après Auschwitz,’” at the conference “Les fins de l’homme: à partir du travail
de Jacques Derrida.” But actually it is not yet Derrida who Lyotard turns to for his
example, but Theodor Adorno, who in the third section of Negative Dialectics begins with
“several micrologies called ‘After Auschwitz.’” Lyotard confronts the problem of how
“after Auschwitz” designates a model (as opposed to an example) that “would designate
an ‘experience’ of language that brings speculative discourse to a halt” (Differend 88).
But supposing this were the case, “does it follow that it leaves place only to subjective
chatter and the wickedness of modesty” (Differend 89)? Since this possibility itself
comes from speculative logic, even imagining a non-speculative logic perpetuates a
speculative logic (Differend 89). The only answer is “to imagine that the cleaving
introduced into Western thought by ‘Auschwitz’ does not pass outside of speculative
discourse . . . [and that r]ather this cleaving cracks speculative logic itself and not merely
its effects” (Differend 89-90).
In finding the successful operation of a speculative logic to apply to “after
Auschwitz” (raised by the problem of speculating “after Auschwitz”), Lyotard must also
find that “the price paid for speculation is the suppression of the we as an identity that
thinks or phrases from the outside” (Differend 96). It is this very impossibility of a “we”
that determines “Auschwitz” as susceptible to speculative logic, by leading to “a kind of
disauthorization . . . a dispersion [perhaps] worse than the diaspora, the dispersion of
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phrases” (Differend 98). Lyotard concludes that “between the SS and the Jew there is
not even a differend, because there is not even a common idiom (that of a tribunal) in
which even damages could be formulated” (Differend 106). These “even damages” rely
upon a common we of humanity, a shared idiom of legitimation effaced by the Nazis. In
claiming this, we can thus perhaps say that there is a differend between Lyotard’s
conception of the “after Auschwitz” and Derrida’s formulation of Nuclear Criticism,
which turns upon the destruction of a hierarchy of phrases, an apocalypse of literature
distinct from an apocalypse of peoples (Derrida’s more speculative “humanity”).
Another answer, in the larger context of the 80s, has to do with other thinkers’
return to the question of the Holocaust as a problem of recent history, which is to say a
rather direct object lesson in the problem of writing history, but also increasingly in the
problem of writing the other’s history. Keith Jenkins, who edited The Postmodern
History Reader, considers how “the problematization of the Holocaust urgently raises the
question of what might be the limits of historical representation in these postmodern (and
indeed other) days” (385-6). Certainly the most famous of these representations is Art
Spiegelman’s Maus, which is carefully constructed around a series of narrative events-the artist Art Spiegelman writing and drawing a graphic novel in which he figures as the
son Artie who interviews his father Vladek, who in turn tells his Holocaust narrative. For
me, the most interesting thing about Maus is the exclusion of Art’s mother Anja’s story,
which Marianne Hirsch and Nancy K. Miller have focused on as a sort of absent core to
the text. Anja’s lost war diaries, later rewritten as a memoir for Artie, turn out to have
been burned by a depressed Vladek, who admits this to Artie at the end of Maus’s first
volume. Miller reads “the question of Anja as that which will forever escape
representation and at the same time requires it: the silence of the victims” (“Cartoons”
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49). While the autobiographical qualities of Maus may initially revolve around Artie and
Vladek’s difficult relationship, Miller suggests that, curiously, “it’s as if at the heart of
Maus’s dare is the wish to save the mother by retrieving her narrative,” (“Cartoons” 49)
although the impossibility of this (a detail repeated throughout both volumes) does not
minimize the artist’s need to try to represent the victim’s silence. Discussing Auschwitz,
Lyotard concludes that “the Jewish phrase has not taken place” and thus we have only
“silences” (Differend 106), and it is this specific problem against which Art must suture
his own absences. Joshua Brown argues a similar point, beginning (as many critics do)
from Spiegelman’s narrativizing of the Holocaust (an event implicitly assumed to be
immune to such process); “Spiegelman is exceedingly self-conscious about history as a
construction and troubled by the fabrication of order, the distorting of historical
experience, necessitated in the creation of a comprehensible narrative” (1669). There is,
especially in the second volume (published in 1991, after the first volume’s success), an
excessive self-consciousness in Spiegelman’s “covering” of the gaps between his frames,
which illustrates the absences necessary to render what is placed within the frames.
But, other critics take up the point about Anja’s effaced narrative to point out the
way in which forgetting is crucial to remembering. Marianne Hirsch, using the term
“postmemory,” points out how Spiegelman has incorporated frequently repeated
Holocaust photographs into his drawings, such as the two gates of Auschwitz, the guard
towers, and mass graves. “His graphic versions recall the photographs we have all seen,”
argues Hirsch, and by repeating these iconic images he “reminds us that memory also
depends on forgetting, that reduction and canonization, and also figuration, are indeed
crucial to the work of postmemory” (“Surviving” 30). I believe Lyotard would agree, as
he argues in Postmodern Condition that if recourse to narrative is inevitable (the
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speculative phrasing of history), then we must “admit an irreducible need for history
understood . . not as a need to remember or to project (a need for historicity, for accent),
but on the contrary as a need to forget (a need for metrum)” (28). This is a tricky point,
however, and raises precisely the problem Spiegelman wants to avoid: representing the
Holocaust by means of only one survivor’s narrative. Hirsch defines postmemory as
“the relationship of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their
parents, experiences that they ‘remember’ only as the narratives and images with which
they grew up, but [which] constitute memories in their own right” (“Surviving” 9). The
proper transmission of these memories is at the heart of Maus, both narratively and in the
context of debates over Holocaust representation. Few critics attacked what could have
been the shocking aspect of Maus--the use of a cartoon medium and “funny aminals”46--to
remember the Holocaust. Yet, narratively, Spiegelman continually illustrates improper or
unwitting transmissions, certainly with Vladek’s burning of Anja’s memoir (and the
related absence of Anja not leaving a suicide note), but also Vladek’s accidental finding of
Art’s comic about Anja’s suicide, Prisoner on the Hell Planet, and Vladek’s posed
prisoner portrait taken in a “fake” camp uniform. Between these moments are the
historical elements--the translated and real photographs, Vladek and Art’s argument about
whether an orchestra played at the gates, the correct sequencing of Vladek’s memory with
other Holocaust accounts--which Hirsch locates as postmemorial.
Referring in part to postmodern theory, James Young argues that “in an era when
absolute truth claims are under assault, Spiegelman’s Maus also makes a case for an
essentially reciprocal relationship between the truth of what happened and the truth of
how it is remembered” (698). For Young, this may lead to history as “vicarious past,”
the “afterlife of memory,” but Young makes the claim that it is impossible to ignore the
46

An early, three-page version of Maus appeared in a collection with this intentionally misspelled title.
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“circumstances surrounding a story’s telling,” which are half of the narrative of the event
itself (699); indeed he goes so far as to say that Holocaust narrative must include the
means of transmission in order to show the importance of the Holocaust. The important
story may be Vladek’s, but without Art’s story we would not be able to understand why
it is important. Elaborating this point, Miles Orvell connects Maus with another novel
with a comic book protagonist, Jay Kantor’s Krazy Kat (1988), based on George
Herriman’s 1913-1944 newspaper strip. Krazy Kat, not about the Holocaust, opens
with the testing of the atomic bomb at Alamogordo,47 but both, according to Miles Orvell,
“have--in a landscape of postmodern irony--stood out conspicuously for a literature that
positions the subject psychologically and morally in history, thus pointing fiction in a
healthy social direction” (110). Like Hirsch’s postmemory, which “mediate[s] not
through recollection but through representation, projection, and creation” (“Surviving” 9),
the focus on the narration in addition to the narrative directly counters common theories
of postmodern flatness or superficiality.
The publication of the first volume of Maus (1986) occurs in the same year as
another newsworthy event in American recognition and negotiation of the Holocaust.
Ronald Reagan, desiring in part to help German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s reputation
(Kohl was not allowed to participate in the prior June’s D-Day anniversary), was to
make a 40th anniversary visit to Kolmeshöhe, a cemetery near Bitburg which Reagan
believed to contain the remains of American and German soldiers from World War II.
But, after making his plans Reagan was told that not only were no Americans buried at

Krazy Kat is an important work that deserves more consideration, especially in contrast to Baudrillard’s
similarly themed America, as well as its development of the concept of history aside Krazy Kat’s “postatomic roundness,” which this two-dimensional cartoon character develops after the Alamogordo test.
47

Bitburg, but also that 49 members of the Waffen SS were interred there.
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Many tried to

get Reagan to cancel his visit, including Elie Wiesel (“that place . . . is not your place”
[243]) and Nancy Reagan, but Reagan went ahead with the visit on 5 May 1985, adding at
the last minute a visit to Bergen-Belsen, despite having earlier refused to go to Dachau for
fear of “reawakening the memories” of Germany’s “great feelings of guilt” (Hartman xiv).
Commentators on Bitburg focus mostly on Reagan’s rhetorical moves, which attempted
to shift the public relations disaster onto the intended meaning of the visit:
“reconciliation.” But as Habermas put it, “someone who ‘does’ Bergen-Belsen in the
morning and holds a veterans meeting in Bitburg in the afternoon has something else in
mind” (New Conservatism 214).
During this time, Habermas was engaged with others in the historians’ debate and
with the German problem Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit or “coming to terms with the
past.”49 According to his reading, the Federal Republic had an “era of neoconservative
stabilization” in the 1980s, and Christian Democrats began to return to office. “The
centerpiece of this process of ‘normalization’ was to have been the visit of the American
President to the German military cemetery at Bitburg” (New Conservatism xiii). Clifford
Marks, comparing the strategies of Maus and Reagan’s remarks at Bitburg, finds that the
two work in opposite directions: “Reagan reduced the Holocaust to a single meaning to
give it closure . . . in a sense he tried to ‘fix’ the Holocaust by giving people relief from
memory and history” (314). Reagan’s rhetoric of reconciliation is a monolithic forgetting,
a willed ignorance (what else could one call it in the face of those later revelations) of the
past for the sake of the present. In attempting to move past the past, Reagan was forced
Reagan puts the number at 48, others at 47 or 56. There was some discussion about who was to blame
for the incorrect information; evidently when the Americans complained that they were not told about the
buried SS members, the Germans countered that they had not known (snow covered the graves) and that at
any rate the Americans should have sought out the information themselves.
49
One position: “in a land without history, whoever fills memory, coins the concepts, and interprets the
past, wins the future” (Michael Stürmer, qtd. in New Conservatism xiv).
48
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to rhetorical extremes, suggesting for example that the Waffen SS were as much
conscripted victims of Nazism as the Jews, or stating inexplicably that “the German
people have very few alive that remember even the war, and certainly none that were
adults and participating in any way” (Reagan qtd. in New Conservatism xxviii). Richard
Wolin, in his introduction to Habermas’s The New Conservatism, read the unintended
effect: “what was intended as a display of German ‘normalcy’ was thereby transformed
into a prime example of that country’s inclination toward grievous lapses of historical
memory” (xiii-xiv). The same is argued repeatedly by American commentators; see
especially Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, an incisive collection of primary
and secondary sources published in 1986. But unmentioned is the way that American
formulations of postmodernism gesture towards such lapses of historical memory.
Certainly postmodernism is incomparable to Nazism, but in criticizing Reagan, many fail
to connect a German problem of coming to terms with the past with an American
problem of coming to terms with the present. Reagan’s desire to paper over the atrocities
of World War II by means of “reconciliation” may be grotesque, but they are also in
keeping with postmodern’s proclamation of the new subject at the end of history.
In the fifth chapter I want to elaborate upon an alternate strategy of dealing with
postmodernism that is neither simply pessimistic nor optimistic, neither catastrophic nor
redemptive. For it is not an option, when a critic tells you to embrace the break, to
simply refuse to do so. Nor does it change the nature of the game, when a critic tells you
that you have been for some time postmodern, to simply refute him or her. These are but
other differends between individual subjects and an increasingly collective and admonitory
program labeled postmodernism. While Jameson feels compelled to engage with
postmodernism because it is truly there, and Lyotard feels compelled to engage with it
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even if it were an artifice, neither of these positions take into successful account the
ethical dimension active in the cultural landscape of the 1980s.

I wanted to conclude this chapter abruptly; there are far too many threads running
between the catastrophic and the redemptive to pluck them all. I consider closing with
Roland Barthes, anticipating my next chapter’s, and the chapter that follows’s, concern
with maternal history. In the second part of Camera Lucida (1980, translated 1981),
Barthes considers photographs found shortly after his mother’s death:
Thus the life of someone whose existence has somewhat preceded our own
encloses in its particularity the very tension of History, its division. History is
hysterical: it is constituted only if we consider it, only if we look at it--and in
order to look at it, we must be excluded from it. As a living soul, I am the very
contrary of History, I am what belies it, destroys it for the sake of my own
history (impossible for me to believe in ‘witnesses’; impossible, at least, to be one
. . . ). That is what the time when my mother was alive before me is--History.”
(65)
I intended to discuss anamnesis as a postmodern strategy, but find it all contained here in
Barthes’s fragment. History is postmemorial, is always exclusive of the subject’s desire
to access it. The end of history cannot be spoken, for history raises itself up by the
knowledge that part of you lived before you ever did.
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Chapter Two
Brat Pack Mommies (Bright Lights, Big City)

“Brats are irresistible, for they are without shame, they are premoral, they waft. . . . Brats
are what everyone else wants to be” (Rudnick, “Do Brats Have More Fun?” 22, 24).
“Not even a dying mother runs deep” (Hendin, “Fictions of Acquisition,” 219)

As is the case with the word postmodernism, each of the objects of knowledge
which are put forth in the 80s as new subject types actually refer back to prior historical
categories. For all of its supposed novelty and invention, the Eighties feeds upon the
Fifties and Sixties for its self-definition, while cloaking these historical references by
emphasizing the sense of presentness and the contemporary. Fredric Jameson terms this
process pastiche, which is distinguishable from parody in the blankness or affectlessness
of its performance (Postmodernism 16-19). While Jameson’s distinction provides a
useful critical tool for art or architecture, as a description of 80s subjectivity it
overemphasizes the loss of history and supposedly concomitant “deadness” of culture
(“speech in a dead language,” “blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs”
[Postmodernism 17]). This chapter will demonstrate how the emphasis on pastiched
cultural labels that exclude history cannot be as unproblematically accepted as
postmodern theory might assume. The Brat, in particular, is an object of knowledge
which becomes a new 80s model for contemporary youth as well as a source of anxiety
for adults. This becomes especially clear in depictions of the Brat in relation to his or her
mother; in brat narratives the mother is almost always presented as dead or dying, and in
the brat’s fascination with the dead mother we can read American cultural interests as

84
closely familial and expressive of new anxieties over what a mother can mean socially,
politically, and culturally.

I. The Hollywood Brat Pack
The word “brat” to refer contemptuously to a child was used as early as 1502
(OED). In the 80s, the word began to be used ironically and was jokingly turned into a
collective group: a brat pack. This label “Brat Pack” was first used by journalist David
Blum in “Hollywood’s Brat Pack,” a 1985 cover story in New York magazine on the
Hollywood film industry. Blum’s phrase characterizes “the young movie stars you can’t
quite keep straight,” and his piece offers an introductory survey of “what kids want to
see and what kids want to be” (“Hollywood’s” 40). Focusing primarily on three male
actors--Emilio Estevez, Judd Nelson, and Rob Lowe--Blum’s first formulation of the
Hollywood Brat Pack misses a number of key figures. Most notably, the only women he
mentions are either unknown hangers-on or Playboy Playmates, and so Blum leaves out
actresses such as Ally Sheedy, Molly Ringwald, Demi Moore, Mare Winningham, and
Andie MacDowell, who all worked together on Joel Schumacher’s St. Elmo’s Fire (1985),
a film whose cast is one of the definitive groupings of the Brat Pack.50 The other
commonly cited key film is John Hughes’s The Breakfast Club (1985), starring Sheedy,
Ringwald, Estevez, Nelson, and Anthony Michael Hall.
The rather singular quality of the name the Hollywood Brat Pack belies the fact
that there are no official or unofficial members; the pack’s numbers range from three to
thirty or more. The basic disagreement over “who is” and “who isn’t” is due to the fact
that none of the actors involved embraced the label, while the popular press immediately
Ally Sheedy is mentioned in Blum’s article, but only in a picture caption to War Games (1983), where
she is marked as “compatibly cute” to Matthew Broderick (“Hollywood’s” 44).
50
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picked it up to characterize not only the new Hollywood films of this period but also to
cultivate a young, exciting image of Hollywood. For his part, Blum defines the Brat Pack
in two different ways. Firstly, he portrays the group as a collectivized form of the star
system (actors whose faces “you can’t quite keep straight”); secondly, the group
members maintain their own pseudo-demographic profile (for example, Estevez is “The
Leader and Treasurer”). These two contrasting definitions allow for continued
reinvention of the Brat Pack at the same time as the Brat Pack can be seen as a stable
social group with defined roles. Contrary to expectations, not being able to quite keep
everyone straight serves not to weaken the group’s identity, but rather to strengthen it by
making it more diffuse. For example, moviegoers confused by the similarity between
Matthew Broderick and Matthew Modine may go to see Full Metal Jacket (1987,
decidedly not a Brat Pack film) after enjoying Ferris Bueller’s Day Off (1986, by the
Pack’s auteur John Hughes).51
To correct some of this confusion, Blum gives each actor he discusses a pseudodemographic handle: Tom Cruise is “The Hottest of Them All,” Rob Lowe has “The
Most Beautiful Face,” Judd Nelson is “The Overrated One,” Timothy Hutton is “The
Only One With an Oscar,” Matt Dillon is “The One Least Likely to Replace Marlon
Brando,” and Sean Penn is “The Most Gifted of Them All” (“Hollywood’s” 42-3). In
addition to separating these otherwise indistinguishable young male actors, this kind of
generic differentiation also reveals a more calculated effect at creating group identity.
While this version of the Brat Pack is far removed from an actual American demographic,
in awarding these actors with such handles, Blum responds to a demographic impulse by
inventing descriptive categories to help moviegoers keep things straight. Nicolas Cage is
Although Anthony Michael Hall, a Brat Packer who appeared in Sixteen Candles, was hired for the lead
and then fired by Kubrick after complaining too much about the director’s style. He then turned down the
role of Bueller’s nebbish friend Cameron to “avoid being typecast.”
51
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labeled “The Ethnic Chair,” and while Blum means to portray the group as heterogeneous,
he only accentuates the lily-white nature of the bunch. In an insider’s explanatory voice,
Blum writes that Cage’s “ethnic looks usually land him the part of brother or best friend”
(“Hollywood’s” 43). Even this kind of racially offensive marker shows that for the Brat
Pack, the individual actor’s importance lies mainly in his pseudo-demographic role.
These actors are “what the kinds want to see” (my emphasis), not “who the kids want to
see.” It is not a problem that these actors fail to distinguish themselves, for they are more
successful when recuperated into a larger group identity.
The significance of this function, where youth identity is both collective and
pseudo-individualized, is also seen in the key Brat Pack films, which strive to homogenize
youth experience into a larger collective organism. When the Brat Pack works together in
a film like St. Elmo’s Fire or The Breakfast Club, they demonstrate a youthful mimicry of
and rebellion against an older generation’s emphasis on rigid social roles. For example, in
Hughes’s The Breakfast Club, the five characters belong to one of five easily definable
high school social categories: “a brain, a beauty, a jock, a rebel and a recluse.” Heading to
detention, their parents’ cars help code for the audience the family’s class, which in turn
provides the initial motivation for the kids’ behavior. At first, Hughes has the teens
parody themselves and their perceived social roles by accentuating their economic
toughness, or acting out their parents’ wealth, or simulating the contradictions of their
moral upbringing. By more and more rigidly enforcing their own perceived role in the
group, the characters begin an antagonistic morning that soon culminates in a realization
that the differences they keenly perceive among themselves are in fact all reconcilable
under the label of youth. Since their self-images are very much constructed and mediated
by their roles as children in a stereotyped family, when placed together the teens find that
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they are equally able to deconstruct their social roles. Discovering for the first time the
contrived nature of their social lives, these youth refuse adult society’s labels in favor of
one of their own self-invention: the Breakfast Club.
This banding together of youth is significant to the 80s, even if it is soon obscured
by cinematic overuse. The effect of the first stirrings of an independent American youth
culture in the 50s, epitomized by James Dean’s character in Nicholas Ray’s Rebel
Without a Cause (1955), is still in the 80s consciousness, but now, instead of fetishizing
the lone male rebel, 80s brats come together in packs and clubs. Blum surely has some of
this is mind when he uses a historical analogy to define the Hollywood Brat Pack; it “is to
the 1980s what the Rat Pack was to the 1960s: a roving band of famous young stars on
the prowl for parties, women, and a good time” (“Hollywood’s” 42). The earlier Rat
Pack, formed in the mid-1950s, most famously included Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin,
Sammy Davis, Jr., Peter Lawford, and Joey Bishop. Of course, the label “Brat Pack”
only works because it is a direct rewriting of the mid-50s and -60s “Rat Pack,” but for
Blum the quiddity of the original Rat Pack is less important than the significance these
two groups have for their respective generations. On the surface, the Rat Pack and the
Brat Pack share little in common, so what they do share--youth, stardom, masculinity--is
all the more important. In the absence of another James Dean, 80s Hollywood cinema
forgoes the lone rebel of the 50s in favor of the collective pack; this is a marked shift in
conceptions of adolescence and youth matched by an 80s emphasis on surface, irony, and
parody.
In rewriting the Rat Pack to the Brat Pack, what journalists such as Blum do is
twofold: by using the recent past to label and organize the present, they both privilege
historical memory at the same time as they render the past less important. This attitude
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is paradoxically much less reverent about a larger sense of history at the same as it
privileges history for those able to get the references; rewriting Rat to Brat makes an
interest in a historical reference clear, but this is only a very superficial interest, a sort of
shallow history. The present is labeled from the past, with the result that this new label
then replaces the past with present. In Blum’s rewriting, we see the Brat Pack as instant
history; an instantly recognizable association to the 50s or 60s suffices in place of the
understanding of the actual historical record. Blum’s first naming of the Hollywood Brat
Pack is without the overt irony that later critics (such as Paul Rudnick) will employ to
describe these 80s youth. For Blum, these actors are less Hollywood’s joke than they are
the illegitimate heirs to the stars of the 60s; abandoned by their families,52 reliant on and in
competition with their colleagues, the Hollywood Brat Pack is the sociological marker of
Hollywood’s version of life’s narrative: a cultured, urbanized Lord of the Flies (another
example of analogous play with earlier decades, Golding’s novel published in 1954 and
Peter Brooks’ film adaptation in 1964).
By portraying these young 80s actors as part of a Brat Pack not necessarily
related to their paternal predecessors the Rat Pack, the popular press titillates its
audience with tales of Hollywood nightlife at the same time as it expresses an anxiety
over the collective aimlessness of these youth and the characters they play in movies.
Rewriting Rat Pack to Brat Pack creates a diminutive meaning by which these terms
pejoratively describe others. While the border between a demographic category (a label)
and a moral category (an insult) is generally calculable by taking into consideration such
variables as audience, subject, and environment, the fragile border crossing between a
child’s cuteness and a child’s brattiness can be more fragile. Brat Pack history is childish
history--mildly clever, “cute,” collectible, and slightly hip in its references. In this
52

Some, like Estevez and Cage, create a self-imposed exile with a last name change.
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conception of 80s youth culture (“what kids want to be”) is the kind of cute-to-some,
irritating-to-others incongruity created by parents who dress up toddlers in ageinappropriate clothing or plaster them with political paraphernalia. Brat Packers weary
quickly; what is acceptable in youth, or in small doses, or for the sake of kindness, soon
breeds contempt and condescension. While the identification 50s filmgoers had with
James Dean and Marlon Brando’s heroic characters demonstrated a stark vision of
adolescence for both adult and youth audiences, the 80s Brat Pack rarely aims itself at
adults. The “Brat Pack,” then, from the outset is a label of 80s teen cinema which is
already tedious and tenuous.

II. The Literary Brat Pack
The themes raised by David Blum’s rewriting of the Rat Pack into the Hollywood
Brat Pack--masculinity and group identity, the use of shallow history in order to
periodize the present, diminutiveness and youth attitude--continually reappear during the
80s in an oblique fashion, twisted in further rewritings of the present and recent past.
Resurrecting the Rat Pack as the Brat Pack moves us farther from understanding the
operative reasons why such Packs are culturally relevant, and instead pushes us to
simply decode and accept the label and its historical referents, satisfied at our cultural
savvy (or, alternatively, worried at our lack of savvy). If the rewriting of the Rat Pack
into the Brat Pack attests to an 80s sense of itself as some new type of historical object,
“connected” to history through surface and not substance, then what is suggested when
the newly-minted Hollywood Brat Pack itself breeds, one and a half years later, a
“Literary Brat Pack”? Like the Hollywood Brat Pack, the Literary one refers to a young
group of artists who suddenly captured much attention, critical and tabloid, at the very
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beginning of their careers. Also like the Hollywood Brat Pack, the Literary Brat Pack
refers both specifically to a core group of starter members and also more loosely to a type
of person--precocious, marketable, perhaps even talented: a lauded tyro.
In this second rewriting of the original Rat Pack is an evident quickening of
symbolic reference; the shifting of Rat to Brat to Literary Brat reveals a desperate need to
grasp the present by means of culturally established reference to the prior generation’s
adolescence. Of course, finding resonance in the past is not a new way of understanding
the present, but the accumulated speed with which the past becomes grist for the mill is
unique. The unironic cannibalizing of the recent past is in fact so sped up that products
such as “Brat Pack” quickly become references to a diverse group of fields, and before
long Brats are everywhere. Paul Rudnick is the great chronicler of the Brat for SPY
magazine, detailing scores of contemporary brats, such as women “brats with legs,”
“balding brats,” “creative brats,” “Betty Ford brats,” and “political brats” (“Do Brats
Have More Fun”). Also around this time, self-help books and articles like How To Raise
a Brat and “The Boom in Brats” warned parents about indulgence and permissiveness
while also warning the nation about the effects of adults’ self-absorbed, workaholic
yuppie lifestyles. Even on the sports page, Tatum O’Neal’s tumultuous marriage to John
McEnroe (“Baby 3 for Brat’s Pack”) continually helped cement the phrase in the media
lexicon. In America’s popular imagination, brats had become a worthy problem.
Such repetitions not only sped up the prevalence of the word brat, but
consequently the shifting cultural relevance of brats. The Hollywood Brat Pack, only a
moment ago a neologism, now becomes a legitimate historical referent itself--a cause to the
Literary Brat Pack’s effect. The disorienting effect on a culture’s sense of selfperiodization is addressed in a New York Review of Books group review of some
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Literary Brat Packers: “That they seem of their periods demonstrates how time has
accelerated, or how changes in style can make for distances” (Pinckney 14). “Making
distance” is both the method and the goal here; whether time is accelerated or whether it is
merely this time’s own fast style amounts to the same thing.
The first use of the phrase “literary brat pack” that I find is by Hilary DeVries in
a 29 October 1985 piece on Jay McInerney in the Christian Science Monitor, where she
writes of “the kind of overnight fame that characterizes the literary brat pack--that covey
of under-30 novelists” (21). Beginning to make the shift to upper case, the next reference
that I find connects the Literary Brat Pack and the Hollywood Brat Pack; Elizabeth
Kastor writes about Tama Janowitz in the Washington Post on 29 August 1986 that
“first time novelist Paul Rudnick . . . smilingly describes them as a sort of literary ‘Brat
Pack’” (C1). Finally, the critic most responsible for establishing the second rewriting
from Brat Pack to Literary Brat Pack (with full capitalization) is Bruce Bawer, a
contributor to The New Criterion and film critic for The American Spectator. In a spring
1987 essay in Arrival titled “Taking on the Literary Brat Pack,”53 Bawer is highly critical
of the artistic merits of the pejoratively-termed Literary Brat Pack, which he sees
dominating contemporary American fiction to the detriment of other, more deserving
authors. As Bawer tells the story, it all began with the publication in 1984 of David
Leavitt’s short story collection Family Dancing. Bawer comments that “at first the
critics were lukewarm or indifferent. Then Michiko Kakutani of the New York Times
gave Family Dancing a rave review--and the next thing one know, Leavitt and his stories
were the talk of the literary world” (“Metropolitan” 382). According to Bawer, this
success brought retroactive critical attention to other young fiction writers such as Meg
Bawer takes the opportunity to reproduce the main points of this article on the occasion of a later book
review of Peter Cameron’s Leap Year in Metropolitan. Since the two articles are substantially similar
(although the second piece’s past tense tone is more “I-told-you-so”), I will treat them simultaneously.
53
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Wolitzer, Peter Cameron, Susan Minot, Elizabeth Tallent, Marian Thurm, and “one or
two others” (“Taking on” 53); the cementing of the popularity of this crop of authors
then occurred with the “astonishingly glowing terms” of a New York Times Book
Review’s front page, “unequivocally positive review” of Minot’s Monkeys
(“Metropolitan” 383), and Leavitt’s National Book Critics Circle Award in fiction for
Family Dancing. This leads Bawer to his christening of these authors:
So great, in fact, is the disparity between the public image and the performance
that one is tempted to refer to this overly hyped circle of writers as the Literary
Brat Pack. . . . Like the Hollywood Brat Pack, they have an overweening sense of
their own importance in the scheme of things, and--by means of the enthusiastic
blurbs and reviews that many of them have given to each other--have helped to
distract the attention of their audience from many of their more deserving
contemporaries. Like the Hollywood Brat Pack, finally, the members of the
Literary Brat Pack have one outstanding skill: they promote themselves extremely
well. (“Taking on” 53)
In hindsight, Bawer sees the genesis of the Literary Brat Pack as a rather crude and easyto-follow plot, and it is for this reason that he is all the more baffled by the possibility
that such a thing could have happened on the front page of the New York Times Book
Review. Bawer allows for a difference between “public image” and “performance,” but
the excessiveness of this difference is striking. And while he is not explicit on this point,
there is in Bawer’s writing evident frustration at an audience who would let itself be
distracted by such an undeserving group. These kids’ de rigueur blind sense of selfimportance and unabashed self-promotion is symptomatic of youth’s folly, but the
erstwhile critics who have failed in their mission to read a “performance” outside of a
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“public image” are even more to blame; the indignity to American fiction prompted by
these unruly brats is simply unacceptable.
Responding mainly to the unnoticed confusion between “public image” and
“performance,” Bawer’s intervention was prompted by an article by David Leavitt titled
“New Voices and Old Values” which appeared in the 22 May 1985 New York Times.
“New Voices and Old Values” is a program piece (that is, both performance and public
image) for the newer authors, and as such is an example of the sort of self-promotion that
irritates Bawer so much. Although Leavitt does not include himself among these new
authors (a fact Bawer is quick to suspiciously point out), he clearly belongs with the
other Literary Brat Packers. Leavitt attempts to provide a reading of “a new generation
of writers who are recording through their fiction the changes in the way young people
think about family, marriage, love and loyalty” (“New Voices” BR1), specifically Maria
Thurm, Elizabeth Tallent, Peter Cameron, Meg Wolitzer, and Amy Hempel.
Since Bawer sees Leavitt’s piece as only so much self-promotion, he takes most
of his cues from Leavitt, continually quoting from “New Voices and Old Values,” which
Bawer calls “the principal document in the study of the Literary Brat Pack” (“Taking on”
53). One problem highlighted by Bawer’s strategy is that Bawer and Leavitt seem simply
to disagree on the significance of certain criticisms. For example, Bawer takes the
following statement of Leavitt’s: “What these writers share is not only their youth--there
are many other notable young writers whose work differs vastly from theirs--but their
predilections and obsessions, both in style and content” (“New Voices” BR1-26). Bawer
summarizes for the potentially hoodwinked reader: “There’s a shorter, blunter way of
putting all this, of course. Namely: ‘All of us Literary Brat Packers write exactly alike.’
Well, almost exactly. Almost everything they do derives directly from Carver, Robison,
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and--perhaps most of all--Beattie” (“Taking on” 54). Compare that last sentence to
Leavitt’s version: “stylistically, their work owes a strong debt to older writers such as
Raymond Carver, Ann Beattie, and Mary Robison” (“New Voices” BR26). What is a
virtue for Leavitt, a coherent expression of a patterned rereading and rewriting of a strong
tradition of American literature, is for Bawer a shameful admission that these young
authors have fallen for the baser impulses of quick and easy fiction. Practically
rephrasing Leavitt, Bawer unintentionally makes clear that what is at stake actually
concerns not the performance of literary ambition or youthful artistic style, but instead
the public image of these young fiction writers as a new gang who, in their collective
strength, aim to consolidate power under the Literary Brat Pack label.
Bawer has three specific complaints about the Literary Brat Pack: 1) the
homogeneity of both Brat Pack authors and Brat Pack characters (their subject matter), 2)
the “arbitrary specifics” of pop cultural reference that Brat Pack authors use to develop
their characters (their style), and 3) these Brat Pack author’s youthful arrogance in the
popular press (their public image).
Bawer’s most direct complaint is his first, and he relishes in reducing all Brat Pack
short stories to one archetypal sentence’s length. For example, every character went
through the same
familiar baby-boom paces: They began lives of their own in the big city (usually
New York), working in publishing houses or second-hand clothing stores; they
had colorful, frustrating love affairs (invariably with other upper-middle-class,
suburban-reared baby-boomers); they came out of the closet to their families; they
watched their aging mothers divorce or come down with cancer or die.
(“Metropolitan” 381)
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Because of their sameness, Bawer is unimpressed with what would ordinarily be
meaningful life events--relationships, sexuality, a parent’s death--and dismisses them with
the tag “baby-boom paces” of “the superficial yuppie sensibility of the 1980s”
(“Metropolitan” 380). In real life, these may be emotionally significant events, but in the
closed world of the Literary Brat Pack they become merely clichéd and incestuous. That
these paces are already overly familiar in the baby boom 80s is one criticism, that these
paces are familiarly overworked in Brat Pack fiction is yet another. “All the sensitive
young gay men seemed to be the same sensitive young gay man” Bawer complains, “all
the intelligent, distant, emotionally self-protective mothers seemed to be the same
intelligent, distant, emotionally self-protective mother” (“Metropolitan” 381). Bawer is
manifestly frustrated at any hint of self-pity, which he reads as exaggerated selfimportance--coming out of the closet is nothing big, a mother’s dying of cancer is passé.
For him, these authors fail to distinguish themselves because they fail to consider that
their subject matter is not interesting enough on its own to warrant attention.54
Bawer even goes so far as to typologize, for the sake of the Literary Brat Packers
and those duped by their critical success, the limited range of experience these fictions
deal with:
There are about four basic Brat Pack story themes: the folks’ divorce . . . , the
troubled relationship with Mom . . . , the frustrations of romance . . . , and dead or
dying mothers. . . . Many of these mothers die of cancer, and in fact cancer is a
particularly popular topic in Brat Pack fiction: in one story after another,
characters talk about their chemotherapy, undergo tests, or mention friends with
leukemia. (“Taking on” 54)
It is worth noting that two gay men are at the center of this early debate, while the later, more popular
Brat Pack authors (Jay McInerney, Bret Easton Ellis, and Tama Janowitz) each write texts that are either
repressively straight or parodically homosocial.
54
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Here, the sense of numbing sameness involves not what the Brat Pack characters make of
their lives, but more fundamentally what initially constitutes their homogenous identities.
Since childhood or the fallout from childhood is such a repeated touchstone, the Literary
Brat Pack in their early adulthood naturally focus on themes relating to their parents:
romance, relationship, death. This is less a criticism of a young generation’s attitude
towards the 80s and more a criticism of their parents’ fault in creating these brats. It is
surprising that Bawer emphasizes this thematic sameness, yet fails to consider how such
a close range of focus indicates some larger cultural feeling, instead attributing it simply to
a lack of creativity.
Worse still for Bawer, all this sameness of subject matter is foregrounded by a
stylistic sameness:
Sometimes the only noticeable differences are the external ones--the names they go
by, the TV shows they watch. Read enough Brat Pack stories in a row and the
young characters begin to run together in your mind--and the same goes for their
mothers and their fathers, their apartments and their jobs, their parents’ divorces
and cancer cases. (“Taking on” 54)
For Bawer, fictional characters need to be individualized, quirky in their own internally
particular ways. By only using external markers of difference, the reader is not given the
psychological clues needed to flesh out a character’s inner life; instead we get TV shows,
pop songs, and cologne brands. The most humorous example Bawer offers is the list of
T-shirts which Literary Brat Packers love to use: anatomical figures, Coke ads (one
English, one Arabic), Disney World, New York subway maps, Star Wars, rock bands, and
one that reads “The Only Safe Fast Breeder Is a Rabbit” (“Taking on” 55). The Literary
Brat Pack’s limited palette, built around Coke t-shirts and Mannix and GQ, reveals yet
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again that bratty self-importance beneath their writing, and the superficial details do
disservice to their already boresome themes. Picking objects over consciousness,
“arbitrary specifics” (Leavitt’s phrase, twisted in Bawer) instead of pointed observations,
the Literary Brat Pack doubly shows their immaturity.
There are actually two debates present in this criticism. The first finds Bawer
criticizing these authors for privileging surface over depth. This, of course, involves the
much broader argument about what is generally labeled postmodernism. The other, more
pointed debate involves the teaching of fiction writing and how fiction is produced for
publication in the 80s. Bawer is only one of a number of critics who have commented on
the rise in the 80s of what is derogatorily called “workshop fiction,” characterized best by
the authors Leavitt admires and Bawer impugns: Raymond Carver and Ann Beattie.
Particularly misguided is the new advice to “load up on concrete details, relevant or not”
(“Taking on” 54), which has the effect that “Brat Pack writers are more likely to give a
detailed run-down on the contents of a given character’s cupboard or clothes or television
viewing schedule than to provide a coherent and convincing set of clues to the contents of
that character’s soul” (“Taking on” 54). These brats do not leave clues to the soul,
instead they check out their buddies’ bookshelves and closets. That this practice is so
widespread is even more shocking to Bawer: “such coincidences bespoke . . . a bizarre
corporate commitment, on the part of all the Literary Brat Packers, to a very constricted
realm of subjects styles, and characters” (“Metropolitan” 383).
“Corporate commitment” is a key phrase here, as Bawer uses it to shift the
Literary Brat Pack into a framework that he and other older critics can understand. It
may be useful to note Bawer’s age; in 1987 when he published “Taking on the Literary
Brat Pack” he was 31 and Leavitt was 25. The slight difference in age may be significant.
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While both men are of the baby boom generation, the instantaneity of the Literary Brat
Pack which is so irksome to Bawer serves to further separate the two; as with all gangs or
packs, those on the outside find it impossible to gain entry. Mixing this with the
economic metaphor of the Reagan 80s, Bawer suggests that the Literary Brat Pack may
model themselves along the structure of the corporation. He has already protested their
shamelessly intermingled self-promotion, and by calling it a “bizarre corporate
commitment,” Bawer further suggests that the Literary Brat Pack misunderstand the way
in which a real corporation works--another example of these brats dressing up in their
spiritual parents’ clothes and uncritically adopting older authors’ voices, without the
slightest nod to their predecessors.
While Bawer’s age provides a tantalizingly inconclusive avenue to understanding
his criticism (is he just jealous?), the more Bawer writes about the Literary Brat Pack, the
clearer he makes his hatred for them. For example, one of many scathing remarks about
these kids’ single most irritating collective characteristic: namely, their insularity,
their smugness, their fatuous certainty that--in a country populated by a quarter
of a billion people--they and their tepid, adolescent little fictions represent the
future of the national literature. (“Taking on” 55)
Bawer is drawn towards hating these young fiction writers, and it is often on such
grounds of protecting a literary tradition (and watching out for its future) that detractors
have made their stand against the Literary Brat Pack. Unsurprisingly, though, enthusiasts
as well as shameless self-promoters have used these same grounds to make the case for
the importance of the Literary Brat Pack’s continuation of the tradition of American
literature. Some of this is self-serving--Paris Review editor Mona Simpson compared the
Literary Brat Pack scene to Middlemarch (James, “New York’s” A51); and some is not--
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Bawer wonders if Peter Cameron may not be “a yuppie Thackeray” (“Metropolitan”).
Often though, the Literary Brat Pack is portrayed as performing an 80s “fast lane”
rewrite of specific novelistic traditions and tropes, such as the novel of manners, the
“anatomy-of-a-loser” and his comic “knight-errantry,” and the lost weekend (cf.
Pinckney, Stubblefield, Wolff). Since these themes typically involve a male character’s
entrée into society, often represented by New York City or a college campus, the specific
model most often invoked is J.D. Salinger’s: “Holden Caufield’s progeny are everywhere
in American fiction” (Pinckney 12). Specifically, Jay McInerney’s Bright Lights, Big
City is often directly compared to The Catcher in the Rye (1951), as well as to Kingsley
Amis’s Lucky Jim (1954), Saul Bellow’s The Adventures of Augie March (1953), and
Truman Capote’s Breakfast at Tiffany’s (1958) (cf. Dobyns; MacDougall; Kakutani,
“Slave of New York”).55
While authors from the 1950s gave critics of the Literary Brat Pack an immediate
point of comparison, the American 1980s is most convincingly similar to the 1920s. This
is often quite self-conscious; for example, Leavitt titles an essay he wrote for Esquire
(this time, about himself) “The New Lost Generation,” with the sub-headline “It’s postSixties, pre-Eighties, and forever in between” (“The New Lost” 85). The Lost Generation
of the Roaring Twenties, and in particular its literary representative F. Scott Fitzgerald,
operates as a mythically identical time and place to 80s New York. David Blum, now
writing about the Literary Brat Pack, notes one author’s connection to the Twenties; “like
McInerney, F. Scott Fitzgerald was obsessed with himself and the times he lived in”
(“Slave of New York” 46). McInerney himself seems to agree: “People are waiting for me
to pull a kind of a Fitzgerald in my life and die of an overdose” (McInerney qtd. in “The
Although some of these have more to do with the threat of an author’s unfulfilled early promise, than of
stylistic or thematic similarities.
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Slave of New York” 40). Even Gary Fisketjon, the influential editor who created Vintage
Contemporaries and launched McInerney’s career, “is--or perhaps would just like to
seem--a throwback to the great book and magazine editors of the Twenties and Thirties”
(Carter 162). Elizabeth Young agrees, including another Literary Brat Packer: “If Bret
Easton Ellis and Jay McInerney had a literary forerunner, it is surely F. Scott Fitzgerald”
(17).56 In a bit of retroactive criticism, Young argues that Fitzgerald is so often mentioned
because “he is probably closer to the ambitious young New York writers of the eighties
such as Ellis than any of the other writers--Kerouac, Salinger--associated with youth
culture in the intervening years” (18). Associating Fitzgerald with Ellis, and not the other
way around, paints Fitzgerald as someone ahead of his time, while simultaneously
painting the Literary Brat Packers as fulfilling the Lost Generation’s spiritual mission,
begun with the Great War and really only slightly interrupted by the intervening decades.
Young explains the similarities, “The twenties were, like the eighties, a decade of
extremely conspicuous consumption for moneyed, status-conscious pleasure-seekers and
there was an enormous gulf between them and the underprivileged masses in American
society” (18). The exclusivity of the enormous gulf, primarily economic although
superficially perceivable as a cultural difference, remains in the 80s; “the loser of the
Eighties, however, is faking it. He can become a winner in the nick of time” (Pinckney
14).
Perhaps because of the Jazz Age similarities, critics and reviewers searching for a
Literary Brat Pack continuity with a tradition of American fiction tend to emphasize
generational conflict, class consciousness, and the down-and-out individual. On the
surface, these dingy themes would seem to contradict the clichéd 80s--wealthy,
And Young’s coauthor, Caveney, is tempted to compare McInerney and John Dos Passos with “a tidy
equation between the twenties and eighties” (Caveney 43).
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conspicuous, mobile; however, there is an evident pride of place for authors who write in
the down-and-out vein despite the glitz of the 80s. In the Eighties, there is perhaps an
especial bravery in admitting, say, that one’s mother has cancer, or that one’s parents are
divorcing.
Like Blum’s Hollywood Brat Pack, the Literary Brat Pack was a term so mediafriendly that it instantly flew out of Bawer’s hands, later becoming a quasi-endearing term
for three writers in particular, instead of a damning label for a new generation of
“workshop fiction” writers who have not spent enough time in the trenches. Of course,
most of these later articles focused on the “public image” of the Literary Brat Pack more
than the “performance,” and soon, the authors that Bawer originally wrote about were for
the most part ignored in favor of flashier authors like Tama Janowitz, Jay McInerney,
and Bret Easton Ellis, who (with the occasional mention of David Leavitt) are the three
now most associated with the Literary Brat Pack.57 Bawer’s neglect of Ellis, McInerney,
and Janowitz should not be read as a mistake. By writing primarily in response to
Leavitt’s “New Voices and Old Values,” Bawer constrains himself to short story writers
who are more or less entirely unrelated to McInerney, Ellis, and Janowitz. Actually, as
has been consistently pointed out, not even those three have all that much in common;
their similarities are best described not by their fiction, but by their appearances on Page
Six. Janowitz complains, “I don’t know why people compare. [McInerney’s] characters
live in New York and go to clubs, so do mine. That’s all” (qtd. in Kastor C1). But
Kastor disagrees, “in the eyes of many readers and reviewers, Janowitz does fit into a
current genealogy of young fiction writers milking a national desire for a certain deadpan
hipness” (C1). Problematically, and underlying Janowitz’s protest, is the idea of this
In fact, Caveney and Young claim that Ellis, McInerney, and Janowitz were the only Brat Pack authors
(16).
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group having a genealogy. Labeling it “a current genealogy” is a way of familializing the
Literary Brat Pack and reducing their originality; these are not just people stuck in a
room--they are tangibly related. In the same piece, we hear that “Janowitz is being called
‘the female Jay McInerney,’ a comparison all the more telling for its time and generation
specificity” (Kastor C1). The sobriquet “the female Mr. X” is distastefully common in
publishing and literary criticism, but here it points up a distinction between Bawer’s Pack
and Kastor’s “current genealogy.” Janowitz, as a woman author and thus an imitator, can
never really be a part of Ellis and McInerney’s pack; instead she is primarily part of a
genealogy. Kastor continues: “Bright Lights seemed to establish a new breed of books-Late Baby Boom literature” (C1). With his establishment of a “new breed of books,”
McInerney takes on confusingly generative possibilities. If Janowitz is “the female
McInerney,” she is so as a daughter, and not as a mother or lover. Indeed, McInerney’s
breed has no mother; if Carver and Beattie are the grandparents, it is McInerney alone
who begets the Literary Brat Pack and its genealogical possibilities.
Further reviewers’ efforts at “packing” McInerney, Ellis, and Janowitz also
cannot avoid genealogical metaphors. In particular is the common strategy where
reviewers connect contemporary authors by borrowing one author’s book titles for
reviews of another author’s books. So, while Janowitz is called “the female McInerney,”
McInerney is also slyly associated with Janowitz when Blum titles his piece on
McInerney’s Story of My Life, “Slave of New York,” reversing the Janowitz-McInerney
influences. Furthermore, two reviews of McInerney’s first novel Bright Lights, Big City-“The Fast Lane” and “Jay McInerney Enters the Literary Fast Lane”--both refer in their
titles to Jayne Anne Phillips’s short story collection Fast Lanes, published shortly before
McInerney’s first novel.
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Since Bawer did not address McInerney, Janowitz, or Ellis, his mantle is taken up
by Jonathan Yardley, who repeats Bawer’s refrain: “What all four [Ellis, McInerney,
Janowitz, Leavitt] have in common is that their first (or, in Janowitz’s case, second)
books were praised far out of proportion to their actual merits and sold uncommonly well
for fiction by unknown writers” (Yardley B2). We are returned to the source of all of
Bawer’s complaints, the meaning of which is contained in his initial temptation “to refer
to this overly hyped circle of writers as the Literary Brat Pack” (“Taking on” 53). In
Bawer’s feigned reticence (“one is tempted”) is something more significant than any of
the criticisms he makes. On the one hand, Bawer overstates his case for the sake of
rallying a defense to a threat to American letters. On the other hand, most of these
complaints are valid and are later borne out by other critical and commercial
reassessments of the Literary Brat Pack. However, throughout Bawer’s writing--and
particularly in that phrase “one is tempted . . .”--there is an anxiety moving beyond just
the fiction. Bawer has to recognize that what he attacks as unjustified hype will only
grow in proportion to the attention his formulation is paid. Despite his pejorative intent,
his label is at first recognizable as a descriptive one, and if anything, Bawer’s piece
inaugurates an even greater period of the kind of fiction he despises; intending to destroy
the Literary Brat Pack, Bawer had first to define them, and in doing so, he ensured that
they would remain. This is more than just the critic’s mistake, for it is here that the real
problem comes out: the only appropriate response Bawer and others can come up with is
that these kids are simply brats. And thus, what he introduces as new is precisely what
he creates: a pack of literary brats.

104
III. America’s Brat Pack
So, what is involved in such a formulation as the Literary Brat Pack, once it moves
from pejorative to descriptive? In the following, I will look at some popular press
responses to the Literary Brat Pack (unfortunately, academic criticism has almost entirely
shied away from this phenomenon). Looking past a simplistic reading of “The Literary
Brat Pack” as only a media-friendly marketing label, we see that the Literary Brat Pack,
taken from Bawer, is actually a rather successful piece of cultural criticism. What it
reveals about both speaker and object shifts between multiple registers: it is a
dysphemistic marker of precocity, a newly collectivized experience of self, and a mode of
relations to the American family in the 80s. Of course, the first subject position to keep
in mind is the newly self-made yuppie audience. To get the resonance of the jokes about
the new brats, a yuppie needs to be above the Brat Pack in order to “slum it”; at the same
time the yuppie is drawn to the Brat Pack because it tells of the yuppie’s recent past. In
many ways, that is what being a yuppie is all about--avoiding one’s recent past so it does
not interfere with one’s newly-minted present.
First, the phrase “Literary Brat Pack” sounds more dysphemistic than derogatory,
as it utilizes the term brat to indicate youthful precocity and so becomes an ambivalently
useful cultural label instead of simply a disparaging phrase. While Bawer was clear with
his own intentions, shifting notions about youth and success lead others to contradictory
feelings about this precocity. For example, one early reviewer seems ambivalent about
the correlation of age and success:
Some hot reviews [of Bright Lights, Big City] and a slot on the bestseller list
generated the kind of overnight fame that characterizes the literary brat pack--that
covey of under-30 novelists, including Lorrie Moore and Bret Easton Ellis, among
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others. Their sheer youth has made them something of a publishing trend.
(DeVries 21)
What is most striking is the final sentence, with its overstated phrase “sheer youth.”
What can be particularly “sheer” about youth is unanswered, but the threat is clear-youth need no other qualifications.58 While “sheer youth” certainly cannot be called a
new trend, precocity always being commercially successful, youth becomes much more
noticeable with the Literary Brat Pack. For example, in a 1988 piece in The Review of
Contemporary Fiction, David Foster Wallace deals with what he calls “Fictional Futures
and the Conspicuously Young”:
The metronome of literary fashion looks to be set on presto. Beginning with the
high-profile appearances of David Leavitt’s Family Dancing, Jay McInerney’s
Bright Lights, Big City and Bret Easton Ellis’s Less Than Zero, the last three-odd
years saw a veritable explosion of good-willed critical and commercial interest in
literary fiction by Conspicuously Young writers. (36)
What is striking for Wallace is the conspicuousness of these authors’ ages--Conspicuous
Youth is public, large, booming. Not only are there numerically more youth post-Baby
Boom, but these youth are also larger in the public imagination. Wallace demonstrates
their Blakean reversal of values: “certain honored traditions of starvation and
apprenticeship were reversed: writers’ proximity to their own puberties seemed now an
asset” (36). In these criticisms of the dreariness of contemporary fiction, Wallace’s piece
is somewhat similar to Bawer’s piece (he gives us three central plots instead of four).
The difference is that Wallace takes the long view, seeing a younger author’s conspicuous
This needs to be qualified, taking into consideration how race, class, and gender are also fundamental in
constituting the American sense of an author. If I lump all youths together to make a point about the
Literary Brat Pack (mostly male, mostly white, mostly straight, mostly upper-middle class), I do so not to
minimize these other considerations but rather to add to them the category of youth.
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efforts as an invigorating sign that American literature will have a healthy future.
In addition to banking on the high profile of these brats’ youth, publishers also
began to more consciously pack them together. The story begins with the biggest
publishing success of the 80s--Vintage Contemporaries.59 Gary Fisketjon, an old friend of
McInerney’s, was given his own line at Vintage, and “what Fisketjon did with the Vintage
Contemporaries line was create a form of name-brand publishing for baby-boomers”
(“Gliterary Life” 162). Under Fisketjon’s Vintage Contemporaries, Literary Brat Pack
authors were aimed at an audience who would respond to lower prices, a uniform and
collectable look, and a fabricated but built-in literary merit (via a backlist and symbiotic
author blurbs). Fisketjon’s plan for the first catalogue of 1984 was to repackage older
books which had not sold well, with the addition of one new book-- McInerney’s Bright
Lights, Big City. He would break tradition by putting this first novel out as a trade
paperback with a lower price than hardbacks. Most important, the packaging of Vintage
Contemporaries would ensure their mutual success; each work would be able to
piggyback off of the success of other works by featuring identical layouts, typography,
cover art, and author blurbs. The effect was striking, “only it didn’t really look like a
book. The design, with its pointillist grid and letter-spaced type, looked more like an
album cover: perfect for his audience” (Carter 165). Fisketjon’s clever dissimulation of an
album cover increased the novels’ visibility while branding a new type of reader.
Specifically discussing Bright Lights, Big City, Hendrik Hertzberg comments on
the dramatic effect of these covers: “it would have been a . . . minor classic [but] since it
originally sold over three hundred thousand copies and was the beneficiary of a shrewd
marketing campaign that presented it as a cross between a compact disc and a SoHo
See Stephanie Girard, who goes into much more detail than I can here, and includes photographic
comparisons of various first editions of Vintage Contemporaries.
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restaurant, it has been the target of much sour comment” (Hertzberg 105). This “sour
comment,” tinged with jealousy and a sense of undeserved attention, is suspicious of the
way these books create their new, contrived form of group identification. However, “for
a generation raised on baseball cards and Barbie costumes, Vintage Contemporaries have
become the latest thing to collect” (Carter 162). Like baseball cards and Barbie costumes,
the cover of these novels follow a standard template, with minimal, stylized variation.
The assumed connection between the boilerplate outer surface and the unread inner
surfaces does a disservice to the readers’ expectations of the texts. However, the
increased visibility of these novels when placed side by side on a bookshelf adds to the
pleasure of those who enjoy collecting.60
These novels, popularly known from some of those sour comments as
“yuppiebacks,” bespeak of guilty pleasures and addictions. For this reason, they are
almost the opposite of Linda Hutcheon’s thesis of what a postmodern novel contains: a
“complicitous critique.” In the case of the Literary Brat Pack, there is much complicity
on the part of the presumed Baby Boomer and Yuppie audience. While the immense
success of these novels may not have much to do with literary merit (what percentage of
novels are successful primarily for literary reasons?), they also represent something more
than a fad. Their short chapters, abundant cultural references, and humorous narratives all
add up to the fact that their slightness is a virtue; “they are all clever, topical, timely, and
ironic--the David Lettermans of the written word” (Kastor C1). These qualities help to
collectivize notions of self under the Brat Pack rubric. As such, the label the Literary
Brat Pack works in favor of the forms of consumerist identification that a yuppie society
operates by: the interchangeability of desire (if you like Product X, you’ll probably like
Consider also the Library of America, another collectible series whose first volumes were published
1982.
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Product Y), the media possibilities in the fabricated “new thing,” the branded surface
packaging, the familiarity of the popular, the impulse to self-label the current “scene,” and
the selling of the promise of Youth.
Connecting the outward appearance of these novels to the similarity of their
themes, critic Josephine Hendin sees a correlation between such activities as collecting
and collectivizing. In “Fictions of Acquisition,” she examines “youthcult fiction,” by
which she describes the “heroes and antiheroes propelled toward mythic stature by an
avid college market. [These] cult heroes dramatize the ethos of the day” (217).
Comparing such fiction of the 50s, 60s, and 70s, Hendin finds 80s youth fiction
impotent:
the comparable fiction of the 1980s seems to be giving up the counterculture
attack on adulthood, authority, and repression. There is in progress a quiet but
sharp recoil from the concepts of self and society, from the quest for authentic
emotion, from the visions of individualism and possibility that have been
animating forces in our literature. (217)
Like Bawer, Hendin sees a similarity in much contemporary youth fiction; however, she
views this similarity as a withdrawal, a similarity of quietude and abnegation. She argues
that “the youthcult novels of the 1980s reflect an enormous shift” from earlier youth
fiction because 80s fiction has lost an individualized “sense of social or generational
conflict or advocacy of a hedonistic, experiential ethic at variance with the competitive
work ethic of American culture” (Hendin 220). Characters of youthcult fiction of the
past (Hendin names Holden Caufield among others) successfully demonstrated such
rebellion against society, work, or one’s parents, but the youth fiction of the 80s does
none of these. Instead, the numbing sameness of superficial details, or drug use, or pop

109
cultural reference, replaces any sense of generational counterculture.
This is Bawer’s fear; homogenization, especially homogenized passivity, is a
threat, while an individuality born of antagonism is a virtue. Hendin argues that “this
youth fiction of personal life has been criticized for being insufficiently true to individual
differences and for accepting commercially viable, collectivized notions of self” (224).
The apathetic, docile nature of the Literary Brat Pack is disturbing to many critics.
Instead of differentiating their characters, Brat Pack authors eschew the chance to make
their characters unique, and instead buy into a “collectivized notion of self” that fails to
push forward the genre of the novel. And since their characters are not differentiated, it
seems that neither are the authors. One criticism, then, is that these authors are
undeserving and immature, another is that these authors simply see culture as being
increasingly standardized and collectivized, and, as producers of culture, are further
responsible for this tendency.
If the Literary Brat Pack cannot be seen as representing a countercultural
movement, then their grouping together is even more striking. On the surface, few would
see anything wrong in being part of a literary pack, but from what point of view are these
authors also Brats? In the third register of “brat pack” there is a state of relations with
parents that is key to understanding what Hendin sees as the recoil in youth fiction.
Tapping into a notion of “brattiness” that best characterizes the fundamentally
bothersome 80s American relationship between parents and children, the label “Literary
Brat Pack” flirts with a maturity and independence characterized paradoxically by its
dependence on parents and authority. “Brat,” in its calling to mind an unruly child, both
raises the parents’ specter at the same time as it buries it. Brats are aggressive, brats are
precocious, brats are of a certain age chronologically and socially (their sexual age, their
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emotional age, their mental age--these are irrelevant). In short, brats are brats in a social
sphere, and their behavior can say both something specific about their parents (“Tommy
is a brat, but look how his parents spoil him”) as well as something general about their
larger cultural upbringing (“All yuppie puppies are brats,” or “the children of yuppies are
brats”).
When we speak of brats, we are also speaking of parents, and in particular
mothers, who are invariably blamed for how their children turn out. Recall that Bawer
noticed an emphasis on mothers as a key constitutive element of Brat Pack fiction: “the
folks’ divorce . . . , the troubled relationship with Mom . . . , the frustrations of romance .
. . , and dead or dying mothers” (“Taking on” 54). The editors of the satirical magazine
SPY make this clear in their 1989 Cliffs Notes parody, Spy Notes, where they ridicule
the “hip urban novel” genre of the Literary Brat Pack, especially poking fun at
McInerney, Janowitz, and Ellis. Through the quasi-academic Cliffs Notes style, they
continually parody the Brat Pack’s dead mothers: “Each protagonist had a mother who
died. And so on” (Editors i). Borrowing from Tolstoy, they point out how “every
unhappy family, in fact, is unhappy in the same way, because the mother is dead or
dying” (Editors 65). In a mock quiz, they ask
Eleven of the 15 books in the genre use the dead mother plot device. Is this
because
a) in the 1980s most young people’s mothers died before the young people turned
25?
b) most of the authors are still at the age when they hate their parents?
c) each author was convinced that his or her own adolescence was much more
traumatic than everyone else’s, and a fictional dead mother is a convenient gambit
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to justify misbehavior and whininess? (Editors 76-7)
Earlier, SPY contributor Paul Rudnick wrote about the role mothers played in the fiction
of the Literary Brat Pack, making “a callous observation: they’re dropping like flies”
(“Missing Mommies” 54). While there are other narrative possibilities, like divorce, for a
Literary Brat Pack character’s “misbehavior and whininess,” “the death of a parent is the
primal shock, the first horror, the scabrous awakening” (“Missing Mommies” 54).
Indeed, if there is anything connecting this disparate group of novelists and short story
writers together, it is truly this one detail.
The brat, then, in the 80s marks out three registers of youthful subjectivity,
serving as a negatively euphemistic marker of precocity (and raising concerns about the
conspicuousness of youth), a newly collectivized experience of self (packaged for the
masses in similarly unusual-looking books), and a mode of relations to the American
family in the 80s (focusing on the child’s imagination of the mother’s death). While a
thorough sociological and literary comparison of the youth of the Eighties to the youth of
the Fifties is outside the scope of this project, I agree wholly with Josephine Hendin’s
diagnosis that 80s youth have lost the image of the lone, iconoclastic rebel popular in their
parents’ youth.61 In its place are these brats and their packs. Furthermore, it is
unfortunate that these texts have not been examined more carefully in a cross-generational
light since the singular common trope of the Literary Brat Pack--the dead or dying
mother--resonates so profoundly with movements in feminism in the 70s and 80s.
Assuming that there are other answers than the three that SPY gives above, what is it
about the mother in the 80s that made her brats so repetitively imagine her death?
In order to answer this question, I shall turn now to a reading of a Literary Brat
This loss becomes even keener in 90s “Generation X” and slacker fiction, which more aggressively gives
up on the myth of the rebel without a cause while simultaneously providing a less desperate reaction to
authority.
61
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Pack novel. Of the three authors most definitively identified with the Literary Brat Pack
(Bret Easton Ellis, Tama Janowitz, and Jay McInernery), Mcinerney with his first novel
Bright Lights, Big City (1984) stands at the summa of the genre, for it has all of the
necessary, archetypal thematic elements: early success and the promise of youth, popular
culture and the evocation of a “scene,” and a son and his dead mother. In short, Bright
Lights, Big City is the representative novel of the yuppiebacks. It is so for commercial
reasons: it quickly sold over three hundred thousand copies, it secured the success of
Vintage Contemporaries and the yuppieback phenomenon, it was made into a 1988 film
starring Michael J. Fox, a 1999 off-Broadway musical, and a new 2005 studio cast
recording, and it helped start some careers (Bret Easton Ellis, a friend and fellow Brat
Packer) and kickstart others (Don DeLillo, whose early novels were republished in
Vintage Contemporaries). Secondly, it is so for cultural and historical reasons: it features
a newly-made yuppie brat stranded in jet-set New York at the height of an 80s club
scene, it includes insider details on fashion modeling, publishing, dance clubs, cocaine use,
riding the subway, and other prurient behaviors available to Manhattanites. Thirdly, it is
the representative novel because it fits directly into the brat mold which critics like Bawer
and Hendin saw as distinctly 80s; the novel problematizes collectivized notions of self by
focusing on superficial details at the exclusion of the protagonist’s inner life, and it not
only obsesses about mothers throughout, but culminates with a brat’s memory of the
deathbed scene of his mother dying of cancer.

IV. Mom’s Brat - Bright Lights, Big City
Bright Lights, Big City follows a week in the life of an unnamed protagonist,
beginning and ending at Sunday’s dawn in New York City. The novel is written in the
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second person, and follows a familiar anatomy-of-a-loser pattern, as the narrator
62

continually fails in relationships, at his work, and among the members of his social scene.
At the novel’s opening, we learn that the narrator has lied to everyone about being
dumped by his wife Amanda, and with the aid of his hedonistic friend Tad Allagash, he
treats himself to lots of cocaine, nightclubs, and bootless one-night stands. The effect of
all this excess is that the narrator is about to lose his job in the Department of Factual
Verification of a thinly-veiled magazine (the New Yorker). Soon, he is scandalously
interrupting Amanda’s fashion shows, hiding a ferret in his ex-boss’s office, and striking
up impossible relationships with one random woman after another, each of which he
invests with much deeper significance than is actually present.
The reader is first led to believe that the main cause of the narrator’s problems is
his being abandoned by his fashion-model wife, Amanda. Bits of Amanda and their unreal
relationship appear throughout the novel, and McInerney seems to attribute this yuppie
brat’s dissolution to the state of yuppiedom in general; this is simply what happens
when one leads an amoral, shallow life. The novel’s key element, though, turns out to be
one most assiduously avoided by both the narrator and the author. McInerney treats the
true source of the narrator’s downfall, revealed in the novel’s closing, as if he were writing
a Hitchcockian thriller; in the vein of Marnie, there are MacGuffins (the job doesn’t really
matter, nor does Amanda), there are mysteriously recurring background characters (just
why does the narrator keep avoiding his younger brother Michael?), there are abundant,
potent symbols (a “Coma Baby,” bread, store mannequins), and finally there is the
penultimate flashback scene, in which all is revealed in close, psychosexual terms. It is
I will refer to this character as “the narrator,” leaving the second-person “you” when it appears in
quotations. See Girard, Kotzwinkle, and Hoffman for readings of McInerney’s decision to use the second
person. In passing, I will note that generally the second person aggressively displaces the lack of
identifiable character onto the reader.
62
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not until the novel’s end that the keystone relationship in Bright Lights, Big City is
revealed to actually be the one with the narrator’s mother; the one-year anniversary of her
death from cancer falls on the book’s last day.
Because the narrator so continually refuses to think or discuss his mother’s death,
even lying about it at one point (Bright 95), the discovery that there is another, deeper
reason for the narrator’s collapse is quite surprising to the reader. Thus, more than one
reviewer has complained that McInerney holds back a little too much a little too late. “At
the end, a revelation of a greater grief doesn’t fit all that went before. A rereading shows
that McInerney tried to hint at it, but the reader hasn’t been properly prepared”
(MacDougall B5, also cf. Moran 42 and “Bright Lights, Big City” 76). The surprise
ending confused reviewers, who thus tended to dismiss or ignore the scene with Mom; for
example, Josephine Hendin writes it off with a refrain we have heard before: in 80s Brat
Pack fiction, “not even a dying mother runs deep” (219).
Yet despite the fact, even because of the fact, that McInerney mishandles the
deathbed scene, Bright Lights, Big City remains unequivocally pointed in this direction.
The narrator’s “night shift” vigil to his mother’s death, and their final conversation,
becomes the new originary scene; in hindsight it generates quite directly everything that
chronologically follows. While the ending may be unearned, McInerney’s workmanlike
strategy is to present the reader with a constant, low-grade maternal bubbling behind the
narrator’s workday. Obsessed with the mother, the text nonetheless constantly flees
from her, and McInerney has done such a good job obscuring her that she ultimately
surprises the reader just as a ghost would. McInerney locates each of the mother’s
hauntings around two types of red herring--both some tangible object and some woman.
Since the narrator sexualizes every female he has a relationship with, the women that
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McInerney wants to matter as mother substitutes are at first unrecognizable. Of the four
significant women that the narrator’s adventures are structured around--Amanda (the
narrator’s estranged wife), Vicky Hollins (Tad’s cousin), Megan Avery (a coworker), and
Clara Tillinghast (the narrator’s boss)--McInerney apparently only intends for Vicky to
represent the narrator’s possibly positive future, but we shall see that even in this she is
allowed little more than a supporting role. By novel’s end, the reader realizes how each
of the four women serves as replacements for the loss the narrator has yet to consider,
and so as each women is taken up and set down by the narrator, McInerney reenacts the
scene which is still to come, but which creates all the scenes which follow chronologically.
For this reason, Bright Lights, Big City is both a novel of club-driven 80s New York City
as well as a hall of maternal mirrors where the narrator unwittingly runs from and towards
the image of his existence as a motherless brat.
The first of the recurring objects associated with the narrator’s mother comes
during his Monday morning subway commute, which reads like a spirit-crushing battle
that in its humorous repetition has become so obviously unwinnable as to be
unremarkable. McInerney describes routine New York City fare, such as a 50-minute
commute on a graffiti-covered train, an old lady crushed in her seat by a begging veteran,
and barkers for Times Square striptease shows. For the narrator, this is all absorbed
without any more comment than to think about the routineness of the hucksters’ spiel
and the too-bright Monday morning sun. Then, at an intersection, he sees
among the announcements of ancient upcoming events strangling the lamppost
like kudzu, a fresh poster with the headline MISSING PERSON. The
photograph shows a smiling, toothy girl, circa Junior Prom. You read: Mary
O’Brien McCann . . . . Your heart sinks. You think of those left behind, the
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dazed loved ones who have hand-lettered this sign and taped it here, who will
probably never know what happened. The light has changed. (Bright 13-14)
The intense response the narrator has to this poster is arresting--we have just seen him
make his bored way to work, ignoring his loopy surroundings, which, wild as they may
be to non-natives, are by now numbingly familiar to him. Why he is snapped out of his
wearied routine by the MISSING PERSON poster at first seems to suggest some clue to
the narrator’s character, who thus far tends to think of himself not as a person, but as a
“kind of” person; for example, “you are not the kind of guy who would be at a place like
this at this time of the morning” (Bright 1). It would thus be easy to read the narrator
himself as the “kind of guy” who is a Missing Person, stopping at a poster for himself in
a self-pitying and self-consciously adolescent way. Soon though, McInerney reveals that
the narrator has been abandoned by his wife Amanda, and the careful reader retroactively
reads the missing wife as the Missing Person. The novel now seems more clearly pointed
towards examining the loss of yuppie love, and the first-time reader may be fooled into
expecting the narrator’s eventual redemption; perhaps the light will change for him, and he
will be able to “know what happened” to his own wife? However, the initials of the
Missing Person, Mary O’Brien McCann, push us in yet a third direction. Although the
narrator’s own M.O.M. will not appear for some time, the reader already sees here, in the
language of the ubiquitous missing person poster, the kind of mourning that the narrator
has yet to make for his dead mother. Since the narrator does not decode the acronym, the
reader does not yet sense that the narrator is also one of “the dazed loved ones” who may
“probably never know what happened.” This is a recurring pattern; the narrator is much
sharper when reading others’ lives than he is when trying to read his own. Despite the
efforts of the second-person voice to sway the reader’s attention, the careful reader will
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by novel’s end also be able to see the manner in which the narrator’s mother’s death is,
for him, a paradoxically “ancient upcoming event.” Others may have already gone to the
event, but if it has not happened to the narrator, it cannot yet count.
As proof of this, the Mary O’Brien McCann poster will return a number of times
throughout the novel, each time accompanied by the same vague sense of recognition.
McInerney tends to play his hand strongly; at one point the narrator takes a walk after
getting drunk on his lunch break: “You are standing at the corner of Walk and Don’t
Walk--staring at Mary O’Brien McCann, the Missing Person poster girl--when
somebody taps you on the shoulder” (Bright 66). Much hay has been made of this line;
in particular critics focus on the cleverly observed “corner of Walk and Don’t Walk.” As
a look into the narrator’s soul, this detail offers us a quick read of the yuppie brat’s
valueless indecision. However, what truly transfixes the narrator is not the crossing sign,
but the associations that the M.O.M. poster raises. The narrator is not stuck at this
metaphoric corner because he does not know which direction to turn; he is stuck here
because the problem of motion is so much more fundamentally voided by a missing
M.O.M.
Later, the narrator sees “in a stationery store, DON’T FORGET MOTHER’S
day,” the lowercase “day” changing the meaning of the advertisement (Bright 86). Shortly
after, “You wait fifteen minutes on the downtown platform. Everywhere you look you
see the Missing Person” (Bright 86). Through the images on these two posters,
McInerney begins more explicitly to connect the Missing Person with missing mothers
(specifically, the narrator’s, although she has not yet been introduced). This theme
becomes intensified when the narrator’s exasperated brother Michael shows up in town
looking for his recalcitrant sibling, who will not return his phone calls. When the narrator
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first catches sight of his brother, he bolts: “On Madison you pass a construction site,
walled in by acres of plywood on which the faces of various rock stars and Mary O’Brien
McCann are plastered” (Bright 150). Again the metaphor is clear: the construction site of
the narrator’s psyche is plastered over and covered up by seemingly unrelated surfaces,
which ultimately reveal themselves as being integral to the reordering of his life. To the
narrator, the soul is a type of space separate from what covers it. Earlier, the narrator
remarks that his “soul is as disheveled as your apartment” (Bright 32). Finally, during his
deathbed reminiscences, he recalls that “after the funeral it seemed as if you were
wandering around your own interior looking for signs of life, finding nothing but empty
rooms and white walls” (Bright 162). That the M.O.M. poster appears so frequently in
the text is part of the papering over of the surfaces of the narrator’s New York life. The
narrator continues his flight: “You keep walking, thinking briefly about the Missing
Person, the one who’s come and gone for good” (Bright 150). No longer an “ancient
upcoming event,” the narrator finally seems closer to grasping the Missing Person for
what she is, “the one” mother who is irreplaceable in life and death.
To cement the dawning of the M.O.M. poster’s significance for the narrator, the
poster appears one final time. After being punched out by his brother, and just before his
deathbed flashback, the narrator and his brother take a walk. They notice that “at
Sheridan Square a ragged figure is tearing posters off the utility poles. He claws at the
paper with his fingernails and then stomps it under his feet. ‘What is he, political?’
Michael says. ‘No, just angry’” (Bright 160). The ragged and angry figure, an id-like
stand-in for the narrator, reacts to the posters, including perhaps one of the omnipresent
M.O.M., in a decidedly more direct fashion than the narrator has up to now. Finally
undoing his pattern of understanding others’ motivations while misunderstanding his

119
own, the narrator’s reading of the ragged figure--he’s just angry--suggests that the narrator
also will be able to go through the grieving process, making the shift from “dazed love
one” to angry “ragged figure” and on to proper mourning.
While Michael’s heavily signaled arrival on the narrator’s stoop is the immediate
catalyst for the narrator’s reckoning with his past, the more gradual cause is the narrator’s
first, wonderfully unsuccessful, mother-surrogate Amanda. The narrator only finally
connects the M.O.M. poster with his own mother after running into Amanda and her new
“Dial-a-Hunk” Odysseus at a party. After collapsing in outrage, he telephones Vicky
(Tad’s cousin), and finally confesses to her (and to himself) that his mother died “‘a year
ago.’ The Missing Person” (Bright 178). Here McInerney explicitly connects Mom and
the Missing Person, but by making Amanda the immediate cause of this revelation,
McInerney plays once more with this red herring. Further confusing matters is the
narrator’s conversation with Vicky: “‘I tried to block her out of my mind. But I think I
owe it to her to remember.’ ‘Wait. Who?’ ‘My mother. Forget my wife. I’m talking
about my mother’” (Bright 179). While the reader ultimately discovers that the Missing
Person is truly Mom, here the reader is as confused by all the “hers” as Vicky is. “Forget
my wife. I’m talking about my mother” is both the narrator and McInerney’s command,
but it is one that is hard to follow.
Bringing Amanda back so late in the novel is further confusing for the reader who
had initially marked her as a candidate for the Missing Person. The first time the text
shows Amanda’s body, she is in Saks: “inside the window is a mannequin which is a
replica of Amanda” (Bright 68). The postmodern unheimlich of this scene is belied by the
narrator’s friend “Tad’s first reaction, when you told him about Amanda’s departure,
[which] contained a grain of genuine sympathy and regret” (Bright 43). True to his
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cynical nature, Tad immediately begins to scheme about how to capitalize on the
situation, since he knows Amanda is not missing so much as she is simply absent;
Amanda is not a missing person to be found, she is just as her mannequin is: an absent,
superficial figure. The surface of Amanda’s body is everywhere in Bright Lights, Big
City, since she has literally left pieces of herself everywhere: “the place is haunted. Just
this morning you found a makeup brush behind the toilet” (Bright 37). There is also mail,
messages from friends, and more horrifying, Tad’s remark that “ninety percent of your
average household dust is composed of human epidermal matter” (Bright 43). To the
narrator, “this explains your sense of Amanda’s omnipresence. She has left her skin
behind” (Bright 43). Clearly their relationship was a “skinny” one, thin and insubstantial
during their time together, and resulting only in so much excess surface material. A
fragmented Amanda is exactly what über-Yuppie Tad expects. For him “Amanda’s
departure was not surprising but inevitable. It confirmed his world view” that living with
the pieces Amanda left of herself is not that much different from living with a whole
Amanda (Bright 116).
On the other hand, the narrator’s brother Michael’s reaction is more perceptive.
After hearing that Amanda has left, Michael (and McInerney) prompts the narrator by
asking “do you think you’d have married her if Mom hadn’t been sick?” (Bright 161).
Put in these refreshingly blunt terms, it turns out that the relationship between Amanda
and Mom is quite simple to parse: “your first love had given notice of departure and
Amanda’s application was on file” (Bright 161). Speaking of the beginning of his
marriage, the narrator uses the language of Wall Street--departure notices and
applications--to bridge the connection between loving Amanda and loving Mom. This
language turns to natal metaphors: “You kept waiting for the onset of grief [over the
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mother’s death]. You are beginning to suspect it arrived nine months later, disguised as
your response to Amanda’s departure” (Bright 162). Grasping for a way to describe the
chain of events and the reasons behind them, the narrator is even now only gradually
becoming suspicious of his earlier actions. The obviousness of these suspicions (to Tad,
to the reader) escapes the narrator since he has “made such a point of not dwelling on the
incidents associated with your mother’s death, almost denying that it was a consideration
at all” (Bright 161). But, like the pieces of herself that Amanda has left behind, the
residue of the narrator’s mother’s death continually resurfaces.
Beyond her functions as a red herring mother-surrogate, what Amanda really does
for Bright Lights, Big City is to generate an urban-rural dualism, demonstrating the evil
seduction of the motherless big city. Presented as a hick Kansan desperate to get to
Gotham, Amanda embodies for the narrator “some kind of truth and American virtue”
present in the heartland (Bright 69). It soon becomes obvious to everyone else that
Amanda is merely using the narrator to escape; he is her “ticket out of Trailer Park Land.
Bright lights, big city” (Bright 116). Of course, one problem is that the narrator is doing
the same thing. Trying to hide his own middle-class, apple-pie morality, he worries that
in New York City “where skin-deep is the mode, your traditional domestic values are not
going to take root and flourish” (Bright 116). The traditionality of the “domestic” and
domesticated lifestyle is at odds with the poisonous environment of Seventh Avenue and
fashion modeling. We see the narrator suckered into believing not only that Amanda can
represent “some kind of truth” but also into believing that there is “some kind of truth” in
the first place. The narrator is as obviously misguided about the heartland as Amanda is
about the city.
Adding to this confusion is the narrator’s increasing awareness of the falsity of the
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dualism between the urban and rural. Although continually reinscribed by the surface of
the city, the basis of this dualism turns out to be unfounded, and by novel’s end this
discovery is key to the narrator’s new sense of self-awareness. McInerney consciously
plays with this dichotomy by repeatedly invoking a prime symbol of the heartland-wheat. Wheat and bread are mentioned regularly, most often in the context of the first
two women in the narrator’s life: his wife and his mother. Amanda’s “hair was the color
of wheat, or so you imagined” (Bright 69). Since the narrator has yet to actually ever see
any wheat, he is unreliable on this score, his thoughts dominated by nationalistic fantasy:
“you pictured her backlit by a sunset, knee-deep in amber waves of grain” (Bright 69).
When the new couple moved from Kansas to New York City, “every morning you woke
to the smell of bread from the bakery downstairs” (Bright 9). With this, the idyll of the
heartland becomes the idyll of the city, connected by the smell of fresh bread. This idea
becomes repetitive when McInerney later returns us to the corner of Bleecker and
Cornelia. The narrator is going to cook dinner with another love interest, Megan: “ ‘Best
bread in the city,’ Megan says, pointing to Zito’s Bakery. . . . The fragrance of the
interior reminds you of mornings on Cornelia when you woke to the smell of bread from
the bakery ovens, Amanda sleeping beside you” (Bright 134). Associating bread-making
with the domestic woman is a hoary trope McInerney is not above invoking, but since he
is also still keeping the mother hidden, it is not until the last chapter that the author offers
the most significant associations.
In the final three redemptive pages, the narrator leaves Amanda’s party at dawn
on Sunday, walking home with a bleeding nose. Smelling bread from a bakery, he cadges
some, choking on it after not having eaten for two days. Even here, the rural-urban
dichotomy still holds for the narrator, who gives his Ray-Bans to the man for bread,
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fantasizing that this is “a man with a family somewhere outside the city” (Bright 182).
Rather than work through the earlier stereotyped associations of the rural, feminine
domestic with bread-making, McInerney here simply gives those tropes over to the men:
after the mother’s death and the wife’s abandonment, it is the men who will make and
trade bread. The novel, then, ends even more ambiguously; while the narrator is ready to
face his mother’s death and a world characterized by her absence, he seems to envision in
response a world without any women at all. Choking on the bread, he realizes “You will
have to go slowly. You will have to learn everything all over again” (Bright 182). This
final, choking communion of self-discovery turns out to be only the beginning; the novel’s
end offers us the narrator’s dawn rebirth, but not any redemption for the failure to grieve
for his mother.
The novel’s end takes the smell of baking bread, first associated with Amanda, and
perversely reworks it as a maternal theme. Leaving the party, the smell recalls to the
narrator a surprise visit home from college. Mom was baking bread, for
she said she had to find some way to keep herself busy now that her sons were
taking off. . . . You sat down at the kitchen table to talk, and the bread soon
started to burn. She had made bread only two other times that you could recall.
Both times it had burned. You remember being proud of your mother then for
never having submitted to the tyranny of the kitchen, for having other things on
her mind. She cut you two thick slices of bread anyway. They were charred on
the outside but warm and moist inside. (Bright 181)
The surprising image of the unsuccessful baker raises a problem for the reader, who would
expect a traditionally domestic childhood memory. But this is a brat’s childhood
memory, and the reader must consider the mother’s own 60s upbringing and possibly
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rebellious youth. By reversing the trope of the feminine bread-giver, McInerney leaves us
wondering how to read this scene. We could see this as an authorial refutation of the
narrator’s sexist attitudes, seeing now that he was not raised with the misapprehension
that all women are good cooks (or, that all that women are good at is cooking).
McInerney’s narrator, while himself uninterested in the act of eating,63 has however been
repeatedly noting the associations food items raise. Or, McInerney could be picking on
the mother; not expecting company, she picks up a traditional hobby only to botch it.
Read alongside a larger pattern of exclusively blaming mothers for their sons’
(mis)development, the mother’s burnt bread provides a shallow cause for the narrator’s
later stupidities. The son’s fantasy--“you are the kind of guy who . . .”--is damaged by
not having “the kind of mother who . . .” bakes bread. Instead, his is the kind of mother
who gets cancer and dies. If the mother had been a good cook, then perhaps she could
have adequately prepared a young man for entering the world of bright lights, big city.
Or, perhaps McInerney’s 80s updating of the fictional, nostalgic, maternal tradition-aproned mother ritually preparing daily bread--tries to see her as properly “liberated.”
The narrator finds a source of pride in the fact that Mom cannot cook because she has
“other things on her mind”; by refusing “the tyranny of the kitchen,” by not being “the
type of mother who . . . ,” she becomes admirable to the progressive son.
It is a stretch to read McInerney as rewriting the mother as a liberated woman;
being a poor cook is not shorthand for being a good feminist, although she does resist the
siren call of the kitchen in a household with four males. Additionally, McInerney
demonstrates his masculinist bent by giving her four sons, two of them twins, by not
giving her a name, and most of all by martyring her on the altar of the son’s manhood.
Literally because of the cocaine user’s suppressed appetite, figuratively because of the narrator’s enforced
emptiness.
63
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Oedipal interpretations aside, the death of the mother is a cruel scene, and the later
64

revelation that she also cannot manage to keep an eye on the oven does not do anything to
mitigate McInerney’s confused sense of what the mother means to the narrator, or, more
importantly, of what the mother can mean to the narrator. This confusion is par for the
course for the narrator, who only at novel’s end accepts that he must come to terms with
his mother’s death; whether McInerney is also confused or undecided about this
relationship, or if he merely desires to be cryptic, is harder to discern.
Continuing the pattern of signaling mother-surrogacy through food, the mother’s
culinary incompetence recalls an earlier scene where McInerney develops the second of
the narrator’s mother-surrogates. In the ninth chapter, “Linguine and Sympathy,” the
narrator finally makes good on a date with Megan Avery, a colleague in the Department
of Factual Verification. Megan, whose initials are also suggestive, has thus far been
mostly forgotten by the narrator. She has asked him to bring her a Tab, a bagel, and for a
lunch date (Bright 27, 63, 107). Each time the narrator has returned empty-handed and
apologetic. Megan, incredibly understanding, suggests that “you’ve had a lot on your
mind lately” (Bright 129). While this is true to an extent, the real reason the narrator
ignores Megan is clear from the way he initially describes her:
She’s older and wiser. You’re not sure how old; she doesn’t seem to have a
particular age. You would describe her as striking, or attractive, but she has such
an earnest, practical nature that it is hard for you to envision her as a sexual being.
Although married once, she seems the West Village type meant to run her own life
and help her friends through their many disasters. You admire her. You don’t
know many sensible people. Maybe you could have lunch sometime. (Bright 234)
64

See, for example, Caveney and Young’s reading in Shopping in Space (53).
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In short, Megan clearly ranks quite low in the narrator’s estimation--one of the West
Village types who is good at giving advice, who is mostly selfless, mostly sexless, mostly
available (both for the purposes of the narrator and the narration) just in case. She is “the
kind of gal who . . . ,” bland and available, exists for others, and McInerney uses her as
much as the narrator does. Introduced and ignored, it is not until the narrator is fired, and
slightly bored, that Megan is finally explored as a character. Furthermore, McInerney
makes it clear that the narrator is slumming it by hanging out with Megan; cleaning out his
desk, the narrator finds cocaine and offers it to her, thinking derogatorily to himself “for
her it might be a treat, something out of the ordinary” (Bright 131).
The two decide to have dinner. When Megan suggests that they cook, the narrator
responds “suspiciously” to this “radical idea” (Bright 133). They buy linguine and
canned clams. Since Megan’s apartment is near the narrator’s first apartment with
Amanda, memories of his estranged wife consume his thoughts (Bright 133). As he did
with Amanda, the narrator is at first over-reliant on his initial interpretation of Megan. In
her apartment, though, he begins to discover things he has never bothered learning before:
that she has two cats, that she originally wanted to be an actress, that “she has a terrific
ass” (“You have worked with her for almost two years without noticing her ass”) (Bright
136), and, most shocking, that she has a thirteen-year-old son (Bright 137). It is with this
last maternal revelation that “suddenly Megan seems much less scrutable than you had
imagined” (Bright 138). The narrator, focused on the sexual possibilities of “a man and a
woman alone in a room with a bed” (Bright 137), had asked of a picture if it was not one
of Megan’s old boyfriends. The narrator is surprised when she replies that it is her son,
and the reader is even more surprised that the narrator should see a picture of an 11-year-
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old and immediately think “boyfriend.” The narrator, trying to get a handle on Megan
65

and her inscrutability, finds himself caught between the only two ways he knows of
relating to women--as a son or as a lover.
Adding to the narrator’s confusion, Megan’s story is rather dramatic, and her
version of the drugs-in-the-80s narrative is much harsher than any of the narrator’s
nightclub bathroom escapades or jokey references to “Bolivian Marching Powder.”
Megan’s husband had her committed and took custody of her son, taking him to
Michigan66 while she was “in Bellevue stupefied with Librium” (Bright 138). She does
not begrudge her husband, though; she tells the narrator, “I was raving. Manic
depression. They finally figured out a few years ago it was a simple chemical deficiency.
Something called lithium carbonate. Now I take four tablets a day and I’m fine. But it’s a
little late to become a full-time mother again” (Bright 138). Megan is oddly resigned to
her dis-mother-ment, and McInerney gives us here another missing mother to another
missing son. Having his character say “it’s too late to become a full-time mother” makes
a point not only about the proper time at which one can be (and at which one needs) a
mother, but also makes a distinction between different type of mothers. Still near the
language of Wall Street, Megan is now a “part-time” mother (she sees her son once a
year), a role significantly less valued than “full-time” mother. Being a “part-time mother”
is always second-best, is always the fault of the mother, is always a ready punishment
for transgressions, and is a dead-end job without upward mobility.
Megan’s conception of mothers is much different than the narrator’s, who will
always be a son to his mother. Paul Rudnick adds a third possible mother to these two,
There is a numerical explanation as well. The narrator is now 24 years old (Bright 65), making him 11
when Megan’s 13-year-old son was born. The picture was “taken a couple of years ago” (Bright 137),
when the boy was about 11. So, the narrator sees himself in the photograph of Megan’s 11-year-old son-potentially both 11-year-old son and 24-year-old boyfriend.
66
Another reference to the rural/urban dualism; Megan and her husband argued over where to raise their son
(Bright 138).
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suggesting that there are “Mothers,” there are “Moms,” and, new to the 80s, there are
“Mommies.” Associating Mothers with authors like Cheever and Updike, Moms with
Roth and Albee, and Mommies with “today’s fictioneers, the bookboomers,” Rudnick
makes his distinction clear by comparing the way these maternal figures end life: “When
Mother died, people whispered . . . in their Sunday best. When Mom died, our parents
raced for the shrink, in hairshirts. When a Mommy dies, the betrayal is enormous, and
kids turn to cocaine, or Rum Raisin, or TV” (“Missing” 54). The narrator’s mother’s
death, still secret, is in Rudnick’s terms the death of a Mommy. But Megan, a part-timer
from the beginning, does not fit well into this category. Her raving, chemicallyimbalanced behavior, drugged into submission, has already caused her to be replaced by “a
wonderful stepmother” (Bright 138), and as such she operates in the novel as the
forfeiture of motherhood--a paradox to the narrator who is unable to imagine a mother no
longer being a mother, or a mother who is not really at heart a mommy.
Megan’s acquiescence to her botched motherhood is covered by the maternal
tropes McInerney associates with her. The raging, uncontrollable mother is as familiar a
theme as the homemaking, aproned one, and Megan combines the two. Very skilled in the
kitchen, she has decided to teach the narrator “how to purchase and make a meal” (Bright
133) although he is able to do little of the work: “You mostly stand and watch as Meg
flashes around the kitchen” (Bright 139). Megan knows things like the difference between
fresh and dried pasta (Bright 133), that wheat bread is better than white (and which
bakery has the best) (Bright 135, 134), how to pick produce (Bright 135), and how to
peel garlic (Bright 139). The “foodness” surrounding Megan, her skill as a cook, counters
the narrator’s mother’s culinary cluelessness, and amazes the narrator. Comparing the
two women’s relative skills, McInerney simultaneously suggests that ironically one
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cannot have a son and be a cook, and also that being a good cook is good cover for being a
bad mother. While Amanda’s hair only resembled foodstuffs, the narrator’s mom at least
tried to bake. In contrast, Megan is coded as a “good cook,” but this is only a mask when
juxtaposed with her second-best mothering. Not only can the narrator only relate to
women as either lovers or mothers, but each woman is also easily consumed by culinary
terms. The most telling example is the last-chance girl the narrator encounters at a club in
the first chapter. He eyes her outfit and quickly summarizes: “the sexual equivalent of
fast food” (Bright 6). As an indication of the superficial way the narrator thinks, this line
is often cited in reviews; reading it next to the narrator’s other relationships with women,
it is misogynistic.
Things get weird after dinner, when a drunk and drugged narrator makes a play for
Megan:
You want to disappear inside her mouth. . . . You reach a hand under her shirt.
Gently, she grips your hand and holds it there.
“No,” she says. “That’s not what you want.” Her voice is calm and soothing.
She is not angry, just determined. When you try to advance your hand she stops
it.
“Not that,” she says. When you try to kiss her again she holds you off, but she
remains on the couch. You feel like water seeking its own level, and Megan is the
sea. You put your head in her lap. She strokes your hair. “Calm down,” she
says. “Calm Down.” (Bright 143)
Megan, as the sea, represents yet again nothing more than an overused literary metaphor
for the narrator, something to disappear inside of.67 As the flip side of “some kind of
Consider also Ellis’s novel Less Than Zero, whose billboard slogan “Disappear Here” invites a different
kind of return.
67
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truth” (Bright 69) that he sought in the heartland, Megan acts as a stabilizing body,
something upon which the man can safely rest. The confusion McInerney provides for
the narrator--is Megan a mother or a lover--disrupts any meaningfulness that this scene is
meant to convey. Either we read Megan as the raving female body, repressible through
drugs but otherwise frantically out of control, or we read Megan as the calming, docile
sea. That she has been tamed and subdued by her initial failure at being a mother makes
her attractive to the narrator. Offering the narrator a reading of his (and our) confusion,
she says of her breast “that’s not what you want.” In many ways, she is wrong. While
McInerney still has yet to reveal the mother’s death, it is becoming clear that the maternal
breast, with its nourishing occlusion of the sexual aspects of the mother’s body, is as
close to “what the narrator wants” as one can get.
Megan drops immediately from the narrative; this is the last we will hear of her.
Whether she is lover or mother is a minor mystery, resolved when, at night’s end, the
narrator urinates in his pants, leaving M.A. to clean him up and tuck him into bed.
Clearly, Megan disappears here because she is not going to be a lover. On one hand,
Megan is the most successful mother-surrogate that the narrator finds because she is such
a bundle of contradictions. On the other hand, Megan, like the narrator’s mother, is an
assumption, and in this they are identical. To the son they are both taken for granted:
perpetually present, selfless and undefined, and unproblematically simple--until they
become unavailable. Perversely, forgetting is a sign of affection in McInerney’s novel; all
those Tabs and bagels the narrator forgot, all the repressed moments with his mother-these are what matter to the narrator.
There is yet another maternal association to food, this time more grotesque.
Earlier, on his lunch break, the narrator went to a deli for a sandwich (forgetting Megan’s

131
Tab). At the deli, “the bald man behind the counter whistles cheerfully as he slices the
meat. ‘Nice and lean today,’ he says. ‘And now for a little mustard--just how your mom
used to make it’” (Bright 27). This comment enrages the narrator: “‘What do you know
about it,’ you ask. ‘Just passing the time, pal,’ he says, wrapping it all up. All of this,
the dead meat on ice behind glass, everything, puts you off your meal” (Bright 27). The
cheerful deli guy manages to “wrap it all up” by an apology of sorts, but both reader and
narrator are left put off by the deli man’s innocent remark, and especially by the
narrator’s overreaction. What is confusing here is whether the narrator is simply
wounded by memory, or if he is not more bothered by the deli man’s insinuation that he
might know something about the narrator’s childhood. The deli man’s remark relies on an
understanding that he and the narrator are bound by a certain shared experience, whether
it be the experience of ordering pastrami-on-rye and egg creams, or the experience of
having mothers make sandwiches for them. There are also class issues here; McInerney’s
deli man fits a classic mold--bald, cheerful, chatty, whistling--that irks the narrator as
much for its stereotypicality as for its familiarity. The deli guy reminds the self-made
yuppie, constantly navigating between who he is and who he wants to be, that the
fantasy of losing yourself in the city is easily short-circuited at every meal. In “The
Short Happy Life of the American Yuppie,” Hendrik Hertzberg remarks on “a popular
yuppie phrase, possibly connected with the well-known yuppie preference for grilled
fish and crunchy vegetables”--“dead meat” (101).68 Hertzberg cites “dead meat” as a
colloquial threat to an employee or competitor. Here, the mother’s “dead meat” which
puts off the narrator is also connected to the next chapter, where the narrator will get
himself fired. In this, McInerney very subtly connects the narrator’s downfall--he is
Interestingly, another vegetarian-friendly way of saying this-- “you’re toast” --was popularized by the
1985 film Ghostbusters (used in a 1983 draft). The proleptic slang “to be dead meat” has been around
since 1849.
68
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soon to be “dead meat” at work--with his mother’s death--her corpse is, morbidly, merely
“dead meat” now.69
It has been suggested that this scene indicates the manner in which the narrator
relates to his mother primarily through media, since the deli man’s comment reiterates a
mustard advertisement (Stubblefield 93). The text is filled with such instances of media
forcefully reminding our narrator of his mother. For example, after being fired, the
narrator stops to listen to a sidewalk guitarist playing blues. The songs he plays
comically upset the narrator: “Ain’t Got No Home,” “Baby Please Don’t Go,” and “Long
Distance Call.” “You turn away when he starts into ‘Motherless Children’” (Bright 107).
Urban culture screams themes of abandonment, loss, and rejection; the narrator’s flight
from them is foolish at best. Like the M.O.M. poster, the recurring smell of bread, and
the pieces of Amanda, we see here a certain type of memory in objects, a form of memory
which is appropriate to a superficial society.
More explicitly so is the way in which the narrator’s situation is transposed onto
the headlines of the tabloid daily New York Post,70 which takes pride of place as “the
most shameful of your several addictions” (Bright 11) because it “confirms your sense of
impending disaster” (Bright 57). The Post is contrasted to the “New York Times, the
newspaper of record and of choice” (Bright 58) at the narrator’s workplace. But his story
is not one of “Killer Bees, Hero Cops, Sex Fiends . . . Tough Tots, Sicko Creeps, Living
Nightmares, [or] Life on Other Planets”; although some of these elements are certainly
present, it is the “Coma Baby” that speaks most to him.
The Coma Baby is the most significant and obvious metaphor concerning the
narrator’s mother’s death. The Coma Baby, who is the fetus of a woman lying in a coma
We are later recalled to this scene when Megan and the narrator go into a delicatessen and then walk past
“Ottomanelli’s Meats, where the corpses of small animals hang in the window” (Bright 134).
70
The paper, purchased by Rupert Murdoch in 1976, became trashier under his ownership.
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after a car crash, is introduced two pages before the M.O.M. poster. As a figure of the
narrator, the Coma Baby’s regular appearance in the Post and the novel offers a running
commentary on the narrator’s fragile relationship to his rebirth. On his morning
commute, the narrator reads the second page item: “COMA BABY SIS PLEADS: SAVE
MY LITTLE BROTHER. There is a picture of a four- or five-year-old girl with a dazed
expression” (Bright 11). The sister provides a direct link between Coma Baby, the
narrator, and the M.O.M. poster when the “dazed expression” on her face is echoed two
pages later in the narrator’s imagination of “those left behind, the dazed loved ones who
have hand-lettered” the M.O.M sign.
True to character, the narrator is generally out of it enough that he is unable to see
the significance of Coma Baby to his own life--even when he has a rather opaque anxiety
dream about the Coma Baby, his boss, and his failure to verify a piece on French
elections. His dream opens the fourth chapter, “A Womb With a View.” Sneaking into a
hospital, the operating room turns out to be the narrator’s office; his coworkers are
speaking French and doing drugs.
The Coma Mom is stretched out on your desk in a white gown. IV bottles are
hanging around the bookshelves, tubes plugged into her arms. The gown is open
around her midsection. You approach and discover that her belly is a transparent
bubble. Inside you can see the Coma Baby. He opens his eyes and looks at you.
(Bright 54)
For the narrator, this is frightful stuff, which becomes scarier when the reader connects
the Coma Baby’s bratty and selfish attitude towards Coma Mom with the narrator’s
attitude towards his own varying mother-surrogates.
The narrator has been cultivating the unfortunate habit of looking through
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people, and in his dream this practice is literalized. Although the “Womb With a View”
71

ostensibly refers to the Coma Baby’s view outwards, more troubling is others’ view in.
For example, the Post calls it “Coma Baby,” as if it were already born, instead of, say,
“Coma Fetus.” Rather than critique this side of the womb with a view and examine how
Coma Mom’s magically transparent belly is a particularly bratty way of thinking about
birth and the special importance of children (mothers are as depersonalized as hospital
incubators), McInerney writes a scene that is ignorant of its anti-maternal setting, and
reduces the mother to a mere vessel (it is her womb, but it is the child’s view). Looking
through the window of the comatose mother’s womb, the narrator sees himself alive and
kicking. McInerney’s description also calls to mind the antiabortion movement’s tactic of
focusing exclusively on the fetus at the expense of the mother. The “transparent bubble”
which is the Coma Mom’s belly is an extremely frightening fantasy with associations that
continue outside of the dream; while Coma Baby is of much interest to Bright Lights, Big
City, Coma Mom is of little. This may be because, for the narrator, mothers are already
dead by novel’s beginning. As far as the narrator is concerned, then, the Coma Mom only
offers a second chance to deal with his mother’s death. Slow, spectacular, mediated,
succinct--in the Post headlines the narrator is able to find the preparation for mourning
that he was unable to find in real life. Prepared by a dramatized death, when the narrator
reads of the Coma Mom’s death, it is hardly worth mentioning, since the Coma Baby
survives.
The narrator learns of Coma Mom’s death the morning after his night with Megan.
The effect of that juxtaposition of mothers and lovers is to once again do away with the
mother in service of the son. This is emphasized even more keenly when the narrator in
Perhaps taking a cue from Tad’s cousin’s girlfriend, “you knew she was the real thing when she
steadfastly refused to acknowledge your presence” (Bright 3).
71
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his dream speaks past Coma Mom’s body to the Coma Baby, who is more irked than
anything at the interruption:
“What do you want?” he says.
“Are you going to come out,” you ask.
“No way, José. I like it in here. Everything I need is pumped in.”
“But Mom’s on her way out.”
“If the old lady goes, I’m going with her.” The Coma Baby sticks his purple
thumb in his mouth. You try to reason with him, but he does a deaf-and-dumb
routine. “Come out,” you say. Then there is a knock on the door, and you hear
Clara Tillinghast’s voice: “Open up. It’s the doctor.”
“They’ll never take me alive,” the Baby says.
The phone is ringing. The receiver squirts out of your hand like a trout.72 (Bright
54-55)
In his dream, the Coma Baby represents the male product of the 80s, and is therefore
freighted with conflicting interpretations: Coma Baby is the narrator, is the type of
person that the narrator wants to be, is the type of son that the narrator does not want to
be, is the kind of kid that America is afraid of raising. The Coma Baby is a fantastical
screen for projected anxieties and dreams; what it means (to the narrator, to the reader, to
the author) depends so much upon what else is happening in the narrative. What Coma
Mom offers is a new nightmare for the Me Generation--someone talking to you not from
the grave, but from a “womb with a view.” The Coma Baby, buried alive before he is
The simile of the phone squirting “out of your hand like a trout” is at first bizarre, although it fits into a
larger pattern of fish and fishing references, for example the narrator taking note of the “WISE MEN FISH
HERE” sign outside of Gotham Book Mart (Bright 68) or the narrator describing the sound of dropping a
cocaine vial into a toilet as “an insolent splash that resembles the sound of a very large brown trout
spitting out the hook of a very small and painstakingly presented dry fly” (Bright 105). In addition to
signifying an often difficult, time-consuming, and occasionally fruitless task, the rural, youthful image of
fishing works as the narrator goes on a journey first to fully “citify” himself, and then a reverse one home
to embrace the idyllic country. Another reading of fishes and loaves is possible.
72
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born, is satisfied; from the yuppie perspective, the womb is little more than an idealized
drug lab--a fetus permanently plugged in, fed, narcotized. For the Coma Baby, Coma
Mom is little more than a source; for the reader, though, it is hard not to see yet another
dying mother and yet another lonely son.
In the Coma Baby’s gung-ho, cowboy western attitude, the narrator also comes to
regard the idealized utopian womb as worth defending. Referring to Coma Mom as “the
old lady,” saying “no way, José,” and rephrasing Humphrey Bogart’s famous line from
High Sierra (1941), “you’ll never take me alive, coppers,” Coma Baby demonstrate a fetal
determination that at first surprises the narrator. Here, the Coma Baby’s tough-guy
speech points out that not even the womb is safe from the effects of popular culture, and
that as a potent symbol, the womb is fair game for a continually rewritten expression of
the current culture’s values and anxieties. A little Bogart in the womb, the Coma Baby is
already primed for a life as a brat. He claims he would rather be dead than without his fix,
which suggests that, like the narrator, he could not possibly imagine a world without
Mommy, and his refusal to “come out” is conflated with the situation of the surrounded
criminal: a shoot-out is in the works.
The morning after this dream finds the Coma Baby “buried on page five. No
developments: ‘COMA BABY LIVES’” (Bright 57). McInerney later uses this headline
to explicitly connect the Coma Baby to the narrator. Adding an exclamation mark, “Coma
Baby Lives!” becomes the title of the sixth chapter, which concerns the narrator’s date
with Tad’s cousin Vicky, a third possible mother-surrogate. There are no references to
Coma Baby in this chapter, and so the chapter’s title must refer directly to the narrator,
who surprises himself by having a wonderfully restrained, drug-free date. Yet, the
authorial excitement for the narrator’s sake, who is finally getting it together, is marred by
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the comparison to the Coma Baby. While McInerney wants us to read this chapter as a
source of hope for the narrator’s future, it is difficult not to see the narrator as living in
the same manner as the Coma Baby is living: selfishly refusing to open up to those
around him. This is exemplified by yet another of the narrator’s feints about his mother,
where he, channeling some of the Coma Baby’s cynical machismo, misleads Vicky.
During a walk in his old neighborhood, the narrator imagines Vicky’s ideal past: “a vivid
image of this childhood Arcadia,” complete with “gazebo . . . tea parties,” “chickens in the
boathouse,” “empty rooms to play in,” and “pets galore” (Bright 94). Despite the idyllic
past, the narrator is suspicious:
The irrevocable past tense of the narration suggests to you some intervening
tragedy. You suspect a snake in the vegetable garden.
“Your parents?” you say.
“Divorced three years ago. Yours?”
“Happy marriage,” you say.
“You’re lucky.”
Lucky is not the word you would have chosen, except maybe out of a hat. (Bright
95)
Here, the narrator lies by omission--both to himself and about himself. While his parents
did have a happy marriage,73 this is hardly the appropriate answer to the open-ended
question “your parents?” especially considering that it is the narrator’s hypocritical
reservations about Vicky that begin this line of conversation. His lie is even worse
following Vicky’s honesty about divorce. The narrator’s one-upmanship--my childhood
was happier than yours--fits with the attitude he reveals when he thinks, “lucky is not
the word you would have chosen, except maybe out of a hat.” The narrator’s statement
73

His mother says “Your dad and I have been happy” (Bright 166).
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cleverly confuses the meaning of luck. The narrator acts as if luck was always something
smart yuppies could choose if they so desired, and that the randomness of luck is only
incidental to the more determined choosing that the self-made man makes. As a yuppie
strategy, getting lucky is equivalent to making oneself lucky.
The yuppie’s conception of luck is also part of the novel’s discussion of cancer.
The narrator’s mother’s painful death is the most dramatic instance, but the theme of
cancer plays a bit part throughout in collapsing the narrator’s sense of self-control, of
determined luck. At first, cancer is a bad joke on Allagash’s part. Out at clubs, Tad has
taken to telling girls unbelievable lies to explain Amanda’s absence and to garner enough
sympathy for the narrator to “make a fine erotic career” (Bright 43). For example, we
hear that Amanda died in a plane crash on the day of their first anniversary (Bright 44),
that she was killed in a crossfire between terrorists and French police (Bright 45), and that
she was Che Guevara’s illegitimate daughter, dying in prison after being tortured by South
American generals (this last a story of the narrator’s own invention) (Bright 50).
Crossing the line, though, is when Tad says that Amanda died from leukemia. “I do not
appreciate this leukemia bit,” the narrator says. “Not funny” (Bright 51). To Allagash’s
protest that he’s “just trying to boost sales,” the narrator says “I’m not amused. Bad
taste” (Bright 51-2). Tad’s witty rejoinder to this is not only in accordance with his
callow nature, but it also demonstrates the cynically relativistic view of the world that
produces the yuppie’s long view of luck. “‘Taste,’ says Tad, ‘is a matter of taste’”
(Bright 52). Tad “gives” Amanda leukemia, controlling her past as surely as he controls
his own.74
Cancer returns the next morning, shortly after the narrator’s Coma Baby
The other connotation of “taste,” sampling drugs, recalls Kathy Acker’s remark in Great Expectations
(1982) that “the total nihilism of 1979 caused nothing but O.D.’s and cancer” (78).
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nightmare. Entering the office, the narrator finds his colleagues looking at a copy of the
New York Times: “one of the magazine’s writers . . . has just won a big award for her
series on cancer research. Cancer. . . . You are about to nod your head and impersonate
enthusiasm when you see the ad on the facing page” (Bright 58-9). The ad on the facing
page features Amanda, and the narrator is shocked to learn from this that she has returned
to New York from Paris. The juxtaposition is too much for the narrator; he gets dizzy:
“Leukemia, Tad said” (Bright 59). While Amanda seems to cause him to swoon, in
retrospect it turns out to be the mother’s real cancer, and not Amanda’s distasteful
cancer, that is most troubling. As in the later party scene where the narrator confuses his
“hers,” McInerney still refuses to play straight with the reader. While Amanda is the
apparent cause of the narrator’s immediate problems, she is also entirely unimportant.
We are now left with the novel’s originary scene: the narrator’s flashback75 to his
mother’s death. McInerney intends this scene to be both grotesquely unsettling and
comfortably familiar, as the mother’s near-corpse holds out for one final, tender scene.
Showing up near the end, the narrator is shocked by the mother’s aspect: “you thought
you would faint [at] the ravaged form. Even the smile had shifted. . . . You wanted to run
away. But the horror passed” (Bright 164). Just as he did with Megan, and with most
women, the narrator has taken his mother for granted; “but for those last hours you might
never have really known her” (Bright 164). McInerney wants to shatter the narrator’s
conception of his mother. She asks him about cocaine and about sex. “Your mother, who
never smoked a cigarette in her life, who got loopy on two drinks. . . . You always
thought your mother was the last Puritan” (Bright 165). After this unexpected
conversation, “the wasted flesh seemed illusory,” and the narrator began to “see her
somehow as young, younger than you had ever known her” (Bright 166). This new phase
75

The second of two flashbacks; the first which recounts Amanda’s story.
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in their relationship--mother as fellow 80s confidant--is attributed wistfully to her
impending death: “I wish I’d known a long time ago that I was going to die” (Bright 165).
The memory starts to ring false notes here; the mother’s eagerness to discuss her son’s
sexual partners and pleasures clearly signals the kind of fantasy that we are in--the
mother’s unplumbed depths become a source of regret only slightly mitigated by the
son’s final, adult relationship with her.
The son’s fantasy of his mother’s curiosity is thematized by the mother’s pain.
McInerney has the narrator’s mother suffer horribly; she can no longer sleep or swallow,
and requires a morphine injection every four hours. The mother tortures herself on this
pain for the narrator’s sake, not taking morphine because “she wanted to talk, to be clear”
(Bright 165, 167). When the conversation turns to the narrator’s childhood, her pain is
associated with the narrator’s unruly behavior: “‘You were a funny boy. An awful baby.
A real screamer.’ Then she grimaced and for a moment you thought it was the memory of
your screaming” (Bright 167). The narrator was the worst of all the siblings, and this
makes him proud. “Unbearable as an infant, always throwing up, biting, crying through
the night,” (Bright 168) the narrator, like the Coma Baby, is a brat from the beginning. As
her own pain worsens, the mother says “it’s like when you were born. It sounds crazy,
but that’s exactly what it’s like” (Bright 168). Her dying hurts as much as her son’s
birthing; the two are equal in this respect. She continues, “I didn’t think I’d live through
it,” (Bright 168) echoing what we’ve heard the narrator say earlier: “before it happened
you couldn’t believe you would survive your mother’s death” (Bright 161). The
unbelievable equations of pain--birth, dying, and mourning--are not only an example of
trite, ashes-to-ashes symbolism, but are also simply abusive and paternalistic. As the sun
comes up, his mother dies in pain, holding his hand. Her last words, “don’t let go”
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(Bright 169), are weepy, lachrymose, and suspicious. The suggestion that the narrator
literally interprets these words, refusing to let go by not mourning his mother, further
vilifies the dead mother.
The novel does not end with mother’s death, but rather as it began: at sunrise on a
Sunday morning. The mother’s death, which was also timed to the rising sun, becomes
another element in McInerney’s association of mortality and this culture’s morality.
Bright Lights, Big City is not far from the vampire story, with its “between” (Girard),
undead narrator. What is most striking is that while McInerney attributes most of the
narrator’s relationships to sexual desire, “the touch of flesh” (Bright 8), the author also
makes each relationship a life or death situation, a play to cheat mortality: “almost any
girl, specifically one with a full head of hair, would help you stave off this creeping sense
of mortality” (Bright 4). Mortality, already associated with bread, is also in particular
summoned by sunlight: “if you go out into the morning alone . . . the harsh, angling light
will turn you to flesh and bone. Mortality will pierce you through the retina” (Bright 6).
McInerney is not done yet, though, for the coked-out, club-going vampire will have to
contend not only with sunlight, but with his mother’s memory as well; leaving the club in
the first chapter “is even worse than you expected, stepping out into the morning. The
glare is like a mother’s reproach. The sidewalk sparkles cruelly” (Bright 8).
The mother’s imagined reproach--the sun’s glare--continually reappears: “the glare
from the sidewalk stuns you; you fumble in your jacket pocket for your shades” (Bright
27). These shades, traded finally to the man for bread, are the narrator’s weapon against
the sunlight and the increasing brightness of his mother’s memory. The “bright lights” of
the title refer not only to the brightly exciting neon lights of night time, but also to the
brightly painful sunlight of a morning hangover. It is through these latter bright lights that

142
the mother suffuses the text. Dazed by the excessive brightness, the narrator is blinded to
any recognition of his mother, and until he gives up his Ray-Bans to the bread man,
McInerney also continually keeps the reader shaded from the significance of the mother’s
death on the son’s burned-out existence in New York City.
It is in both of these bright lights, however, that the son’s guilty imagination of the
mother’s reproachful glare threatens to undo the illusioned life the narrator desperately
wants to lead. He is “the kind of guy who . . .” wants to lead a life where wives do not
run off and where mothers do not die, or at least have the good decency to die a quick,
meaningless death, preferably while in a coma, at the hands of a crazed sex killer, or in a
freak accident. Something, in short, reportable and newsworthy. Shining through in the
end, though, is the mortal, piercing ray of maternal ambivalence; the mother is gone, and
while each of the son’s problems are traceable back to her absence, they are each also
caused by his own dazed guilt and fantasy over his improper, avoided mourning.
McInerney dedicates his novel “FOR MY MOTHER / AND FATHER, AND FOR
MERRY.” Merry is McInerney’s second wife; they divorced the year after Bright
Lights, Big City was published. Other than this dedication, there are no fathers in the
novel, and the only other named male characters work with the narrator; gay, pedantically
scholastic, or dodderingly old, none of them are remotely father-like. McInerney’s
mother, though, takes pride of place in his dedication and at the novel’s emotional core.
Falling short of an apology, the guilty narrator’s choking on bread does promise a return
to a normal life for the sake of the mother’s memory; the brat’s flight to yuppiedom,
which the novel’s details revel in, is shown to be only so much escape from the
inescapable confrontation with a mother’s very un-80s death.
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Chapter Three
. . . Mater sed certissima and “In the Matter of Baby ‘M’”
“‘Pater semper incertus est,’ while the mother is ‘certissima.’” (Freud, after the Latin)
“Well, who’re you going to believe? Certainly not a mother, not these days.” (Barbara
Katz Rothman, “Comment on Harrison” 312)

I. Feminism and the NRTs (matter)
This chapter will consider scientific and legal techniques by which the 1980s
absents the maternal in its figuration of a new type of feminine subject. Following
Foucault, I mean to think of these techniques as practices that structure
problematizations in a culture, and so this chapter will look at both actual scientific
techniques that are new to the 80s, as well as legal, social, and cultural techniques of
dealing with supposed technological novelty. First, though, a brief restaging of the
feminist debate regarding science and technology,76 as it relates to that period’s feminists’
increasingly nuanced understanding of their troubled relationship to science. To begin
with, one way of putting the question of the interrelation of science and feminism is to
look materially at biology, tracing a history of all forms of women’s oppression
(physical, economic, social, political, legal) to unequal reproductive roles stemming from
biological difference. Since reproduction,77 presumably desired by all members of a
By the former I mean generally the paternalistic implementation of the latter; no implement of
technology being essentially evil or benign, but also no implementation of technology coming without a
scientific agenda. I have in mind specifically critics such as Donna Haraway, Valerie Hartouni, Rosalind
Pollack Petchesky, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Vivian Sobchack.
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I use the word “reproduction” cautiously, noting that it is just the most recent (1782) of the following
similar words: “generate” (c. 1374), “procreate” (1386), and “beget” (1205). See the Oxford English
Dictionary for more, but in passing it is interesting to note that the connotations of “reproduction,” later
criticized by feminists as having dehumanizing and technological overtones, were also criticized at its
earliest usage; the first OED citation has Wesley complaining that Buffon “substitutes for the plain word
Generation, a quaint word of his own, Reproduction, in order to level man not only with the beasts that
perish, but with nettles or onions.”
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species, results in unequal consequences qua labor, time, and investment (all three
including physical, emotional, and economic vectors), one half of the reproductive pair
has historically been treated unequally outside of the reproductive paradigm.78
Additionally, as the technologically mediated use of new assisted reproductive techniques
rapidly increases in America’s postwar era, it in turn strongly “reinforces the already
near-compulsory cultural bias toward maternity” (Farquhar, “Reproductive
Technologies” 6). The result is an increasing ambivalence in late-70s and early-80s
feminist discourse about America’s entrenched pro-natalism, charted in Nancy J.
Chodorow and Susan Contratto’s “The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother,” which argues
that authors such as Nancy Friday, Judith Arcana, Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Adrienne
Rich share a “belief in the all-powerful mother [which] spawns a recurrent tendency to
blame the mother on the one hand, and a fantasy of maternal perfectibility on the other”
(80). In a similar context, Susan Suleiman in Risking Who One Is, points out the effect of
such a single-sidedness: “it is as if, for psychoanalysis, the only self worth worrying
about in the mother-child relationship were that of the child” (16). It is against this
version of the all-powerful mother in the early 80s that new scientific techniques measure
themselves.
When a new technique comes about which upsets or affects the traditional
procreative arrangement, there can be at the least two feminist responses. On the one
hand, if science and its products can help erase, or at least begin to efface, sexual
difference in the reproductive roles, then women could embrace such science as a means
for restoring fairness between the sexes, a radical version of this being Shulamith
Firestone’s early 70s example of “cybernetic communism.” On the other hand, this
This is true, the argument goes, for recorded history, which is in turn somewhat coincident with the
development of man’s idea of his role in reproduction, a role of which he was initially, in prehistory,
ignorant.
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erasure of biological difference, most often instigated and controlled by male scientists and
legislators, can in practice become destructive of a woman’s fundamental right to her own
body, a right of autonomy which is imperative regardless of intention or outcome. So it
becomes of more than passing concern to distinguish, in regards to science, between rights
affecting an individual woman and those affecting women as a class group; while a new
reproductive technology may enable a woman, say, to make money from the products of
her body just as men do (fertility figured as a woman’s “natural asset”), it is also easy to
imagine another group of women from whom these products are coerced or taken by
inducement. The compromise position attempts simultaneously to recognize and to
minimize biological difference in the “granting” of bodily autonomy to women. The
question, then, surrounds the economies of a woman’s body--an “unnatural” technical
manipulation of a natural bodily product creates a possible service in turn dependent
upon the laws of supply and demand, of competition and the free market, and finally,
regarding women’s bodies in particular, the legislative or juridical regulation of such an
economy. For feminists, it seems, the question of balancing an embrace of motherhood as
something more than an “activity” (cf. Rothman) without falling into a biological
determinist model is especially thorny in the Reagan 80s because, as Valerie Hartouni
observes, “particularly during the 1980s, public discourse and debate have been
obsessively preoccupied with women and fetuses. The 1980s began, need we remind
ourselves, in a flurry of antiabortion, antigay, anti-ERA, profamily, prolife, pro-American
rhetoric” (32). This flurry of attitudes is undoubtedly in response not only to feminist
interrogations of the notion of the family and mothering, but also in response to the
feeling, shared by feminists, that “we are now faced in the 1980s with a situation in which
all aspects of reproduction have come under the command of science” (Jacobus, Keller,
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Shuttleworth 3). As far as science goes, the question introduced by new techniques are
under even more scrutiny by feminists as these techniques redefine woman’s bodies, and
especially so in the technologies surrounding infertile and fecund--motherly--bodies.
One example of earlier feminist ambivalence regarding the aims of science would be
the response to the introduction of oral contraception in the 1950s. It has been shown
that the history of the development of the pill is rife with questionable attitudes towards
women, from the use of Puerto Rican women as guinea pigs to an apparently arbitrary
standardization of women’s menstrual cycles to a strict 28-day period (cf. Asbell).
Nonetheless, the reproductive choice that the pill is meant to allow women is profoundly
important to their fraught and contested bodily rights. The pill is perhaps the best
analogy for initially framing the thought about the new or alternative reproductive
technologies of the 1980s, which once again threaten to upset the traditional reproductive
roles of the sexes (even some of the same panic-driven rhetoric is present--there will be an
increase in female promiscuity, destruction of the family, and a lessening of the
population). In the case of the later reproductive technologies, though, the pill’s choice is
reversed: if the pill allowed sex without reproduction, then the new reproductive
techniques of the 80s allow reproduction without sex.
Like the pill, however, these new reproductive techniques turn out to be less
“new” than promised. While there are some distinctly new scientific achievements, the
majority of the “new reproductive technologies” that captured public attention in the 80s
are actually just newly created ways of understanding older traditional forms. For
example, surrogate motherhood, one of the important minor social issues of the 80s, is
upon reflection, actually nothing new at all. As everyone who writes about surrogacy is
quick to point out, surrogacy has Biblical precedents in the story of Abraham, Sarah, and
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their handmaid Hagar (Genesis 16). Fictionalizing the recurrence of that tale in the nearfuture, Margaret Atwood’s 1986 novel The Handmaid’s Tale can be read as a
“speculative ethnography of the present” (Balsamo 83).79 Despite the foreignness of the
Genesis tale to modern ears (those were “different times”) and the disavowal of the moral
lesson’s utility (it is a “special exception”), it does seem to offer a precedent of sorts.
Discussing the mixed fascination with the Genesis story, E. Ann Kaplan points out that
the fact that surrogacy “is old and does not actually require any medical sophistication . .
. may be part of its appeal” (“Politics” 117). Kaplan cites a number of surrogate
narratives, each of which has strong ritualistic aspects and often a decided lack of medical
sophistication, such as the one involving a turkey baster and its nod to Thanksgiving.
Another critic demonstrates how the judge in an important surrogacy case “also
recognizes that the common assertion that surrogacy involves new science and medical
technology is nonsense. . . . The novelty in the method is legal” (Annas 1).80 Thinking
that we had found something new, an attempt was made to incorporate this newness into
older forms, which only served to obscure the fact that these older forms may have been
where to search in the first place. “Surrogate motherhood is more a social solution to
infertility than it is a medical technology”; it is “more a reproductive arrangement than a
reproductive technology” (OTA 12, 267). Or, as sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman
cynically puts it, “the business of ‘surrogacy’ has nothing to do with scientific progress,
and everything to do with marketing” (Recreating 129). After the shock of novelty wears
off, and the confusion between socio-legal arrangements and scientific promise is clarified,
we are forced to consider “new” forms just as we consider old forms, and thus surrogacy
It and Orwell’s 1984 are invoked constantly; Atwood stands out in that she was writing of her own time.
In that case, “fooled by broker publicity . . . [Judge] Sorkow saw surrogacy as so modern and marvelous
that it could not possibly be subsumed under any existing laws” (Annas 1). The “modern and marvelous”
remains a clever juxtaposition for historicizing science; as advanced as science may become, it always
retains the power of miracle.
79
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narratives are filled with the metaphors of Pandora’s box, Solomon’s wisdom, Genesis’s
precedent, or other legal maxims, which first appear cleverly to link the past with the
present, yet end up being red herrings themselves: nothing’s changed except the rhetoric.
Of course, Foucault would remind us, that is the point; while there may be some new
techniques, and these techniques may provoke certain areas of human experience (in this
case, our social experience of the maternal), ultimately what is important to examine are
the ways in which the relations between individuals are mediated by, and displaced upon,
these external forms. There is often not yet new language to describe or understand older
arrangements; thus, the “new reproductive techniques” (NRTs) are often renamed
“alternative reproductive techniques” (ARTs), diminishing their scientific strangeness in
favor of an artistic utility.

If the older technology of surrogacy did become in the 80s a suddenly popular
way of arranging new relationships (that is, a new “technique”),81 then it was
unintentionally due to what actually was a new technology: the development of in vitro
fertilization techniques. The idea of in vitro fertilization (IVF) was first put forth in 1937
in an anonymous editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Conception in a
Watch Glass” (cf. also “breed[ing] babies in bottles” from Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s
Lover [1928]). During the 1930s, such activities as artificial insemination and the freezing
of human sperm were both first successfully performed; IVF practice began more

Making this both a more difficult and a simpler claim is the lack of statistics regarding surrogacy before
the 80s. Defined as a problem of contract law, “surrogacy” did not exist before 1976. OTA reports in
1988 that about 600 surrogate mother arrangements have been completed, and that there are about fifteen
agencies in operation (13). On the one hand, surrogacy is brand-new in the 80s, on the other it is only new
as a statistical issue, suggesting it was not a source of concern before this period (and thus more
common?). The narrow definition of surrogacy clearly does not match with its historical presence, and
opens a way for a theoretical conception of the notion of surrogacy as infecting all procreative relationships,
both voluntary and involuntary.
81
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seriously in the 1960s, despite initially being viewed of as an impossibility. IVF is the
82

broad term encompassing medical interventions wherein fertilization, normally taking
place in vivo, is instead performed, in the colloquial imagination, in a glass test tube.
There are many such possible variations of this practice: the original genetic material can
be from a couple (who can be married or unmarried), or either or both sets of genetic
material can be from donors (who can be known or anonymous). Furthermore, after
fertilization occurs, the embryo can be implanted into a married woman, into an unmarried
woman, into a known surrogate, into an unknown surrogate,83 or (speculatively) into an
artificial womb (ectogenesis or extrauterine gestation). Again, the artificial insemination
typically associated with surrogacy need not use any sophisticated technology, but IVF
means that “for the first time in human history, babies are being born following
extracorporeal fertilization” (OTA 17). So, in many ways, the new reproductive
technologies of the 80s can be popularly read as a story of access to oocytes (ova, eggs);
getting the inside of the woman’s body outside is specifically what is new.
There is of course a discrepancy between imaginative possibilities and scientific
ones; as IVF was first introduced, it became popular before it was perfected, and those
taking advantage of early IVF had a more limited set of possibilities (whether because of
At that time, “very few living human eggs had ever been seen before, the first probably being flushed
from the oviducts and photographed alive by phase-contrast microscopy in 1966. . . . Yet even as a man
walked on the moon, no one knew when a woman ovulated” (Edwards and Brody 2; see this work for a
technical overview of the ethics of “assisted human conception”). Cf. Petchesky on the crucial importance
of vision in constructing medical science. Here are some landmarks of IVF: the first IVF pregnancy,
occurring in Australia in 1973 (also the year of the Uniform Parentage Act and of the Roe v. Wade
decision), ended in early embryo death. The first successful IVF baby born was Louise Brown, in England
1978; the first IVF baby born in the United States was Elizabeth Jordan Carr, born in 1981. Economics
had already entered the picture; Noel Keane arranged the first surrogate motherhood contract in 1976 (his
Infertility Center of New York would later play a role in the Baby M case), and in 1987 the patenting of an
embryo transfer procedure began the practice of patenting bodily products, whose varying constitutionality
would need to later be sorted out by the court system. In 1988, the “first U.S. child conceived from a
donated egg is born;” the donor was paid $250. Successful in vitro fertilization was reported as early as
1944 (cf. Wilder 178), but Brown’s pregnancy only occurred after scores of failed attempts with other
women. According to Corea, by the end of 1980 the “live birth success rate for human IVF was .04
percent,” or three out of 287 women (116). Rothman later puts it at 10 percent (Recreating).
83
This rarely occurring in the instance of medical accident or of a women who desires a child genetically
unrelated.
82
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medical risks or public disapproval) than will later be available. These technologies
dangerously “extend the possibility of a medical and scientific practice that outreaches
human understanding and public control” (Stanworth 1), but as we shall see this is
generally truer when the technologies in question are practiced upon a woman’s body. It
is the early cases that fall within the gaps between “scientific practice” and “human
understanding” that prove most compelling, for they demonstrate resolutions to what
often ultimately become, practically speaking, non-issues. Yet, this resolution, most
often done after the fact by the court system or state legislatures, results in decisions
which continually accrete, developing a hypothetical set of practices formed around an
implicit notion of women’s bodies. As an example, when embryo implantation was still
considered experimentally risky, common surrogacy arrangements necessitated that one
half of the genetic material be from a third party (that is, using the egg of the surrogate
mother who would bear the child). As we will see in the case of “Baby M,” it was not at
all clear at the time what this would mean in terms of existing law (relating to, for
example, property and inheritance; the Tenth [state’s rights], Thirteenth [abolition], and
Fourteenth [due process and equal protection] Amendments; patent law; parental rights;
and the contracting or willing of the body or of the body’s products). Once IVF allows
for extracorporeal fertilization, that one specific problem of genetic parentage could be
technologically circumvented (that is, doctors would now instead recommend gestational
surrogate mothers, who contribute no genetic material), although such an advance then
raises a whole other host of problems (like what happens to the gestational surrogate
mothers), which will next presumably become less divisive or in need of legislation once
artificial wombs are perfected (and their own issues made present, etc.). To use the
common metaphor, in its search for perfectibility in the human, medical science
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continually opens and closes varying versions of Pandora’s box. In short, the hurry to
practice these techniques upon women’s body forced courts, legislatures, and the public
quickly to form opinions about women’s bodies; many of the practical issues of these
decisions were soon rendered irrelevant by later scientific technology, but the social
residue of these decisions remained.

Ultimately, the best way to understand the history and development of IVF as
one of the new reproductive technologies is to read the story of gamete cryopreservation.
Artificial insemination with frozen sperm was successfully accomplished in 1953 (OTA
36), and had been imagined in 1866, in the case of soldiers going to battle (Wilder 178).84
Soon, freezing sperm became a regular practice, and today sperm is commonly sold by
sperm banks under FDA regulation. At first, however, the selling of human sperm was
not related to artificial insemination or reproductive demand on the part of women.85
Rather, early sperm banks had as their focus the storage of sperm for men about to
undergo sterilization or who were concerned about losing fertility in a post-atomic,
environmentally hazardous world. The popularity of buying sperm, on the other hand,
only comes much later; at last by 1988, “sperm selling seems to be socially acceptable, in
part because it generally does not conjure up images of selling a particular, potential
human being” (OTA 228).
Contrary to the early success with freezing sperm, oocyte preservation (eggs, ova)
has been more difficult and has only occurred in practice much later (cf. OTA 299). While
it seems to me that this tardiness is because gender bias has prevented male scientists
Consider also the implications of this upon Nancy Huston’s reading, in “The Matrix of War: Mothers
and Heroes,” of the homologous and contrary relationship between mothers and heroes. A mother’s son
goes to war, yet first preserves his semen so that if he does not return he may still engender himself.
85
As is common in scientific narratives, technologies are more quickly accepted in farm and agricultural
industries; I will just examine here human medical practices.
84
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from taking seriously a woman’s body as an object of inquiry, Gena Corea in her
influential The Mother Machine reads it differently, cynically noting that while sperm
cryopreservation took some hundred years to develop, “there has been no comparable
hesitancy on . . . the conception of babies in laboratory dishes” (34). There are two
scientific problems associated with oocyte cryopreservation, both reflecting a
scientifically constructed notion of the “fragile woman.” First is that eggs are thought of
as more delicate than sperm, since sperm is compact and supposedly more focused. The
problems with all cryopreservation occur during freezing and thawing (not in storage), and
female gametes are apparently unable to undergo this process as safely as male gametes.
Second, unlike sperm donation, ova donation is medically risky; retrieving eggs to even
store in the first place requires surgery, which entails additional risks and ethical concerns
for women.86 For these reasons, egg cryopreservation was not common at all during the
80s, yet ironically the same reasons against it led instead to the replacement practice of
embryo cryopreservation (that is, of in vitro fertilized eggs). Since embryos are hardier
than eggs, scientists commonly began to freeze them. Yet, since egg cryopreservation is
unsuccessful, doctors must use “fresh” eggs each time they wish to create embryos to
freeze. Since this requires medical risk, doctors are reluctant to surgically retrieve one egg
at a time, which leads to the practice of chemically inducing ovulation and then
“harvesting” many eggs per surgery. Of course, these eggs then each need to be be
fertilized while they are viable (“fresh”) and each of the resulting embryos frozen, leading
finally to an increasing number of embryos stored in embryo banks worldwide (that is, a
doctor “harvests” a dozen eggs from a superovulated woman, fertilizes all of them by
IVF, and then freezes most or all of the resulting embryos for later implantation). The
Again, consider the importance of viewing techniques (here, laparoscopy) in constructing these bodies
(Laqueur).
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status of these frozen embryos, the potential liability of storage sites, and the moral and
religious challenges to define them as living beings all invest oocyte and embryo
cryopreservation with more sinister overtones than sperm cryopreservation. Thus it is
no surprise that, unlike with sperm banks, there are common challenges to ovum (not to
mention embryo) sales, although there seemed at the time to be some Constitutional
protection for this: “prohibiting women to earn money by selling their ova when men are
permitted to sell sperm, may violate” the Fourteenth Amendment (OTA 225). Part of
the problem is based on a gender bias in the law; state statutes historically have not used
the neutral word “gamete” to describe the materials of reproduction, but have instead used
“sperm” or “semen” (OTA 256). The Fourteenth Amendment protection thus seemed
likely to hold, first given the presumption that medical risks associated with egg donation
could be reduced, and that legal challenges associated with an embryo’s status could be
resolved.
What looking at the economies (personal and public) of cryopreserving sperm and
ova in the 80s makes clear is that the scientific imagination of the human exchange of
gametes still operated under Aristotelian notions of the difference played by the two
parts in procreation. Put otherwise, the biological difference in reproduction, historically
unfavorable to women, is still unfavorable even once medical science moves reproduction
outside of the womb or penis. Aristotle’s oft-cited definitions of the terms “male” and
“female” are illustrative of an understanding based more on the role of the body (or Final
Cause) rather than specific body parts themselves (or Material Causes). His earliest
definition of “a ‘male’ animal [is] one which generates in another, [and a] ‘female’ [is] one
which generates in itself” because the male has the “principle of movement and of
generation” while the female has but the principle of “matter” (Aristotle 716a5).
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Aristotle soon modifies this, though, when he states that the terms “male” and “female”
are really only “epithets of the whole of the animal,” since an animal “is not male or
female in respect of the whole of itself, but only in respect of a particular faculty and a
particular part” (716a30). These particular parts, and more importantly, their particular
faculties (most often associated with Material Causes--menstrual fluid and semen
specifically) in turn are responsible for a potential condition of ability or inability, by
which Aristotle means the ability or inability to potentially offer “movement” (in the
form of semen, or concocted blood) to the potentially movable menstrual fluid, which is
blood not fully concocted due to a lack of heat in females (cf. Aristotle 720a, 728a26,
765b10, 777a17). It is important to note that the ability or inability to cause the
generative movement is always couched in terms of potentialities, instead of absolutes.87
The male acts upon, activates, stimulates the female; his sperm likewise. An active form
is provided and moves the female substance. Now, Aristotelian prejudices in science have
been pointed out repeatedly by feminist critics,88 but in the context of the 1980s, and its
purportedly “new” reproductive technologies, we see a remarkable restaging of the
ancient meaning of the materials of reproduction. For one, the kinetics of ova--their
potential--require either stringent avoidance (in the case of a science which focuses on the
role of sperm--who is the father?) or stringent regulation (in the case of the law which
requires bodies to arise from one definable material substance--who is the mother?). And
so arises a disparity in feelings about the selling of bodily materials; it does not seem
likely that both parties can be considered to play an equal role, and so only one gamete
Recall OTA: “sperm selling . . . does not conjure up images of selling a particular, potential human
being” (228). Freezing sperm is freezing form, freezing eggs or embryos (both feminine substances) is
freezing a particular.
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See Laqueur for an illustrative history of the topic. Consider also other Foucauldian discussions
regarding the ways in which techniques of viewing what was previously unviewable allow for the
constitution of new subjects. The example here is fetal monitoring techniques of the late 1960s and 70s,
which in turn create an 80s debate about abortion and the new quasi-status of the fetus, which for the first
time has limited legal rights (cf. Hartouni, Balsamo, Petchesky, Haraway).
87
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type is salable, bankable, worth something. For this reason we see, concomitant with the
attempted opening of the storehold of the woman’s body by means of IVF, a renewed
interest in the story of sperm, following a more general “social trend” of what was labeled
in the 80s a “man shortage,” or “infertility epidemic,” or “birth dearth.”89

In 1929, the first “sperm count” was undertaken by Macomber and Sanders,
finding a normal sperm density to be 100 million sperm per milliliter of semen; this would
prove to be relevant in 1979, when other studies began to anxiously show decreasing
sperm counts--often around 60 million sperm per milliliter, but one as low as 20
million/mL (Castleman). A 1981 New York Times piece, “Sperm Found Especially
Vulnerable to Environment,” juxtaposes an alarmist report (Dr. Dougherty puts the
average sperm count at a damagingly low 60 million/mL) with a dismissive one (Dr.
MacLeod is certain that there has not been “any serious change in potential fertility”), but
who is going to take a risk (Brody C3)? Shortly after, in 1982, the Sperm Bank of
California becomes the first sperm bank established for the use of single and lesbian
women, a spermatic literalization of the 80s theme sounded by sociological trend
spotters: that there was a dearth of available men, and hence increased competition and
diminished chances for romance or marriage. The often repeated statistic, as a 1986
Newsweek article puts it, is that “forty-year-olds are more likely to be killed by a
terrorist: they have a miniscule 2.6 percent probability of tying the knot” (Salholz 54).
The published examples of the decreased sperm count--the loss of active potential to
offer movement and form to passive matter--rewrites the medical story of mothers in the
See especially the second chapter of Susan Faludi’s Backlash, “Man Shortages and Barren Wombs,”
where the source and formation of these and other myths is demonstrated. There are so many urban
legends surrounding such public crises that I am not always confident about my sources, although the
veracity of the events may matter less than the fiction of their telling.
89
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80s as not a problem of access to oocytes, but rather one of access to sperm. The “new”
“social problem” of infertility compellingly figures this. The federal government’s Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) published in 1988 a fascinating report entitled
Infertility: Medical and Social Choices.90 This report sought to clarify the many
misconceptions about infertility; the purported “newness” of the new reproductive
technologies seems to have also suggested a “newness” to a problem of infertility, and
hence retroactively to have generated increased legal, medical, and moral permissiveness.91
OTA reports that “the overall incidence of infertility remained relatively unchanged
between 1965 and 1982,” which in 1982 was around 8.5 percent (4). Furthermore,
“although there has been no increase in either the number of infertile couples or the overall
incidence of infertility in the population, the number of office visits to physicians for
infertility services rose from about 600,000 in 1968 to about 1.6 million in 1984” (OTA
5). OTA does not provide statistics on infertility in women versus men; they view
infertility, regardless of the cause, as the problem of a couple, not an individual,
furthermore cautioning that “it is important to note that infertility is not only a personal
medical problem but also in some ways a social construct” (OTA 3). Sociologist Barbara
Katz Rothman puts this social construct into some perspective, noting that a new
acceptance of single parenthood and of abortion also contributed indirectly towards the
social construction of infertility: “infertile couples can no longer benefit, no matter how
innocently, from the tragedies of young mothers” (Recreating 231). Fewer undesired
births due to contraception, abortion, or the acceptance of single parenting, coupled with
the media’s excitement over IVF and other NRT success stories (for example, the rare
Lamentably, OTA was closed by a Republican Congress in 1995. In response, Clinton created a
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, which exists in some form today.
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Of a landmark surrogacy case, the judge notes how a state’s interest in legislating new reproductive
technologies would dramatically change dependent upon the veracity of the then available infertility
statistics (Wilentz n16).
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headline cases of quintuplets or quadruplets), resulted in an even keener sense that
infertile couples did in fact have a new problem, which Rothman, citing a 90 percent IVF
failure rate, sees as yet another social problem in itself.
The socially constructed nature of infertility is undeniable, even if it is only
predicated upon psychological issues caused by one or both partners (the anxiety of
infertility quite often being enough to cause infertility in the first place). Yet, despite the
supposed diminished sperm count, and perhaps because of the increase of sperm banks,
infertility will be figured in the 80s as a female problem. To demonstrate, here is an
example of two normally opposing viewpoints regarding surrogacy as a “cure” for
infertility: “‘what gives the trend [of surrogate parenting] momentum is necessity” (Gary
Skoloff, qtd. in Rust 52), and “we need to have a public policy to address the very real
problem of infertility, but not by allowing rich people to use poor women to bear their
children for them” (Rothman, qtd. in Rust 52). So, surrogate mothering, an old “new”
reproductive technology, is now caught up in a larger socially constructed problem of
infertility, which is both of momentous necessity due to IVF procedures (and by
implication deserving of some regulative leniency) as well as one which could create an
environment of abuse if not properly regulated. It is the suggested newness of the
infertility problem within a society already microscopically focused on defining,
regulating, and controlling the female body that is at issue, and that makes it difficult to
see that the debate is not about infertility (about children), but about fecundity (about
mothers). Of the lack of agreement among feminists regarding the Baby M case, which
provoked the two responses above,92 one critic sees how “the shock of it, initially
catching feminists by surprise, in the end proved therapeutic” (Keller 25). Feminists, and
Gary Skoloff was the Stern’s lawyer in the Baby M case, and Rothman became strongly opposed to
surrogacy.
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lawyers, had to say something--and quick--lest they lose their place in the argument.
The new “social problem” of infertility, provoked if not directly caused by the
publicity of new or alternative reproductive technologies such as surrogacy and IVF, is in
turn “cured” by these same techniques. One specific practice, however, points again to
the true economies at work in the NRTs. The first meaning of “surrogate” is a woman
who is inseminated (most commonly artificially) by another man. She then is supposed
to deliver the child and surrender it to the genetic father, whose wife adopts the child
legally (of course, he need not have a wife, although this is less common). The surrogate
was either paid (“commercial surrogacy”) or not (“altruistic surrogacy”). This process is,
obviously, not new. However, with IVF, a new configuration did arise: the “gestational
surrogate mother.” In the first case, the mother was genetically related to the child she
surrendered--it was after all her egg that was fertilized, and so the child would carry half
of her genetic material. In the case of gestational surrogate mothers, though, one woman’s
egg is fertilized in vitro, and then implanted into a different woman; the child that this
second woman gestates and bears has no genetic relationship to her. This situation was
first reported in the U.S. in 1985, nine years after the first “traditional” surrogacy
contract (OTA 36).93
The problem gestational surrogate mothers pose is twofold. First is a legal
challenge based on competing juridical, social, and scientific ways of defining of what a
mother is: “models of responsibility based on male biological linkages may well be
inadequate to cover the complexities of female biological linkages, which can entail a
gestational relationship as well as one based on genetics” (OTA 239). This is dramatized
A quick note on terminology: in addition to contesting the word “mother,” critics also raise problems
with “surrogacy” or “surrogate” and the “donor” in “sperm donor.” As legal analyst George Annas puts it,
“no one is ‘giving’ anyone anything in surrogacy: it is the sale of the mother’s interests in a child to its
father” (3), and thus she is not a “surrogate mother,” but more simply a “mother.” Likewise, sperm donors
only euphemistically “donate,” since they do it for commercial reasons (if it was for altruistic reasons, they
would certainly be called something milder).
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most clearly in the case of Anna Johnson, a black single mother who delivered a white
baby not genetically related to her, and refused to surrender the child to the genetic
parents.94 Overall, OTA counts “five ‘parents’--three types of mothers (genetic,
gestational, and rearing) and two types of fathers (genetic and rearing)” (OTA 213). We
can add to this also two more--“legal” mothers and “legal” fathers, who need not be the
same as “rearing” parents. In their efforts to decipher parental relationships, courts and
legislatures have turned increasingly to the science that has provoked these problems.
Genetics, according to pro-surrogacy lawyer Carmel Shalev, leads to a “masculine ethic of
‘right’ that stresses a parent’s biological tie to his or her offspring [which] should be
rejected in favor of the feminine ethic of ‘responsibility’ that emphasizes a person’s
intention to take care of a child” (H.W. 1179). Now, “intent” is tricky to certify, as in the
case of, say, whether a woman can truly offer “informed consent” about her future,
potentially pregnant state. What is interesting, though, is that in moving away from the
masculine “rights of the body” (an economic right), to a feminine responsibility (surely
one addressed to the children and not the parents), Shalev suggests a way to see how the
reductio ad absurdum of the masculine ethic’s focus on genetic certainty in turn reveals
new, unusual, and useful structures of kinship. For example, as Rothman points out in
Recreating Motherhood, genetic linkages do not, in themselves, necessarily form parentchild relationships. Rothman gives us the percentages of various familial genetic
connections, pointing out that identical twins are 100 percent related, siblings are 50
percent related, a parent and child are 50 percent related, grandparents and grandchildren
are 25 percent related, as are half siblings. She concludes, “in strictly genetic terms, your
sister might as well be your mother. The genetic connection is the same” (Rothman,
Recreating 40). Rothman notes that the manner in which feminists “capitalize[d] on the
94

See Hartouni’s “Breached Birth” in Cultural Conceptions (pp. 85-98).
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value of ownership to gain certain rights for women” had unintentional effects as it
created an “owned body,” which can in turn could create an “owned child” (Recreating
68). By moving away from a masculine, obsessive focus on the genetic rights of the
body, it may be possible to find in gestational surrogate mothers a new ethic of
responsibility that is still informed by the body.
The second problem is that gestational surrogate mothers render the economies of
a woman’s body duplex. Instead of a gendered distinction between gamete types-sperm/ova--extracorporeal fertilization and transcorporeal reproduction introduce a new,
distinctly feminine “service”; fertility is replaced by the simpler womb as a woman’s
natural asset (with the womb itself speculated to soon be technologically replaced). In
legal contracts and court documents such new terms as “human incubator” and “thirdparty gestator” depict a woman’s function in reproduction as “a surrogate uterus and not
a surrogate mother” (Lee Salk, qtd. in Harrison 301).95 The nature of a woman’s “service”
overturns the expectations made of a woman’s body,96 apparently offering her (at least for
her childbearing years) chosen entry into economic life (at least in conjunction with other
reproductive technologies, like the pill). What exactly constitutes the kind of services a
woman as mother provides? A mandatory “term of service”? Simply “babysitting”?97
Rothman finds these notions becoming an actual part of the new rhetoric of motherhood:
“we are in the process of redefining motherhood, of changing the meaning of that basic,
essential relationship. . . . The old definitions saw motherhood as a status . . . the new
language sees mothering as an activity” (“Comment” 312, 313). As “motherhood” turns
into “mothering,” many looking at surrogacy are troubled by the emphasis on wombs; if
gestation is seen as merely a service in the larger process of procreation, yet one divested
See also Hartouni’s “Containing Women” on a dead woman delivering a healthy baby (pp. 26-50).
Susan Suleiman asks, of the “woman’s body (can we say that it is always, in some sense, the mother’s
body?)” (5).
97
See Anleu (42) and Kaplan for gestational surrogate mothers labeling themselves “babysitters.”
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by the body, then surrogacy and gestational surrogacy in particular appears to resemble
another activity: prostitution.
On one important court decision, a critic finds that “in viewing a woman’s body
as a commodity that could be bought and sold, the court equated by assumption all
surrogacy with prostitution” (Anleu 39). Later legislation sought to get around this by
disallowing commercial surrogacy but allowing altruistic surrogacy, at which point one is
back to denying to women the aspects of biological difference which have for so long been
forced upon them. One critic “argues that recognition of a special mother-child bond in
reproductive law defines women as rooted in their biological capacities and impedes their
economic and political progress” (H.W. 1177), and the problem is that if one disallows
surrogate mothers because one does not believe that a woman has a natural right to the
fruits of her labor, then one falls into “a tradition of paternalistic protectionist
legislation”98 that keeps women “out of full participation in economic life” (H.W. 1178).
Anleu argues that “the distinction between commercial and altruistic surrogacy is neither
self-evident nor natural but is based on powerful gender norms that pervade everyday
life” and that “agreeing to become pregnant for money violates norms specifying that
women should become pregnant for love” (31, 37). Altruistic surrogacy is suspicious
since it is hard to believe a woman can genuinely turn herself into a “mother machine” (cf.
Corea) for purely selfless reasons; however, the kind of common sense that commercial
surrogacy makes is seen as incompatible with the gender norms surrounding motherhood-there are some things given that cannot be priced, but nothing’s free.
So, the case of gestational surrogate mothers makes clear the irreducible economic
logic at work that pins together the centuries’ varied thinking about the raw materials of
i.e., “The fact, however, that many women may not perceive surrogacy negatively but rather see it as an
opportunity does not diminish its potential for devastation to other women” (Wilentz ***61).
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reproduction; namely that you can’t get something for nothing, and therefore your own
special something becomes increasingly important in a world of competition, or illness, or
disaster. Unacceptably, surrogacy contracts threaten to violate this principle by making
it possible for women to become legal (rearing or genetic) mothers without having to be
physical (gestational) mothers. While the 80s allows sperm donors and recognizes
“surrogate fathers,”99 surrogate mothers are only accepted with much greater difficulty.
What allowed surrogate mothers in the first place was a legal fiction suggested by a
supposed infertility crisis, and an appeal to the miracles of a new science extending to
women further control and manipulation of their reproductive capabilities.100 The new
type of woman--surrogate mother--is in a tenuous position, and the apparent violation of
fundamental economic laws is unacceptable, especially in the 80s. In one important case,
the judge noted that “the whole purpose and effect of the surrogacy contract was to give
the father the exclusive right to the child by destroying the rights of the mother” (Wilentz
***50). This is a rather brutal reconfiguration of the family dynamic; the mother is
sacrificed for the sake of the child by the father, who himself is thus (if we are speaking of
genetics) reborn through this act. Likewise, a critic notes “that this method of
reproduction can help one family only at the expense of another[;] the ‘surrogate mother’
arrangement creates a family bond only by destroying a family bond” (Annas 1). This
theme is common in critiques of surrogacy, as if the idea of a free ticket were so repugnant
that it is necessary to remind us of the price paid.
After presumptive paternity laws in response to artificial insemination, they are called simply “fathers.”
Also, it has yet to be remarked that IVF and embryo cryopreservation forestall the increasing biological
imperative towards maternity prompted by menopause--and so we now have stories of 63-year-old mothers,
and even of children born long after both genetic parents have died. Octavia Butler’s science fiction
Xenogenesis trilogy deals with these kinds of issues, as well as the issue of race. Along these lines,
Marianne Hirsch points out that slave mothers are an exception to mater certissima, as the traffic of slave
bodies makes no room for a distinction between gestational/genetic and rearing mothers (Mother/Daughter
Plot 56). Patricia J. Williams, in “On Being the Object of Property,” considers her need to continually
write about her great-great-grandmother; Williams wants to “pin [herself] down in history” by “picking
through the ruins for [her] roots” (5).
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***
As needs to be repeatedly pointed out, sperm is not a practical analogue to ova,
despite an undue scientific focus on these substance’s equal genetic role. Rendering the
two equivalent would apparently be a step towards rectifying sperm’s heretofore
privileged status (see, the ova is just as useful and important as the sperm), yet again the
possibilities of ova visibility, creating conditions of apparent gamete equality, is only
possible when the body is first made messy by scientific invasion, and this invasion, qua
gametes, is really only necessary for women. Viewing the microscopically material
aspects of reproduction diminishes the other, more obviously visibly material aspects-namely nine months of gestation ending in an un-analagous “parturition” (cf. Rothman,
“Comment”). Dion Farquhar puts it this way:
despite the resistant hermeticism of the ovum to extraction, female gamete
provision . . . enables the social effect of distributing and dispersing maternal
identity and responsibility, thereby destabilizing its unicity. Perhaps this
historically unprecedented monstrous fragmenting of maternity can only be
allowed if it is shown to be the effect of disciplining and torturing a recalcitrant
and chaste female body. (“Gamete Traffic” 28)
The dispersal of maternal identity is the most obvious “problem” with surrogacy, both
for those in favor and for those against.101 The autonomy of sperm--its hardy ability to
survive outside of the body (and in a woman’s threatening womb), its potential to give
form, its simultaneously precious and profligate nature--is both metonymy for the
autonomous male body as well as simply a substance meaningless in its abundance. In a
legal context, one critic considers a judge’s upholding of the alienable (that is, transferrable
Although this problem was recognized, it had not been understood. Chodorow, for example, in 1978
had to begin her argument about why women mother by pointing out that “being a mother . . . is not only
bearing a child--it is being a person who socializes and nurtures” (Reproduction 11).
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in ownership) nature of sperm; a “man’s property in himself is foundational to liberal
democracy” (Valerius 180). By comparing the relatively recent rights of a woman to hold
property in herself with the “foundational” notions of a man’s body, we can see how the
emphasis on sperm’s role unintentionally backfires as a strategy of reasserting gender
relevancy; that sperm is alienable makes more obvious the gendered notions of bodily
rights, and a body’s resulting capability for political agency. Ironically, as Farquhar
suggests above, the shattering of maternal unicity (separating genetics from gestation from
rearing) is permissible if it is seen in service of a social maternal unicity, which is itself
first threatened by the “recalcitrant and chaste female body”--the infertile, hermetic,
fragile figure of the liminal woman-about-to-be-(trying-to-be-)mother. In order to uphold
the maternal in the face of a supposed infertility crisis, the maternal category is split into
different functions, each of which then can be performed by various subjects. In order to
preserve maternity, it seems, it must be reduced to its component parts.
In conclusion, what artificial insemination makes clear is that definitions of
paternity and maternity based on genetics will no longer work, if they ever did. A
patriarchal fear of sperm banks, demonstrated by Corea, requires new legal and medical
negotiations of what paternity is, in order, as she sees it, for patriarchy to retain its
power over an increasingly “anonymous” world. She lists some tactics used by medical
doctors to “obliterate the sperm vendor,” most fascinatingly that they often “advise AID
[artificial insemination by donor] couples not to tell the AID child or their family or
friends how the child was conceived. ‘The majority of couples--something like 99
percent--choose not to tell anyone’” (Corea 54). What is surprising is that dissembling in
this case both admits and denies the importance of genes. Why lie if it is not an issue?
Why not lie if it is an issue? Another related medical strategy to increase paternal
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uncertainty is a version of the firing squad’s practice, where multiple donors’ semen is
used in each insemination. In this case, no one could possibly know, until after the child
is testable (by blood or cell), which sperm donor is the “true” father, although if we can
analogize to the cases of gestational surrogate mothers, it seems that we should conclude
that they all are.102 These built-in functions of deceit, which work against a medical
science’s tendency to truth, objectivity, and certainty, are displaced onto the new sign of
the gene, itself unable to bear such weight.
The material feminist problem I began with seems less and less convincing as the
true issue of the “new” problem of surrogacy and how it relates to woman’s relationship
to science. Difference will always be found between men and women (that is, maintained,
reinforced, reinscribed). My first staging of a feminist’s problem as one of procreative
biology is bothersome because it uses the same models of biological difference. Are
genetic, hormonal, minute differences really where feminists want to take their stand?
Shall we give up the body (a man’s trick to assert rationality--let’s all be men)? Or shall
we draw nearer to it (same trick, different sides)? In the next section, I want to turn
briefly to the role of fantasy in the construction of new family arrangements caused by
new reproductive technologies.

I am not sure if similar statistics exist for the U.S., but Stanworth cites a study that showed that 25%
of fathers in a British town could not be the father of the child they held as their own. This is likely also
an urban legend, repeated, for example, in Rothman’s Recreating Motherhood (225). A man’s paternity,
with blood tests, could not be conclusively proved, but it could be conclusively disproved. This changes
with genetic testing,which can prove and disprove.
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II. Freud and certainty (matters)
“In the case of surrogate motherhood, what is the child’s relationship with his or her birth
mother (even if the relationship occurs only in the child’s fantasy life)?” (Office of
Technology Assessment 304)
“I’ll give you three days to guess my name. If you find it out in that time, you may keep
your child.” (“Rumpelstiltskin”)

Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate mother in the landmark “Baby M” case,
reprints in her authorized narrative of the case a sympathetic letter to the editor of the
New York Times. The letter refers to the fairy tale of Rumpelstiltskin in order to make a
moral comparison between the “compassionate” Rumpelstiltskin (who allowed the Queen
to keep the child promised to him) and the evil judge in the Baby M case (who wanted to
take the child away from its mother). As in uses of the Genesis tale to explain surrogacy,
this letter writer’s attempt to use the Rumpelstiltskin tale to point out a simple moral
ignores many details of the original version. In the Brothers Grimm’s “Rumpelstiltskin,”
for example, the manikin does not willingly give the child to the Queen, but rather is so
angry at being tricked by her that he stamps his right leg so far into the ground that he
tears himself in two when he pulls on his left one. The letter also leaves out the fact that
the Queen was originally but a poor miller’s daughter, and that her marriage to the King
only came about when she was able to show, with Rumpelstiltskin’s help, her economic
prowess in turning straw into gold. When Rumpelstiltskin returns a year later to claim
his child, the Queen tries to bribe him, but he refuses, holding “something alive” dearer
than riches. He does, however, give her a second chance to keep the child by guessing his
true name, but it is only by means of her messenger that the Queen is able to do so.
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What a closer examination of the Rumpelstiltskin tale reveals is that its happy
ending is a product of both the tale’s complexity as well as our sympathy with the
mother-child bond. Reading it in light of surrogacy arrangements in the 80s, there is a
clear analogue in the incommensurable disagreement between the adoptive, promised
father and the true, birth mother. Nancy J. Chodorow, using Alice Balint, shows how
fathers tend to be more “real” to children’s fantasy life, since children must work harder
to separate themselves from their mother (Reproduction 79-80). Phyllis Chesler also
comments on how often fairy tales feature either missing fathers or fathers “duped” by
stepmothers (138). In “Rumpelstiltskin,” the woman occupies both roles, moving from
daughter to mother by means of Rumpelstiltskin’s magical aid. Rumpelstiltskin, then,
becomes a kind of false mother to the child, being that he has some legal or logical claim to
the child. Yet, what makes Rumpelstiltskin so interesting is the way that he is also
conceived, by his lack of a name, as a kind of anonymous second father. The manikin
who appears to help the miller’s daughter three times in a row stakes his claim on his
anonymity, and it is the Queen’s naming of Rumpelstiltskin that results not only in her
keeping the child, but in the little man’s self-destruction. Trading his name for the child,
Rumpelstiltskin clearly illustrates the role that fantasy and naming play in fairy and
family tales.

Describing some of the secondary effects of the new family arrangements in the
80s, Gena Corea in The Mother Machine reports that some women recipients of IVF
“have fantasies about the man whose baby they are carrying. They feel that sperm
vendors are supermen--studs chosen for their superior intelligence and strength” (55). In
consequence of such fantasies, husbands tend towards latent hostility or jealousy towards
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the child (giving another reason not to support surrogacy). Phyllis Chesler, a figure in the
Baby M case, also discusses the role of fantasy in unusual family arrangements.
Specifically referring to mothers who give their children up for adoption, Chesler writes
that “birth mothers often have recurring dreams of their lost children, and they may even
follow children on the street whom they fantasize may be their own. . . . Birth mothers
often imagine that their children are either already dead or still alive but suffering” (118);
another reason to hesitate before giving your child up for adoption (and thus another
reason not to support surrogacy). As these examples point out, surrogacy is generally
figured as a maternal issue, and one that carries with it the mother’s potential for narrative
exuberance. Looking at the mother’s anxieties mirrors, as has been pointed out by others,
a shift in 80s feminists’ incursions into the role and definition of mothering and
motherhood, which had earlier been focused on, for example, pre-Oedipal situations and
those that develop from the mother-child relationship, generally from the point of view of
the position of the child. This is especially clear in psychoanalytic feminist criticism (for
example Chodorow and Kristeva)103 which responds to the shortcomings in Freud’s
account of the boy’s Oedipal situation with an equal insistence on the role that women
(mothers) play in this development, and especially the differences between the boy’s and
girl’s Oedipal figuration, seeking a positivist account that does not merely mirror
masculine forms (“the blind spot of an old dream of symmetry”). Symbolically
prompted by Adrienne Rich’s Of Woman Born and the “great unwritten story” of the
“cathexis between mother and daughter,” the newer emphasis is on woman’s potential or

See Jane Gallop’s “Reading the Mother Tongue” on how the mother is especially important in the then
surprisingly successful intervention between feminism and psychoanalysis. Gallop traces a double birth:
on the one hand is Irigaray, Cixous, and Kristeva, and on the other is Chodorow’s The Reproduction of
Mothering (1978). 1985 is for Gallop a “historic year,” producing the first anthology of psychoanalytic
feminist criticism, The M(O)ther Tongue; “the heroine in the book is surely the mother” (317).
103

actual motherhood, as opposed to woman’s actual daughterhood.

104

169
Marianne Hirsch’s

The Mother/Daughter Plot traces some of these late-70s and early-80s texts, and by
considering the strangely non-maternal point of view of some mothers’ stories, Hirsch
begins a shift towards developing a theory of maternal discourse in order to avoid the trap
of those who in their “daughterly perspectives . . . collude with patriarchy in placing
mothers in the position of object, of other--thereby keeping mothering outside of
representation and making maternal discourse a theoretical impossibility” (Bassin, Honey,
and Kaplan 13). Rather, Hirsch “is trying to imagine what model or definition of
subjectivity might be derived from a theory that began with mothers rather than children”
(Hirsch, “Maternity” 94). Part of this model of subjectivity involves the very same
fantasy practices that are evident in comparisons of surrogacy with Genesis, or
Rumpelstiltskin. In The Mother/Daughter Plot, Hirsch emphasizes what she calls
“family romance,” which “describes the experience of familial structures as discursive: the
family romance is the story we tell ourselves about the social and psychological reality of
the family in which we find ourselves and the about the patterns of desire that motivate
the interaction among its members” (9). Building on Hirsch’s analysis, I would like to
turn to another kind of fairy tale--Freud--to explore one way in which the new
reproductive technologies’ construction of surrogacy reflects other 80s concerns,
especially ostensibly postmodern ones such as truth-telling, the question of forms of
legitimacy, and a Freudian reinvention of the surface/depth model, concerned with
simulations and simulacra and all other manner of superficiality imitating, replacing, or
posing as reality.
In a short 1909 piece titled “Der Familienroman der Neurotiker,” translated
This was recently made clearer to me by a friend’s mother who, seeing a homeless woman on the
subway, pitifully exclaimed to me, “how horrible; that’s someone’s mother.” I couldn’t bring myself to
point out that that need not be true, that she should have said “how horrible; that’s someone’s daughter.”
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simply as “Family Romances,” Freud describes the way in which a small child becomes
disillusioned by the earlier idea of his parents being “the only authority and the source of
all belief” (298). As the child grows, so does his disillusion: he discovers other parents,
perhaps becomes jealous of siblings, or begins to experience sexual rivalry. “His sense
that his own affection is not being fully reciprocated then finds a vent in the idea . . . of
being a step-child or an adopted child” (Freud 298). According to Freud, the neurotic
does not remember this, but the non-neurotic often does, and we can treat the fascinating
idea of each of us at one time considering--wishing--for other mothers and fathers as an
idea both expressive of a child’s lifelong ambivalence towards parents, as well as one
instrumental in a parent’s later constitution of their own “family romances” (and this last
especially strengthened by some of the newer family forms under discussion). The child,
to varying degrees,105 fantasizes that his “true parents” are of higher social standing, and
thereby escapes both his own lowly birth as well as his newly-found low opinion of his
parents. Freud postulates that this all occurs during the time of a child’s sexual
innocence, but
when presently the child comes to know the difference in the parts played by
fathers and mothers in their sexual relations, and realizes that ‘pater semper
incertus est,’ while the mother is ‘certissima,’ the family romance undergoes a
curious curtailment: it contents itself with exalting the child’s father, but no longer
casts any doubts on his maternal origin, which is regarded as something
unalterable. (299)
Now, having learnt the facts of life at last, the child’s imaginative possibilities are cut off-Here, of course, I mean varying dependent upon the sex of the child; the boy, having a stronger
imagination, thus “has a far more intense desire to get free from him than from her” (Freud 298). What are
we to do with Freud, who, as Chodorow dryly puts it, “was only sometimes describing how women
develop in a patriarchal society” (Reproduction 142)? It remains to be seen how family romances figure
differently for a girl.
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that is, the imaginative possibilities of and towards his mother. Yet, this is a “curious
curtailment,” for in his certitude of the physical aspects of his maternal origin, the young
child also allows himself to come to the secondary fantasy that his mother is a whore,
brought “into situations of secret infidelity and into secret love-affairs” (Freud 299). This
serves to satisfy some of his sexual curiosity, but can also, by a form of inversion, serve
to re-legitimize the child by bastardizing his siblings. Freud, anticipating readers to be
scandalized, calms us by showing that none of this in truth is really all that bad or
harmful, for in fact imagined parents always have elements of real parents, and the child’s
fantasies serve as a kind of compliment towards the father, since the child really only
wants to return things back to the time when he exalted his parents, especially before the
onset of disillusionment.
By focusing on the child’s discovery of sexual difference (and by misdirecting this
all through what the adult neurotic does not experience),106 Freud strangely moves past the
way that pater semper incertus est might also form the mother and father’s experience of
the family as parents.107 Since pater semper incertus est is a Latinate legal tag, in Freud’s
version of the Aristotelian revelation of the “difference in the parts played by fathers and
mothers” we have no recourse to truth, or birds and bees, but rather to a stuffy,
generically determined principle of law. What is interesting is that pater semper incertus
est would seem foremost to involve the father’s anxiety about the paternity of his wife’s
children, yet here the tag instead becomes the tool to resolve the child’s certainty about
the mother. It is difficult not to see the father’s potential fear of the mother’s
faithlessness--displaced and vanquished here as the son’s knowledge of the mother’s
faithfulness--as in truth reflecting the deeply intertwined development of sons into
Why this piece is specifically about the neurotic is never made clear--we get similar childhood processes
in both types, with only a later differentiation that Freud does not elaborate.
107
From this, we can utilize Hirsch’s search for “what model or definition of subjectivity might be derived
from a theory that began with mothers rather than children” (“Maternity” 94).
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fathers, a development in turn under the governance of fathers and mothers. We could
thus read this as a story about a family’s self-definition; the “Familienroman” of the title
means both “family romance,” but more specifically “family novel.”108 The use of
“romance” suggests the imaginative sexual associations created by the parent’s eventual
discussion of sex. But “family novel” seems to highlight not only the narrative aspects of
the family’s story (demonstrated through history), but also (I hope for our purposes), the
novelty that is created and cut off by the family’s veiled and unveiled sexual certus--the
mother as familial certainty, as constitutive of a child’s only definitive sense of birthright.
For Freud, “Der Familienroman der Neurotiker” was about “childish depravity,”
about the neurotic child’s imaginative life; however, we can see in the theory of the
interruption by the knowledge of sexual difference upon all children’s imaginative life the
concept that families narrate themselves by establishing a gendered certainty involving the
fact of parentage, and that this certainty--obliquely, legally put--in turn controls the kinds
of imagination a child (let us say here, “boy”) can have about his two parents.
Furthermore, we can see in the movement from uncertainty to certainty (from innocence
to knowledge of sex), the structuring of the role of the maternal body, such that
imagination is either curtailed, or only perversely applied. Of the father, of the father’s
own uncertainty (his child’s uncertainty about him is mirrored literally by his own of his
child) we can begin to see how the kind of anxieties normally inhering in the procreative
facts about a family (the family’s “romance,” in both senses) already reflect a decisively
uncertain (ambivalent) certainty on the part of the child regarding the truth he knows and
subsequently imaginatively denies, an anxiety hence exacerbated by the new certain
Nancy K. Miller pointed out to me the way that Roland Barthes, in Roland Barthes, also invokes the
“family romance.” In the picture section which opens his book (images which are Barthes’s “treat” to
himself for finishing the text) Barthes traces how his “family novel” is about generations and how they end
up: “final stasis of this lineage: my body. The line ends in a being pour rien” (Barthes 19). Of course,
this construction too lies under the text’s epigraph: “it must all be considered as if spoken by” un
personnage de roman--a character in a novel (Barthes 1).
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uncertainty of the NRTS of the 80s. This anxiety, incidentally, appears true both of
those technologies that are actually new (gestational surrogate motherhood) as well as
those that are not (“traditional” surrogate motherhood).
Freud, being Freud, deals primarily with the male son’s imagination of the mother,
privileging the boy over the girl by default. Yet, in “Family Romances,” the difference in
effect on the child is important. Even though, for the non-neurotic, the adoption fantasy
remains humorous, if remembered at all, it nonetheless plays an archetypal role in light of
the new situations where what Freud matter-of-factly refers to as “the difference in the
parts played by fathers and mothers in their sexual relations” is fragmented. That is,
turning from Freud’s emphasis on the child’s imagination of the adult to an adult’s
imagination of the child allows us to reconsider the fraught nature of the family romance,
which especially expresses itself in the newly technologized 80s.
Sociologist Mary O’Brien discusses the way in which paternity is, at best, an
abstract idea, while maternity is, at least during gestation, an experience. Furthermore,
with new technological interventions, Gena Corea argues, “woman’s claim to maternity is
being loosened; man’s claim to paternity is strengthened” (289). That is, paternity begins
to be experienced while maternity becomes potentially abstract. Corea sees this
abstraction as part of a larger patriarchal movement to recover men’s claim to paternity,
weakened by artificial insemination practices and recovered by controlling women’s
surrogate motherhood (244-45). It may be ironic that men embrace technology which
could render them spermatically useless, but it is completely expected that patriarchy
would seek a way to control all sexual experience, a technological advance upon the
originary, prehistorical recognition of men’s role in procreation.109 What commentators on
Corea envisions the moment when men first realized that they played a part in procreation, and their
consequent destruction of mothers as religious figures.
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gestational surrogate motherhood cases fail to recognize is that the legal (and social)
emphasis on genetic paternity is irrelevant in terms of the rather material nature of
pregnancy. What would it matter to a pregnant woman, other than in a social sense,
whose genes helped form the baby she carried? She’s still pregnant, regardless of whether
it is with “her” child or not. The unintended effect, though, of the possibility of
impregnating a woman artificially is that the child a woman carries is separable from her
avant la lettre. The difficulty of enacting and enforcing this separation is raised by
abortion and fetal rights laws because a theory of individual liberties (such as an
individual’s right to her body) requires at some point in time such a separation; the
fumbling over words to describe what happens inside a woman’s body (gamete,
blastocyst, zygote, pre-embryo, embryo, fetus, child), makes this clear.
Pater semper incertus est is no longer true in light of genetic or DNA testing.110
The other, maternally certain side of the equation, though, is also newly no longer true.
The certainty of the mother (and hence the reduction of her imaginative hold over the
child) is now contested in terms of her newly destabilized role, her shattered maternal
unicity. Now that the “true” mother is no longer certissima, maternity necessitates a law
like the one regarding genetic paternity. Worse, the certainty of the mother will be
attempted to be forced by means of a legal agreement. The nature of a contract for
maternity, so foreign to our senses of ourselves as children, itself represents the problem
with thinking of motherhood outside of the biological paradigm; one wag points out that
the very fact that legal contracts were seen as necessary in early surrogacy negotiations
proves that there’s a problem with surrogacy. There are two points of view to this: the
genetic mother who does not gestate, and the gestating mother without genetic link. The
DNA profiling, invented in 1985, was first used in criminal cases in 1987, and became more widespread
(because more reliable and inexpensive) in the early 1990s.
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former is figured as taking advantage of the latter, and the heroines of surrogacy
arrangements thus tend to be the latter. Yet, the strange fact that these arrangements
allow men to get what they want most (what they have always been denied: certus),
while women can “not get” what they “don’t want” (that is, can avoid the reduction to
biological necessity) is not as promising as it might be because women can only “not get”
what they “don’t want” by means of another woman’s body. Put otherwise, a woman
desiring to be a mother without being pregnant needs to first find a body to be pregnant
for her. For her to not be pregnant, she needs to find someone who wants not to be a
mother. Under the new contracted surrogacy arrangements, a husband gets scientifically
and legally verifiable certainty of paternity, while a wife can get the exact opposite. In
the case of gestational surrogate mothers, the problem is that woman’s presumption of
motherhood and right to their child is founded on, ironically, little more than her
certissima. This, of course, is usually enough to satisfy a nurse in the delivery room, but
as the dramatic court cases evinced, new laws would need to be configured to match
possible disagreements in these new family romances.
OTA notes that “existing legal models of the role of the purely genetic connection
between parent and child have been worked out in the context of fathers, not mothers”
(239). Previously, a genetic connection between a man and a child made the man legally
responsible for the child, whether he intended or desired the child, except when a court
specifically rules otherwise, as in cases of abuse or abandonment leading to adoption. So,
for example, a man cannot force a woman to have an abortion, and is legally responsible
for the care of the offspring. But, this genetic rule poses problems for cases of artificial
insemination; in 1954 an Illinois court ruled that inseminating a married woman
constitutes adultery, even given a husband’s consent. These kinds of rulings were
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changed with the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 (also the year of the first IVF pregnancy
and of Roe V. Wade), which provides the one crucial exception to the genetically
determined paternity rule. The rule of “presumptive paternity” holds that a child born to
a married woman is also to be legally considered the child of the husband, regardless of
whether he is or is not the genetic father. So, if a wife is artificially inseminated with her
husband’s consent, then the husband is considered by the law to be the father, and thus
the sperm donor is not considered to be the legal father of a child conceived of his sperm.
One more case is worth mentioning: Michael H. v. Gerald D., an important 1989 U.S.
Supreme Court in which the wife was impregnated by another man without the husband’s
consent (or knowledge). The court upheld the rule of presumptive paternity, and so the
cuckolded husband became the legal father. Since common law makes it difficult to
challenge paternity, adultery is encouraged, with the implication that men can take
biological advantage of the laws to beget offspring without legal (read: economic)
consequence. In the case of genetic inheritance, this is getting something for nothing. We
should also consider how sperm donors too get, genetically speaking, something for
nothing, and how limits on the number of acceptable donations (and “type” of donations,
in the case of disallowing homosexuals to donate) are figured as fears over incest. The
solution to preventing too many of one man’s sperm from fertilizing too many different
women’s eggs is to provide for more certainty of paternity--a donor database for
example--which leads to the problem of this otherwise anonymous information being
sought or discovered by any future offspring. While in these kinds of cases the advantage
of gender is clear, the NRTs begin to allow the same possibility to women, a possibility I
argue is part of the paternalistic legal system’s motivation to restrict such possibility--we
are back to the potential erasure of biological difference, allowing a woman to have a child

177
without having had to be pregnant or impregnated.
What should be at the forefront of all of this, the interests of the child or future
child, are generally put to the side.111 In the case of sperm donation, the courts must
weigh a child’s right to knowledge about his or her paternity with a donor’s right to
privacy. Anonymous sperm donation is the most extreme example of pater semper
incertus est, but even here the rule, being predicated upon the language of law,
demonstrates flexibility. The legal dimensions make sense in terms of a child’s right to
know of inheritable diseases or genetic predisposition, but the ethical dimensions are more
difficult once they involve the child’s imaginative fantasies--the family romance he or she
invents as part of his or her structure of being. OTA, for example, demonstrates the two
dimensions, noting that “if children were genuinely harmed [psychologically or
physically] by the fact of their noncoital conception” then there could be Constitutional
argument to regulate some forms of IVF (226). When dealing with the question of truthtelling and confidentiality issues, however, OTA has a more difficult time. Posing the
questions
should a child be told that his or her rearing parent is not the child’s genetic and/or
gestational parent, and also how he or she was conceived? Should information
about a child’s biological origin be kept on file? Should a child who is not living
with his or her father or mother be entitled to at least some information about this
genetic parent? Should a child be entitled to know the identity of the genetic
father or mother and thus be afforded the opportunity to contact this parent?
OTA is unable to come up with any more acceptable an answer than to quote, of all
people, Hegel: “children are potentially free and their life directly embodies nothing save
In adoption narratives, the reason for this--the theme of genetic narcissism--is mentioned, but not fully
elaborated.
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potential freedom. Consequently they are not things and cannot be the property of their
parents or others” (211-2). While these are of course questions that do not have “correct”
yes or no answers (although some of our notions of Constitutional rights strongly
influence us to say “yes” to each), it is clear that the question of the parent’s moment of
revelation, at which OTA can only summon Hegel, is of great concern in creating the new
parents of NRT children. The new or alternative reproductive technologies must use a
fiction, a narrative, to create kinship or relationships that were previously “natural.”
Freud is useful because, being modern, he nonetheless offers a very postmodern way of
getting to the matter: a storytelling of the surface, about which the depth is rendered
irrelevant.
In Chapter One I elaborated upon the “giving up” of history which is so
problematic for the postmodern periodizing hypothesis. In light of personal history-lineage, parentage, inheritance, paternity and the matrilineal--we can briefly connect the
dilemma over the new reproductive technologies with a more general cultural concern over
the nature of authority, certainty, and legitimation in the 80s. One common formulation
of the rubric of postmodernism involves a “crisis of legitimacy,” whether this is the
legitimacy of certain cultures over others, of certain types or forms of knowledge, or of
different strategies of representation. Anthropologist Sarah Franklin, examining
“postmodern procreation,” explains this by arguing that “postmodernism describes the
process whereby certain foundational distinctions or boundaries are breached, leading to a
crisis of legitimacy: this process is occurring, for example, in traditional beliefs about
parenthood, procreation, and kinship” (335). By connecting the crisis of legitimacy to
procreation, Franklin follows a more general “extension” of the postmodern crisis to
feminism and to women. The question of “authenticity,” whether referring to something
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abstract like “information” or to something practical like “motherhood,” is always
narrated, for example in the use of fairy tales or Biblical stories to account for, explain,
and ultimately legitimate apparently new family or parenting structures. These are all, at
heart, “new reproductive stories.”
Lyotard and Habermas are the two critics of the postmodern perhaps most
associated with the “crisis of legitimacy.” Briefly put, Lyotard sees legitimation as the
process whereby legislators authorize laws as norms; as such he is criticizing Habermas,
who took an inverse position, seeing those under the law as legitimizing the legislators,
and finding a legitimation crisis in this reversal. The crisis of legitimacy is one of those
formulations that can be traced through the entire social sphere of postmodern life;
Lyotard, though, refuses the supposed significance of this crisis:
turn-of-the-century Vienna . . . carried awareness of and theoretical and artistic
responsibility for delegitimation as far as it could be taken. We can say today that
the mourning process has been completed. There is no need to start all over again.
. . . A kind of legitimation not based on performativity. . . is what the postmodern
world is all about. Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in
no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity. What saves them from it is
their knowledge that legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic practice
and communicational interaction. (Postmodern Condition 41)
The postmodern, as Lyotard describes it, seems not only to no longer mourn
delegitimation, but also aggressively to disavow any feelings about its passing. The
Postmodern Condition takes this in the direction of a new form of education based not on
content but on structures: language games. The freedom from barbarity, the saving
moment of linguistic practice, is based not on academic knowledge, but on a floating-
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between, a transversal movement of such language games. The question is no longer “is it
true?” but instead “what use is it?” (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition 51). Likewise,
postmodern science, according to Lyotard, produces not the known, but the unknown
(Postmodern Condition 61). This is yet another move that means to displace and to
create further displacements in the “incredulity toward metanarratives” which most
basically characterizes the postmodern (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition xxiv).
Applying these notions to surrogacy and IVF arrangements is unsettling; on the
one hand, Lyotard’s suggestion that utility replaces truth is often invoked in legal
contexts surrounding surrogacy, such as the idea that one’s “intent” to parent may
supersede one’s actual (genetic) paternity or maternity. As mentioned earlier, lawyer
Carmel Shalev wants to emphasize a feminine ethic of “responsibility” with a
concomitant focus on an individual’s intent to be a parent. Alternatively, a critic of
surrogacy warns that “parenting is more than a contractual statement of intentions”
(Annas 2). It also seems that moving legitimation to one’s “linguistic practice and
communicational interaction” would ultimately, in the case of surrogate mothers, be
disadvantageous to those with limited practice or interaction. For his part, Lyotard sees
the complicated social interactions present behind legitimation:
the question of the legitimacy of science has been indissociably linked to that of
the legitimation of the legislator since the time of Plato. From this point of view,
the right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to decide what is
just, even if the statements consigned to these two authorities differ in nature.
The point is that there is a strict interlinkage between the kind of language called
science and the kind called ethics and politics: they both stem from the same
perspective, the same ‘choice’ if you will. (Postmodern Condition 8)
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Following Lyotard, we can clearly see the new reproductive technologies of the 80s as
being subsumable to postmodernism, even if this is only in their use variously to generate
and to degenerate familial legitimacy. The narrative strategies used by surrogacy brokers
as well as would-be parents further attests to the desire to imagine a world where the
question “is it true?” is replaced by “what use is it?” This focus from the quick biological
fact of procreation to the lifelong ethical determination of the family romance on the one
hand represents just another formulation of the degendered, masculine discourse about the
postmodern, but on the other hand it also may in turn provide a way to reconceive of
family narratives along the lines of lived experience and not biological fact--who’s to say
that Rumpelstiltskin would not be a better parent than the desperate miller’s daughter?

III. Baby M (mater)
“Even an infant needs her own space.” (Judge Sorkow ***126, on “Baby M”)

The galvanizing case for public opinion about the “new” reproductive techniques
and the “new” surrogacy was “In the Matter of Baby ‘M,’ a Pseudonym for an Actual
Person.”112 In this case, begun 5 January 1987, William Stern brought suit against Mary
Beth Whitehead for failing to fulfill her obligations in a surrogacy contract, a legal
instrument not new, but not yet tested in the court system. Stern, Whitehead, and her
husband Richard had signed an agreement in February 1985, brokered by Noel Keane’s
Infertility Center of New York, which stipulated that Mrs. Whitehead would surrender a
live infant to the Sterns; the infant would be created by means of artificial insemination
(that is, Mr. Stern’s sperm and Mrs. Whitehead’s egg, and so not IVF), and for this
“Baby M” was of course not the first instance where a woman has refused to give up her baby. Indeed,
each of the issues at the center of the case had already been warned against years earlier, see especially
Corea’s thorough outline. As such, what made this case important is not the details so much as the “social
construction” of the case (cf. Harrison).
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service she would be paid $10,000, plus ancillary medical costs not covered by her
insurance.113 Also in the contract were stipulations regarding Mr. Whitehead (he would
relinquish legal right to be considered the father of the child born to his wife), the event of
miscarriage or stillbirth (if occurring after the fourth month, then Mrs. Whitehead would
receive a nominal $1,000), and payment to the infertility center (Mr. Stern would pay
$7,500 for its services). Mrs. Whitehead was delivered of a girl 27 March 1986, but she
signed a birth certificate which read “Sara Elizabeth Whitehead” instead of the agreed
upon “Melissa Elizabeth Stern.”
What happened next is complicated, as the infant is passed back and forth
between the Sterns and Whiteheads (and at one notable point, surreptitiously passed
between Mrs. and Mr. Whitehead through a bedroom window to avoid the police in the
next room [Sorkow ***148]). In short, Whitehead refused both the $10,000 and to
surrender the child. After the Sterns responded with a police-enforced court order (later
judged to be unenforceable), the Whiteheads fled the state of New Jersey and began what
the trial judge in the case, Hon. Harvey R. Sorkow,114 described as both a “hegira”
(***149) and an 87-day “fugitive existence” (***48) in Florida. Ultimately, Sorkow ruled
that the surrogacy contract must be enforced, but with reservations about the lack of laws
regarding surrogacy contracts and the problem with analogizing these kinds of cases with
adoption cases (***87-8). Additionally, and somewhat extraordinarily, Sorkow
terminated Mary Beth Whitehead’s parental rights, and Mr. Stern was adjudged to be the
legal father and given permanent custody of the child, thereby allowing his wife Elizabeth
According to OTA, this was the most common fee (OTA 275). In “Baby M,” the payment is stipulated
to be a “compensation for services and expenses,” not “a fee for termination of parental rights or a payment
in exchange for a consent to surrender the child for adoption,” yet the fee is only payable upon surrender of
live infant (cf. Wilentz). See the contract as Appendix A to Wilentz or as Appendix A to Chesler.
114
Since the case was later sent to the Supreme Court, I am dealing with two different judges (Sorkow and
Wilentz) and two different opinions. For clarity’s sake, I’ll cite the opinions by judge’s name, as opposed
to case number.
113
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to adopt the child (becoming the legal mother). Judge Sorkow needed to go to some
lengths to terminate Whitehead’s parental rights because such termination is “an
extraordinary judicial remedy which is to be granted only after intensive consideration of
parental conduct and the needs of the child” (***135). In fact, state statutes specifically
require evidence of actual abuse or abandonment by a parent in order legally to terminate
parental rights, but Sorkow momentarily circumvented this requirement by invoking the
doctrine of parens patriae and the court’s role in regulating the best interests of the
child.115 The media had been interested in the case since the baby was dramatically taken
from the Whiteheads in Florida (she in the hospital, her daughter beating the police with a
hairbrush as they knocked the maternal grandmother to the ground), but it was the
termination of Whitehead’s parental rights which outraged and rallied public commentary.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately overturned that part of
Sorkow’s decision; that court’s opinion, by Chief Justice Wilentz, invalidated the
surrogacy contract and ruled that such contracts were unenforceable, except perhaps in
cases where no compensation is given and the mother is given the opportunity to revoke
the contract after giving birth.116 Additionally, Chief Justice Wilentz annulled Mrs.
Stern’s adoption of the baby and restored Whitehead’s parental rights. While Mr. Stern
would retain custody of the child, Mrs. Whitehead was given visitation rights to be
spelled out in a later ruling (cf. Sween, “In the Matter of Baby ‘M’”).
This was an important legal case as well as a dramatic social one. In the public
Parens patriae allows the courts to act as parents to minors, protecting their best interests in cases
where there are no parents or the parents are in conflict. Sorkow argues “that parens patriae continues to
exist with a power even greater than specific statutory grants” (***136). Later, Wilentz disagreed, “the
Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially restricted termination of
parental rights if it had intended to allow termination to be achieved by one short sentence in a contract”
(***38, cf. ***43).
116
Sorkow had ruled that the contract could be revoked only up until the time of conception, and the
contract is valid at the moment of conception: “the male gave his sperm; the female gave her egg in their
pre-planned effort to create a child--thus a contract” (***91-2 and ***93), or, as the media more succinctly
put it: “sperm seals the deal.”
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imagination, much was made of the moral character and social standing of the principal
actors, lending a soap opera quality to the proceedings while simultaneously investing the
trial court’s decision with much apparent social weight. The court battle was primarily
configured as one between the Stern household and the Whitehead household, and in
particular one between Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead, the figured couple, as
commentators and the public first tried to make sense of the arrangement as they knew
how--to see it as a custody dispute, as a lover’s squabble, as an argument between
parents. Even Judge Sorkow must remind himself and us that “Mrs. Whitehead and Mr.
Stern were never a family unit” (***144); “these people are not former spouses. They
are strangers to each other” (***60). Simply put, this story is about a man who badly
wanted a child, and a woman later coming to the same realization, but for lack of other
examples of this kind of situation, “Baby M” was played out more or less as if it were a
complicated adoption case, despite the underpinning contractual nature of the dispute.
For this reason, public sympathy was initially overwhelmingly on the side of the Sterns,
who appeared to better represent what parents should be. Yet, as we shall see, once
Judge Sorkow said that Whitehead was not a mother, doing so in a particularly cruel way
that blurred her biological position with her social position, Whitehead’s claim to the child
proved to be a compelling rallying point, leading many observers to “forgive” her.
And so public sympathies shift with progressive revelations: first, we learn that
Mr. Stern’s wife Elizabeth was infertile, her multiple sclerosis preventing her from
bearing children without risk of grave injury to herself. However, Mrs. Stern, more
properly Dr. Stern (she holds both an M.D. and a Ph.D. in Human Genetics, working
professionally as a pediatrician), turns out to have self-diagnosed her multiple sclerosis in
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1979, a diagnosis not definitively confirmed and thus marginalized and one made when
117

the effect of pregnancy in exacerbating multiple sclerosis was unknown (Sorkow ***25).
Judge Sorkow is willing to accept that Mrs. Stern had “a fixed . . . understanding that she
could not carry a child without great risk to her physical well-being” (***27 and
***102),118 although a more cynical view sees her as using multiple sclerosis as an excuse
for the opportunity to further her career by taking advantage of another woman’s
apparent willingness to bear children for her. Additionally, we learn that Mr. Stern also
holds a Ph.D. in Biochemistry and “ran a genetics laboratory” (Harrison 302), which
raises the question of how two well-educated scientists could possibly enter into such an
arrangement with a partly employed high school dropout (Mary Beth) and an alcoholic
garbage man (Richard) with such seeming naiveté (cf. Sorkow ***45). Apparently they
did not, some argue; and the Baby M case was read by many as “baby-selling, pure and
simple” (Kimbrell). Pregnancy contracts, especially those involving gestation of a
woman’s own ovum, “might as usefully be compared to contracts for consensual slavery
as to other kinds of employment contracts” (Shanley 629). Even if it looks like freedom
to do so, Shanley points out, one cannot freely give up future freedom or Constitutionally
contract away Constitutional rights.119 Katha Pollitt, writing in The Nation, remarks upon
the unusualness of such a set of circumstances and uses another metaphor: “so-called
surrogacy agreements are so unprecedented that the resulting human arrangements bear no
“She probably had multiple sclerosis” (Sorkow ***24) although “her anxiety appears to have exceeded
the actual risk” (Wilentz ***9).
118
Sorkow thereby also gives a broader definition to “infertility”: “the inability to conceive and carry to
term without serious threat of harm to one’s physical well-being” (Sorkow ***102). OTA notes that
“numerous physicians and hospitals have come to treat pregnancy as an abnormal, highly dangerous
(almost diseased) state” (326). In this light, what pregnancy cannot be read as a “threat of harm”?
Firestone had put it more bluntly: “pregnancy is the temporary deformation of the body of the individual
for the sake of the species” (188).
119
As in the above footnote, I wonder how theoretical negotiations of surrogate motherhood will in turn
affect “regular” motherhood. If a surrogacy contract is like consensual slavery, would that make pregnancy
without a contract analogous to nonconsensual slavery? If surrogacy contracts morally require evidence of
infertility, will more women “become” infertile?
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resemblance to adoption, illegitimacy, custody after divorce, or any other relationship
involving parents and children, yet, at the same time, bear an uncanny resemblance to the
all-sales-final style of used-car lot” (667).
Yet, another detail about Mr. Stern turns our sympathies back to him: he was
born in Berlin in January 1946 to “parents who were the sole surviving members of his
family to escape the Holocaust” (Sorkow ***22). His father died when Mr. Stern was
12, and “with the death of his mother in 1983, Mr. Stern became the only surviving
member of all branches in his family” (Sorkow ***23). Whitehead was artificially
impregnated 13 months after Stern’s mother’s death; he is reported to have said Kaddish
each day for the year of mourning. His mother’s death becomes, in Stern’s mind, one
specific reason against adoption and offers in place a heart-wrenching motivation for
surrogacy (and gives our narrative another absent mother). Commenting later on the
Sterns’ intentions, Chief Justice Wilentz also sympathizes with Mr. Stern’s past: “the
decision had special significance for Mr. Stern. Most of his family had been destroyed in
the Holocaust. As the family’s only survivor, he very much wanted to continue his
bloodline” (***10). The maternal loss, figured here as a material loss--the bloodline
contained in his gamete--becomes an obsessive purpose. What is important to the Sterns
is not their child, but his bloodline, the responsibility for which, after the loss of his
mother, falls to him. Yet some were not persuaded by this. Psychologist David
Brodzinsky, called by the court-appointed guardian ad litem, offers commentary on Mr.
Stern appropriate for a juvenile delinquent’s rap sheet: “the ambivalent relationship with
his mother through his formative years [has] left [its] mark on Mr. Stern” (Chesler 177).
Chesler uses such details to suggest that the media (incorrectly) blew up the Holocaust
angle, leaving Stern more sympathetic. She goes on to suggest that Stern’s Jewishness is
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confused, as he picks a Catholic woman to be his surrogate, knowing surely that under
Jewish law his child would be Jewish only if the mother was.
On the other hand, Mary Beth Whitehead’s character is savaged by Judge Sorkow
and the Sterns’ expert witnesses; even given the clear bias against Whitehead that Sorkow
demonstrated in his handling of the case, the press at first seemed to follow his lead.
Clearly, as was shown after the first trial, much of Sorkow’s treatment of Mary Beth
Whitehead is patently unfair. He labels her simply “a woman without empathy”
(***132). One of the expert witnesses, Dr. Schechter, paints Whitehead as unfit: she
handed Baby M out a window to escape the police, she fled to Florida and stayed in
different hotels, she violated a contract. Most outlandish are three specific issues
Schechter cites to support his diagnosis of “mixed personality disorder” due to the
presence of her “impulsivity, manipulative behavior, a sense of self-importance,
exploitiveness, lack of sympathy and justification through provocation” (Sorkow ***634): she dyes her graying hair, she brought stuffed panda bears for Baby M to play with
instead of pots and pans, and she said “hooray” instead of “patty cake” when Baby M
was playing the game of the same name. Critics had a field day with these more
ridiculous testimonies; a letter, “We Are All Unfit Mothers,” signed by 129 women
including Gloria Steinem, Andrea Dworkin, Susan Sontag, Betty Friedan, and Meryl
Streep, sought to show the incoherencies in the specialist’s depiction of maternal fitness.
By selecting and isolating individual statements used by the court to demonstrate
unfitness, such as “Mrs. Whitehead feels . . . that her role as a biological mother enables
her to understand her children better than anyone else,” the “Unfit Mothers” letter
showed how these indications of unfitness are also contradictorily culturally valued
assumptions about motherhood (cf. Peterson and Chesler for full text and signatories).
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“If the woman [in a surrogacy arrangement] wants to keep the child, she becomes ‘doubly
deviant’: first, for entering contractual relations and, second, for reneging on these
obligations. As a result, the woman may be labeled ‘unfit’ and her claims to her child
undermined” (Anleu 32). So, by being a “fit mother” (that is, refusing to give up her
child), a woman becomes an “unfit mother” (by refusing to honor a legal contract). In his
decision, Sorkow finds that “she is a good mother for and to her older children. She
would not be a good custodian for Baby M” (***132), which is both contradictory and
coherent. Is she a good “custodian” for her older children? Granted that she would not be
a “good custodian” to Baby M, would she be a “good mother” “for” Baby M, or “to”
Baby M?
Chief Justice Wilentz, finally standing up for Whitehead, puts it as such: “we do
not know of, and cannot conceive of, any other case where a perfectly fit mother was
expected to surrender her newly born infant, perhaps forever, and was then told she was a
bad mother because she did not” (***88). Wilentz sees more clearly that both parties’
behavior is motivated “undoubtedly because of their own self-interest” (***11). “The
depth of their conflict about Baby M, about custody, visitation, about the goodness or
badness of each of them, comes through in their telephone conversations. . . . The dashed
hopes of the Sterns, the agony of Mrs. Whitehead, their suffering, their hatred--all were
caused by the unraveling of this arrangement” (Wilentz ***49). In retrospect, sympathy
is due her for her unfair treatment in the courtroom and media, some of which Judge
Wilentz provides, yet even a sympathetic party has difficulty accounting for all of
Whitehead’s actions, especially those stemming from the “unraveling of this
arrangement.” For example, Whitehead had threatened over the telephone to accuse
falsely Stern of sexually abusing her 10-year-old daughter--a threat Stern tape-recorded
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and played back in court (Sorkow ***49). Also, Sorkow criticizes Whitehead’s “bringing
of her older daughter to court where the child was terrorized by the crush of media and
[Whitehead’s] fawning use of the media to her own narcissistic ends” (Sorkow ***125
and Sorkow ***33). Finally, the most frightening, but simultaneously empty, is another
of Whitehead’s threats to Stern: “‘I’d rather see me and her [Baby M] dead before you
get her,’ and ‘I gave her life, I can take her life away’” (Sorkow ***49). While for
political activists, this is a problem (for example, Chesler worries about how good a
public figure Whitehead will make), Whitehead’s complex character and the imperfection
of her claim to her child best dramatize the uncertainty among all commentators on the
case, whether it is the judges trying to decide the child’s best interests, feminists trying to
decide whether surrogacy arrangements are liberatory or essentialist, or the public’s own
imagination of what kind of women mothers are or can be.
Mr. Stern ironically alters Whitehead’s threat to do away with Baby M, saying
that, absent a decision that he be awarded sole custody, he would not want to share
custody or take advantage of visitation rights (Sorkow ***62). While Whitehead would
rather have no child than give one to Stern, Stern would rather give Whitehead the child
than share it. For this selflessness, the court sees him as a better parent, which is shown
again when it is recounted how he at first gave a distraught Whitehead, who claimed to be
suicidal, Baby M; Judge Sorkow saw this is as demonstrating not flawed parenting (giving
your child to a supposedly suicidal woman), but rather “immense concern for Mrs.
Whitehead” (***45). Possessing the wisdom of Solomon, Mr. Stern is able to
“subordinate his wishes for his daughter and give up visitation” (Sorkow ***83-4), while
Mrs. Whitehead is labeled “self -important” for seeing herself as a mother and therefore
considering the child as hers. The lesson is that Stern has to demonstrate that he can give
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up the child in order rightfully to claim it, while Whitehead’s mistake is making a direct
claim for the child itself, and not her own motherly ability. Interestingly, in Whitehead’s
own narrative of events, she describes how her own mother’s initial advice had made her
angry; she had advised Mary Beth to remember the story of Solomon (Whitehead 33).

Discounting the seriousness of her threats to harm herself or her child,120 the most
troublesome issue with Whitehead’s character (for both judges, for feminists trying to
decide their allegiances, for this reader) involves her truth-telling ability. I hold that this is
not only an issue configured by the juridical requirements of a public court case, but one
that further reflects those issues of parentage raised by Freud and the crisis of legitimacy
which is meant to mark the postmodern moment.
Mary Beth Whitehead can in many ways be simply represented as a liar--breaking
her contract with the Sterns, lying to the court in an effort to win custody, even lying to
her parents about keeping Baby M (Sorkow ***141). In addition to breaking a contract
(whether “truly” legal or not), she at one point suggests to the court that the child is
actually her husband’s, since they had intercourse prior to her conception. The court
found this an impossible claim after a blood test revealed that Richard had had a voluntary
vasectomy nine years earlier. Furthermore, the Whiteheads already had two children,
testifying that after the birth of their second child in 1976 (the first was born in 1974)
they “decided that they did not want to have any more children, that they were ‘content’
with two children and thought they had the ‘perfect family’” (Sorkow ***299). “The
Whiteheads had created their family and wanted no further children” (Sorkow ***29),
which further demonstrates the unfairness of Whitehead’s later claim to Baby M; since
As we shall see in a moment, the fact that it is Bill Stern she addresses is part of the reason it can be
discounted.
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she already had two children and the Sterns had none, she was apparently dissembling in
her representation of her own familial satisfaction.
Along these lines, the most intriguing passages in the case occur in relation to the
judges’ considerations of how and when the different parents would reveal the truth of
the child’s origins to Baby M. Whitehead’s “inconsistent stories about various things
engendered grave doubts about her ability to explain honestly and sensitively to Baby M-and at the right time--the nature of her origin” (Wilentz ***85). On the other hand, the
Sterns “are honest; they can recognize error, deal with it, and learn from it. . . . When the
time comes to tell her about her origins, they will probably have found a means of doing
so that accords with the best interests of Baby M” (Wilentz ***86-7). The best interests
here are psychological in nature, and it almost goes without saying that honesty is in the
best interests of a child born under these new social arrangements. The measure of the
judge’s uncertainty that the mother or father will provide for the child’s own certainty is
twofold: genetic and rearing. That is, it is not admitted that Whitehead could lie about
Baby M’s father, or that Baby M could be successfully reared with false knowledge.
Ironically, the new genetic certainty, which undoes pater incertus est, in turn prompts a
legal uncertainty in a parent’s rearing practices. Put otherwise, the formula Freud uses is
both undone by “new” reproductive technologies (science can identify fathers) as well as
reversed by them (a judge has trouble legally identifying a mother). Judge Sorkow in
particular doubts that Whitehead would tell the truth, specifically because of her refusal
to privilege Mr. Stern’s verifiable paternity: “to this day she still appears to reject any
role Mr. Stern played in the conception. She chooses to forget that but for him there
would be no child” (***129).121 Sorkow, concerned like Freud with the child’s fantasies
Dr. Schechter puts it in economic terms, noting that Mrs. Whitehead gives “no value to the genetic
contribution of Mr. Stern” (Sorkow ***64).
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of the parents, uses parens patriae to forestall potential parental uncertainties. Also, in
Sorkow’s eyes, it is apparent that while there can be no child without a father, there can
be a child without a mother. Sorkow’s phrasing establishes the certainty of paternity as a
prerequisite for pregnancy: “but for him there would be no child.”122 Ironically, this kind
of certainty is upset by the language of the original contract: “RICHARD WHITEHEAD
further acknowledges he will do all acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity
of any offspring conceived” (Wilentz ***107). This legal maneuver to avoid presumptive
paternity laws is not upheld, as Mr. Whitehead’s name is affixed to the birth certificate at
the hospital, taking advantage of his uncertain state to certify himself as father.

The problem with looking at the judge’s engagement with the principals is that it
ignores what to me is the crucial aspect of this case: the relationship between the two
battling mothers, Mary Beth Whitehead and Elizabeth Stern. Clearly, their’s is the
relationship most important in this narrative, but the one least present in the textual/legal
records. So taken up with the issue of parentage, the case (both in Chancery and Supreme
court, as well as in the commentary) is figured repetitively by the familiar. While both
judges are sailing into uncharted territory (and thus cautiously recognize the newness of
the situation), the law is forced nonetheless to apply itself to already established forms,
and so the Baby M case becomes just an odder, more complex adoption case: Mr. Stern
vs. Mrs. Whitehead. Yet, what I would like to find is the way that women talk to women
in these kinds of negotiations; the much more crucial relationship for understanding the
new surrogacy arrangements is the one between Betsy Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead.
One effaced in the court documents, the other overdetermined by scores of shrinks and
Also, according to Sorkow, this is not baby-selling, since Stern “cannot purchase what is already his”
(***88).
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media pundits, the two of them together pose problems for how women will or can
negotiate their own relationships in light of the “new” reproductive technologies.
Elizabeth Stern’s name is continually, explicitly, written out of the Baby M case.
First is the contract where she is not named (leaving three men as signatories to a contract
of the fate of a child, who turns out to be female), presumably in order to avoid violating
state baby-selling statutes (ironically, this is the same reason that Richard Whitehead is
named in those contracts). While Elizabeth Stern’s name never appears, she is indirectly
mentioned twice; first is in relation to the document’s attempt to portray this
arrangement as one for services and not for a baby: “the sole purpose of this arrangement
is to enable WILLIAM STERN and his infertile wife to have a child which is biologically
related to WILLIAM STERN” (Wilentz ***106).123 The second mention occurs in a
clause dealing with the event of Mr. Stern’s death, in which case “the child will be placed
in the custody of WILLIAM STERN’S wife” (Wilentz ***113). It is easy to see this
other Stern as both victim and villain of the case. She is villainized because of the
inequality of her social status and appearance in relation to Mary Beth (a doctor versus a
former “barroom dancer”), as especially configured around the suggested doubt regarding
Mrs. Stern’s self-diagnosis of multiple sclerosis (a detail, incidentally, used to humanize
Mrs. Stern). Portrayed as uptight, repressed, put-together, Betsy Stern most of all
appears to be trying to get something for nothing--a baby without labor. Yet, in the
contract and in court, she is excluded even from the fruits of Whitehead’s womb. Barbara
Katz Rothman, for example, points out that it is Mrs. Stern who quit work in order to
care for Baby M, although Mr. Stern is the one photographed while carrying Baby M to
and from court--visibly parenting away (“Comment” 314-5).
cf. Wilentz ***7-8 and ***28. Wilentz isn’t buying it: “we have no doubt whatsoever that the money
is being paid to obtain an adoption and not, as the Sterns argue, for the personal services of Mary Beth
Whitehead” (***25).
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While Rothman provides some needed perspective on the case, she is using
Elizabeth’s role to make a claim about the dynamic at the Stern household. In the context
of Mary Beth and Elizabeth’s relationship, it is interesting to see how critics figure the
two of them collectively. The “decision” made between these two women (one that is
left implicit and not legally contracted), which the rhetoric of the case seems to
necessitate, undoes the larger issue of motherhood. By focusing on whether Mary Beth
or Betsy would be a better mother (and this is done either by reference to biology or
economics, subspecies of nature and nurture), the terms of the debate are already ignored.
Phyllis Chesler, in her book on the case, Sacred Bond: The Legacy of Baby M,124
discusses the evidently binary nature of the two women, who also physically resemble
one another: they are “two sides of the same coin, the Janus head” (Merle Hoffman qtd.
in Chesler 23). Hoffman continues, giving us the following pairs: Whitehead vs. Stern;
passion vs. mind; blood, tissue, guts, need, sex vs. intellect, control and alienation; mother
vs. career; bad girl vs. good girl; whore vs. virgin and immaculate conception; Elizabeth I
vs. Mary, Queen of Scots; Athena vs. Venus (qtd. in Chesler 24-5). With these
distinctions in place, Chesler suggests, public admiration of Betsy Stern is admiration of a
woman acting like a man, not only in the refusal of pregnancy, but also in adopting the
rational, intelligent sense of entitlement and the disavowal of the bad, sexual body in favor
of a new kind of feminine-masculine parenting. The public’s question--who is a better
mother--is answerable by a far simpler question--who is better, mother or father?
Chesler reads Betsy as a man in women’s clothing: she is “pale, gaunt,
accomplished, incredibly narrow at the wrist, waist, pelvis, and ankle, the most
‘masculine’ (i.e., the least emotionally expressive) of Baby M’s four parents” (24).
Chesler is a direct participant in the case, befriending the Whiteheads and organizing press conferences
and demonstrations.
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Chesler asks “did Betsy really want a baby--as much as Bill did? Bill is quoted
everywhere, ad nauseam, on his feelings about having a child. It is surprising how few
public statements Betsy seems to have made on the subject” (25). Betsy’s public
quietude, rather than being read as feminine meekness, is used against her in keeping with
her overly-masculine nature; in Chesler’s eyes she is so much of a man in comparison to
the other principals that her true maternal desire becomes suspect. Chesler here seems to
figure the masculine as a repressed feminine; Betsy is the least emotionally expressive, is
the tightest of all of them, and so appears as most masculine. Yet, Chesler also makes the
opposing claim that “Betsy is hardly an emancipated woman. Betsy moves in the same
patriarchal trance or fugue state that moves Mary Beth” (25). Picking out some of
Betsy’s testimony to demonstrate how she parroted Bill’s testimony of the previous
day, Chesler finds Betsy both subservient to Bill’s desires under patriarchy (never
questioning his wishes) at the same time as she is the model, for the court, of patriarchy
(having a male career, she would never become pregnant [Chesler 43]). Who’s the real
mother? The maternally grief-stricken Bill Stern. Who’s the real father? The maternally
masculine Betsy Stern.
Mary Beth Whitehead is later brought into Chesler’s organization of the confused
Stern household. Chesler intimates that Whitehead’s desire for a child was actually a
desire for a parent: “does the surrogacy-contract mother want to be a ‘surrogate’ mother-or does she want to have a ‘surrogate’ mother for herself?” (40). By means of italics, we
can read through Chesler’s question the two possibilities available to women in this
situation: existence or possession. “Being a surrogate mother” or “having a surrogate
mother” is an odd way of deciphering the potential relationships women can have in the
face of new maternal arrangements, and when what the woman “had” was a female infant,
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the possession of women becomes more bothersomely tangible. Whitehead continually
invokes the phrase “my baby,” to which Baby M would presumably counter with “my
mother.” We shall see momentarily that the right to be called “my mother” (or rather, the
right to construct the family narrative around such a self-referential statement) is what is
at stake. Chesler, perhaps overwhelmed by Betsy’s self-evident masculinity, has a
difficult time conceiving of an equal relationship between Mrs. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead.
Suggesting that it would have been more natural for Mary Beth to speak only to Mr.
Stern questions the significance of Mary Beth’s surrogate act; despite the contracted
desire to structure the situation to the contrary, for Whitehead this is a gift not to Mr.
Stern but to Mrs. Stern. In retrospect, traditional surrogacy arrangements such as this
appear to present a gift to men (they get from another woman what they are unable to get
from their wife), and this seems to be how Chesler sees it. Instead of finding a gift
between women, Chesler finds Whitehead treating Mrs. Stern not as another woman, but
as a parent, and specifically (probably) a father. Mary Beth is her own baby, and Betsy
becomes Mary Beth. Or, villainous Betsy becomes Bill, and Bill becomes Betsy, or
becomes Mary Beth. Or, Baby M becomes Bill’s own surrogate mother.125

Chesler is keen to read Betsy Stern as a traitor to her cause, both grasping for
patriarchal power and simultaneously falling under it. In her own narrative, A Mother’s
Story: The Truth About the Baby M Case, published a year after the Supreme Court
decision, Mary Beth Whitehead reveals a less nuanced picture of Betsy Stern, yet one
that is still strangely loving despite its bitterness. Interestingly, the text’s most dramatic
moments--Mary Beth admitting to the Sterns that she is keeping the baby, being
Chesler argues that Mr. Stern was so self-loathing that he wanted a Christian baby to stand in for his
overbearing, “pushy,” Jewish, Holocaust-surviving mother (42).
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assaulted in her home and fainting, being thrown bloody into the back of a police car--are
filtered not through the judge, not through the infertility center, not even through Mr.
Stern, but rather always through Betsy; they are in each case clearly addressed from one
mother’s point-of-view to another. For example, Mary Beth first called Betsy to tell her
she was pregnant; she first told Betsy, over the phone, that she did not want payment;
when offered more money, Mary Beth addresses Betsy in an interior monologue; it is
Betsy whom she calls the morning after giving the baby to the Sterns; next Betsy
telephones her to try to retrieve the baby; she is physically assaulted by Betsy; it is
Betsy who “instructs” the police to take the child away; and it is Betsy who later attacks
Mary Beth’s character in court (Whitehead 92, 21, 22, 30, 33, 35, 46, 129). If Betsy
Stern was effaced in the surrogacy contract and court opinions, she is writ large in
Whitehead’s imagination. On the other hand, Bill Stern is, like the procreative role he
played, practically nonexistent during this time; “during the seven months that I was
regularly inseminated with Bill Stern’s sperm, we remained intimate strangers. I learned
very little about the man whose child I bear” (Whitehead 91).126 This feeling was shared,
in fact, by Mr. Stern; in a footnote, Chesler gives us a fascinatingly suggestive bit of Dr.
Levine’s testimony not reported in the media:
During the course of the pregnancy, Mrs. Whitehead expressed a desire to deal
only with Mrs. Stern, and then after the pregnancy she rarely spoke to Dr. Stern
even on the telephone. Dr. Stern said that he felt like an intruder, that Mrs.
Whitehead was carrying his baby and he felt extremely awkward. (206)
Early in her narrative, Whitehead soliloquizes Betsy Stern. Whitehead is still
recuperating in the hospital after delivery, having more or less decided to keep the child,
when the Sterns arrive and offer her more money. Whitehead reports,
126

This, tellingly, in a chapter called “My Marriage to Rick.”
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I looked at Betsy Stern and thought to myself, “Betsy I’m not selling this child. I
started this when I actually believed it wasn’t my child. Everyone had convinced
me that it was your child, but going through the pregnancy and the pain of labor . .
. has made me realize that this is my baby, not yours, mine.” But I didn’t say
anything. I just burst into tears. (22)
Mary Beth’s inability to speak her own mind, a flaw she repeatedly laments as it causes
more confusion and hurt, is portrayed here and throughout as a potential conversation
between mothers.127 Initially, Mary Beth seems to have literally believed that “it wasn’t
my child,” suggesting elsewhere that she thought, until the day of delivery, that the baby
was in fact genetically related to both Sterns, and that her role in the arrangement was
similar to one she had seen in a film, where a gestational surrogate mother, after some
conflict, happily gives her child away (Whitehead 32, 8).128 Whitehead tells us that “the
concept of an egg remained a meaningless abstraction. I didn’t think of it as the genetic
substance of my child. No one ever said to me, ‘It’s your baby’” (12). While recognizing
that she had some part to play in the matter, Whitehead seems to have confused her eggs
with her womb, and “it wasn’t until the day I delivered my daughter that I fully
comprehended the fact that it wasn’t Betsy Stern’s baby” (12). Conflating narratives of
birth and the loss of innocence, the joy of birth and the recognition of the bond with the
child is figured as the arrival of knowledge. Whitehead’s text is filled with phrases such as
“looking back” or “I now know,” but here is the originary moment where Whitehead
begins to learn for herself the truth of the matter. After Noel Keane, the surrogate broker,
suggests Whitehead go to counseling, she angrily refuses him, explaining, “I know what
Ultimately, this communication, halting throughout, would end. In the fifth month of Whitehead’s
pregnancy, she “felt [Betsy] was so overbearing that [she] simply stopped communicating” (Whitehead 94).
128
This, incidentally, is the arrangement that the Sterns had initially desired, yet they were dissuaded by
IVF’s still experimental nature. (Sorkow***34).
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I’m doing. The girls who give away their babies are simply in a deeper state of denial”
(33). As in the earlier quote, Whitehead locates her sense of herself as a mother in the act
of her knowledge of the child; what made her realize that she could not part with the child
was having the child in the first place. Recall her complaint about the infertility center
nurses: “No one ever said to me, ‘It’s your baby,’” a piece of information which
Whitehead, despite the surrogate broker’s efforts to the contrary, manages to learn for
herself. We truly know not what we miss, until it arrives. However, exactly when
Whitehead figured out she was keeping the child is hard to determine. She suggests a
number of times that it was at the moment of birth; in retrospect, though, she places it
earlier: for example, at the beginning of the ninth month, Betsy calls and says she bought
baby clothes that day, as did Whitehead, who thinks “this woman is planning to take my
baby home with her” (96). Ultimately, that question seems impossible to answer given
both parties’ construction and counter-construction of their family narratives.
Betsy Stern, like all good villains, has two apparent natures. When Mary Beth
finally tells the Sterns she is keeping the baby, “first, the color drained from Betsy’s face.
Then she became violently angry. It was my first taste of Betsy Stern when she didn’t
get her way” (Whitehead 34-5). “I had said yes to her over and over, but it wasn’t until
now, when I said no, that her true colors came out” (Whitehead 35). According to
Whitehead, Betsy violently attacks Mary Beth, whose uterus begins to contract, doubling
her over. “Give that baby to Bill” or “Give Bill that baby” Betsy shouts over and over,
and Bill is too paralyzed, crying, to do anything. Betsy “stuns” Mary Beth by her
behavior, by the expression of her “adamant,” violent desire for Bill to have the baby.
This scene is far too melodramatic to take serious; Betsy becomes Bill’s foot soldier
simultaneously as Bill is reduced to whimpering on the periphery. Mary Beth’s uterine
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contractions, causing her to almost black out, recall for us her recent pregnancy, and the
strength she derived from the knowledge gained that day leads Mary Beth to now
miraculously manage to keep possession of the child. Mary Beth “wins” by virtue of her
suffering; the Sterns suddenly, “unexpectedly,” change their tone and manner, leaving
peacefully but, as we discover later, duplicitously going directly to a lawyer.
When the Sterns show up some weeks later with a police order and escort, Betsy
is again the source of aggression, adamantly grasping for the child, trying to snatch it from
Mary Beth; “give me that baby” she “demanded” (Whitehead 46). Next, audaciously,
“Betsy began to instruct the police” (Whitehead 46). Whitehead, in maternal disarray and
shock, runs to their car, imploring them not to take the child, upon which plea “Betsy
took the side of [Bill’s] face and whipped it around toward her. ‘Don’t look at her, Bill.
Don’t look at her’” (Whitehead 48). “As [she] stood there barefoot, in a pink and white
nightshirt, with [menstrual] blood all over [her] legs,” Mary Beth unsuccessfully implores
Bill to “look at me” before she is handcuffed and thrown in a police car (Whitehead 48).
This manic public scene, in view of the neighbors and thematically witnessed (as so much
of the events are) by Whitehead’s daughter Tuesday, is shocking in its gruesomeness.129
The second of two “fluid” scenes,130 Whitehead describes how in her panic over having her
baby taken from her, she had “soaked right through the sanitary napkin” (Whitehead 48).
Just like the last scene where Betsy attacked Mary Beth, the maternal injury which the
Sterns here attempt to inflict on Mary Beth is literalized; “I still hadn’t healed from the
baby’s delivery and I felt like an open wound” (Whitehead 49). Despite Mary Beth’s
Ten-year-old Tuesday witnesses every traumatic moment; she’s there screaming at Bill to help, she later
beats the policeman who takes her sister away, her horrified expression is captured in a photograph as she
leaves the courtroom. The lesson is not lost on Tuesday (nor on Mary Beth) when Tuesday says, in
response to her mother’s statement “someday you’ll have a baby too,” that Tuesday would rather hire
someone to bear it for her (Whitehead 95).
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The first describes Whitehead waking at night in “a pool of milk . . . alone in the darkness, with the
milk running down my chest and soaking my nightgown. I held out my empty arms and screamed at the
top of my lungs, ‘Oh God, what have I done--I want my baby!’” (Whitehead 26-7).
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physical display, Betsy--infertile, masculine--cannot read Mary Beth’s blood, nor does
she allow Bill to attempt to. Whitehead’s leaky, messy body, representing everything
that is opposite to Betsy’s, is familiar as the image of the grief-torn woman, and figures in
situating the appropriateness of Whitehead’s private life (dying her gray hair, purchasing
the wrong gifts) with her public mothering (fleeing to Florida, withdrawing her son from
school). If a reader is meant to sympathize with Whitehead, it is clearly not because she
manages publicly to represent herself as a “good” woman and mother, but rather because
she is so stricken by being a mother--so publicly falling to pieces that it is impossible for
anyone to justify keeping her and her child separate.

Discussing surrogacy narratives, E. Ann Kaplan is surprised by the fact that
surrogacy narratives so often end acrimoniously,131 and that both women involved seem to
be proceeding naively through most of the process: “neither woman is self-consciously
aware of the discursive forces shaping her experience and of how the stories are linked.
The [surrogate mother’s] violent desire to keep the child may be provoked precisely by
the adoptive mother’s urgent desire to claim the child, evidencing a negative symbiotic
process” (“Politics” 122). Struggling to resolve this process, Kaplan suggests we blame
media representations of women--the “positions of women fighting women so common in
film melodrama and TV soaps” (“Politics” 122) which suggest to women that they
become surrogates in the first place by stressing that “the self-sacrificial mother is what
mothering is all about” (“Politics” 122). However, the “desire for this self-sacrifice wills
into being its opposite binary, the jealous, competitive mother, who wants to possess the
cf. “While the relationship between Mrs. Whitehead and Mr. Stern grew distant, her relationship with
Mrs. Stern grew closer. The relationship subsequently deteriorated as Mrs. Stern insisted that Mrs.
Whitehead undergo amniocentesis, take a prescription pharmaceutical in order to control the effects of the
difference in blood type between Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead and take certain precautions when Mrs.
Whitehead reported an elevation in blood pressure in the last months of pregnancy” (Sorkow ***41).
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child” (Kaplan, “Politics” 123). Consider again Chief Justice Wilentz’s surprise at the
Sorkow decision: “We do not know of, and cannot conceive of, any other case where a
perfectly fit mother was expected to surrender her newly born infant, perhaps forever,
and was then told she was a bad mother because she did not” (***88). Whitehead’s
jealousy and possessiveness brings about her selfsame sense of sacrificial motherhood,
just as Whitehead’s narrative in turn calls forth Betsy Stern as the image of the jealous,
competitive mother. Mrs. Whitehead claimed during the second trial that her erratic
behavior, used against her in the first hearings, were caused by legal and judicial mistakes,
and that her response did not indicate her future mothering abilities; Judge Wilentz agrees
that “any mother who truly loved her child might so respond and that it is . . . unfair to
judge her on the basis of her reaction to an extreme situation rarely faced by any mother”
(***22). Whitehead has both to disavow and to justify her erratic behavior in order to be
seen as a good mother, while that same behavior also needs to be evidence of the strength
of her maternal attachment to her child.
In the “Baby M” case, an argument was made and rejected regarding the
contractual obligations of informed consent. It was proposed that informed consent is
impossible in the case of pregnancy, that something happens in this period to change a
woman, or at least impair her ability to make a truly informed decision.132 Sorkow rejects
the argument regarding the absence of informed consent in Whitehead’s case because it is
both irrelevant (a nonpregnant woman would, no matter what amount of information
given, never know what it is like to be pregnant) and because Whitehead was at any rate
as informed as one could be about any contract involving a “common experience.” He
gives the example of marriage contracts or property settlement agreements (Sorkow
“Stern, her father, claims intent: he planned on that child. Whitehead, her mother, claims love: she had
not planned on loving that child” (Rothman, Recreating 138).
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203
***58), neither of which remain in limbo until after the fact, which is in effect what
Whitehead seemed to want to happen. On the other hand, Wilentz disagrees with this
line of thinking, arguing that “under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably
committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a
totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby’s
birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed” (Wilentz ***52). The “most
important sense” of the woman “uninformed” prior to pregnancy echoes Whitehead’s
own knowledge narrative in A Mother’s Story. Referring to the original report prepared
by the Infertility Center suggesting that Whitehead would have difficulty separating from
a child, Whitehead says “I now believe that even if Betsy had read the report, I would
have remained incomprehensible to her. We were such different kinds of women” (92).
Here is another example of A Mother’s Story offering itself as a tale of self-revelation.
Humble, ignorant, Mary Beth in retrospect has learned a great deal, especially about
someone like Betsy Stern. While she may be “incomprehensible” to Betsy, presumably
Betsy is comprehensible to Mary Beth. Yet, Whitehead’s understanding of the situation
hinges on the efficacy of a report to describe the kind of person she was (or rather, the
kind of person Betsy would be able to see her as). She says that she and Mrs. Stern
“were” such different people, leaving open the possibility that they at present are not (a
suggestion supported by A Mother’s Story’s conception of the Baby M case as one
between two similarly competitive women). In the calling forth of their split social
selves--two different mothers created in their struggle over one child--Whitehead and
Stern become, at least in Whitehead’s mind, compatibly similar. If they “were” such
different people, it seems that now Mary Beth, with her new knowledge, has become a
bit more like Betsy.
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When the truth of Betsy Stern’s multiple sclerosis came up at the trial, Whitehead
became bitterly convinced that “even her original longing to help an infertile couple had
been thwarted” (122). After reading a newspaper article in the Bergen Record which
interviewed three doctors, Whitehead came to believe that “as far as anyone could tell,
[Betsy] was no more infertile than I was, and . . . there was no medical reason for her not
to become pregnant and have her own baby” (122).133 With this, things change for
Whitehead, who makes the curious observation that “after that revelation, Bill and Betsy
and I seemed to grow farther and farther apart. Separated from each other by a bank of
attorneys and a lawyers’ table cluttered with legal pads, briefcases, and official-looking
documents, Bill and Betsy no longer even looked at me” (123). It is quite surprising,
given all that we have witnessed in her text, that Whitehead would only now see the three
parties beginning to grow apart. Indeed, it seems as if Whitehead misses the entire point
of the last year of custody battles and spectacular courtroom scenes and revelations.
Humble (needy?) as ever, Whitehead is affected by the Sterns not looking at her, or not
wanting to leave the courtroom at the same time. In what other terms could Whitehead
have possibly configured the court battle? What sense does it make to displace the
emotions of this case metaphorically onto a table strewn with “official-looking
documents”? Whitehead is bothered by Betsy’s apparent duplicity, involving as it does a
negation of Whitehead’s motive for “helping” in the first place. She also appears
bothered by the fact that this case is not somehow bringing the families closer together.
Finally, she “often thought about how sad it was that we had come to this point. And
that all of us were in so much pain. Sometimes I felt as if the whole horrible struggle was
crushing my spirit” (Whitehead 123).
In 1999, Whitehead spoke to the press about the fact that Stern’s MS did in fact get worse, to the point
where Betsy now needs to use a wheelchair: “I don’t want to be cruel. I feel very sorry for Betsy. But I
also feel that what she did was very selfish. I believe disabled people have every right to have children,
but living with a disabled parent can create a sense of guilt in a child” (Churcher 38).
133

205
So, perhaps (according to Kaplan) Mrs. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead call each
other’s social being into existence. If so, motherhood, shown in the case to be determined
by a relationship with a child, is actually one involving a relationship not to a child but to
another mother. Kaplan figures the relationship from both mothers’ point of view: “also
intriguing in [these] narratives is why [surrogate mothers] do not anticipate the separation
from the child, which they ultimately describe as ‘heart-wrenching,’ or anticipate that
they may desire to keep the child despite their having had other children. Why doesn’t
the adoptive mother anticipate that the [surrogate mother] will have such a struggle?”
(“Politics” 122). What could possibly make someone in the 80s think it was acceptable
to sell a baby? What could possibly make someone in the 80s think it was acceptable to
purchase a baby? And why are people actually surprised when these new arrangements
fail to meet some prearranged, theorized outcome? “Hasn’t she seen Kramer vs. Kramer
[1979]? Doesn’t she know the revolution happened?” (Rothman, “Comment” 314).
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Chapter Four
Yuppies and Yuckies: Gender and Power in Young Urban Killers

“When Mephistopheles shows up wearing a gold Rolex he’s truly a creature for our age”
(Maslin, “Now, Slyly, Comes the Yuppie Devil” B1)
“Moneyman with a true killer instinct: mergers and acquisitions become murders and
executions” (Corliss 78)

The most recognizable object of knowledge in the 80s was the Yuppie. Indeed,
the yuppie look was so well-defined in 80s dramas and comedies that he or she appears,
almost undifferentiated, in scores of film, television, and print media from the period.
Because it is a simple character to get--self-obsessed, pampered, eclectic, snobbish--the
yuppie provides an easy foil to saner ways of living. In this role, the yuppie often
appeared as a comic trope; in popular television shows like Family Ties (1982-1989) and
films like National Lampoon’s Christmas Vacation (1989), the yuppie neighbor or family
member had comically misdriven ambitions. In Family Ties, Michael J. Fox stole the
show by portraying Alex P. Keaton as a tie-wearing young Republican humorously out of
step with his hippie parents’ values. In middle-class, everyman comedies like the
National Lampoon films (scripted by John Hughes), Chevy Chase and Beverly D’Angelo
play characters scorned by their yuppie next-door neighbors, whose perfect lifestyle,
indicated by an elaborate stereo system, chic bedroom decor, and jogging routine, is turned
upside down by the simple-hearted Griswolds. Played for laughs, these yuppies are
ridiculed for their image-obsessions, illustrating to middle-class audiences the frivolity of
pretentious aspirations and asking us to sympathize with the frustrated aims of the
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everyman. Barbara Ehrenreich, in her study of middle-class life in the 80s, Fear of Falling,
points out how yuppies serve as a marker for middle-class anxieties; “they were also the
very worst children, the apotheosis of middle-class forebodings about the corrupting
effects of affluence” (197).
Nonetheless, elements of so-called “yuppie culture” did begin to appear with
more regularity among the middle class in the mid- to late-80s. Even as they were being
lampooned, yuppies were figured sensitively and realistically. After yuppie film avant la
lettre Annie Hall (1977), Lawrence Kasdan’s The Big Chill (1983) was the popular film to
best capture the prototypical yuppie coming-of-age narrative.134 While satiric
representations of yuppies address themselves to an audience identifying with the comic
losers trying to make by without leather goods, silk ties, and imported food, a film like
The Big Chill is unabashedly a yuppie film made for yuppie consumption. Focusing on a
group of former sixties radicals who reunite for a friend’s funeral, Kasdan’s film presents
yuppie introspection, guilt, and envy as the eight friends alternately justify and deny
their new lifestyles. Instead of pitting the yuppie against the rest of the middle class,
these kinds of films pit yuppies against yuppies, showing that yuppies too can have
emotion, can experience failure, and can learn life lessons. The kind of group yuppie
lifestyle portrayed by The Big Chill was continued in such quintessentially yuppie
television shows as Moonlighting (1985-1989), thirtysomething (1987-1991), and L.A.
Law (1986-1994). Ehrenreich, in a class analysis, once again points out the contradiction,
arguing that the middle class--those most susceptible to the yuppie message--“fancies
itself a set of self-determining individuals” rather than a sociological group with shared
motives and concerns (238). For the middle-class, there is no shock of recognition with
The Big Chill, I must note, merely yuppifies the far more complex version of the aging theme explored
in John Sayles’s The Return of the Secacus 7 (1980).
134
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these popular portrayals of yuppies; “probably very few people read about yuppies and
thought, ‘Oh my god, that’s me!’” (Ehrenreich 238). Nonetheless, as yuppie culture was
increasingly disseminated, “many in the middle class could see some part of themselves,
some emerging constellation of tastes (for coarse-grain mustard, linen suits, or frequent
workouts), and realize that they themselves had been labeled, caricatured, and fingered as
part of some larger conformity emanating from beyond their individual will and judgment”
(Ehrenreich 238). This tension is particular to the 80s, and as I will show in this chapter
is located even more specifically in the few years right after 1984.
In post-90s culture, Yuppies tend more readily towards a mix of the comic and the
banal, and today it is about impossible not to partake innocently in what was in the mid80s a snobbish yuppie pleasure. Even then, though, as imported luxury foods began to
fill supermarket aisles, the items that once set the yuppie apart no longer seemed to
signify much; “yuppies keep trying to find avenues out of yuppiedom but they end up
just starting a new trend that catches up with them,” notes New York Times journalist
Maureen Dowd in 1985 (B4). After the easily assimilated dramatic and comedic
representations of the yuppie, the yuppie became by the end of the 80s and in the early
90s a stale site of discourse about American mores and values. Yet for me this very
staleness identifies the yuppie as a premier object of the knowledge for the 80s; the
yuppie’s blandness and search for conformity demonstrates important fractures in the
American sense of identity. Ehrenreich illustrates some of the discrepancies between
middle-class values and the yuppies as a social group, focusing on class as an important
80s marker of identity. In addition, the yuppie trope avoids the question of gender.
Following a demographic or sociological definition, women can be, and are represented as,
yuppies, but it is men who strategically occupy the more serious representational roles.
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Representations of the yuppie in fact try to be desexed, pointedly sublimating sexual
activity to the greater good of activity and personal achievement. Countless jokes reoccur
about the yuppie couple scheduling time for sexual intercourse, or turning their beds into
second offices. Additionally, initial newspaper articles about the yuppie repeatedly use
the nonspecific noun “creature” to describe the yuppie, further desexing it (see below, and
my first epigraph). In addition to Ehrenreich’s analysis of class-skipping economic
power, we must add an analysis of the yuppie’s degendered relation to power.
What makes the yuppie especially fruitful for these kinds of analysis occurs in the
period immediately after its heyday in the mid-80s, when the yuppie was conflated with
another American object of knowledge popular in the early 70s and 80s: the serial killer.
The two epigraphs which open this chapter highlight this new conflation and summarize
the late-80s momentary production of a third, intermediary body whose liminal status
exposes the bland yuppie’s true relation to gender and power: the yuppie psycho killer.
As a clinical term, “yuppie psycho killer” is useless. While acknowledging the important
differences in such criminal and psychological types as serial killers or mass murderers,
what I want to look at are not the specifics of actual “Yuppie Killers” (such as Robert
Chambers, 1986’s “Preppy Killer”), but rather cultural productions of public, spectacular
death. So if I conflate serial killers (like Ted Bundy or Richard Ramírez), mass murderers
(like postal killing sprees that first occur in 1986 or 1978’s Jonestown massacre), and
assassins (like 1980’s Mark David Chapman or 1981’s John Hinckley, Jr.), it is to
address the nature of a public anxiety over public homicide in America. This is a plea for
laxity, but as merely subsets of the population, yuppies and killers are uninteresting. As
a conflated object of knowledge, however, they can be captured by the imprecise phrase
“yuppie psycho killer” to describe the most rabid cultural fears and to demonstrate the

210
limit point of the yuppie’s lifestyle. Suddenly, the yuppie was no longer a humorously
maladjusted, but otherwise benign, citizen. In Hollywood films like Blue Steel (1990) and
Vampire’s Kiss (1989), and novels like American Psycho (1991), he was a homicidal
maniac; impeccably groomed on the outside, inside he was ravenous and wounded,
psychotic and dangerous. This chapter investigates how and why the yuppie went from
being a “subject of history” representing a foolish American lifestyle, to an “object of
knowledge” that served as a severe moral warning about the consequences of money, of
privilege and social status, and of trust in the image of perfection. Additionally, the
asymmetry in the 80s’ production of power and gender make the psycho yuppie a
compellingly confused site of discourses about gender and power.

I. A Yuppie Past
“You think it’s easy trying to keep in step with 30 million individualists?” (Chevat 23)

Michael Kinsley, writing in The New Republic in 1984, begins his explanation of
the yuppie by invoking a periodizing comparison with the Fifties. The term “Yuppie,”
like the “Brat Pack” discussed in Chapter Two, is best initially understood along the lines
of this kind of comparison, since both refer explicitly to an earlier generation while
simultaneously disavowing this lineage. Claiming that “yuppydom is the 1980s
expression of American bourgeois culture,” Kinsley gives examples of the two decades’
cultural models: “in the 1950s it was the suburban subdivision with two cars in the garage
and wife at home raising kids. In the 1980s it’s a working couple in the renovated
townhouse sharing the child raising with each other and probably outsiders as well” (4).
Kinsley means not to suggest that the latter is a true model for American experience, but
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rather that yuppydom does describe “a set of trends affecting a significant chunk of the
middle class in this predominantly middle-class country” (4). Kinsley’s analysis faces
some of the same problems I faced in my discussion of postmodernism in Chapter One,
which, like the yuppie, would only in error be applied as a true description of actual
American culture. Yet, Kinsley affords the opportunity to point out once again the way
that periodizations work off of earlier periodizations at the same time as they exclude
explicit knowledge of earlier decades or periods. That is to say, having an understanding
of the word “yuppie” both relies on a historical joke or reference at the same time as it
catchily operates without any of the necessary knowledge to get the joke.135
Perhaps I should explain the humor. The etymology of “yuppie,” which, despite
appearing rather authoritatively right around 1984, left room for disagreement about what
was being linguistically signaled. The simplest version is that “yuppie” is a diminutive of
Y.U.P., an acronym formed by the initial letters of “young urban professional.” The
rather demographic-sounding “young urban professional” was marked by cultural
commentators as a subset of the Baby Boomers;136 the yuppies stuck out from other
Boomers because of such 80s contrivances as money market funds, arcane forms of
investment banking, and other Wall Street tomfoolery which aided in the creation of an
urban nouveau riche able to live a publicly lavish life. The term “young urban
professional” is meant to help track and explain (and, surely, to exploit) the dramatic
surge in this kind of population; but calling someone a “yuppie” obviously entails a
further figurative use. As Hendrik Hertzberg suggests, “what we are dealing with here is
Of course, this may just an example of what Jameson refers to as pastiche--the neutral practice of
parody’s mimicry.
136
To be clear, Yuppies and Baby Boomers are sometimes used interchangeably, but most consider the
latter to be more inclusive. American Demographics puts the number of yuppies at 4.2 million, or 5
percent, of Baby Boomers; “while few baby boomers qualify as yuppies, millions of baby boomers are
following the trends that the yuppies set” (“The Big Chill [Revisited]” 29). The number of yuppies ranges
from 1.5 million to 20 million, depending on who is counting and who counts (Feuer 56). Another
appellation, which did not quite stick as it was less catchy, is Tom Wolfe’s “Me Generation” (1976).
135

212
something that began as a demographic category with cultural overtones and ended up as a
moral category” (101). Similarly, Barbara Ehrenreich notes that “what started out as a
neutral demographic category evolved with alarming speed into a social slur” (196), and
Fredric Jameson notes how the term “smuggle[s] in a little surplus of concrete social
representation along with itself” (Postmodernism 407). Part of this process was a public
negotiation over the right to be a yuppie and the opposite anger over being so categorized.
People wrote letters back and forth, describing how they were or were not a yuppie, or
why they were a yuppie but someone else was not. Even in 1984, commentators
remarked about the elusiveness of the yuppie; Cheryl Russell, writing in American
Demographics, humorously remarks that “the funny thing is, no one has ever found a
yuppie. Not even the people who look and sound like yuppies will admit to being
yuppies” (2). Russell concludes that “the yuppie is a mythological demographic beast”
(2). Rising to the defense, Michael Kinsley saw the beastly yuppie as more a creature to
be pitied; what he finds “especially unconvincing is the attempt to cast the details of
yuppy culture in a Gibbonesque light, as the beginning of the end of America. What, after
all, is so terrible about quiche? Are jogging and spinach salad really more decadent than
golf and sirloin?” (41). Thousands of such pages of print were devoted to the topic, and
so as the “moral category” grew larger and larger, “yuppie” was rendered less precise as a
descriptive, and thus more useful as a derogative.
At first, though, the yuppie had a simpler life. Initially, the demographic meaning
of the word had a political component.137 The New York Times first used the word
“yuppie” in an 18 March 1984 piece on Gary Hart’s campaign, “Hart Taps a Generation
of Young Professionals,” calling them “the newest creature on the political scene this year
See “1984 Campaign Oratory Is Yielding Few Memorable Terms” for the importance of American
politics on the development of the English lexicon, although a senior editor at Merriam-Webster was at the
time skeptical that “yuppie” would make the cut.
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213
and one of the most important” (Roberts 26). This short piece quotes a number of
“yuppies” (Roberts uses quotations for “yuppie” throughout), who identify themselves
with Hart’s campaign primarily because he appeals to the “Me Generation” attitude
expressed by one “yuppie,” who explained that “people don’t want to take on the titles
[like Democrat or Republican] others have . . . and being independent sounds a lot cooler”
(Roberts 26). “If there is one word to describe more ‘yuppies’ it is ‘independent,’” says
Roberts, noting that many “yuppies” “grew up in traditional communities with
traditional ideas, but severed their roots when they went off to college” (26). In Roberts’
piece, “yuppies” seem to be Democrats in spirit (one says “my primary interest is
defeating Reagan” [Roberts 26]) but just not, for some strange reason, in name. Clearly,
the idea of a political affiliation based on the “coolness” of the party’s name is
disheartening, but the cultural force of “cool” rhymes with the “severed,” “independent”
identity that young Baby Boomers sought to establish for themselves in an effort to
distinguish themselves both from their parents as well as their large number of peers.
So the yuppie label, at first denoting a new political group, still did not have a
coherent politics behind it, just a vaguely contrarian attitude. While it may, in its first
uses, seem to have represented a Democratic bloc in practice (at least as far as Hart’s
abortive campaign went), uses of the term yuppie continued to be so avowedly
ambivalent about specific political affiliations that they began to be sinister. Brett Duval
Fromson, writing in the 2 October 1984 New York Times in a piece titled
“Reaganomics’s Lure for the Yuppies,” is downright cynical about himself and his peers.
On the one hand, he writes, “we viewed the recession as medicine necessary to relieve the
ills of stagflation caught during the Carter administration. . . . Most of us assumed we
would make it on our own even during a recession--and didn’t give much though to those
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who wouldn’t” (Fromson A31). On the other hand, though, the yuppies have not been
“drawn to the Republicans’ ideological appeals. . . . We are no more or less conservative
than the young of the 1960s and early 1970s” (Fromson A31). Explaining the
ambivalence shown towards both parties, Fromson suggests that yuppies are “essentially
pre-ideological. . . . Most of us slosh soupily in the middle of the ideological spectrum
without giving it much thought” (A31). With his brutal, selfish tone, it is hard to tell how
serious Fromson is being or how much or how little thought he has given the matter; while
he seems to agree with other journalists that yuppies are issue-oriented, and not prone to
empty-headed political affiliations, what exactly he means by calling them “preideological” is hard to say. He ends his piece with the “lure” of the title--“Yuppies, if we
do anything at all, respect those who deliver the goods. How else are we going to afford
our Ferragamo pumps, Brooks Brothers suits, country houses, European cars and
California chardonnays?” (Fromson A31). Needless to say, these final remarks brought
fire from other indignant “young urban professionals,” who objected that not all of them
were “chardonnay-sipping elitists” (see Jacobson and Nelson). But perhaps this
disgustingly simple “crass materialism” is just what Fromson meant by pre-ideological:
for the yuppies, no thoughtful politics, just the goods plain and simple?
“Reaganomics’s lure” of delivering “the goods” to the yuppies proved itself to be
a lure for both political parties. Whether it was true or not (and, since Hart’s campaign
tanked, how could it have been?), the yuppie was the new “political creature” to be
termed or courted.138 After Reagan won the 1980 presidential election, political analysts
Gordon Rayfield and Julian Baim offered the same “warning to the Republicans” as
“advice to the Democrats”: “don’t take yuppies for granted.” Repeating a familiar theme,
It is a mark of early journalist’s uncertainty that the word “creature” was often quizzically used to
describe the yuppie and the yuppie’s desire (e.g., Will C7 and Roberts 26).
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they saw the election, with its many yuppie “Reagan Democrats,” as “having thus
demonstrated our independence” (Rayfield and Baim A31). This libertarian
“independence” from “ideological prescription” is the overriding quality that the early
politically-defined yuppies felt that they shared. Sociologist John L. Hammond agrees
with this assessment, but for very different reasons. Analyzing the media claim that
yuppies are paradoxically more conservative on economic issues (“social spending and
government responsibility for economic welfare”) but more liberal on social “lifestyle”
issues (“broadly, sexual and gender liberation”), Hammond debunks the myth that
yuppies constitute a new, independently conservative social group which suddenly
appeared overnight: “yuppies are as liberal, or more so, as the rest of the population on
both lifestyle and economic issues” (488).139 Seeking to explain the yuppies’ conservative
reputation, Hammond focuses on their conspicuous consumption and visible presence in
the public eye. For one, there was a noticeable lack of radical politics in the 80s,
compared to the 60s and 70s. Furthermore, yuppies, by sheer numbers, “visibly
transformed the American cityscape with health clubs, gourmet delis and remodeled
houses” (Hammond 497).140 For this reason more than any, Hammond argues, yuppies
became a marketing target (for advertising and politics) and thus media outlets catered to
them, supported them, and wrote about them. Hammond sees the yuppie story as the
very paradigm of journalistic models--“the arrival of the yuppies qualified as an event; it
could be dramatized and visualized” (498). A Time magazine piece later shows how “the
This at the end of 1986; in the same issue of The Public Opinion Quarterly, Michael Delli Carpini and
Lee Sigelman reach the same findings. Using more detailed research and sophisticated regression analyses,
they find that the “political distinctiveness” of yuppies is “less a matter of demographic characteristics,
than . . . of a state of mind or a lifestyle” (517). There appears not to be “some unique political profile
that results from the combination of being young, urban, and professional [but rather that] yuppies are
more liberal than the rest of the population because they are young, and young people are generally more
liberal; because they are urban, and urbanites are generally more liberal; and because they are professional,
and professionals are, on balance and in recent times, more liberal” (Carpini and Sigelman 515-6).
140
“Yuppie culture is responsible for the popularity of the new American cuisine, the elevated status of
pasta and the proliferation of raspberry vinegar” (Piesman and Hartley 16).
139
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fascination with charting the tastes of this subgroup was easily explainable: ‘Yuppies live
in the fashionable neighborhoods of large urban areas. . . . That’s also precisely where
editors and TV producers live’” (W. Shapiro 65). If the yuppies appeared to be more
conservative politically, then it was because the whole country was becoming more
conservative; yuppies simply did so more noticeably.141 Finally, Hammond concludes
that “the rapid spread of the yuppie story [in the media] and its equally rapid
disappearance are themselves grounds for suspecting that its diffusion was due to a social
process rather than a process of verification” (498). In other words, “no social group
adopts, or abandons, a common culture overnight” (Hammond 498). The fact that they
appeared to do so, however, suggests a strange rapidity to the nature of this social
process, explained by Jane Feuer as a “marketing icon” that “seized the imagination” (14).
Indeed, Feuer, referencing Linda Hutcheon’s theory of postmodern art as engaging a
“complicitous critique,” finds it plausible that “the whole tone of yuppie culture was
self-mocking,” and that an “unselfconscious yuppie was truly a media myth created by
yuppie journalists” (Feuer 50-1). Yuppies who knew they were yuppies were unable to
admit it, and instead ridiculed other yuppies for their shared values.
But while politicos, pollsters, and media pundits were quick to identify their
target audience, they moved too quickly to align yuppies with politics. Particularly
thorny for some was the “u” in yuppies. A few initially read it not as “urban” but as
“upwardly-mobile,” an etymology that led to the competing phrase “Yumpies,” for
“young upwardly-mobile professionals.” As conceived by the media, which of these two
features--urban or upwardly-mobile--was more important to the authentic yuppie
lifestyle? In the same New York Times issue that had that paper’s first use of the word
A related explanation is that the yuppies’ conspicuous consumption of “pricey comestibles . . . are
affordable luxuries [which] serve as consolation for the lack of unaffordable luxuries like a large house”
(Kinsley 41).
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“yuppie” (18 March 1984), an editorial discusses the “small peripheral fight [that] has
bubbled up over a name” (“Big Chillers” E20). Some synonyms suggested are “the brieand-chablis set,” “the Big Chill generation,” “the Y.P.’s,” “Yumpies,” and “Yumpys” (too
much like “lumpy”),142 before the author finally votes for “Yuppies, with its apt echo of
hippies and Yippies, labels that some of them once embraced” (“Big Chillers” E20).143
Clearly, this semiserious “small peripheral fight” has nothing to do with the qualifications
for being a member of this set, but rather with the right to label this group. The social
process rarely seems to be as suggestive as it is about “the big chillers,” and the media’s
satisfaction with choosing among all these potential lifestyle labels is mock-epic.
But even in this editor’s vote for “Yuppies” is a serious reference to the “apt
echo” of the 60s. In the following week’s New York Times, the editorial “The Year of
the Yuppies” disagrees, arguing that “to think of today’s Yuppies as politically akin to
yesterday’s hippies is as to be mistaken now as Charles Reich was then,” referring to the
author of The Greening of America, who spoke promisingly, but incorrectly, of a coming
youthful revolution in man’s relationship to himself and his environment (E20). The
author of “The Year of the Yuppies” saw a different relationship between the potential
political power of the yuppies and radical 60s politics. Yuppies “possess atypical
affluence and influence: These are the people who created the counterculture,” and thus
seem by rights to now also have the privilege to recreate it as mainstream culture (“The
Year of the Yuppies” E20). “The Year of the Yuppies,” like the other articles, tries to
Furthermore, unlike “Yumpy,” “Yumpie” “ends with the word ‘pie,’ thus suggesting the young,
upwardly mobile professional’s life is a piece of pie, a piece of cake, or a bowl of cherries, or something,”
writes Russell Baker (A31) in the 12 September 1984 New York Times.
143
The matter was raised again, with a smaller field, in the 28 June 1984 New York Times: “what’s the
right term for all those post-1945 baby-boom voters: yuppies or yumpies?” (“Hippies, Yippies, Yuppies”
A26). The editor decides “There’s no music in yumpies. It’s lumpy, even wimpy. Yuppies, by contrast,
captures something of the hippies who peopled ‘Hair’ and the yippies who tossed dollar bills down onto
the New York Stock Exchange” (“Hippies, Yippies, Yuppies” A26). Other suggestions: “Y.P., Yo-Pro,
Young Elite and Valley Crowd” (“Onward and Yupward” 47).
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represent the Yuppie as politically sui generis. Their levelheaded, rootless independence
is hence only established by disavowing their radical past (which is the point of The Big
Chill), and many did so strenuously, arguing not only against labels like Democrat or
Republican, but also against any “apt echoes” of hippies and Yippies. In response to this
article, which along with a William Safire piece of 25 March 1984 (on “Yip, Yap,
Yumpies”) more or less legitimated the New York Time’s use, without quotes, of yuppie,
readers responded: “I can understand your fascination with the emergence of a new
political generation. Moreover, as with most stereotypes, there may be some truth to
this one. Even so, the ‘yuppie’ label is offensive and patronizing” (Holtzman E20). The
letter continues, “our views--once rejected as too radical--can now be rejected as a
product of our culture” (Holtzman E20).144 This author highlights the similarity between
Yippies and Yuppies by finding common ground, the “apt echo,” in society’s shared
rejection of them; there is no contradiction between the Yuppie and Yippie’s political life,
rather they are identical in that both are excluded.
The etymological niceties in the similarities between hippie, Yippie, and Yuppie
are compelling,145 and suggest an alternate origin story for the yuppies. Are the yuppies
simply Yippies who have gotten haircuts and jobs and gone straight? And what exactly
could a yippie--> yuppie etymology really signify, besides an evolutionary connection?
While at once a way of dismissing Yuppies as being just like those crazy Yippies, this
etymology also has the opposite effect of politically resuscitating the Yuppie: they’re not
all evil Reaganites opposed to liberal values, they’re just modern, savvy radicals, as Bret
In another context, Louis Menand pointedly illustrates the back-and-forth between politics and class in
the eighties, calling Critical Legal Studies “radicalism for yuppies,” which is “a style of radical politics
that doesn’t require giving up” “a rather desirable set of occupational conditions” (259).
145
And again, like the term Brat Pack, we have specific antecedents in the 60s, a decade very much in the
mind of the 80s. And is it really possible, as a 1985 U.S. News & World Report article suggests, that the
woed “hippies” also has acronymic roots: “hippies got their name from a San Francisco political
organization known as H.I.P. (Haight-Ashbury Independent Proprietors)” (Golden 63)?
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Easton Ellis indicates when he writes that “this generation, it seems, wants to be Wall
Street’s Gordon Gekko with the conscience of Abbie Hoffman” (“Twentysomethings”
B1). Confusing this relationship between Yuppies and Yippies is a series of debates in
1985 between Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin. Hoffman, representing his “Youth
International Party” of the 60s, debated his former Yippie cofounder Rubin, who argued
that Yuppie values need not be seen as conservative or neo-revolutionary. One popular
portrayal of Rubin saw him as personifying the shift between the 60s and the 80s, with
the once-politicized hippies now coming back into the system in order to use it to their
own ends. Not everyone bought Rubin’s argument; Barbara Ehrenreich puts it plainly:
“it was possible in fact to have been a radical in the first decade and a self-centered hustler
in the second, as Jerry Rubin’s transformation from rebel to networking impresario
illustrates” (198).
When later lexicologists revisited the question of the yuppie’s origins, focusing
not on Hart’s campaign but on Rubin, they reinforced the linguistic (and thematic)
connections between Yippies and Yuppies. Fred R. Shapiro, who discusses computerassisted lexicology and how electronic databases allow researchers to find antedatings in
order to expand etymologies, uses the word “yuppie” as his example. He begins with the
first reported citation by Chicago Tribune columnist Bob Greene, who used the term
yuppie in a 23 March 1983 column about “Yippie-turned-Yuppie” Jerry Rubin; Greene
says he heard the word from “one social commentator.” Others suggested that actually
the phrase came “from somebody Greene ran into at a bar” (Adler 16).146 Greene’s piece,
“Jerry Rubin’s New Business is Business,” is usually cited as the first print appearance
of the word yuppie, and Shapiro argues that 1984’s The Yuppie Handbook “appears to
Greene responded in his column (30 December 1984: 2) that he could not remember exactly who he
heard it from, making an (unsuccessful) public plea for that person to contact him.
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have independently coined it using different analogies” (“Yuppies” 140) (although theirs
is the OED’s first entry). He adds further that “Greene’s social commentator [the person
he ran into at a bar] and Piesman and Hartley [coauthors of The Yuppie Handbook] were
probably not the only independent coiners of yuppie” (Shapiro, “Yuppies” 140). Shapiro
then gives an earlier citation for “yuppie”--17 September 1983--and even earlier citations
for the parent phrase “young urban professional”--19 February 1979.147
Following the theory that yuppies must have derived or mutated from some
earlier group, another candidate for how the yuppie got its name (and image) is the
preppy. In “The Short Happy Life of the American Yuppie,” Hendrik Hertzberg
outlines this second derivation, focusing not on the disjunct in the political life of the
yuppie-hippie dialectic, but rather the economic and class distinctions between yuppies
and preppies. Hertzberg comes up with the joking “pseudo-social science formula” “y =
h + p” to explain the yuppies’ “democratic realm.” Yuppies and preppies share the same
outward appearances and interests, but preppies have an exclusive “aristocracy of birth, a
bastion of hereditary privilege” (Hertzberg 103). This, of course, further explains the
touted yuppie “independence” from their parents’ past, and imagining the yuppie’s
exclusion from the true state of preppy grace goes some way towards explaining their
later, stereotypically self-interested behavior; the yuppies’ is a climb to mimic
preppydom that cannot be completed.
Hertzberg gets much of his material from the inaugural text of what was labeled, ad
nauseam, “The Year of the Yuppie.”148 Marissa Piesman and Marilee Hartley’s The
Since then, even earlier datings have been found--I believe 13 May 1981 (R.C. Longsworth’s “Chicago:
City on the Brink” in the Chicago Tribune) is now the first print use of “yuppie,” although, as Shapiro
suggests, the multiple, simultaneous coinings indicate that yuppie was initially used in oral
communication. See Shapiro’s piece for a thorough dating of the various early citations. Sorting through
these initial citations, Shapiro finds that “the Yippie derivation received scant mention until late 1984”
when the “Yippie vs. Yuppie” debates occurred.
148
Before the 1984 Newsweek New Year’s Eve piece was a 25 March headline, “Year of the Yuppies.”
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Yuppie Handbook: The State-of-the-Art Manual for Young Urban Professionals,
published in January of 1984, was a best-selling knockoff of Lisa Birnbach’s The Official
Preppy Handbook (1980). Discussing the “Year of the Yuppie,” a 31 December 1984
Newsweek special report suggests “it was the year, also, in which all these people finally
learned who they were” (Adler 14). Impatient with the past, they had to wait until 1984
to have a name for themselves, and as critic Jane Feuer points out in Seeing Through the
Eighties: Television and Reaganism, “George Orwell was wrong: 1984 would come to
represent an orgy . . . of consumerism,” since it “was also the year of Reagan’s reelection,
of Diana Vreeland’s Yves Saint Laurent retrospective at the Met, of the rise of Dynasty
to the top of the TV charts, [and] of Miami Vice” (14). What is interesting is how The
Yuppie Handbook, with only one or two possible prior print citations, was able to get
the yuppie lifestyle so dead on a full year earlier. From that initial public appearance,
though, Yuppies were clearly a joke. The Yuppie Handbook, published by a division of
Simon & Schuster,149 portrays on its front cover a couple, drawn in the style of a visual
dictionary or foreign language textbook, with lines and captions pointing to such
accessories as Cross Pen, Cartier Tank Watch, Squash Racquet, Co-op Offering
Prospectus, Burberry Trench Coat, and Fresh Pasta. Inside are chapters testing “Your
Yuppie I.Q.,” defining “Yupification,” suggesting which dog to get (an Akita--“State of
the Arf”), and explaining “Mail Order Mania.” The “handbook” is illustrated throughout
with diagrams and drawings, and the short chapters are mostly bulleted or boxed lists of
things to do or not do in order to be or to identify a yuppie. The authors’ strategy is to
With a mail-off ad in the back for other humor titles such as Real Women Don’t Pump Gas, The
Complete Air Guitar Handbook, and The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. Feuer, by reprinting the drawn
cover of The Yuppie Handbook and a photograph from the Newsweek special, points out that the later
Newsweek photograph is “‘uncanny because [it] exactly duplicate[s] the cartoon figures on the cover of The
Yuppie Handbook” (49). See especially 43-51 for a discussion of the yuppie’s “jocular” “self-distancing”
and how it relates to Feuer’s avoidance of a “unidirectional causal relationship between politics and
television” (1), which Todd Gitlin also emphasizes (see Chapter One).
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take the yuppie mock-seriously, and so they detail all aspects of the yuppie lifestyle-eating habits, relationships, car buying, apparel, religion, hobbies.
The Yuppie Handbook’s first section--“Beyond the Preppies”--emphasizes that
derivation, and makes clear that, unlike those forebears, yuppies inhabit a style of living
as opposed to a way of living: “like all caricature it is based on exaggeration of fact” (Will
C7). By this I mean that yuppies do do all of the same things that non-yuppies do--have
jobs, go to restaurants, work for a living, throw barbecues, own pets, go to the movies, do
drugs--they just do these things differently (as in The Big Chill). For this reason, the
yuppie lifestyle is so easy to parody: “Michael and Jennifer drink their coffee while
donning their respective single-vented navy blue suits. Jennifer puts on Adidas over her
stockings and tucks her pumps into her briefcase. Michael wears his wingtips” (Piesman
and Hartley 77). “When they’re pressed for time, they frequent the local gourmet takeout store, buying expensive, esoteric versions of chicken salad” (Piesman and Hartley 16).
This way of life, not so much different as skewed (it is not ascetic or indulgent, not
decadent or modern--rather just expensive and eclectic), overwhelmed earlier images of
yuppies as “political creatures” or reformed Yippies.
Not everyone found the joke funny; Barbara Ehrenreich argues that
the very frivolity of yuppies--and hence of the very subject of yuppies--was a
distraction from the deeper changes their appearance signaled. In the eighties, the
class contours of American society were undergoing a seismic shift. The extremes
of wealth and poverty moved further apart. (200)
The yuppies’ apparent insouciance in light of economic and social change, and the
media’s humorous cultivation of this frivolity (cf. Chevat’s “Gelato Was My
Armageddon”), began to bring about some of the worst “cultural overtones” about
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Yuppies. The 28 June 1985 New York Times notes a “new ‘hostility’ attached to the
word” (Dowd B1), and (while I was not able to find the first use for it) the phrase “Die
Yuppie Scum” intaglioed its way across cities. Ehrenreich explains that since one segment
of the middle class “seemed to have a clear strategy for success” and “because that
strategy involved such a betrayal of traditional middle-class values . . . the media [may
have] turned so quickly against those who followed” the yuppie lifestyle (200). While it
was argued that the supposed backlash against the yuppie “will lead to more social
concern” (Dowd B4),150 as Lee Eisenberg, the editor-in-chief of Esquire put it, by “the
summer of ’87--it had become all too plain that America’s favorite cartoon character was
ready to take his place on the endangered-species list. Nobody, but nobody, liked the Yword anymore, for it had grown tired and meaningless from its virulent overuse” (15).
What we are left with from the “short life, untimely death, and general inaccuracy of the
media’s image of the yuppie” (Hammond 497) is an unanchored object of knowledge,
signifying diverse and contradictory aims.
In summary, we have three types of yuppies: an independent political group to be
won (or tamed, as the “creature” metaphor indicates), a demographic category falsely seen
as representing a specific set of social or cultural beliefs (which much of the rest of the
middle class disliked), and a humorously exaggerated, often vilified, cartoon stereotype of
a post-recession, worldly 25- to 39-year-old. There is, as I remarked earlier, one other
80s yuppie image that only developed at the end of the decade and in response to the
yuppie backlash: the yuppie psycho. Just as the Yuppie and the Brat Pack refer back to
60s notions of subject types, so does the term “psycho” recall Hitchcock’s famous 1960
film. But the yuppie psycho shares only certain features with Tony Perkins’s portrayal
Hartley, coauthor of The Yuppie Handbook, explicitly points to yuppies’ children, who supposedly
“will have a humanizing effect” on their yuppie parents (Dowd B4).
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of reclusive, mommy-obsessed Norman Bates. Between Hitchcock’s film and later
versions of the psycho figure is an American subhistory of violence and murder, a
continued development of what Mark Seltzer calls America’s “wound culture.” Seltzer’s
Serial Killers: Death and Life in America’s Wound Culture presents an argument about
serial killing which links a focus on graphomania, “deindividualized individuality,” and the
crossings of bodies and histories along the public/private divide. While beginning with
such figures as Jack the Ripper and other notorious turn-of-the-century murderers,
Seltzer spends most of his time on what we have only recently come to call “serial
killers,” a term first coined in the mid-70s by the FBI, who were in the early 80s
beginning to become as well known as their quarry (16). After a 1983 Senate hearing,
“Serial Murders: Hearing on Patterns of Murders Committed by One Person, in Large
Numbers with No Apparent Rhyme, Reason, or Motivation,” and a 1984 HBO special
Murder: No Apparent Motive, quite a number of nonfiction books were produced on
serial killers in the 80s (Tim Cahill’s Buried Dreams: Inside the Mind of a Serial Killer
[1986, on John Wayne Gacy], Joel Norris’s Serial Killers: The Growing Menace [1988],
Ann Rule’s The Stranger Beside Me [1989, on Ted Bundy], and Elliott Leyton’s Hunting
Humans: The Rise of the Modern Multiple Murderer [1984]), including historian Philip
Jenkins’s Using Murder: The Social Construction of Serial Homicide, which argued that
“in the 1980s, serial murder came to symbolize the worst manifestations of human
behavior” (qtd. in Seltzer 150). The initial, conflicting representations of the yuppie
stand in counterpoint to the isolated, invisible, “everyman and no man” serial killer of the
80s, and so the yuppie psycho killer represents a curiously unassimilable amalgamation
of those features of the yuppie which are obscured or covered over by jokes and
dismissive statements about the yuppie’s homogeneity, blandness, and self-
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interestedness. In the psycho yuppie, the unexpressed qualities lying under the yuppie’s
façade are shown to be disassimilated--unsuccessfully contained within and by the
association of these two types.
It is a mark of the further disassimilation of the yuppie and the serial killer tropes
that as recently as 2000, when Mary Harron directed American Psycho, based on Bret
Easton Ellis’s “controversial” novel, the film’s reception showed clearly the way that the
yuppie serial killer was still an object of criticism and anxiety. That is, whatever was
disturbing about a yuppie killer in the 80s is still so today, even though Harron’s film was
clearly an anomalous period piece, not representing the kind of movie villains typical of
late 90s and 2000 cinema.151 Harron’s American Psycho was boycotted, protested, and
attacked in the same manner that the book it was based on was, and this suggests that
while the yuppie psycho figure emerged briefly in 1989-1991, these representations
unsuccessfully resolved whatever it was about the yuppie psycho that was so
bothersome in the first place. Could it be, as Pagan Kennedy points out about Ellis’s
American Psycho (“a Frankenstein monster of a book”), that “just as in the horror flicks,
the mob, armed with pitchforks and torches, is chasing down the beast . . . rather than its
true creator” (428)? It is with this question in mind, that I want to look more specifically
at the fate of the yuppie after the media attention of 1984 died off and a backlash set in.
There was already a renewed interest in the serial murderer or killer in the late 80s and
early 90s. Public shootings--Reagan (1981), Pope John Paul II (1981), and John Lennon
(1980)--began the decade, and the images of their shootists were later assimilated into
If anything about the film was timely it was the way it addressed, by means of a very simple reading,
the evil born of rampant consumerism and a capitalist-centered existence, a topic certainly present during
Reagan’s presidency as well as Bush II’s. Peter Bowen, in an interview with Harron, suggests that “its
mix of identity crisis and abrupt violence seem oddly more in tune with the tenor of our times” and that
“its fable of a fractured identity in a post-capitalist, hyper-mediated world seems now a mirror of our
culture rather than a warning about it” (1).
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fiction and film by the figure of the psychopathic, serial killer.
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Thomas Harris’s Red

Dragon, written in 1981, was successfully filmed by Michael Mann as Manhunter in
1986, and Harris’s The Silence of the Lambs, written in 1988, was filmed by Jonathan
Demme in 1991, winning multiple Oscars. Such novels as Ira Levin’s Sliver (1991) (Levin
best known for Rosemary’s Baby), Paul Theroux’s Chicago Loop (1990), Lew
McCreary’s Minus Man (1991), Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian (1985), Dennis
Cooper’s Frisk (1991), and Andrea Dworkin’s Mercy (1991), feature at their core graphic
murder and dismemberment, sexual and serial violence. Dworkin is an interesting case in
point of the popularity of these fictions for both men and women, New York Times
journalist Edwin McDowell quizzically discusses “the acceptance of such novels by
many women” (D8). Court cases like Richard Chambers (“The Preppie Killer,” 1986),
and the executions of notorious figures like Ted Bundy (1989) focused public attention on
the gruesome, horrific deaths of what Time magazine labeled in 1983 “a new breed of
killer” (Stanley 47), literally expressed in 1991 with the introduction and popularity of
the cable network Court TV, and embodied by cultural villain-heroes such as Freddy
Krueger, who made his way from horror cinema to syndicated television and toy store
shelves during the “media-borne ‘serial killer panic of 1983 to 1985’” (Seltzer 65).
There are many yuppie films in the 80s, and many of these feature young urban
social climbers getting themselves into trouble, but only in a few do these Yuppie
characters cross the line and act as evil Yuckies--Young Urban Killers. What I will
examine in the following sections is the overlapping of the two larger public fascinations
traced here: the yuppie and the psycho killer. In particular, two very confused films,
Again, there is a difference between serial killers, mass murders, psychopaths, sociopaths, cannibals,
exhibitionists, child molesters, rapists, assassins, and religious nuts. However, mainstream cinema,
television, and fiction rarely, if ever, makes such distinctions. On this point, see Elizabeth Young’s
excellent “The Silence of the Lambs and the Flaying of Feminist Theory.”
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Kathryn Bigelow’s Blue Steel (1990) and Robert Bierman’s Vampire’s Kiss (1989), offer
prototypical treatments of this dialectic, which is later fully realized in Bret Easton Ellis’s
novel American Psycho (1991). I would be remiss here to not mention in passing Adrian
Lyne’s Fatal Attraction (1987), a very prototypical yuppie film with a female slasher,
although one that is hopelessly caught up in itself and its regressive sexual politics. Fatal
Attraction (and, to a lesser extent, Paul Verhoeven’s Basic Instinct [1992]) stands apart
from the yuppie killer films I will discuss because it unproblematically accepts the
yuppie trope in the same way as, say, The Big Chill does. While Fatal Attraction
criticizes Michael Douglas’s character for his yuppie sense of entitlement and privilege,
ultimately the viewer is forcefully required to identify wholly with him against the “crazy
bitch” who has invaded the home (in this light, Fatal Attraction can be read as a yuppified
update of Clint Eastwood’s 1971 Play Misty for Me). Against this version of yuppie
death, the three texts I will discuss each introduce a blurred set of discourses; what would
otherwise be a conventional cop thriller, vampire film, or slasher novel is instead
contaminated by the newly-villainized yuppie. The result is an uncertain critique of the
“asymmetrical social relation between gender and power” (the phrase is Elizabeth
Young’s), where the yuppie’s privileged power status fits uneasily against mainstream
cinema’s insistence that slasher and horror plots feature destabilized, paradoxical gender
relations.153

See, for example, Carol Clover, who takes up the question of sadism and masochism as it relates to a
putatively adolescent male audience’s enjoyment of plots revolving around the destruction of a voyeuristic
male villain at the hands of a Final Girl. Additionally, this is the one thematic element which is carried
over from the 60s version of the psycho.
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II. American Psycho: Yuppie Phantoms
“No introduction necessary.” “Killer looks.” (movie taglines for American Psycho)

Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho (1991) is the most coherent and well-known
example of the yuppie psycho killer, and has already been critically discussed (and
defended) at great length. Rather than provide my own reading of the novel here, I want
instead to focus on some of the reception and defense of the novel in order to indicate the
ways in which the novel was perceived as breaking new ground in its juxtaposition of
yuppie culture and misanthropic gruesomeness. Much of the initial response to the novel
was sensationalist,154 and entirely a product of its first publisher Simon & Schuster’s
dropping of the novel three months prior to publication, which led to censure from
groups like the National Organization of Women, but complaints of censorship from the
Authors Guild and the American Civil Liberties Union. The subject matter of the novel,
centering around the inner life of yuppie Patrick Bateman, whose multiple, ritualistic
murders are described in extremely vivid details, tended to overwhelm the novel’s style in
the mind of early reviewers. Simply put, many could not get past what happens, and
failed to take into account the novel’s flat, distanced tone. If one is to approach the novel
at all, one needs to be willing to consider the satiric or parodic implications of the yuppie
style, which in its quest to be the best focuses more minutely on tiny, superficial
distinctions (which shade of ivory is best for a business card? Which precise pinstripe
width exudes the more power?) than other social groups would. Again, as Jane Feuer
puts it, “the whole tone of yuppie culture was self-mocking,” and so one reply to the
novel’s attitude towards its own horrors is, “what did you expect?”
See especially Roger Rosenblatt’s hysterical review “Snuff this Book!” and Richard Bernstein’s more
temperate response.
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Some reviewers were able to connect the novel’s jarring scenes of murder and
cannibalism with the novel’s boring period details and thorough description of its
yuppie’s world, finding a metaphor in Bateman for the kind of conspicuous consumption
and extremely selfish hedonism epitomized by the Reagan 80s. This part is easy to get,
and provides the most common reading of the yuppie psycho. But while accepting the
value of the metaphoric implications of cannibalism in American Psycho, I want to move
further into the other themes produced in mixing these two objects of knowledge-yuppies and serial killers--to see how and why violence was only later added to the
yuppie image, without simply saying that America got tired of Reaganomics’s lure (that
reading oversimplifying the novel’s relationship to its period, suggesting that Reaganism
“caused” yuppie psychosis or depictions of it, without considering the ways in which the
field of “the Reagan 80s” was also in turn constructed by such depictions).
Critics Linda S. Kauffman, James Gardner, and Ruth Helyer represent three
distinct readings of Ellis’s text that move beyond shocked initial reactions to the novel’s
conflation of yuppie culture and serial murder and try to address the form that this
conflation takes. Kauffman finds the metaphoric relation between yuppies and psychos
to be simultaneously based on newly alienating urban forms. Gardner on the other hand
suggests that one leads to the other. Finally, Helyer finds yuppies and psychos as two
distinct warring impulses in 80s America, each fighting for the upper hand. Each seems to
me also to address the novel’s series of misidentifications, where characters continuously
misrecognize other characters, calling each other by different names or even answering to
someone else’s name; in fact, Bateman at one point exploits this confustion, assuming
another person’s identity in order to murder a man, only later to begin to believe that he
may have unwittingly murdered someone else. Initial readers’ misidentifications of the
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novel’s tonal and thematic elements are replicated by the novel’s characters
misidentifying each other and themselves.
Kauffman, discussing Harron’s film version, refers back to her reading of the
novel, in which the cannibalism in particular (an element only alluded to in the film),
serves as “a metaphor for the conspicuous consumption of Ronald Reagan’s America in
the 1980s” (41). Kauffman herself unwittingly extends the metaphor; as she discusses
the film’s credit sequence, which takes place in a restaurant, she declares that
“consumption is a portmanteau pun; it signals the excesses of crass materialism and
simultaneously transforms ‘good taste’ literally into a matter of life or death” (43).
Kauffman’s focus on the visual elements of consumption leads her to compare Ellis’s
novel to Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, calling American Psycho “another tale about
self-fashioning in a gilded age of greed” (41).155 It is this “gilded age of greed,” represented
most clearly in both tales by a nouveau riche urban environment, which produces “the
convergence of consumerism and psychosis” (Kauffman 41) that is figured by the yuppie
psycho; the two together seem to be less a product of their individual components and
more a conjoined twin of the (post)modern age.
Against this reading is Gardner, who in reviewing Ellis’s text finds that “it is a
main conceit of the novel to suggest that yuppie-dom, with its arrogant egomania, is one
step on the way to serial murder” (56). Gardner is not entirely persuaded by Ellis on
this point, and he finds fault with the author’s need to “attribute to [his] private
preoccupations a larger social message, which is really only window dressing” (57).
Nonetheless, by suggesting a causal link between yuppie-dom and serial murder, Gardner
echoes what one character says at the beginning of American Psycho:
As suggested in an earlier chapter, the 1920s, Fitzgerald especially, seemed especially relevant to
describe the 80s.
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There’s this theory out now that if you can catch the AIDS virus through having
sex with someone who is infected then you can also catch anything, whether it’s a
virus per se or not--Alzheimer’s, muscular dystrophy, hemophilia, leukemia,
anorexia, diabetes, cancer, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis, cerebral palsy,
dyslexia, for Christ sakes. (Ellis 5)
This is an example of the sine qua non of the yuppie’s anxiety over contagion, which
works against Gardner’s separation of “private preoccupations” from “larger social
concerns.” To have a yuppie imagine that he can “catch” dyslexia from someone suggests
that the yuppie has a more general worry about the boundaries between the private and
the public (or the powerful and the impotent); the yuppie simply cannot separate the
two that easily, for it is a boundary under constant threat from the virus of the middleclass, or “the fear of falling,” in Ehrenreich’s terms. As Gardner reads Ellis, the yuppie’s
“arrogant egomania” likewise predisposes him to in turn “catch” the serial killer lifestyle,
to become infected by that other social trope.
Finally is Helyer, who bases her reading of Ellis’s novel on its similarities to and
differences from the gothic novel. She reads a character like Patrick Bateman as a Jekyll
and Hyde figure gone wrong. For example, when Bateman later goes to Paul Owen’s
apartment (whom he has killed some time ago), he finds a real estate agent there who
turns him away. A confused Bateman “comes away from Owen’s flat knowing that he
must increasingly imitate himself. Such self-parody is symptomatic of boundary
fluctuation” (Helyer 729). Helyer sees Bateman’s fluid boundaries as central to his
inability to be himself and not “the other”; he is especially “horrified by the threat of
feminization” (Helyer 739). As in the two films I will next discuss, the threat of
feminization seems to be the key point here for the yuppie psycho’s disassimilation.
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Setting aside a causal relationship between yuppiedom and psychosis (which would not
to do justice to either trope’s popularity in the public imagination), Helyer suggests that
the complexity of the yuppie psycho stems from his contrary, uneven negotiation of
power and gender. If we can trust what the author says of his text, we would find Ellis
agreeing, claiming in an interview that the book “does in some way reflect my outlook on
what the Eighties seemed to symbolize for me. It’s very basic. The Eighties seemed to
me to be a very ugly decade, and this was what I came away with. And it’s an ugly
book” (Interview 49). The ugliness of American Psycho, I would argue, is a product of
the incommensurability of the yuppie and psycho killer tropes, both of which take under
themselves distinctly confused attitudes towards gender and power. Throughout, then, is
the question of this reality; Jane Feuer says that the yuppie, like Reagan, “was a
nonexistent phantom figure whose effect as image was nevertheless real” (49). Likewise,
Patrick Bateman in Ellis’s novel realizes at the end that “there is an idea of a Patrick
Bateman, some kind of abstraction, but there is no real me, only an entity, something
illusory . . . I simply am not there” (376-7). The truly provocative idea here--that the
yuppie male ceases to exist as he comes into contact with the feminine--appears in the
two earlier films I will next discuss, Blue Steel and Vampire’s Kiss.

III. Blue Steel: Crazy in the Supermarket
“For a rookie cop, there’s one thing more dangerous than uncovering a killer’s fantasy.
Becoming it.” (movie tagline for Blue Steel)

Blue Steel (1990) is Kathryn Bigelow’s third film, co-written with Eric Red (who
scripted The Hitcher and Bigelow’s Near Dark), and despite or due to its occasional
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showing on cable television, is an under-appreciated work from this director. The film
stars Jamie Lee Curtis as Megan Turner, a newly graduated recruit of New York City’s
Police Academy who leads an otherwise quiet and lonely life. One night, while her male
partner is using the restroom, Turner is witness to a holdup in a supermarket, and after a
standoff with the thug (Tom Sizemore), she blasts him through the storefront window
with six bullets from her service revolver. The thug’s gun falls in front of yuppie
commodities trader Eugene Hunt, played by Ron Silver, and he secretly takes the gun and
hides it. With the gun missing, and none of the witnesses able to corroborate her story,
Turner is put on suspension for shooting an unarmed man. Soon, though, her name
shows up carved on bullets recovered from a series of murdered bodies, and little does she
suspect that the man she has just begun dating, Eugene Hunt, is responsible for these
random killings. As Hunt and Turner become romantically involved, Turner also begins
working with tough-guy homicide detective Nick Mann (Clancy Brown) in order to solve
the case with her name on it. Blue Steel, intercutting between Eugene and Megan’s lives
from the time of the holdup, derives its tension by showing the audience Eugene’s
increasing insanity while keeping Megan in the dark as to her lover’s secret life. But, even
when Megan discovers what has happened, she is alternately constrained from stopping
Hunt by her department’s disbelief, the yuppie’s crack lawyer, and her fear for her
friends and family. After Eugene shoots her best friend Tracy (Elizabeth Pena), Megan
must finally violate the law in order to get her revenge on the now-psychotic Hunt.
Bigelow’s film is, as reviewers were apt to point out, quite bloody. There are
scores of deaths, most of which happen in spectacular, cinematic fashion. Take the
thug’s death, for instance, wherein Turner empties her gun into his chest, splattering
blood everywhere, and sending him flying backwards through a plate glass window. The
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editing pattern supports the spectacle, repeating the moment he hits the window three
times, and offering medium shots of the entry wounds. The violence of the thug’s death
at the film’s beginning is mitigated by the satisfaction that the nervous rookie heroine is
safe and sound, but this extreme type of violence continues throughout; whether directed
towards friend, foe, or stranger, these shooting deaths are vividly unpleasant. In this
foregrounding of violent spectacle, Blue Steel shares features with Bigelow’s previous
film, the critically well-received vampire western Near Dark (1987). The success of that
film, her marriage to powerful Hollywood director James Cameron, having Oliver Stone
and Edward R. Pressman as producers, and Bigelow’s reputation as an attractive woman
(“a nearly model-perfect face” [Sharkey H17, cf. Lane 63-4]) had predisposed at least one
critic or another to anticipate Blue Steel with suspicion, and so its mixed reception is as
much a fate of its circumstances as it is of its cinematic content. While Bigelow fielded
the same questions all female directors working in Hollywood must receive, the
apparently feminist subject matter of this film and its self-stated intention to be a cross
between Dirty Harry and Fatal Attraction made the question of (or the critical decision
about) the film’s sexual politics even more relevant and divisive. Along these lines, Blue
Steel is generally discussed in relation to Jonathan Demme’s The Silence of the Lambs
(1991), since both share not only many broad and small qualitative features--female
investigators, difficult training sequences, mentorship relationships with men,
psychosexual villains, and knowledgeable references to specularity and the cinematic
apparatus--but also since both are unusual in depicting what is referred to as a
“postfeminist” female detective: rookie, ambiguously sexed, in the position of both acting
subject in the cinematic narrative while simultaneously also the object of the male gaze.156
See Linda Mizejewski for her excellent phrase “the female dick,” Elizabeth Young for readings
comparing the two films, and Judith Halberstam on The Silence of the Lambs’s “posthuman gender.”
156

235
Rather than continue this initial line of critique, which demonstrated the
identificatory problem viewers have with the space created between female detectives and
female victims,157 I would like to instead turn attention towards Blue Steel’s villainous
yuppie killer, Eugene Hunt, who has been overlooked in the emphasis on Megan Turner’s
character (and also in later comparisons with the exceedingly complicated dual villains in
The Silence of the Lambs). In many ways, Ron Silver plays Eugene Hunt as a classic
thriller film psychopath. On the one hand, he presents himself to the authorities, to
Megan, and to Megan’s parents as a perfectly innocent, cultured and sensitive gentlemen
(to the contrary of Megan’s and the audience’s knowledge). On the other hand are the
private scenes the camera allows us; beginning with his unobserved theft of the gun,
leading to his auditory hallucinations, and building up to a blood-drenched, rooftop
yowling at the moon. Eugene Hunt is a mix of thriller tropes: he is predatory and
cunning, he charms his way into the heroine’s family, he knows how to cover his tracks
and stay one step ahead, and he displays cinematically classic “psycho” behavior--killing
a prostitute, hearing voices from God, and overconfidently taunting his victims. The
difference with this killer, though, lies in his particular psychosis, which, I argue, is
importantly coded as a yuppie one. Now, while Eugene Hunt will be a prototype for
later representations of yuppie killers (especially in television police dramas), Blue Steel
allows him complex motives instead of simply name-checking the yuppie as part of the
80s setting.
Others would disagree. David Denby, in a debatable reading, writes Eugene Hunt
off as simply “a schizophrenic commodities trader” (76). Janet Maslin, pointing out the
presence of the “yuppie devil” in other contemporary films like Internal Affairs and Bad
Although this reading certainly inflects, and is a necessary part of, my reading of Blue Steel. See
especially Mary Ann Doane on this point.
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Influence, points out that “Blue Steel reveals almost nothing else about [Eugene], yet it
counts on audiences to greet him with instinctive mistrust. . . . When the film assumes
that this man automatically has the makings of a psychotic killer, it doesn’t imagine itself
to be making any kind of leap” (“Now, Slyly” B1). Utilizing a surface/depth model of
psychology, Maslin elsewhere claims that “it is the film’s contention that just beneath his
high-gloss yuppie surface there lurks a deranged, psychotic killer yearning to break free”
(“A Deranged Yuppie” C18). Roger Ebert agrees in substance and form, writing that
Hunt is “a customer who hit the deck long before the shooting started. He is already a
deeply troubled man” (1). While it is certainly in keeping with yuppie iconography to
describe Hunt’s superficial qualities, it is contradictory to assert also that underneath this
is a “depth” which can be so simply described. It is precisely against these kinds of
readings of Hunt, which ignore any distinctions or shadings in his yuppie persona in favor
of a one-dimensional reading of ill-defined “schizophrenia” or “psychosis,” that I want to
situate my own analysis. The “customer who hits the deck” is, like the maligned yuppie,
a construction which works to contain contradiction and nuance by appealing to the vague
category of mental illness.
As Blue Steel develops, we find that Eugene’s behavior, which might be
summarily dismissed as but a product of his insanity, actually works in counterpoint to
the film’s development of Megan’s character; the two come into being by means of their
increasingly complex relationship. In this, Blue Steel sets itself apart not only from other
policiers and cop thrillers, but also from other yuppie films. Three general questions
arise, which explore the Yuckie’s gendered relationship to power without succumbing to a
psychologically motivated description of Eugene’s behavior. First, why does he steal the
gun in the supermarket; then, why does he direct his random murders, by means of the
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engraved bullets, towards Megan; and finally, how does his sense of sexual desire or
nondesire figure into his very real physical desire for the phallic Megan? Readings of
these questions get especially caught between Eugene’s personality--an unhappy-for-noreason Wall Street yuppie--and the odd object of Eugene’s desire--repeating the primal
scene with Megan holding out her gun, blasting away.

1. Stealing the Gun
First is the question of why Eugene takes and hides the gun. Structurally, the
holdup scene recalls the film’s opening, precredit sequence, where, in a realistic training
scenario, Turner has to respond to an emergency where a man is holding a gun to a
woman’s head (the first of a number of such images in the film). Megan successfully
shoots the man and rescues the woman, but ultimately fails her test when she does not
notice the man’s “wife” pull a gun from her purse and “shoot” Turner. At this, Megan
rolls her eyes and curses, and the viewer quickly realizes that the scenario is all fake.
Megan’s superior admonishes her with the supernatural wisdom: “in the field you’ve got
to have eyes in the back of your head,” a warning that Turner will later fail to remember in
the supermarket.158 Once Turner has graduated and this scenario later plays for real in the
supermarket holdup, the film slots Megan back into the student role, and explicitly
connects the faked reality of the training sequence with the true reality of “the field” of
New York City. Since the rest of the film concerns Megan’s mentored relationship with
homicide detective Nick Mann, it is striking that, from the beginning, Blue Steel so
carefully equates faked, “educational” violence with real, “field” violence; this is true for
Megan as well as for the viewer. In the supermarket, having seen Megan already make
While Turner yet again fails to see Eugene when he comes from behind, killing Tracy, she does notably
take this advice at film’s end, when Eugene rises up in the distance behind her on a subway platform and
she spins around to shoots him, precipitating their final showdown.
158
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this mistake once, and being uncertain about the unknown man who reaches for the thug’s
dropped gun (we notice his cufflinks, his manicured beard, and his bright eyes--seeming
entirely innocent), viewers can only assume that the yuppie, just like the fake in the
earlier training scenario, takes the gun with the intention of using it. His hiding of the gun,
however, is surprising, suggesting either an ungraspable present need (maybe he’s in
money trouble? or some illness or other plot contrivance?) or an example of yuppie
opportunism (an illegal, untraceable gun does have a certain value, after all). The film
appears to suggest that people don’t kill people, guns kill people--Eugene certainly
doesn’t look like a killer, but that .44 Magnum does. In this world, practice makes
perfect, and since Megan fails a second time to notice the thug’s dropped gun (because,
perhaps, she is so excited about using her own), the crux of the film’s plot becomes
predicated upon teaching this girl how to pay attention, and especially how to pay
attention to other people’s guns.159
This foregrounding of the gun as a live object, and its fetishized presence in these
characters’ imagination, is established earlier in the film’s opening credits, which appear
over tracking shots across a strange blue landscape, which turn out to be extreme closeups of Turner’s service revolver, a Smith & Wesson .38. The microscopic focus,
geometric framing, and cool palette and soundtrack all serve to eroticize the gun, but as
has been pointed out, the otherwise phallic gun is here contoured as feminine. This
slowly moving landscape of blue steel next cuts to a close up of a stomach being buttoned
inside a blue shirt. As the camera moves upward to reveal a lacy bra and then Jamie Lee
Curtis’s face, we realize that “the ‘blue steel’ . . . is not the gun--it’s Megan Turner,”
reinforcing the particulars of this gun’s feminine erotics (Garcia 365). Film critic
Other things Megan cannot “see”: the marks on her mother’s arm (which the father causes), Silver’s
erratic behavior (which the viewer sees).
159
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Christina Lane takes this one step further, pointing out that, “rather than impart the point
of view of the bullets going into the chamber from the outside in, [Bigelow] presents the
insertion ‘from within,’ perhaps suggesting a point of view that is gendered female” (71).
Yet there is another layer to the opening credits, and that is Bigelow’s projection
of the cinematic apparatus onto the gun-feminine dialectic, using the camera to adjudicate
further between the blue feminine and the phallic steel. As the Smith & Wesson’s
chamber turns, it remarkably resembles a spinning film reel, enlivening the familiar pun
between camera shot and gun shot.160 This is one of many references to the cinematic or
visual apparatus in Blue Steel, and cinema in particular seems a useful metaphor for
Bigelow’s understanding of sex and violence.161 The opening shots identify this cinematic
knowledge with the contours of the gun, and so it is this struggle (as opposed to the
normal pas de deux between hunter and hunted--see Clover’s discussions of Final Girl and
her requisite monstrosity162) that we follow: who will control and contain the gun, and
thus the site of cinematic knowledge (which is itself, after Mary Ann Doane’s argument,
mixed with knowledge of sexual difference)?
What these opening cinematic references make clear is the role of vision in the
construction of Megan and Eugene’s relationship. Eugene’s fascination with the thug’s
gun is at least as complicated as Megan’s relationship with her own gun. The only two
people in the store who saw the thug’s gun were Megan and Eugene, and Megan makes
two mistakes in not noticing where the gun went and in not noticing where the yuppie
went. As Megan is visually identified in the opening credits with her gun, so is Hunt
identified with the thug’s gun by virtue of the two of them not being seen. In this seeing
N.B. Paul Virilio’s War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception (1989).
Her later science fiction film Strange Days (1995) explores this topic fully, imagining a way to record
and play back images, thoughts, and feelings directly from the cerebral cortex.
162
Mizejewski, summarizing Linda Williams, puts it succinctly: “the Final Girl of the horror genre must
herself turn monstrous in her attack on the psychopath/murderer” (12).
160
161
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and nonseeing is the unlikely connection between a rookie woman cop and a male yuppie
psycho. And, once again, as Megan learns to “see” better and get those eyes in the back
of her head, and Eugene strives to get others to see him (more on this later), they are also
forced to consider the visual meaning of the irreducible object between them--the gun.
There are, to be sure, two guns at play throughout--a “legal,” sanctified one, properly
owned by the improper “female dick,” and the “illegal” one, passed on from a street thug
to a yuppie who has everything he needs except this transgression. In both cases, the
erstwhile neutral gun (“guns don’t kill people, people kill people”) represents the
fulfillment of their functions together; we need to keep in mind that both Eugene and
Megan are novices at gunplay, and thus both must work to sort out the proper and
improper uses of their guns.
After the holdup, Megan is introduced to Detective Nick Mann, whose role and
last name set off a series of male characters that question the acuity of Megan’s vision.
After she identifies the make of the thug’s gun (a .44 Magnum), Mann questions how
Turner could have known that from the forty feet distance between her and the thug.
Megan’s unequivocal response--“I saw it. It was there. I saw it. I saw the metal glint”-is unsatisfactory for Mann, who performs another version of the earlier training scenario.
Asking her to recreate the standoff, he quickly reaches for his gun, and, when she pulls
hers on him, reveals himself to be merely holding a comb. This serves as proof of
Megan’s “overreaction,”163 and destabilizes again the relationship between reality and
play or training. Like the earlier test scenario, Megan fails because her eyes are not yet
quick enough or good enough. Ironically, she has a quick draw and good aim with her gun,
but as a female rookie, she is identified by the men as a washout. As Mann leaves,
Chief Hoyt had just said to her, “but the fact remains that you emptied an entire load. I suggest to you
that there may have been some overreaction on your part.”
163
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Megan shows she is beginning to understand what is expected of her, pointedly saying
“I’ll be seeing you.”
Later, Mann and Turner develop a more overtly specular relationship, which
mirrors the one which Hunt will develop for Turner. Mann needs to use Megan as bait to
lure the unknown killer, telling their boss Chief Hoyt, “I gotta position her with high
visibility.” After the next killing, with the media swarming and looking at them, Mann
begins training Megan, instructing her to “examine the crime scene,” and to read the
forensic evidence there. From the position of the body, she decides that “maybe [the
killer] likes them to see it coming,” a reading reinforced when Megan does discover who
the killer is, and his fascination with reflected gazes. Megan also has to “like to see it”;
since she is the only lead the police have, Mann has her looking at the file cards of past
criminals. “Keep looking,” he demands, to which she wearily replies, “only 600,000
more faces to look at.” Later, as Megan begins increasingly to pursue Hunt, staking out
his apartment and following him (since there is no concrete evidence on Hunt, Mann tells
her “just watch”), so too does Mann begin to pursue and follow Megan. Naturally, when
Turner discovers that Mann has been following her as she follows Eugene, she is upset,
asking “didn’t think I could handle it?” Mann’s response is similar to one that Eugene
would give: “I wanted to watch you handle it.”
“Are you seeing anybody,” Megan’s best friend Tracy asks early in the film at a
barbecue. Tracy introduces Megan to Howard, who provides one version of a repeated
scene where Megan is asked why she chose to become a cop. In each case, Megan gives a
joking answer, and in each case someone is told to “lighten up” their visibly horrified
look. In this case, when Megan tells Howard that she is a police officer, he noticeably
blanches, which she calls attention to: “you look bad.” Before asking her, “why would
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you want to become a cop,” he makes reference to her looks: “you’re a good looking
woman; I mean, beautiful, in fact.” For Howard, as for others, the incongruity of
Megan’s “look” with the seriousness of her job (he asks “you wear a gun?”) frustrates
her. She gives Howard one joking answer--“I like to slam people’s heads up against
walls,” echoing what she earlier told her partner, who, moments before the holdup, asked
the same question. There, she responded “yeah, I wanted to shoot people.” But these
defensive, joking answers drop away when she is asked a third time by Mann. To his
question, “so what made you want to become a cop,” she simply answers “him.” The
most obvious referent for “him” is Megan’s alcoholic father, whom she has just almost
arrested for beating her mother. Some reviewers, like Roger Ebert, have commented on
the curiously undeveloped subplot involving the father, and ascribe Turner’s reason for
becoming a cop to him. Early in the film, we learn that he did not go to her graduation,
later saying in disbelief “I’ve got a goddamn cop for a daughter.” His anger leads to one
reading which emphasizes the performative aspects of Megan’s tough-cop persona,
which she later only lets down in front of Nick; this reading relies on her dressing at the
end of the opening credits and the “drag” she performs when she steals an oversized
uniform for her final confrontation. While Blue Steel avoids casting too much suspicion
on its heroine (unlike, more recently, Jane Campion’s In the Cut), there is the possibility
that Turner is serious with her other, more violent answers, that like the superficial
yuppie with the dark interior, Megan’s touch-cop persona also covers over a homicidal
inner life.
For Turner, looking is part of her job, and from the opening scenes it is marked as
a skill she needs to develop.164 For Eugene, too, looking is a crucial part of his obsession
In this, Blue Steel is reminiscent of Akira Kurosawa’s Stray Dog (1949), about a rookie policeman who
loses his gun, which is then used in crimes.
164
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with Megan, and the film makes numerous references to the attention or inattention he
pays to certain objects. Directly before the first murder, Eugene walks aimlessly through
the rain through a “Don’t Walk” sign; the driver of the car that almost hits him shouts,
“hey what are you, fucking blind!” He next does not see a crack in the sidewalk; when he
trips, his gun falls out and he shoots the accidental onlooker. Later, walking aimlessly
again, he is startled as if by a ghost when a prostitute comes on to him. And, of course,
mirrors in particular make up an important part of his mental world. After work at the
New York Stock Exchange, we see him staring at a mirror, pointing the stolen gun at
himself and mimicking a gun’s “pow!”, his eyes darting between himself and the door,
recalling the way his eyes darted during the holdup. During a later workout scene, Eugene
is sitting on his exercise machine, watching a television report about “The .44 Magnum
Killer’s” fourth victim. Facing the camera, he looks at the television on the lower right of
the screen, whose reflection we can see in a mirror to the left of the screen. It is not that
Eugene is figured by the film as unseeing, rather it is the case that he sees only one thing-Megan and her gun during the holdup. At that time, the film cut prominently between
Megan, the cashier and the thug, and two bystanders: Eugene and an old lady. Unlike the
old lady and the cashier, Eugene’s eyes were not downturned; rather, he was actively
watching the exchange between Turner and the thug (indeed, the editing pattern relies on
Eugene’s eye movements to bridge some of the shots).
Eugene is fixated throughout on this “first sight,” mentioning it accidentally to
Megan. After he forces a meet with her by sharing a taxi, he takes her to a fancy
restaurant and, in a Woody Allen imitation, tries to explain: “I saw you standing there; it
was pouring. You were wet, cold. You reminded me of a cat I used to have. I couldn’t
resist.” Megan is suitably flattered, if still a bit cautious, and Eugene continues, almost
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unwittingly letting out his secret when he reminisces, “the first time I laid eyes on you. .
.” before quickly saying, for the second time, that his being there “is very unusual for
me.”165 Parting after this first date, Megan says “hope to see you again,” to which Eugene
replies “there’s no question about that.”166
By developing so thoroughly a visual metaphor both for and between Megan and
Eugene’s characters, Blue Steel shift ironic emphasis from the gun--the blue steel--back
onto the phallic representation of power and authority. Hunt steals the gun to take part
in the spectacle of feminine, authorized violence he just witnessed. The gun represents
for Hunt the possible tools for a reconstruction of the primal scene where the act of
violence replaces and becomes symbolic of power. His practice on strangers or in the
mirror unsuccessfully replicate that initial scene, and it becomes increasingly clear that
what Hunt wants is not Megan, or the gun, or more power, but rather all of these
contained in one image: woman+phallus+authority+violence.
Bigelow puns with their sight of each other one more time, when Megan abruptly
says to Eugene over dinner, “look,” as in “look, I have to tell you something.” He
responds “what” and she simply says “me.” Megan’s awkward, monosyllabic
conversation fails to make sense of the series of looks that the film develops between
them. Is she saying look at me? Or, the look is me? Or, look, why pick me? Her anxiety
passes, and when she gushes “I feel like I’m on top of the world,” the scene resolves
cleanly into a conventionally romantic, if expensive, one, where Eugene takes her on a
nighttime helicopter tour of lower Manhattan. There, pointing out a sight (“Look,” she
Earlier, picking her up in the cab, he says “I don’t make a habit of this.” Eugene seems surprised by the
habits he finds himself developing. Young comments on the notion of seriality, and I would extend that
idea from Hunt’s serial killer persona to the seriality of his yuppie life as a commodities trader. Regarding
American Psycho, Helyer notes that repetition, in the Gothic genre, is “indicative of a human urge to keep
certain bounds” (736).
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Compare this with the scene where Megan and Mann first meet--“I’ll be seeing you”--and Mann leaves
on a similar exchange.
165
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says), he delivers a suggestive speech whose pointedness is caught up by romance: “You
know, when you’re way up here, looking down, people they’re just little specks. Like
they don’t matter much. It’s just the two of us; we’re the only people in the world.”
This sentiment is the familiar, self-interested yuppie attitude, and it entrances Megan.
The film’s villainization of the yuppie is thus incomplete because of Megan’s attraction.
Megan’s middle-class origins and her initial caution and suspicion about Hunt’s attraction
to her show us the dangerous allure of the privileged lifestyle of a Eugene Hunt. Hailing a
cab when they first meet, Hunt makes a reference to The Wizard of Oz--“hey, remember
what happened to Dorothy when she didn’t get out of the storm”--but in many ways
Blue Steel’s true structuring narrative is Cinderella--remember what happened to
Cinderella when she didn’t get back home in time, when she stayed out too long with a
strange, rich man?

2. Bullet With Her Name On It
Eugene Hunt turns his initial obsessions with the thug’s gun towards Megan, and
in a taunting, ritualistic gesture, he engraves her name on the bullets he uses to kill his
victims. How are we to explain this inscription, which continues to develop (and literally
marks) the gun’s libidinal economy, but also at the same time seems pathetically shallow?
If Hunt has no clear reason for taking the gun, or for shooting his victims, then the
deliberate name-carving seems to also be another cinematic signifier of dangerous
obsession. After his theft of the gun, the next “strange” thing we see Eugene do is to
work on these bullets, although we do not know what he is carving until we later see
Mann hold up the recovered bullet. The idea for this may also be contained as another
detail from the holdup; consider what the thug twice says to the cashier during the
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holdup: “what, do you want it engraved?,” impatiently signaling with the pronoun both
an invitation and the waiting bullet. It is not far-fetched to later hear the thug’s words in
Eugene’s imagination as he carves the bullets. But Eugene’s scratching of “Megan
Turner” on the bullets is contradictorily assigned by the film because it establishes two
unique but related relationships--Megan and Eugene’s, and Megan and Mann’s. On the
one hand, it serves as Eugene’s threat to Megan--there is a bullet with your name on it
(when Megan is brought in to explain, she tells Mann “I don’t think of myself as the kind
of girl who gets her name on a bullet”).167 But, as we see, Eugene never takes up any of
the multiple opportunities he has to shoot Megan, until the closing moments, after she
shoots him first; in fact, quite the opposite is the case when we earlier see him asking
Megan to shoot him.
As demonstrated earlier, the film clearly connects Megan’s uniformed body with
her gun’s blue steel. Along these lines, we can also read Eugene’s scratched bullets as a
demand for her body; he’s not threatening her, but calling her, providing her name-asdeath as a way to fill in the gap between her body and her gun. I want to return to this
“open space” momentarily, but I should note here that all of the bullets in Blue Steel are
labeled, for they become by and in their performance part of the shootist. “You emptied
an entire load” says Chief Hoyt to Megan, implying that “her load”--an overreaction-should have been saved or would have been better used. When he inscribes the bullets,
Eugene literalizes Megan’s load--assigning value-in-a-name (like a good yuppie) to the
bullets.
Of course, it is the tough homicide detective, Nick Mann, who is at first
responsible for properly reading Megan Turner’s name, and comprehending the
Further, just as Eugene was paired off with the old lady during the holdup by rhyming shots of the two
of them, so does Megan Turner have an older “twin” living in New York City--Megan Augusta Turner,
who turns out to be an 86-year-old Bronx woman living in a nursing home.
167
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significance of her appropriated load as he calls her in to explain the bullets.

168

This

provides a third reading of the bullets, and looks ahead to the triangular relationship that
develops among Megan, Eugene, and Mann, a relationship connected by their exchange of
looks and bullets--the inscribing of names on bullets is matched at the end of the film by
the inscription of bullets on skin. Eugene is shot in his upper left arm by Megan (he pulls
the bullet out with his fingers, gazing into a mirror while doing so), and he later shoots her
in the same place. In a way, it is Mann and Eugene who seek each other out--the
detective wants to put Megan in “high visibility” and the killer wants to put Megan’s
name as a clue to find him (“if it wasn’t so bold, it would be stupid,” Mann grudgingly
comments). Introduced as a tough police veteran and as part of the boy’s club at the
police station (while Hoyt is his boss, they treat each other more like drinking buddies),
and then made a kind of paternal mentor to Megan (replacing her alcoholic, absent,
abusive father), the film finally asks Nick Mann to represent heterosexual normativity.
Recall that he first points a comb instead of a gun at Megan, and despite (or because of)
this reference to his curly, “feminine” hair (Megan’s is short), he provides an acceptable
release for Megan’s otherwise ambiguous sexuality when he sleeps with her at the height
of their danger. While this ambiguity stems most obviously from her “inappropriate” job,
from her masculine dress, from her close relationship with Tracy, and her friend’s
continuous nagging about settling down, I think most telling are not lesbian signifiers, but
rather the absence of heterosexual signification.169 Also relevant is Mann’s disbelieving
comment when Megan denies having any violent ex-boyfriends: “what, no old
boyfriends--is that a personal problem?” This comment is one of the many domesticating
Another stretched reading of the named bullets is that Eugene is so turned on by her blasting the thug
away that he simply wants to be like her, naming his little bullets in mimicry. This falls apart, though, in
light of Eugene’s later expressed desire to “share” with Megan.
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See Young on the same function in The Silence of the Lambs, which figures its detective as neither
straight nor gay, but rather something else.
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events between Mann and Megan which culminate in their sexual encounter, beginning
with his paternalistic, omniscient comment to Hoyt, “if she pees I gotta know about it,”
through to his criticism of the contents of her cupboard (“you ever shop?”); waiting in her
apartment while she is on a date with Eugene, he quips “you want to keep secrets, do me
a favor: go shopping.”170
Blue Steel offers another mini-narrative which better illustrates the engraved
bullet’s significance in representing the exchange of sexuality in the film. Bursting in on
Megan’s meeting with Chief Hoyt just after the holdup, the film introduces Mann as he
starts telling Hoyt a story (“you gotta hear this”). Mann, oblivious to Turner’s presence,
describes a man from New Jersey who, receiving oral sex from a prostitute in a cab, had
his penis bitten off when the cab hit a pothole. The punch line of the story is that while
“she’s still got a dick in her mouth,” the man “don’t want to go to a hospital because he’s
somebody,” and so “the hooker pulls out a needle and thread [and] sews his dick on
backwards.” Turner, disgusted, interrupts by saying “I wonder what he’s gonna say to
his wife,” at which point Mann notices her and turns professional, critiquing her handling
of the holdup (asking “why didn’t you just tackle him?”). This scene, and the story that
Mann tells, demonstrates the film’s structuration of sexual relationships, which are
doubly inflected by economic and patriarchal power. The john (“he’s somebody,” just
like Eugene) cannot go to the proper authorities, and thus is a sympathetically comic
figure to the police, who can relate, as men, to the difficulties in regulating sexual life and
social life. While the john remains the butt (or the dick) of the joke, Mann makes the
hooker’s stupidity the point of his telling of the story. Meant to be a story between male
buddies, their joke further reflects upon Megan’s own uneasy role in these kinds of
Although, this is not very likely to occur; the film portrays Megan as very much not a domestic figure;
in a later scene with Tracy, Megan mock-proudly tends the stove, saying “there, I boiled water.”
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power relationships. The two men, innocently sharing a humorous story (“you gotta
hear this, you’ll piss yourself”), effectively exclude Megan permanently from police life.
Already forced to defend herself on procedural grounds, what defense could she possibly
mount against this kind of thinking?
Not only does the story marginalize Megan’s presence on the force, but the detail
of the hooker’s well-intentioned misplacement of the man’s penis appropriately captures
the film’s construction and critique of women’s role in men’s affairs. Having lost his
penis because of a woman (and in an illicit relationship he must hide in order to protect
the privileged status which allows such women in the first place), the man has no recourse
but to turn to this hooker in order to help him put it back on.171 The hooker’s needle and
thread and her expected skill at sewing recall the familiar feminine trope of the weaving
woman (and the trope of the male desire for the domesticated whore). Her getting it
backwards, though, and then being laughed at later by two men, demonstrates this film’s
deep confusion between the sexes. The passing back and forth of the penis, signaling the
appropriate and inappropriate use of the phallus, expresses Blue Steel’s anxious content,
but this lesson is entirely lost on Mann and Hoyt, who share the story between
themselves, leaving Turner out of it in a way that simply recirculates their anxiety. The
point, which the guys miss, but which Megan relies on from the start, is that the phallus
is mobile. The film’s exchanges make this clear: the passing back and forth of guns in the
first half of the film (Eugene taking the thug’s, Chief Hoyt taking Megan’s) is structurally
matched by the passing back and forth of bullets at the end.172 The passing back and forth
of the guns, the passing back and forth of bullets, and the passing back and forth of the
Mann significantly tells Hoyt that the cabbie--the other accessible male--was simply upset about the
blood in the car.
172
Eugene describes his work as a trader as misanthropic. Similarly, trading bullets, like trading gold, “is
kind of a misanthropic enterprise, when you think about it”; people buy bullets, like gold, “betting that
everything else in the world’s going to go to hell.”
171

250
penis all represent the same thing: the inaccessibility of one gender to another, and the use
and care men and women should have for their phalluses. So, does Blue Steel set up
Megan to be the hooker with the penis in her mouth; is one either the hooker or the john?
From Mann’s point of view--yes, and the question for him will be whether Megan can
sew the case on backwards or straightwards. Eugene, too, in naming these detached
bullets after Megan, asks the same question.

3. His Odd Desire, Open Zones
At this point we need to consider the nature of Eugene’s sexual desire for Megan.
Initially, he is curiously aloof towards her; when she first invites him up to her
apartment, he surprises her by responding, “soon.” Eugene’s desire is ironically less
“masculine” than Megan’s, only expressing his need most clearly to Mann near the end of
the film. Mann, handcuffed to the steering wheel by Megan, has Eugene’s gun to his
head. Eugene demands, “look at me. I want to see you. I want to see you see it. See it
in your face: the reverence, the light, then nothing.” Eugene’s quasi-religious tone is
apparently a product of the voices he hears in his head, perhaps from God, which first
manifest themselves when Eugene is lifting weights. At that time, the musical score
signified suspense with an almost angelic, synthesized choir. Not hearing the voices that
Eugene hears, we must decipher whether he is relaying only one side of the conversation
or both:
What? What? Who are you? Why are you talking to me?173 You are God,
Eugene. You are unique, Eugene. But unto them that fear your name shall the
son/sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings.174 You are not alone,
Note that this mirrors Megan’s earlier question to Eugene.
The religious quotation is from Malachi 4:2, except Eugene appears to address God (“that fear your
name”) while in the original God speaks (“that fear my name”).
173
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Eugene. Oh, God. Stop it! Stop talking to me! I can’t hear you! I can’t hear
you, God!
While some of this is conventional “person going crazy” dialogue, Eugene’s desire for
uniqueness is crucial, especially in regards to the earlier scenes of him at work on the floor
of the Stock Exchange, struggling to be heard. It is immediately after hearing voices that
Eugene finds his first female victim, a prostitute (although we are not told the fate of the
third victim, the other two were men, both in their 40s). The filmmakers are discreet
about her murder (did they first have sex? did he use his gun?), although as the camera
pans across a rooftop looking at the New York skyline, we hear Eugene’s offscreen
panting and screeching. Finally, the camera settles on Eugene’s back as he undresses
(reversing the earlier shot of Turner dressing), and although the prostitute’s body is not in
the shot, Hunt grabs her blood-drenched dress and wipes his body with it. By no means
the first violent act, the film approaches this scene as Eugene’s first major transgression;175
not only has the camera yet to be coy in regards to violence, offering close-ups and
medium shots of bullet wounds and gunshots, but Hunt’s savagery, wiping blood on
himself, is the most over-the-top scene in a film already excessively bloody. The
prostitute’s murder, strangely left unshown (was it about sex or death? how does it relate
to Mann’s earlier story?), leads directly into Eugene’s psychosexual play with Meagan.
Only, in fact, after killing the prostitute does Eugene admit Megan into his sexual life.
Another cinematic reference serves to bridge Eugene’s killing of the prostitute and
Megan’s incipient discovery that he was present during the holdup. After a brief scene
where Mann and Megan argue, the film cuts to an image of a hand turning a crank,
visually recalling the gun’s cylinder/film reels shown during the credits. We soon realize
that this is not the crank of a camera or projector, but rather that Megan is moving a
175

Next of the three is killing Tracy, and finally is raping Megan.
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paper target in place in a shooting range. As she takes shots at the target, extremely
strong backlighting makes it look like a punctured movie screen. Megan’s firing of the
gun, marked in relationship to the cinematic apparatus, satisfies her immensely, although
in the next scene when Eugene reveals his presence at her performance in the supermarket,
she is upset to be unwittingly playing a role in his mind other than the “new girlfriend”
she thought she was. After shooting a few rounds, Megan steps lightly down the street,
teasingly passing Eugene, who (for the viewer who has just seen him drenched in the
prostitute’s blood) is waiting creepily outside. She gives a coy turn and a very passionate
kiss, moving his hand to her neck and to her breast. Here is the most open and vulnerable
that we have seen Megan, and its masochistic elements--consisting of Eugene putting his
hands around Megan’s throat--continue in the next scene, when Megan enters Hunt’s
apartment, and they are about to have sex.
As Megan and Eugene embrace, her holstered gun instantly becomes part of their
sexual play. He is able to identify it by touch, “a .38,” and begs her not to take it off.
Echoing what the earlier blind date Howard said, who referred to her beauty right before
asking about her gun, Eugene tells her “in the morning, your face is there even before I
open my eyes . . . I think you’re the most beautiful woman I’ve ever seen in my life.”
This scene is romantic, except for the fact that what Eugene finds beautiful in Megan--the
inner picture that is constantly with him--is something behind Megan’s face. In a plea
embarrassing for both Megan and the viewer, Eugene asks her to “take out your gun and
hold it” with two hands. She finally does so, and, pressing the barrel against his forehead,
he reveals his role as voyeur during the holdup: “I knew, the first time I saw you [that] I
have found my brightness.” Calling the thug’s gun his “radiance,” the film shifts Eugene’s
apparent fetishization of the gun onto his fetishization of Megan’s role in the hold-up.
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This yuppie does not want the material object--he does not ask for Megan’s gun, or
produce his own as a kind of counterpart. Instead, he wants to recreate the used object,
or rather, the object-in-use which the gun represents. In this case, it is the yuppie’s
desire for power, fetishized by Eugene as Megan’s “legal” power to kill. Hunt
discovered, during the holdup, what Foucault refers to in The History of Sexuality: An
Introduction as the difference between the right of death and power over life. Blasting the
thug out of the window, Turner opens up a zone of sexual authority, of phallic
transformation, without, as Hunt noticed, blinking an eye. “Why are you a cop, Megan?”
Eugene finds his own answer as a witness to the holdup, and only a yuppie could in this
way be turned on by the spectacle of mediated, legal death.
Megan’s shooting of the thug creates an open zone of legal killing, which in its
confused sexual content176 suggests alternative modes of power for Eugene. Megan reads
Eugene’s insane speech: “I think he sees me as some sort of kindred spirit,” and Eugene
literalizes this in his next killing, when he shoots Megan’s best friend Tracy. This scene,
occurring at the film’s one hour mark, is Eugene’s second major transgression, and
motivates the first of the “now-it’s-personal” revenge motifs (the other is Megan’s rape).
It is also excessively violent and abusive, and thereby literalizes Eugene’s desperate
attempts to occupy the open space created by Turner during the holdup. Surprising them
in the stairwell of Tracy’s apartment, he comes from behind and puts his arm around
Megan’s neck. As he pulls her close from behind, Eugene strikes a hostage-taker’s pose.
The careful viewer will recall a similar pose from earlier in the film, when Megan grabs
Tracy during the graduation scene, mugging with her best friend for the camera (and a
third variation during the training sequence). Here, Megan frantically struggles to close
The thug dismisses Turner, saying “I didn’t come here to fuck with you bitch.” Christina Lane
describes Eugene’s desire as being “catalyzed by Megan’s own status as an outlaw in the realm of body
politics. Megan cannot ‘be’ a woman’s body in a male role” (72).
176
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off the open space of Eugene’s desire, which is to be, like Megan, a legitimately
illegitimate shooter. Tracy gets one bullet; the camera cuts to outside the doorway, and
her blood splatters the pane, covering the screen red.
After this, Megan attempts to displace Eugene’s fetishization of her shootingimage back onto her own gun. Eugene has buried his stolen gun and Megan has been
surveilling him. He goes to Central Park, digging and scratching around; his face covered
with dirt, he makes yelping and panting animal noises, which build even further on his
earlier howling at the moon. “Looking for something?” she asks. As if calming an animal,
she continues, “it’s OK,” and unzips her shirt, revealing her holstered gun, held under the
armpit near her breast. “I have one. Go on, Eugene, grab for it.” Cutting to Eugene’s
face, we see him weigh the offer, and then we see flashback inserts of multiple angles of
him grabbing the gun in the supermarket. Just as he is going to go for it, Mann arrives,
prompting the bizarre line, “It’s OK Nick, he’s just going to grab my gun,” before Mann
grabs it instead and Eugene takes off. In classic Western convention, we see Turner
operating according to the logic of the gun--only one of us can have it, and if he goes for it,
then I’ll have to give it to him. From this scene on, where Hunt rapes Megan and
ultimately is killed after a spectacular chase and shootout (taking numerous bullets,
getting run over by a car), Blue Steel abandons its villain for stereotypical horror
conventions.
It is the film’s spectacularly violent ending, generated by Hunt’s unstoppable177
pursuit of Megan, that covers over the complexity of the yuppie’s desire. We might
believe that Hunt was already insane before he entered the grocery store (which provides
an easy solution to the film’s problem); in this case we would need to read the film as a
In another context, a Time magazine article reports in 1991 that “up to now, yuppies have proved harder
to kill than Freddy Krueger” (W. Shapiro 65). This is certainly true of Blue Steel, and casting Halloween
actress Jamie Lee Curtis, who also had to fend off an indestructible villain in that film, makes this clearer.
177
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straightforward thriller, and understand the film’s coding of Hunt as a yuppie as simply
metaphoric for the kind of lonely, pointless, and crazy-making existence yuppies lead.
Yet, I am not convinced by this reading, as it gives short shrift to the complexity of both
Eugene’s and Megan’s character. The problem with reading Eugene as a metaphor for
how Reagan-era excess and greed can make one crazy (and I will return to this when I
discuss Vampire’s Kiss) is that we may then be tempted to read Megan metaphorically as
well--for how feminism, for example, can make guys crazy. While the film relies
somewhat on the concept of a purely evil, obsessive psycho for the dramatic heft of its
conclusion, more suggestive is a reading of the first three-fourths of Blue Steel as a parable
of yuppie desire. Watching a woman shoot a man turned Hunt on, and especially so in
the field of the supermarket. Rather than read his later psychotic break as a symptom of
his yuppie lifestyle, his behavior indicates the forms of yuppie sociability that he is
engaged in: he is unable to make sense of Turner, and finds in her a set of incompatible
problems--“the female dick.” The overrecognition of himself in her--(“I know you better
than you know yourself,” “we’re two halves of one person, you and I”)--fuels the
yuppie’s ambition. “Death is the greatest kick of all,” he tells Megan, “that’s why they
save it for last.” And, with this final revelation, the yuppie’s goal is clear: “being with
Megan is the biggest kick of all.” As he approaches the feminine, the male yuppie ceases
to exist, entering as he does one place closed off to his power strategies.
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IV. Vampire’s Kiss: Plastic Teeth and Psychoanalysis
“Seduction. Romance. Murder. The things one does for love.” (movie tagline for
Vampire’s Kiss)

Robert Bierman’s Vampire’s Kiss (1989) is another interesting, under-examined
film from the 80s featuring a yuppie psycho. Bierman’s first film, Vampire’s Kiss stars
Nicolas Cage as yuppie literary agent Peter Loew, who is (or is he?) bitten by a bat one
night after picking up a woman at a trendy club. Loew becomes increasingly obsessed
with the idea that he is turning into a vampire who is being courted by a second woman he
later picks up, the vampire Rachel (Jennifer Beals). As he begins to exhibit the classic
signs of vampirism, he starts to increasingly demonize his secretary Alva Restrepo
(Maria Conchita Alonso), who in turn keeps warning him about the gun in her purse.
Soon, Loew is so far gone that he hides behind sunglasses, sleeps under his overturned
couch, shrinks in horror from mirrors, and wears plastic vampire’s fangs. Unfairly
spurned by Rachel after he bites his first victim, Loew is driven over the top; insane,
talking to walls and dragging a big wooden stake through New York City’s Lower East
Side, successful yuppie Peter Loew meets his end as an ordinary vampire. What makes
Vampire’s Kiss so difficult to read is that while Peter in every respect follows a
conventional vampire transformation narrative, at some point the audience realizes that he
has actually not been bitten--that in fact everything he does as a vampire is a product of
his fantasy, his yuppie identity, and his psychoanalytic exploration of sexual boredom
and surface.
Vampire’s Kiss is important because it is an anomaly, a rare instance of the naked
display of the yuppie psycho trope that is otherwise contained or concealed in other 80s
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depictions. By counterposing the vampire transformation narrative with the yuppie’s
investigation of himself, the film is driven from the beginning towards darkness; unlike
Blue Steel, whose Eugene Hunt is too easily read from the beginning as another psycho,
Vampire’s Kiss disallows the reader the comfort of immediately understanding its
protagonist. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that it is evidently a black comedy,
a subgenre much less common then than it is now. There are certainly humorous elements
here not normally present in straight horror: for example, the film satirizes Loew’s
lifestyle and his psychiatrist, Cage uses a hilariously shifting accent (shades of early
Keanu Reeves or Sean Penn in Fast Times at Ridgemont High) which is meant to sound
pretentious, and he puts on a wildly over-the-top, scenery- (and cockroach-) chewing
performance that, when he is not delivering lines, continually veers towards Keatonesque
slapstick. However, at the same time the film can be exceedingly grim and unfunny, as
when Loew, after twice attempting to shoot himself in the mouth, rapes his unconscious
secretary, or when, after murdering a woman at a club, he attempts to publicly impale
himself with a makeshift stake. There is no doubt about it, this is a very brutal and
thematically ugly film. Interestingly, though, Vampire’s Kiss does not feel disjointed; it
manages simultaneously to elicit the comic and the horrific, a feat of counterpoint not
only difficult to create, but also to watch. By so self-consciously mixing generic
conventions, and by doing so in a highly mannered, impossibly satiric and caricatured
way, Vampire’s Kiss becomes a film that excludes its audience. It seems impossible for
the filmmakers to ever recreate this tone; if they had known what they were doing,
undoubtedly Vampire’s Kiss would not have been made in the first place. It is difficult to
imagine how to describe the tone of this film without unnecessarily emphasizing one
element over the other, and since Loew’s is a potentially unreliable point of view, more
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obvious politically correct statements (like, “this film is misogynistic”) become less
obvious.
Critics, of course, hated Vampire’s Kiss, especially attacking Cage’s performance
as indulgent and the script, by Joseph Minion,178 as directionless. Vampire’s Kiss is very
much also a film about New York City, and Cage’s physical approach to his surroundings
was seen only as so much scenery-chewing (“this is scorched-earth acting,” says one
reviewer [Hinson C2]). What this kind of critique misses is that Peter Loew’s interaction
with his surroundings is very much in keeping with the kind of aimless, superficial
lifestyle this character would lead, and much more so than if Cage had played his yuppie
like one of those in The Big Chill. Vampire’s Kiss marks its protagonist as a yuppie by
emphasizing three things now familiar to the yuppie iconography: his dress (Paul Owen
suits, dark glasses worn inside, stylish haircut), his surroundings (brownstone apartment,
hangouts such as Tunnel and Mondo Cane, his windowed office with secretary’s
intercom), and his therapy sessions (another beautifully scenic office, his vacant,
repetitive, clock-watching discussions). Mirrors are everywhere in Loew’s New York,
and he always takes time to check himself out, pursing his lips and arching his eyebrows.
Laid atop Loew’s yuppie character is the film’s other thematic element, the
character of the vampire. The film contains classic vampire film iconography; taking F.W.
Murnau’s version as its central text, Cage’s performance179 and the film’s cinematography
quote often from Nosferatu (1922), and Peter at one point even watches that film.
Vampire elements accumulate: the bat, the fear of crosses and of mirrors (since vampires
cannot see their reflections), photosensitivity and nocturnal activity, the eating of insects
Minion also wrote Martin Scorsese’s After Hours (1985), a companion piece tale of being stuck out of
place in downtown New York.
179
The actor Cage emulates is Max Shreck, whose performance is much more expressionistic and mannered
than other later popular portrayals of the Count, such as Bela Lugosi’s in Tod Browning’s Dracula (1931).
178

259
and animals, the coffin, the experienced vampire’s “turning” of a novice and his or her
anxiety over his or her own first bite, the vampire’s erotic imagery and telepathic control,
the vampire’s aesthetic and aristocratically groomed appearance, and, of course, the
pointy teeth and bloodletting at the neckline. Vampires are perennially popular,180 but the
rather classic representation of the bloodsucker in Vampire’s Kiss is problematized by its
time and place; so many elements of the yuppie lifestyle are shared by the vampire
(which is, obviously, the film’s setup joke),181 that keeping the two distinct is impossible.
It is a necessary task for the viewer, though, since our sympathy for Peter Loew is
colored by whether we see him as victim of a malevolent force beyond his control, or
whether we find this self-made man as the truer source of evil.
There is no doubt by the film’s end that Peter Loew has become insane due to his
experiences, but, like the suggestive nature of the gun in Blue Steel, there is an uncertainty
about whether the yuppie goes insane because of an outside force, or whether we are
meant to imagine the yuppie as already irreparably damaged and prone to psychosis. In
answer, I would argue that the film’s ethical content relies on its ability to leave the
question of Peter’s vampirism undecided. I am stretching the film a little here; it seems to
me that Peter is more often marked by the film as not a vampire, and reviewers have in
fact complained that the film is not as indeterminate in its setup as it could be.182 For
example, the audience can see Peter reflected in mirrors, he is able to walk about during
Other notable 80s vampire films include Tony Scott’s The Hunger (1983), which is an arty, lesbian
vampire film, that, while being pre-yuppie, still provides quite a prototypical visual feast with Catherine
Deneuve and David Bowie. The Lost Boys (1987), by Joel Schumacher, represents a more popular teen
movie; set in California and involving an adolescent gang of hip vampires, it is a sort of Brat Pack-style
version of the vampire legend. Once Bitten (1985), with Jim Carrey and Lauren Hutton, seems a safely
comic mixture of the vampire and the decade. (Of course, we should also mention the version Cage’s
uncle Francis Ford Coppola made in 1992). Rather than these predecessors, I find Vampire’s Kiss more
comparable to Roman Polanski’s work; cf. The Fearless Vampire Killers (1967) and his apartment trilogy,
especially The Tenant (1976) and Repulsion (1965).
181
Or as Marx pointed out, “capital is dead labor which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labor,
and lives the more, the more labor it sucks.”
182
Critic Jay Carr, for example, wishes the film were more indirect and had a sense of dislocation.
180
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the daylight, and he has to buy his pointy teeth. Also, a number of times the camera
shows Peter addressing an empty room when he believes he is talking to Rachel; the
sex/biting scenes with Rachel also occur with him lying passively on his back dressed in tshirt and boxers, suggesting a masturbation fantasy. He is wearing the same clothes when,
hunched over, he glazedly watches Nosferatu late at night, implying the extent to which
he is only mimicking his vampirism.
On the other hand, the film allows one answering moment, which, while not as
ambiguous as it would like to be, is still no less significant for its presence. Near the
film’s end, Loew is spurned by Rachel, who now has a new boyfriend, Donald. Chasing
her down at Tunnel, Loew accosts her on the dance floor, shouting to the onlookers “look
at her teeth.” She says “shut up” rather vehemently (does she think he’s making fun of
them, or are they really pointy?) before smiling at Donald. This slight look between the
two reinforces their complicity against Peter, and the viewer is asked to go back over the
evidence that Peter is indeed a vampire: he certainly acts as one, sleeping in a coffin,
drinking blood and eating pigeons, dying with a stake through his heart. It is the yuppie’s
death which makes it so hard to know--if he had died any other way (a gunshot, for
example), then we would be able to more easily say that he is human. Likewise, the
bandage that covers his neck raises problems--does it hide bite marks, or just a shaving
cut? (One secretary, trying to read the mixed signals, simply says “he’s so eccentric”). I
recognize that part of this forced reading attempts to save the film by extending Peter
every opportunity to be what he thinks he is, but the film’s ethical content lies in the
multiple possible readings. As in American Psycho, Vampire’s Kiss puts the viewer in
the difficult position of having to decide which is worse: a crazy yuppie who imagines he
is a vampire, or a crazy yuppie who is a vampire (or in the case of American Psycho: a
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crazy yuppie who gets away with gruesomeness, or one who only imagines that he
does)? If Loew is truly a vampire, then we can accept the film as metaphorizing the
relationship that yuppies have with society--they are just like bloodsucking vampires.
But if Peter is acting this way because he truly believes he is a vampire, then does that
mean that he is not really as evil as he appears? Is the murderous yuppie simply
misunderstood, lonely, in need of help? The yuppie-vampire dialectic is one part of the
way the film interrogates this “asymmetrical social relation between gender and power”
(Young, “Silence” 9). Further complicating matters is the series of five different female
relationships that Peter develops (three of these women have a similar “look,” confusing
matters, while Vampire’s Kiss noticeably offers only minor male relationships--Peter’s
boss Langdon,183 a chatty cab driver, and Alva’s vengeful brother Emilio). As Peter’s
dependence on the fantasy of Rachel develops (a fantasy akin to Eugene Hunt’s for
Megan Turner), his relationships with other women become hopelessly exacerbated.
Examining these female relationships illustrates the problems in the film’s ambivalent
tone, especially as regards Peter’s own sense of helplessness in the hands of the
vampiress.
The apparent aimlessness of the the film, which bothered critics, comes most from
the lack of a unitary, structuring, heteronormative relationship.184 While Loew is paired
off sexually with the vampire Rachel, she is only one of many women whom Loew
continually comes back to. First is his therapist, Dr. Dorothy Glaser, who is introduced
in the film’s first scene. Loew, lying on a couch, is telling her about having to deal with a
Langdon is introduced at a meeting, where the guys sit around and laugh at Peter’s most recent freak
out. “[Alva] asked me for a raise for getting chased into the ladies room,” chortles Langdon, who then
says mock-seriously, “one question, Peter: is my name written anywhere on the bathroom wall, and what
did it say?”, which puts everyone in stitches.
184
Notwithstanding Young’s comment that “the psycho killer is one of Hollywood’s reigning
characterizations for gay men” (“Silence” 32), yuppie psychos seem impossibly heterosexual, which is
more a product of their string of partners than of any true sexual desire. Sexuality seems not to figure for
the yuppie any more than work does (cf. above, and The Yuppie Handbook’s joke about scheduling sex).
183
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woman the morning after: “I wanted her to disappear. I wanted her to get the hell out of
there.” Glaser points out a theme she will return to, the confusion in Peter’s desire,
saying “and yet, just the night before, you wanted her very badly.” This comment points
to Peter’s pattern of behavior, which vacillates from desperate hunger to bored irritability.
While the film satirizes yuppie psychotherapy,185 Dr. Glaser does manage to diagnose
Peter for the audience, even when Peter is not paying any attention. During one scene
transition, we cut to her office as she is telling Peter “. . . starting with your earliest years
when you somehow were taught to expect something that wasn’t even halfway
attainable.” To this insight, which certainly is Loew’s primary problem, Peter looks at
his watch and stands to leave. In these earlier scenes, Loew goes to therapy just as he
goes to work and to the clubs; it is simply a meaningless, time-filling gesture. As we see
by his other relationships, Glaser is actually the perfect woman for Peter; when he wants
her to disappear, she does, unlike Jackie, who calls and leaves angry notes on his door
after he twice stands her up. Later, though, although he has expressed his scorn for
therapy, Loew becomes panicked when he cannot see Glaser over the weekend. Calling
her to try to move his appointment earlier, Loew imagines Dr. Glaser answering the
phone in a robe. As Peter, whimpering through the plastic teeth he is wearing, begs
“sooner,” she is approached by a man wearing a towel, who caresses her and tells her to
hurry up, in another example of Peter expecting something “that wasn’t even halfway
attainable.”
Against Peter’s relationship with Dr. Glaser is his relationship with his much putupon secretary Alva. Peter has Alva working on a pointless task--sifting through files to
find an old contract from the 1960s. Alva cannot find the file, and during the film Loew
Less so than The Silence of the Lambs, which presents a cannibal for a shrink, but Vampire’s Kiss does
give us an analyst-cum-matchmaker. Dr. Glaser: a glazier or a glacier?
185
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increasingly harasses her about it, demanding she stay after work to look for it by herself
if she wants to keep her job, even though he knows “it’s a horrible, horrible job.” The
next day, jumping on the desk, Loew chases her into the ladies’ room. After another
scene where he mocks her gun, she stays home sick, and Loew takes a cab all the way to
the Bronx to bring her back to work. After each of his outbursts, though, Loew seems
genuinely apologetic; blaming his behavior on mescaline or “the pressures.” When she
finally locates the contract, Peter tells her it is too late, and after chasing her through the
empty building, attacks her in a manner that film critic Caryn James finds “tastelessly
unfunny” (“Woman He Adores” C11). It certainly is, but what Loew’s treatment of Alva
reveals is the way in which he needs her. Finding the contract, as made clear when he
freaks out about it on Dr. Glaser, is such a pointless waste of time. Yet it seems to be the
only thing that Peter does that week, and his single-minded pursuit of Alva as the newest
employee at work contrasts with his being pursued by Rachel.
Just before attacking Alva, Loew takes her gun and shoots himself twice in the
mouth. The viewer knows what he does not know, that the gun is only loaded with
blanks, and so this proves it to him: “I’m a vampire, a real vampire.” Snatching the cross
off of Alva’s neck, Loew imitates his vampire lover Rachel, who has momentarily
exchanged places with Alva in his mind, laughing at him. Rachel provides the title’s
“vampire kiss,” and she appears to Loew as a possessive, jealous lover, preventing Loew
from keeping his date with Jackie and from answering a phone call: “how much nicer
when the outside world doesn’t interfere with your pleasure.” Rachel, the consuming
lover, soothes Peter, saying “it’s alright. You chose me.” The notion of the yuppie’s
choice is portrayed ironically here; in fact Peter’s habitual, nightly “choosing” of women
seems to have come back to bite him in the neck. Later, disgusted, Rachel takes his fake
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teeth out, and Peter is reduced to trying to convince her that he is just like her.
The last woman that Peter meets exists solely in his imagination, when he
fantasizes his final therapy session with Dr. Glaser. Finally opening up and declaring
that he is ready for a change, Peter says he has in mind “love. . . but I mean real love, the
sweep-me-off-my-feet, the big L. I’m not talking about fairy tale love. I’m talking about
a mature relationship.” This cracks Dr. Glaser up (which infuriates Peter), until she
reveals that another of her patients, Sharon, wants just the same thing. After being
introduced, they discover that they share all the essential yuppie favorites--poetry,
horseback riding, long weekends in the country, and “refreshing” Japanese food. As they
go off, cured, to share their big romance together,186 Peter seems finally to have found his
perfect fantasy woman. But, as a crazed Peter approaches his brownstone, we see him
shouting to an empty street, “Sharon, I don’t want to talk about it anymore.” Upstairs,
he imagines her harping on the same old things, “when did you become a vampire? Why
couldn’t you be normal? Does this mean we can never have children?” Kicking her out,
he mutters “I really can’t handle these relationships, maybe I should see a shrink.”
Sharon, the perfect, doctor-approved mature relationship, turns out to be just as awful to
Peter as all the others, since it breaks down just as quickly into boredom and routine.
Peter dies immediately after, staked by Emilio.187 After such an ending, the
problem of the viewer’s identification with or against Peter seems impossible to resolve.
Curiously, this is a departure from the first scenes of the film, whose cinematography so
effectively established a traditional horror approach. First is the credit sequence, with
shots of New York City landmarks at dusk played against eerie music. As Peter leaves
Dr. Glaser clears two obstacles to their future happiness, Peter’s rape and murder, by saying it was “just
a little id release,” and “people get murdered every day, stop worrying.”
187
Technically, Emilio murders Peter, punishing him for the rape of Alva (but not the murder of the girl at
the club), but since Peter holds the stake up to his own chest, and has been begging for someone to kill
him, the scene can also be read as a strange kind of assisted suicide.
186
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the bar with his date, he says “this is my kingdom, and my palace is but two blocks from
here,” at which point first-time viewers may think that Peter Loew is the titular vampire
taking his victim to his castle. Next, we are given many strange, high angles, producing a
voyeuristic effect; the first shots of Peter’s apartment are literally from outside his
window, high up from where the bat will enter. These ceiling shots continue throughout,
in Peter’s apartment, at his office, at a hotel, on the street. Even with these “bat’s-eye
shots,” though, the film assiduously manages to avoid imposing a style on the
proceedings. That is, if one is to read the film as a psychological narrative about yuppie
insanity and vampire-obsession, then it would make no sense for the film itself to look
like a vampire film. Given that Peter is not really a vampire, then this film is not really a
fantasy, but rather attempts something more realistic. The “true” images we are given,
then, cannot be recovered by the fantasy of the vampire genre, and, like American
Psycho, the viewer has an insider/outsider problem in dealing with these yuppie psychos:
are we experiencing something remote, or internal? Is this safe fantasy, or serious reality?
Unlike Blue Steel, which relies on the connection of the authority of the filmic
image with the authority of the “legal” gun, Vampire’s Kiss continually throws into doubt
the seen image. While we identify with Loew because we are shown scenes from his
imagination (Rachel against a black background, the later imagined scenes with Dr.
Glaser), his point of view is obviously problematic: first, he is a self-absorbed yuppie,
and thus has misplaced values and has to go to therapy and act like a jerk; and second, it
is increasingly obvious that he is “crazy.” In Vampire’s Kiss, we are denied what Eugene
wants in Blue Steel; he says he wants to watch himself in the other--and we are not given
an identificatory character in Vampire’s Kiss that would allow us to watch-in-reflection
our yuppie protagonist. This identificatory displeasure makes the viewer’s work more
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difficult; American Psycho and Vampire’s Kiss are hard and ugly to read because they are
both solipsistic and overly self-reflexive. Opposed to Blue Steel, these two are
acinematic, because the necessary apparatus which would mediate between subject and
object is missing or fragmented. Instead, as in Vampire’s Kiss, we have only the fear of
the mirror, burning us, shocking us. While we can see Loew see himself in the mirror, and
he can see himself in the mirror as a yuppie, once he fulfills the film’s idea of himself and
becomes a vampire, his reflection becomes invisible. The mirror in Vampire’s Kiss, then,
replaces the cinematic codes in Blue Steel, shortcutting the yuppie’s pleasure in image
consumption.
George Will, writing in 1984 in the Washington Post on the ambitiousness of
yuppies, argues that “many hard-charging Americans between 25 and 40 seem to combine
extraordinary ambition and extraordinary insecurity. One ambition is to assuage their
insecurity by means of an elaborate, all-absorbing strategy of socially correct
consumption” (C7). As a guiding principle for the yuppie psycho trope, the search for
socially correct consumption is one that continually veers between the cultural and the
psychological. The supposed independence from their parents frees the yuppie to
express desire and pleasure in new ways; yet under the banner of the yuppie, these
desires are also reformulated as a problem of sociability--the yuppie distinguishes himself
from other baby boomers by his taste and aesthetics, which are continually measured
against other yuppies’ social expressions. The yuppie creates a form of identity focused
on establishing inherently unnatural relationships of consumption with other people and
objects--and this is also a form of identity established by the vampire. Since their single
test is one of “socially correct consumption,” the yuppie, like the vampire, represents a
dead space in the possibilities of ethical self-engagement in the 80s.
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Chapter Five
Engaged Withdrawal: The Four Questions of Kathy Acker

“To judge from recent trends in scholarly as well as popular literature, three crucial
questions can be seen to stand at the forefront of today’s preoccupations: the question of
mothering, the question of the woman writer, and the question of autobiography”
(Barbara Johnson, “My Monster / My Self” 2).

As we have seen with earlier chapters, the “question of mothering” is a recurring
preoccupation of both theory and literature in the 80s, and one that appears even in
unlikely places. For example, the “recent trends” which Barbara Johnson refers to in
1982 are evident in a range of examples from popular literature like Brat Pack novels and
films to philosophical and medico-legal wranglings over the new roles men and women
should play in childbirth and child rearing. Johnson’s “My Monster / My Self,” a group
review of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Nancy Friday’s My Mother / My Self (1977),
and Dorothy Dinnerstein’s The Mermaid and the Minotaur (1976) in a special “Cherchez
la Femme” issue of Diacritics, connects the three interrelated questions--of mothering, of
the woman writer, and of autobiography--with the notion of feminine monstrosity and a
certain self-preoccupation regarding women’s roles as scholarly and popular writers in a
new, postmodern age. In doing so, Johnson illustrates how the question of mothering, or
the “critique of the institution of parenthood” (2) which each text raises, is not an isolable
question for productive feminist discourse, but rather one which ties into the questions of
woman’s writing and of autobiography so that the three demonstrate a kind of joint
mastering of the self-monstrosity characteristic of female autobiography (and especially
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so in implicit autobiography, which none of her texts are). “In each case,” Johnson
argues, “the autobiographical reflex is triggered by the resistance and ambivalence involved
in the very writing of the book” (3). In each case, the woman writer cannot help but
reveal how “the monstrousness of selfhood is intimately embedded within the question of
female autobiography” (Johnson 10). Since female autobiography measures itself against
a literary genre founded upon the male imagination (and upon the masculine imagination
of the feminine), Johnson finds in the three texts she discusses a unique “theory of
autobiography as monstrosity” (10) which stands out as the more fertile autobiographical
act.188
To the three preoccupying questions Johnson presents, I am inclined to add one
more, the question of women’s history. As the theoretical landscape of the American
1980s, dominated initially by postmodernism, created such a self-conscious decade, we
find not only an increased importance of the descriptive efforts of self-periodizing
statements, but also a lack of examination of the proscriptive result upon the subject’s
sense of his or her ethical place in this time. Renaissance historian Joan Kelly-Gadol’s
seminal essay “Did Women Have a Renaissance?” (1977) challenges traditional schemes
of periodization, arguing that women’s history must account for the variance between
women’s and men’s experiences of seemingly shared historical periodizations that are
generally only formed around important experiences in men’s lives. Kelly-Gadol finds
promise in the idea that periodization has become “relational” in women’s history, and so
rather than overthrow historical periodizations or write an alternate history of women’s
See Chapter Three, “. . . Mater sed certissima and ‘In the Matter of Baby “M,”’” where I discuss other
critics’ theorizing about late-70s and early-80s thinking about the emphasis placed on the mother. Nancy
Chodorow in particular describes out how mothering itself is “reproduced,” while later critics such as
Marianne Hirscch argue that “daughterly perspectives . . . collude with patriarchy in placing mothers in the
position of object, of other--thereby keeping mothering outside of representation and making maternal
discourse a theoretical impossibility” (Bassin, Honey, and Kaplan 13). In light of the opening questions
of this chapter, one response is to question whether women may intentionally adopt such daughterly
perspectives in order to keep their mothers outside of representation.
188
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experience, she proposes that traditional periodizations be used to “relate the history of
women to that of men” (“Social Relation of the Sexes” 812). Likewise, for the 80s, rather
than rewrite the Reagan 80s solely from women’s perspective, we must work to draw
men’s history and women’s history into a relation with each other. In these “social
relations,” I find a useful pathway towards explaining 80s self-periodizing efforts, which
focus on men’s experience as solely as a concept as “the Renaissance” does.
For instance, postmodern theory’s efforts to characterize the present by first
establishing a recent epistemological break focus on only one possible experience of the
present. As part of its self-periodizing work, postmodernism’s coupure suggests a
stylistic freedom from the strictures of the past. Most often discussed initially in terms
of art or architecture, before long the postmodern style became evident in the behavior
and representations of 80s subjects. Since this self-periodizing is different from straight
historical periodization by virtue of the speeding up of self-consciousness about the
contemporary, the social relation of the sexes which Kelly-Gadol discusses is even more
fraught with troubling implications for women. For example, as Nancy K. Miller points
out in “The Text’s Heroine: A Feminist Critic and Her Fictions,” from the same Diacritics
issue as Johnson’s “My Monster / My Self,” there is little comfort for women in mid- to
late-70s theoretical analyses of humanistic thought which resulted in the decentering “end
of ‘man.’” As the 80s arrive and as European poststructuralism filters into American
postmodernism, the much touted epistemological rupture cleared the table of suddenly
outmoded notions of authenticity, legitimacy, and self-knowledge, but it not
unintentionally also took away women’s seats. As Miller puts it, speaking of Michel
Foucault’s “sovereign indifference” in asking of the concept of the author, “what matters
who’s speaking?,” it matters very much: “only those who have it can play with not
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having it” (“Text’s Heroine” 53). After the epistemological rupture of postmodernism,
“freeing up” humanistic thought as it may have presumed to have done, we find women
excluded from both playing with it and playing with not having it.
Furthermore, as such postmodern themes as blankness, flatness, superficiality,
and pastiche are picked up in the Brat Pack films and novels, a whole literary industry of
neo-hedonism is made possible. Stylistic freedom seems to have translated into cultural
freedom as the consumeristic “age of excess” became culturally fashionable. Yet, we
curiously find that virtually all Literary Brat Pack novels revolve around the rather
unhedonistic figure of the mother, and set up a specific relation between the death of the
mother and the supposed affectlessness of contemporary culture. The more nihilist these
characters acted, the harder their mother’s deaths became. Could it be that
postmodernism, as culturally represented by the Brat Pack characters, is really a theory
of mourning? Is it that renegotiations of the meaning of the mother was the true,
immediate reason for a shift in feeling in the 80s?
Evidence for the centrality of the mother’s role also comes from more direct legal,
medical, and political attempts to redefine motherhood in the 80s. Surrogate motherhood,
a “new old” technology, was pushed to extremes so that surrogacy brokers like Noel
Keane could sell it. But as it coincided with the shift of emphasis from motherly
perspectives to daughterly perspectives, surrogate motherhood provoked an ambivalent
feminist response; who is more important: mothers, daughters, or women? Ironically,
surrogate motherhood provokes in men a fear of crazy-making situations, figured as a
medico-legal paternal “crisis of legitimacy” that mirrors the postmodern crisis over
knowledge. In this, postmodernism’s self-periodizing hypothesis of an epistemological
break may not be much more than a mask for masculine anxiety over technological
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changes rendering them less biologically necessary.
As the questions of mothering, of the woman writer, of autobiography, and of
women’s history come to preoccupy both women’s and men’s concerns with the selfconsciously novel 80s, it is apparent that the “objects of knowledge” which organize this
dissertation and which provided stylish warnings to 80s subjects are insufficient alone to
represent a kind of self-periodization of the 80s. That is, while these objects of
knowledge were not intended to be solely representative of lived modes of 80s
subjectivity, they also fail to account individually for a form of 80s subjectivity which
deals with the self-periodized 80s in a manner that is neither only resistant nor only
receptive. If I am right in arguing the primacy of postmodernism on the cultural
landscape of the 80s, then I have thus far only discussed “objects of knowledge” which
stand in an either optimistic or pessimistic relation to this primacy. I would like to put
together the four questions we began with to show how the ambivalence and resistance
involved in women’s writing, which Johnson sees as provoking an impulse to feminine
autobiography, represents another fruitful model for 80s subjectivity. Like Johnson, I
find the monstrosity of selfhood an expression characterized by a sort of paradoxically
committed ambivalence. I term the conscious execution of this strategy “engaged
withdrawal.” The point of historical periodization (or in the case of this project, the
periodization of a self-periodization) must be to address the contemporary moment. The
difficulty of writing about the 80s is that it feels so much like the present moment,
despite our own contemporary attempts to distance ourselves from the past. The 1980s
is situated between a post-68 moment of shared political activity and engagement and a
21st century problem with political mobilization and ethical engagement, and the selfconsciousness of self-periodization and the ethical dimensions of self-behavior and self-
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knowledge in that decade suggest a more elusive strategy of engaged withdrawal. This
engaged withdrawal provides a paradoxical model of political, artistic, and ethical activity
that stands outside of postmodernism’s dividing rupture. After briefly glossing the
historical placement of the model of engaged withdrawal, I want to connect it with the
four questions (of mothering, of the woman writer, of autobiography, and of women’s
history), in the context of Kathy Acker’s novels.

II. Engaged Withdrawal
By engaged withdrawal I mean a subject’s paradoxically present absence in
culture. Situated historically, this theme is not new to the 1980s. The Greek philosopher
Epicurus’ early third-century B.C.E. dictum “live unseen” and Chinese philosopher Lao
Tzu’s sixth-century B.C.E.189 advice to “do that which consists in taking no action” both
revolve around the question of the individual’s proper role in society. Epicurus’
philosophical school, dubbed The Garden, was notorious for accepting women and slaves
as students, and this notoriety was in part responsible for misreadings of Epicurus’
promotion of pleasure as the goal of life as purely hedonistic and amoral. Actually,
Epicurus defines pleasure by gauging it against the removal of pain, raising more problems
in regulating moral and social activity than in regulating individual, bodily pleasures.
Epicurus’ thought, while an individualistic philosophy focused on self-sufficiency, also
goes to lengths to stress the value of friendship and community. In doing so, Epicurus
relies on a relative notion of social justice, which changes depending upon changing
circumstances. In disavowing moral absolutes (and, in particular, the action of gods),
Epicurus introduces the idea of the socius, or social self, which will later become so
consuming to Romans, Christians, and other social forms analyzed by Foucault.
189

Modern scholars differ, dating Tao Te Ching to the late fourth- or early third-century B.C.E.
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Likewise, Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching, which stresses the individual subject’s recognition of
the passivity of action, also fundamentally questions the importance of self-knowledge,
strength, and control as it relates to an individual’s behavior among others. Relying as
Epicurus does on evidence from the natural world, Lao Tzu juxtaposes the fruitless
vanity of human endeavor to control one’s surroundings with metaphors from nature to
illustrate an underlying “action of nonaction” linked to a feminine principle. Lao Tzu’s
text are often consigned, by the tradition of European philosophy, to religious mysticism;
yet, while there is not space to do so here, Lao Tzu’s reaction to Confucianism (as well as
Epicurus’ atomistic reaction to Plato’s theory of forms) deserves to be brought into
dialogue with a post-Cartesian conception of philosophy and sexual difference.
Both texts, in recognizing the mutuality of opposites, in a way presage
poststructuralist critiques of Western metaphysical dualities.190 Yet, these examples have
not been taken advantage of to describe or provide models for postwar, American ethical
behavior. To turn to one of these dualities, engagement versus withdrawal, or social
activity versus passivity, in the post-68 period, as theorists and critics questioned and
complicated the relationship between theory and art, thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre
proposed a newer, more politically engaged form of literature that serves as a touchstone
for literature after the radical negativity of surrealism. As he explains in What is
Literature? (1949), Sartre’s littérature engagée, or “engaged literature,” was intended to
“take up a position in our literature, because literature is in essence a taking of position”
(278). Even more dramatically, “literature throws you into battle. Writing is a certain
way of wanting freedom; once you have begun, you are engaged, willy-nilly” (What Is
65). This may be one way of stressing self-consciousness in the ethical act of literature,
One reference here is to Jacques Derrida’s often reprinted essay “Structure, Sign, and Play in the
Discourse of the Human Sciences” which, in arguing that “the center is not the center,” returns us to Lao
Tzu’s observation that a spoked wheel is only useful due to the emptiness around the center.
190
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and in a difficult sentence, Sartre imagines the engaged writer as a mediator: “I shall say
that a writer is engaged when he tries to achieve the most lucid and the most complete
consciousness of being embarked, that is, when he causes the engagement of immediate
spontaneity to advance, for himself and others, to the reflective” (What Is 76). “His
engagement is mediation,” (What Is 76) Sartre concludes, and it becomes clear that
engaged literature is for Sartre more a function of the author than the text; the author
should attempt to summon “the most complete consciousness of being embarked” (la
conscience . . . la plus entière d’être embarqué), in order to render clear and lucid what
may be hidden--that literature is always already a taking of a theoretical position, and
thus it is an ethical form related to the writer’s and reader’s struggle for freedom. As a
theoretical formulation of the proper role of literature in a politically active life, Sartre’s
argument demonstrated postwar concerns about the nihilism or affectlessness of
contemporary culture. Furthermore, he responds to a philosophical tradition, stemming
from Nietzsche and Heidegger, of figuring the individual in the world; Sartre’s early novel
Nausea (1938), for instance, dramatizes a man’s horror at the monstrous excessiveness of
his existence. “There was no half-way house between non-existence and this floating
abundance. If you existed, you had to exist all the way” (Nausea 128). This feeling about
the world, which the narrator Roquentin calls nausea, becomes synonymous with the
narrator’s feeling about himself: “I no longer have to bear it, it is no longer an illness or a
passing fit: it is I” (Nausea 126). The narrator’s problem is how to come to terms with
this feeling, and up until the last page Roquentin “dare[s] not make a decision” (Nausea
178). Sartre’s later emphasis on political commitment responds in a way to these
indecisions. Yet, for me such a decidedly engaged stance only recirculates the potential
for un-engaged activity. Implicit to a theory of art as a political act is a whole host of
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associated acts; engaged literature, for example, presents such terms as activity, control,
commitment, strength, and the hortatory as positive values for art. That these values
often collude with masculine, nationalistic, aggressive, or rationalistic values is troubling.
Sartre’s response to his concept “nausea” responds in turn to all those other European
malaises which have structured the individual’s experience with the limits of art: la noia
(or “boredom,” the title of Alberto Moravia’s 1960 novel about a young and an old
artist), anomie (as in Albert Camus’s The Stranger [1942]), decadence (Huysman’s
Against Nature [1884]), ennui (Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal [1857] or Paris Spleen
[1867]), and melancholia (as in Freud’s paper [1917], Keats’ Ode [1820], or Burton’s
Anatomy [1621]).
Before Sartre’s littérature engagée, there is an earlier American literary example of
the question of writerly and readerly engagement and withdrawal. Herman Melville’s
short story “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Tale of Wall-Street” (1853) centers on the central,
enigmatic figure of Bartleby. The story is narrated after the fact by an unnamed lawyer
who had hired Bartleby to work in his office. Bartleby, asked to do a number of different
tasks, responds to each by saying “I would prefer not to.” As the narrator becomes
increasingly frustrated with his new employee, Bartleby moves further into himself.
After the narrator moves his law office to escape Bartleby’s presence, Bartleby is put
into jail, where he finally dies, presumably since he “would prefer not to” eat. From the
outset, “Bartleby, the Scrivener” is an impossible tale since the narrator emphasizes the
inscrutability of Bartleby but nonetheless endeavors to pin him down--if Bartleby is
mysterious to the narrator, he is doubly so to the reader who must wade through the
narrator’s own confused account of Bartleby’s life. Accounting for solemn and ghostly
figure of Bartleby ultimately means accounting for Bartleby’s repeated “I would prefer
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not to”; trying to read this speech, which veers between engagement and withdrawal
without ever addressing either, leads the narrator as well as the reader to some obscure
middle ground of ambivalence. Interestingly, two poststructuralist thinkers have taken up
“Bartleby, the Scrivener” to explain postwar, ethical reading practices and the level of
engagement the reader has with a text. J. Hillis Miller, in Versions of Pygmalion, reads
Melville’s short story as another version of the Pygmalion myth, where there is “a
character who does something like falling in love with a statue,” and where “reading makes
something happen” (vii, viii). In Bartleby’s case, Miller focuses on the narrator’s ethical
responsibility towards Bartleby, which Miller links with the narrator’s unsuccessful
attempts to write Bartleby’s biography. In Miller’s reading, the tale is really of the
narrator, and Galatea-like Bartleby turns out to be the sculptor Pygmalion as well, a
“mute bust of Cicero . . . whose silence reduces the one who addresses it to silence too”
(149-150), turning both the narrator and the reader slowly to stone. In its focus on the
“doubling” of conscience/ethics in the narrator/reader, Miller’s evaluation of Bartleby
recalls Freud’s notion of the uncanny in freezing the reader. The effect of “Bartleby, the
Scrivener” is to demonstrate the author’s play with literature and ethical engagement--in
Sartre’s terms we have the “consciousness of being embarked,” but Miller demonstrates
that this embarkation serves mainly to turn around upon itself. Gilles Deleuze, in Essays
Critical and Clinical, takes Bartleby as a symptomatological model to express a
relationship between literature and life, between the critical and clinical. Much as he did
with his study of Sade and Masoch, Deleuze works to extract from literature a set of
signs to describe life. In a kind of “Bartleby-criticism,” Deleuze elucidates this
character’s “being as being, and nothing more” (“Bartleby” 71). In this reading,
Bartleby’s catchphrase formula “is devastating because it eliminates the preferable just as
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mercilessly as any nonpreferred” (“Bartleby” 71). In doing this, Bartleby’s “formula”
(which Deleuze distinguishes from a “Procedure” with which to treat language) “ravages
language” and “make[s] the whole [of it] confront silence” (Deleuze, “Bartleby” 73, 72).
Like Miller, Deleuze refers to speech act theory, upon which the narrator is dependent in
attempting to place Bartleby, and which Bartleby’s formula destroys. In this, Deleuze
finds that Bartleby, “even in his catatonic or anorexic state . . . is not the patient, but the
doctor of a sick America” (“Bartleby” 90). Unlike Sartre’s committed intellectual,
though, in “Bartleby” we have a series of engagements and withdrawals, moving outwards
from Bartleby’s phrase to the reader, passing through the character, the narrator, the text,
and the author.
It is not until the 1990s that there was an indentifiable American response of sorts
to Sartre’s call for engaged literature. In the early 1990s, popular authors and filmmakers
cultivated what was known popularly as a Generation X “slacker” culture. Douglas
Coupland’s novel Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture (1991) gave a name to
this shift in feeling, and early independent American cinema, such as Richard Linklater’s
Slacker (1991) and Kevin Smith’s Clerks (1994), provided a kind of social realism of
bored, aimless, post-80s “twentysomethings” (a label which “Generation X” replaced).
These characters were like rebels with neither cause nor any real rebellion. Coupland’s
novel is laced with kitschy Pop Art cartoons, with a glossary of terms such as “McJob,”
“Knee Jerk Irony,” and “Legislated Nostalgia,” and with meaningless, bumper-sticker like
mantras such as “SOIL ISN’T A DOCUMENT” and “REINVENT THE MIDDLE
CLASS.” These last are similar in typography and bluntness to Barbara Kruger’s art, yet
there is no irony here, or at least no ironic commentary on an image or other text. Rather,
spread through slacker culture is the attempt to shore up the fragments of recent

278
American history (of the Cold War variety) against the ruin of the global culture of the
90s. The question for the 80s, then, as it falls between different, transatlantic breeds of
anomie--Sartre’s engagement on the one hand and Gen X’s withdrawal on the other-- is
whether the later wholesale slackening of political and social engagement is a continuation
of or a response to the culture of the 80s. Were the 80s the beginnings of the slacker’s
shrug to European, post-68 ideas of political activity, or is the feeling of Generation X a
product of the failure of the American 80s to integrate such ideas successfully?
As I have argued earlier, as far as postmodernism goes, “slacker” culture is clearly
a natural outgrowth of the supposed affectless of the postmodern condition. In his 1984
foreword to Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, Fredric Jameson writes of the thencurrent “rich and creative moment, of the greatest aesthetic play and delight” which has
two central features: “the falling away of the protopolitical vocation and the terrorist
stance of the older modernism [and] the eclipse of all of the affect (depth, anxiety, terror,
the emotions of the monumental) that marked high modernism” (Foreword xviii). This
affect is replaced by Coleridge’s “fancy,” Schiller’s “aesthetic play,” and what Jameson
summarizes as “a commitment to surface and to the superficial in all the senses of the
word” (Foreword xviii). One supposes that this is commitment of a sort, yet still I
wonder about the effects of a “commitment to surface” which intends to eclipse affect,
and in particular how the emphasis on aesthetics and aesthetic play willingly reduces
emotions and affects which are then made to seem unseemly. This is, Jameson continues,
“the moment in which aesthetics gives way to ethics, in which the problem of the
postmodern . . . becomes that of one’s more fundamental attitude toward the new social
formation” (Foreword xviii). Presumably, the kind of ethical response--the “fundamental
attitude” one would have--would be as superficial as the thing it responds to. That is,
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confronted with the superficial, in how ever many senses there are, we find either
reception or resistance, neither of which is going to be successful, since both are reactive.
Or, perhaps there is some middle ground between the two, as in Linda Hutcheon’s
“complicitous critique” or Judith Fetterley’s “resisting reader.” Yet, I am not sure of
these either; poststructuralism (and for that matter, Taoism) points towards a certain
“complicitous critique” as being a feature of all objects. More so, in combining reception
and resistance, a phrase like “complicitous critique” retains both engagement and
withdrawal wholesale, and only by juxtaposition is it able to ironize one or the other. Is
it possible to have neither one nor the other, nor both, but rather neither?
Luckily, the idea of the avant-garde, of the terrorist, of anxiety that Jameson saw
eclipsed with postmodernism did survive in the 80s, and furthermore did so by playing
with the notion of “aesthetic play” instead of considering the superficial and the deep as
mutually exclusive characteristics of art. Kathy Acker is the most important figure in this
respect, and before examining her work specifically, I want to turn to another woman
writer, Hannah Arendt, whom Acker employs as an example of the kind of ambivalently
engaged political and artistic activity that can stand apart from depictions of the
postmodern age as affectless and superficial. In her 1995 address to the Authors Guild,
“Writing, Identity, and Copyright in the Net Age,” Acker considers authorship and
copyright in light of her practice of textual appropriation; in this case, Acker borrows
from Arendt’s Men in Dark Times (1968), looking pessimistically (as Acker was wont to
do) at the way Arendt’s “thinking is deeply embedded in the historical” (98). “Perhaps
this is how literature works,” Acker proposes, and then quotes Arendt on the writers she
examines who “have ventured into the public life”:
I am afraid that in their efforts, they felt very little responsibility toward the
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world; these efforts were, rather, guided by their hope of preserving some
minimum of humanity in a world grown inhuman while at the same time as far as
possible resisting the weird irreality of this worldlessness--each after his own
fashion and some few by seeking to the limits of their ability to understand even
inhumanity and the political and intellectual monstrosities of a time out of joint.
(Arendt qtd. in Acker, “Writing, Identity” 98-99)
The themes that we began with are here: expectatations of responsibility, the private and
public author and the world, literature’s possible resistance to a resisting world,
understanding inhumanity, the capacity for intellectual monstrosity, and the historical.
Acker finds community with Arendt since they both share a concern with the author’s
ethical responsibility to her culture--to finding a response to help mitigate the feeling one
of Acker’s characters has, that “all are grasping for good reason in these desperate times”
(Great 123).
Hannah Arendt is a product of dark and desperate times, as is Kathy Acker. In an
earlier essay, Acker reflects on New York City in 1979, imagining that “if my friends and
our society didn’t find a way for adequate change, we would die and quickly. . . . I
wanted radical change, however it had to come. At the same time I was aware that writing
changes nothing on the larger political scale” (“A Few Notes” 7). What then is one to do,
Acker asks, with the hardships of history; how is a writer, a woman writer, to write
change if writing is not change? In answer, Acker later takes up Arendt’s term “a
committed act,” whose meaning is “revealed only when the action itself has come to an
end,” that is, when it becomes narratable (“Writing, Identity” 100). “Insofar as any
mastery of the past is possible,” Acker quotes Arendt, “it consists in relating what has
happened” (“Writing, Identity” 100). Now, Acker explains, Arendt does not here mean
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“master narratives” of the kind Lyotard investigated in the postmodern context, but rather
Acker proposes a subtle distinction between a “writing, narration” which does nothing
and a “narration, writing” which is a moving language and which “restores meaning to a
world which hardship and suffering have revealed as chaotic and senseless” (“Writing,
Identity” 100). But what of the case, Acker writes, of really dark times? “How can we,
as Hannah Arendt says, even in worlds that seem to have become inhuman, remain
obligated to these worlds?” (“Writing, Identity” 102). Acker finds Arendt’s answer:
“‘Flight from the world in dark times of impotence can always be justified as long as
reality is not ignored.’ Flight does not mean abandonment” (“Writing, Identity” 103).
The restoration of meaning to the world by means of “narration, writing,” in which
narrative (as we shall see, a nonlinear, noncircular narrative) comes over “just writing,”
allows for a kind of fleeing from the world which is not abandonment, which is justified or
justifiable. “Flight does not mean abandonment”; between these two terms there is one
way out that is also a way in.

III. On Kathy Acker
“The whole world and consciousness revolve around my mother” (Kathy Acker, Great
Expectations 14)

Let us begin at the end; of Melville’s scrivener, J. Hillis Miller tells us that
“‘Death’ is a catachresis for what can never be named properly” (144). Kathy Acker died
30 November 1997 in Tijuana, Mexico of breast cancer; she had been told she had a week
to live, her age at death is listed by newspapers variously as 52, 50, 48, 53. Her
obituarists do their duty in making some sense of the details, but like Melville’s narrator
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they do so with difficulty, as we realize that “throughout her life’s work, Acker retold the
story of her life” (Scholder, “Kathy Acker,” n.p.). Kathy Acker’s biography is still
unwritten, an absence compounded by conflicting stories, gossips, slanders, and fictions.
When alive, her obituarists tell us, her “arresting image, relentless outsider status, and
provocative reading style” “was a publicist’s dream: tattooed, motorbike-loving, her
publicity picture by the feted Robert Mapplethorpe” (Scholder, “Preface” vii; Lockerbie
18). Or, perhaps she was not like that all, but rather a gentle “sipper of herbal teas”
(Vulliamy 1), a nature lover (Rose E5) (especially of birds [Pulsifer 13]), “in the flesh . . .
not scary at all” (Moore 19), “with her glasses on . . . straight out of The Prime of Miss
Jean Brodie” (Times 17).191 Or, perhaps a reading which tries to take both images into
account: “the tattoos, piercings, muscles and motorcycles were simply private pursuits
and public window-dressing. . . . [She was] far more complex than the standard
reductionist ‘underground sex queen’ clichés” (Murray 18). Her life’s work as well
misunderstood, or multiply understood: she was a “queen of underground erotic writing”
(Vulliamy 3) who “wrote graphically about sex and violence” (Moore 19), “unashamedly
made plagiarism part of the basis of her writing” (Lockerbie 18), was “fascinated by
language and its relation to power and to the body” (Guttridge 21), and detailed “sexual
violence and the exploitation of women, all set to searing punk rhythms--and without a
hint of self-indulgence” (Hoekstra 35). As evidenced by such self-indulgent hyperbole,
Acker’s critics were stuck in trying to present her as unpresentable: a “Showy Queen of
the Underground,” as the London Times obituary titles her (“Showy Queen” 17), Kathy
Acker is a female Orpheus obscured and clarified, a poet paradoxically on display and
Jeanette Winterson, in Essential Acker, says something similar: “I have seen her in her piercings and
leopardskin, suddenly put on her reading glasses and look exactly like perfect casting for The Prime of
Miss Jean Brodie” (vii). Although not the case with Winterson, sadly Acker’s breast cancer often appears
in sentences that try to re-feminize her, to find a vulnerable truth behind the “in-your-face” image (cf.
Vulliamy 3).
191
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hidden.

192

The contrariness of Acker’s obituaries marks an interesting kind of necro-

biography of an author whose texts are bound up with the four questions--of mothering,
of the woman writer, of autobiography, and of women’s history--that we began with. As
Barbara Johnson argued, “the monstrousness of selfhood is intimately embedded within
the question of female autobiography” (10), and the representations and
misrepresentations of Acker’s life’s work in her obituaries make, for the woman writer,
the question of autobiography even more relevant.
Despite the disagreement over some of the biographical facts of Acker’s life and
the proper interpretation of her “showy” yet “underground” persona, everyone agrees
that her texts are in some manner inextricably bound up with her own personal
experience. Arguing that “Acker retold the story of her life,” Amy Scholder, Acker’s
friend and publisher of Verso, addresses some of this confusion; there is in Acker’s novels
a literal question of autobiography, as one is never sure if events in her texts are “real” or
“fake.” Acker’s life’s work self-evidently rhymes with her life; in addition to copying
other authors’ texts, “she also copied out her own life, in a relentlessly repetitive process
of transcription that called every received idea about literary value into question” (Dick
111). “Her art--while not as autobiographical as some thought--was completely
intertwined with the way she lived” (Rose E5). Critics later cite her interview with
Sylvère Lotringer to explain; Acker was taught (by David Antin, although she claims not
to remember who it was) that writers wrote from their experience, and so when Acker
was too young to have any good experiences, she simply copied others’. The textual
practice remained; mixing fake and real life, she describes how she “looked for a voice, a
self. I placed ‘true’ autobiography next to ‘false’ autobiography” (“A Few Notes” 10).
Is this not how Freud defines the unheimlich, which Barbara Johnson in “My Monster / My Self”
suggests is limited to men and is repressed in a gesture of “feminine contradiction,” a repressed gesture that
exhibits “the possibility that for women as well as men the home can be the very site of the unheimlich”
(10)?
192
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Her friend and lover Peter Wollen reads this practice as formulating a multiple, demonic
identity, constantly “decomposing the identity of the heroine” (“Kathy Acker” 10), since
for Acker “a split identity was a more viable way in the world” than a static, coherent one
(Acker, “Devoured” 7). Author Robert Glück takes it from the other, readerly side,
writing that “she manipulates my urge to build a reality behind an I” (49). The “I” behind
which Acker hides or behind which Glück wants to find a reality constitutes the moment
of performance in Acker’s texts. Acker’s “I,” “the linguistic index of identity” (Wollen,
“Kathy Acker” 9) raises together the question of autobiography and the problem of the
pronoun--the first thing Acker’s reader must learn is that the “I” is unstable, and that it
repeatedly cycles through the antinomies of identity--male/female, sadist/masochist,
human/animal/robot, free/imprisoned. With this multiple “I,” it is absolutely true that
Acker “constantly rejected being for becoming” (Wollen, “Kathy Acker” 2). The next
problem, though, is whether the reader is meant to perform this becoming with Acker; to
the question of autobiography, is the shifting “I” the author’s answer or the reader’s?
Despite the multiple, reiterative possibilities of the intertextual identity of
Acker’s characters, joined together as they are by the first person pronoun, there is, intratextually, a much fewer number of recurring modes or roles. While Acker’s character’s
names and identities shift, the obsessive return to echoing narratives of rape, incest,
pirates, a mother’s suicide, sex shows in Times Square, or tattooing curiously help anchor
a reader of Acker’s 80s novels, and in their repetitiveness these narrative reoccurences
also suggest the “true” moments of Acker’s autobiographical writing. Of these, a child’s
moment with a mother is the one most often repeated: Great Expectations (1982) begins
and ends with it, Don Quixote’s (1986) crazy-making abortion propels that text’s search
for feminine love, and Empire of the Senseless (1988) opens with a narration of Abhor’s
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matrilineal horror story. Peter Wollen suggests that the suicide of Acker’s mother Clare
when Acker was 30 may have been “the most emotionally painful event of her life,” and
her texts reflect this pain, repeatedly putting the narratorial “I” into the role of an
abandoned, traumatized orphan. In Great Expectations, the most ambivalent and
disconcerting of the novels regarding the mother, Acker rewrites her mother’s suicide and
funeral three times--structurally introducing, dividing, and closing the novel with it (Great
5, 63, 127). Such preoccupations pile up, sticking out within what is an otherwise
disorienting experimental voice, and these repeated moments, acting as textual markers,
ask to be read as confused but proud repetitions of moments out of Acker’s “true”
autobiography. This is true of the mother’s suicide, of Acker working in strip shows, of
her getting tattooed; so what is the reader to assume except that Acker cannot help but be
an autobiographical writer, practicing a novelistic confession in order to manage the
emotional and traumatic pain of her mother’s suicide?193 Or, perhaps, returning to
Acker’s tough punk image, we could conclude, as Barbara Kruger did, that Acker was a
nihilist, that she was not nearly as fragile as others suggested--a claim refuted, perhaps,
by the sole fact that her confession about the importance of her mother comes tumbling
out over and over again in each of her novels. Again, the question of autobiography, of
the mother, and of the woman writer: Acker’s traumatized orphan role is the obverse of
her “outlaw heroine” persona; like the tattooed and pierced punk, as the scared orphan
Acker is “both flaunting her independence, defying her oppressors and bolting in
desperation, abject and humiliated” (Wollen, “Kathy Acker” 8).
Other critics make sense of Acker’s traumatized orphan role in a number of
productive ways. First is to read it as an autobiographical performance from her own life,
Or, as Barbara Johnson said of the three writers she examined, “the autobiographical reflex is triggered
by the resistance and ambivalence involved in the very writing of the book” (3).
193

286
a way of getting through the “task work”

194

of writing, of using the one text-worthy

experience Acker does have. Another reading is suggested by Carla Harryman, author and
friend of Acker, who discusses Acker’s repetitive narratives in light of a reading of the
myth of Echo, pointing out that prior to Echo’s “language atrophy is her excessive
talkativeness,” which Acker shared (both in her texts and her life) (40). Harryman argues
that “this revisiting of subject matter involves a pleasure the reader can associate with a
kind of talkativeness that serves as a bridge to pre-traumatic feelings” (40). The obsessive
retelling of family dramas in particular is a kind of recovery; while Acker’s echoing
language is itself a “tragic signal or sign of trauma” (Harryman 40), it is also a way to
return to a disorganized, pretraumatic moment, to return to a morcellated body in
psychoanalytic terms. Many others likewise comment on the “un-formed” childishness
of Acker’s texts,195 which enact childhood trauma while also gesturing towards the
linguistic and psychoanalytic state that precedes ego organization. Narrative fiction, like
ego boundaries, are confining structures, and Acker’s childish words and her fluid
narratorial “I” can be read as strategies to lose these ego boundaries and thus escape the
confinements of the self. Robert Glück asks “if texts and selves are prisons, would it be
too fanciful to find a kind of freedom in the non-space between texts, in the silence and
emptiness between juxtapositions?” (48).196 Glück and Harryman are both able to make
sense of the question of Acker’s autobiographical elements and her “un-formed” narrative
identity by teasing out the implications of her regressive, childish diction and subject
matter. As a form of language practice (as opposed to an organizing, narrative practice), I
connect Acker’s textual role as a traumatized orphan with what Harryman refers to as
Acker says of her early texts that “I really didn’t want any creativity. It was task work, and that’s how I
thought of it” (“Devoured” 8).
195
“Acker Un-Formed” is the title of Harryman’s contribution to the Lust for Life collection.
196
I am reminded of Foucault’s formula “se déprendre de soi-même,” to release oneself from one self.
Acker’s work similarly considers, in her terms, “the need for narrative and the simultaneous need to escape
the prison-house of the story--to misquote” (Bodies of Work x).
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“the ventriloquy of childhood” (37).
I would argue that part of this “ventriloquy of childhood,” whose textual effects
are often humiliating and frightful, is what led Kruger to complain about Acker’s nihilism.
Peter Wollen summarizes Kruger’s parodying of Acker in the art journal ZG: Acker is,
from Kruger’s perspective, “a nihilist, rather than a critic. No engagement. Nonsense.
Nothing. . . . In the end, it all boils down to baby talk, to unbearable nonsense: ‘Goo
goo’” (Wollen, “Kathy Acker” 1-2). Likewise, the West German government’s Federal
Inspection Office for Publications Harmful to Minors decides that Blood and Guts in
High School (1984) was immoral, “for the vast part it consists of individual words,
mostly childish blabber that doesn’t make any sense” (“Immoral” 143). In truth, Acker is
much more conscious about this kind of refusal of adulthood and relishing of adolescence.
For instance, in the essay “A Few Notes on Two of My Books,” which I mentioned
above in the context of Hannah Arendt and the possibility of writing political change,
Acker imagines a new phase in her work and in society--a “post-cynical” phase which has
“no more need to deconstruct, to take apart perceptual habits, to reveal the frauds” (11).
Instead, “we now have to find somewhere to go, a belief, a myth,” and in a telling
example, she uses the film Rebel Without a Cause (dir. Nicholas Ray, 1955) as a
touchstone; in the American 80s, as in the American 50s, “the kids are desperately
looking for a place so they can live” (“A Few Notes” 11). James Dean, Marlon Brando,
these were icons because they were misunderstood by the older generation. In the 50s,
the idea of teenagers was being invented, and in the 80s, Acker ventriloquies this concept.
As she does, the desperation of this myth comes across. “The only reaction against an
unbearable society is equally unbearable nonsense,” (“Realism” 18) Acker often says, and
she also often says just how unbearable American society in the 80s is; indeed, she
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writes, “the United States resembles a giant baby, perhaps mongoloid . . . who not
maliciously but unknowingly breaks everything it meets as it crawls around in chaotic
paths” (“William Burroughs’s” 1). She then gives us Piaget’s view of babies, who are
unable to distinguish themselves from the external world. This is, for Acker, the way
America looks now, and in this sense her works are neither nihilistic nor political, but
more simply in the tradition of realism. Nayland Blake, an artist and friend of Acker’s,
remarks that
the seventies were a time when the obscene was the last refuge of the sane. A
bloated culture made by corporations paraded itself everywhere as common sense
and sensual bliss at the same time. Collective political action had collapsed into a
morass of ‘self’ cultivation that blinded people to the extent of their oppression.
(100)
Coming out of the 50s, the teen who held onto the myth of a rebel without a cause had it
suddenly deconstructed for her. In the 70s and 80s, as this work proceeded, the efficacy
contained in the notion of the collective split into the what Blake ironizes as the “self.”
Now what, Acker and that 50s teen, asks? The nihilistic childishness of her texts, or
rather the artistic “ventriloquy of childhood,” of Acker’s texts performs a nostalgia for
the pre-“post-cynical” phase. We have returned to the mythic possibilities of the 50s,
but without either naive innocence or the artistic task of revealing the naivete of earlier
periods.
Yet, we find in this ventriloquy of childhood that these things are true not only of
reading Acker’s life work and her essays on political activity, but also of reading Acker’s
life. Acker’s relationship with her mother, gleaned from interviews and obituaries, is
rather confusing, and at least two of her obituarists unintentionally connect the question
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of mothering with the question of autobiography. For instance, Peter Guttridge, writing
in The Independent, tells us:
Her mother committed suicide when Acker was 30. After years of silence, they
had begun to see each other again four years before. But then her mother lost all
her money. She couldn’t cope with impoverishment. Her mother’s death features
in most of Acker’s novels, most particularly in My Mother: Demonology (1993).
Acker always contended the bits about her mother were the only autobiographical
parts of her books. (21)
What is interesting is how Acker’s first-person pronoun, confusingly representing both
the real and the fake autobiographical voice in her novels, is replaced in her obituaries by
the third-person feminine pronoun, which just as confusingly represents both Kathy and
Kathy’s mother Clare. “But then her mother lost all her money”--does Guttridge mean
that Clare lost all of Kathy’s money, or that Clare lost all of Clare’s money? “She
couldn’t cope with impoverishment”--is this Kathy or Clare who couldn’t cope with
poverty, or perhaps the two together? Just as Acker performs a pronomial shift in “I”s
in her texts so that she may continually reconstruct the traumatized orphan persona, so
do her obituarists unintentionally perform a similar shift in “her”s--her mother/her
money, Kathy/Clare. As Guttridge, and so many others point out, these “bits about her
mother” are the most (if not the only) autobiographical elements, and so I wonder why
there is a pronomial lapse where one would otherwise (in the necro-biography of the
obituary) expect factual precision.
This confusion is repeated elsewhere; Gary Pulsifer, in The Guardian, writes,
She never met her natural father, who deserted her mother when she was three
months pregnant with Kathy. Kathy’s mother appeared to have blamed her
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daughter for this act of betrayal; in later life she undertook acts of petty thievery;
by Acker’s 30th birthday her mother at last managed to kill herself--a subject the
budding novelist turned to time and again. (13)
Again, we are left to ask, who is the “she” who was also a petty thief? As in Guttridge’s
obituary, we see Pulsifer follow a pronomial confusion between mother and daughter with
a claim about the importance of the mother to the daughter and with a gossipy detail
about family money. Both Guttridge and Pulsifer, in creating such confusions between
the two women, make an identification that Acker perhaps also worked towards. In this
case, Pulsifer makes it sound as if the mother’s death is merely good source material for
Acker; she (Clare) “at last managed” to suicide so that she (Kathy) could indefinitely
rewrite this act as a fiction. The mother’s suicide, happening in time for Acker’s 30th
birthday, becomes generative for the “budding” novelist. This kind of cause and effect
apparently works for the mother as well; Pulsifer’s semicolons connect the two women in
a circle--the circumstances of Kathy’s birth caused Clare to hate her (Kathy, and Clare?),
which caused “petty” family dramas which led Clare to suicide, which caused Kathy to
write.
These two obituarists also, contrary to Acker’s impoverished bohemian
performance (for instance, Acker reports that her first marriage came about because she
was disowned), raise the fact that Acker’s family was in fact wealthy, and in doing so
Guttridge and Pulsifer also bring together the issue of money and the issue of the mother.
In “Simulating Sex and Imagining Mothers,” critic Colleen Kennedy, considering the
simulation of pornography in Acker and Catherine Texier’s work, makes use of Luce
Irigaray’s argument that women are “products” that men exchange: “How can such
objects of use and transaction claim the right to speak and to participate in exchange in
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general? Commodities, as we all know, do not take themselves to market” (Irigaray qtd.
in Kennedy 177). Kennedy argues that “in a sense, Acker does take herself to market,” in
that she puts herself into her fictions such that she becomes “a fiction herself” (177).
Examining Pulsifer and Guttridge’s obituaries in this light, it is fascinating how clearly the
economic and maternal dimensions of this fiction-making collude to produce a reading of
Acker’s autobiographical predilections. “Her mother lost all her money,” “in later life she
undertook acts of petty thievery”--if this is Kathy and not Clare, then perhaps we are
suggesting that what Acker thieved were really the “bits about her mother.” The question
of the woman writer who economizes herself in an effort to become subject and object197
is disrupted in Acker’s case by her questionable relationship with her mother, both
pronomial and monetary.
Clearly Acker was writing about mothers--autobiographically about her mother-all along, and later, after the 80s, Acker works to figure out for herself what has been clear
to her readers: “the more that I write my own novels, the more it seems to me that to
write is to read” (“Reading the Lack” 66). This is what sympathetic critics mean when
they say Acker practices “appropriation” and what ironic critics mean when they call her
a “plagiarist.” Robert Glück writes that “the already-known is a public stage on which to
reclaim emotion” (53). Acker’s writing, performing in the space between affect and event,
becomes clearer as she writes, although her specific themes also shift and mutate as she
reclaims emotion. Considering Acker’s 80s novels, as a reader I am struck by how
unselfconsciously they perform the traumatized orphan role and the question of
mothering. The question of Acker’s “autobiographical” or “appropriative” style is telling
when reviewers struggle to deal with someone with such “relentless outsider status”
Like Barbara Kruger, Susanne Kappeler, and Luce Irigaray, “Acker finds herself, as a woman writing,
simultaneously object and subject--never completely subject because always object” (Kennedy 176-7).
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(Scholder, “Preface” vii). It is easy to see the fumbling phrases invented to both
marginalize and to center Acker. My own difficulty seems to be a product of my
uncertainty about the honesty of Acker’s voice--my difficulty with reading a 30-yearold’s “ventriloquy of childhood,” which I both desire and resist reading as a merely
confessional or restorative act. Acker the author may “reclaim emotion” by such
practices, but what of the reader? And what of the questions of the woman writer and of
autobiography, occupying as they do an ethical space between the public and the private?
If this is what Acker worked at her whole career--the refusal to separate fictions and
identity--we must wonder why it is later necessary for her to replicate this distinction
between her own life and the myths of her own life and her fictions.
For example, the first lines of the opening subsection, “I Recall My Childhood,”
of Great Expectations, the most forthrightly maternal of Acker’s early novels:
My father’s name being Pirrip, and my Christian name Philip, my infant
tongue could make of both names nothing longer or more explicit than Peter. So I
called myself Peter, and came to be called Peter.
I give Pirrip as my father’s family name on the authority of his tombstone and
my sister--Mrs. Joe Gargery, who married the blacksmith.
On Christmas Eve 1978 my mother committed suicide and in September of
1979 my grandmother (on my mother’s side) died. Ten days ago (it is now almost
Christmas 1979) Terence told my fortune with the Tarot cards. (5)
The offhandedly private confession on the first page, the disarmingly practiced and
concise flow of this disclosure, and the matter-of-fact parenthetical details confuse the I’s
role as recaller. “I Recall My Childhood” is part of “Plagiarism,” the first of three longer
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sections that divides the novel; we have just jumped headlong from a short parody of
198

Dickens into something much more serious and personal. Indeed, while Acker’s section
heading labels her use of Dickens as plagiarism, she modifies the original, jokingly
substituting the more difficult name “Peter” for Dickens’s “Pip.” She also leaves out the
word “family” in the first sentence; Dickens’s text begins “My father’s family name
being Pirrip” (Dickens 1). A question of textual scholarship, perhaps (Acker does correct
this in her second paragraph: “I give Pirrip as my father’s family name”), but there is a
not insignificant difference in Acker’s oeuvre between the “father’s family name” and the
“father’s name.” Such practical observations, mingling with the functionality of Peter’s
confession of his mother’s suicide, forces an effort of will to recall that dictum of reading
which asks us to remember that authors are not characters, and in fact may be people in
their own right. As Acker puts it, “when I’m writing I become the characters in the
novel, but the characters in the novel aren’t me. People always think they’re me, and it’s
a drag” (“Devoured” 20). And so by shifting dramatically between plagiarism and
confession, Acker of course invites a connection between the author’s and Peter’s person,
a connection not unaided by a similarity in the dates of Peter’s mother’s suicide and
Clare’s.
What makes this passage troublesome is not only Acker’s narrative strategy, with
its rapid jumps from narrative moment to narrative moment, but also the paradoxically
clear, straightforward voice, a concrete example of the “ventriloquy of childhood.” After
the short plagiarism of Dickens, we are told of the mother’s suicide and maternal
grandmother’s death, and then taken directly into a Tarot reading. Clearly the accounting
of Peter’s lineage which opens the text is meant to be read as important information, and
The other two are “The Beginnings of Romance” and “The End.” Of course, calling the first section of
Great Expectations “Plagiarism,” both makes Acker more of a plagiarist while also less of one by raising
the question of whether it is really plagiarism if one admits it before hand.
198
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the fact that Peter’s name and the fate of his maternal ancestors are all we need to know
by way of introduction suggests that these “bits about the mother” will have an increased
significance, creating a character with less of a past, and therefore one whose history is
freighted with significance (this is true of Dickens’s novel as well). The fantasy of
orphanhood in Freud’s description of familienroman suggests that children turn the
surprise of sexual knowledge into imaginings of illegitimacy, thereby providing room for
fantasies of a more exciting, “true” lineage.199 This is certainly an apt description of many
of the orphaned characters in Acker’s texts. Simultaneously, however, the bluntness of
Acker’s claim to the mother’s importance--locating her at the outset of Great
Expectations--serves paradoxically to make this mother less important; are we meant to
read in the mother’s suicide the same irony as in the preceding sentence: “I gave Pirrip as
my father’s family name on the authority of his tombstone and my sister--Mrs. Joe
Gargery, who married the blacksmith” (Great 5)? Does Acker’s authority likewise rest
on a tombstone? If so, whose--her mother’s or the father’s?
Barbara Johnson suggests that, “simultaneously a revelation and a coverup,
autobiography would appear to constitute itself as in some way a repression of
autobiography” (4). In trying to place the question of the mother’s importance, and
specifically how the mother’s suicide both frustrates and creates the titular “great
expectations,” I find myself stuck between using the language of “autobiography” or
“confession” or “plagiarism.” I attribute some of this to my own well-developed sense of
privacy, but one can further see in Peter’s declaration, and in Acker’s declaration, some
more open strategy for confronting what is clearly a painful memory while also providing
a coverup for it.200 This strategy is much more experimental, much more abject, much
See Chapter Three, “. . . Mater sed certissima and ‘In the Matter of Baby “M.”’”
This may be the hinge--would not a mother’s suicide always be painful, traumatic, no matter what
claims to the contrary?
199
200
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more disgusting, than the majority of the elements which critics and reviewers harp on-the genitals, the sex, the waste. Rather than focus on such excesses, Acker provides in the
opening to Great Expectations a vocalization of the absence of the mother, out of which
the novel explores what this spoken absence may mean for the daughter, and especially
for a daughter of age in a feminist world which depends, in some cruel way, on “sorting
out” the relationship with the mother. But this “vocalization” is the problem; if I term it
“confession” do I not consign the question of the women writer to an illegitimate genre?
If I call it “plagiarism” do I not suggest that the woman writer is forced to steal, in
Acker’s case, from male authors? And is “autobiography,” as Johnson said above and
Jeanette Winterson will say below, not simply associated with a weaker form of feminine
writing, set off against male authors’ more serious texts? Or, in the specific cases of
describing Acker’s vocalization, does suicide always provoke confession in the survivors?
Does one “admit” suicide? “Confess” it? “Narrate” it? Do all traumatic events prompt
similar issues with the verbs of speech?
Jeanette Winterson, author and Acker’s friend, in her introduction to Essential
Acker specifically connects Acker’s “struggle for feminine authorship” with the
complaint that women’s personal texts are unproblematically assigned to the genre of
autobiography:
when women include themselves as a character in their own work, the work is read
as autobiography. When men do it--say Milan Kundera or Paul Auster--it is read
as metafiction. Women can only write from their own experience. Men are
imaginative. Women write testimony and confessional. Men write the big picture .
. . --or so we’re told. (vii-viii, italics and ellipsis in original)
Women write autobiography, men write metafiction, and it is clear that metafiction is the
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more properly “literary” pursuit. While this distinction, on the one hand, merely serves
further to give men the intellect and resign women to the body, from the perspective of
Kathy Acker we can also see that this distinction highlights the reason why men may
fight so hard to hold on to the intellect in the first place. By calling Acker’s work
autobiography and Auster’s metafiction, one can preserve, for Auster, the sanctity of the
private moment. Is this metafiction just “safe autobiography”--autobiography with less
risks? Acker, whose work is more self-evidently violent, pornographic, and personal, is
not offered this separation; readers have a difficult time taking her as a person distinct
from her characters, since her texts work against this separation.
It is not necessarily the case that we need to fight to reconceive Acker as a
metafictional, as opposed to autobiographical, author. After all, who wants to be just a
metafictionist? Of Kundera, Auster, or others, Acker would likely ask what these
intelligent metafictionists were doing trying rationally to describe an “unbearable society,”
an “American culture [that] now is insane” (“William Burroughs’s” 2). Acker can be
consigned to autobiography because readers do not know what to do with her, as in her
obituarists’ contradictory phrase “showy queen of the underground.” Following
Winterson, autobiography, a label applied to women’s writing that includes women’s
selves, is ostensibly less rigid, less calculated, less intellectual than male writing. Acker
disproves this idea by constructing her texts so that the autobiographical rigidity of “real
life” is confused by means of the diffuseness of personality, by the equally rigorous
application of “fake life.” Take a character like Peter in Great Expectations. If male
critics read Peter as a stand-in for Acker, then they must acknowledge that the
transformations which Peter’s voice undergoes--turning into Sarah, or Rosa, or some other
“I”-- result in a far more disconcertingly coherent version of self than would be expected
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in straight autobiography. This may be Acker’s great theme: that voice is the center of
art; traversing fact, narrative, statement, subject. If this is to be labeled autobiography,
then it is a much more involved type of writing of the self, compared to the fashionable,
two-dimensional, roman à clef style of metafiction.201
We are still left with the question of how to account for both the character’s and
author’s maternal relationship, a question only asked when one is faced with the absent
mother, who both generates the child’s recall of his/her childhood and is simultaneously
generated by the formal act of this plagiaristic recall. The recitative nature of Peter’s back
story, complete with answers to about-to-be-asked questions, doubly includes and
separates the reader. I am in particular struck by the parenthetical sides: “my
grandmother (on my mother’s side) died.” We are told something important--and we
cannot help but sympathize with such a miserable tale--but neither can we refrain from
being distanced by the address of such a practiced tone. The novel’s end reveals another
address--the daughter’s letter to the mother: “Dear mother, / End” (Great 127-8).202
Between these two moments, and between the two parentheses, is Acker’s version of the
purloined letter. Like that letter, the ownership of lineage is more important than the
content; keeping the secret matters more than what the secret is. The maternal loss which
begins Acker’s novel is at one and the same time revealed and obscured in the
parenthetical aside, hidden in a sense in plain sight. Author and friend Leslie Dick is also
“struck by the set-ups, the opening moves: Kathy introduces some version of herself as
character . . . and then this is quickly abandoned, without a backward glance” (115).
In light of Acker’s reference to Rebel Without a Cause as a myth for contemporary youth’s “postcynical” search for “a place so they can live,” she discusses in her interview with Lotringer how Jack
Kerouac’s work came “too much from intuition and [so she] wasn’t interested in that kind of
autobiographical work” (“Devoured” 4).
202
The line “Dear mother,” appears at the very bottom of page 127, and the word “End” is alone, centered
horizontally and vertically on page 128. Acker claims that Great Expectations “has no beginning nor end,
but there’s a cumulative effect” (“Devoured” 15).
201
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More in rigor than boredom, Dick suggests that Acker uses “device after device to undo
cumulative narrative logic,” and also to undo the automatic, machinic manner in which
“the reader takes almost anything you give to turn it into a story” (115, 116). Having
childhood recalled, ventriloquized to me by Acker, I now look desperately in the
parentheses for a middle, an end.
As I suggested earlier, the “plainness” of the importance of the mother’s suicide to
Acker’s early novels is something she only comes to acknowledge later.203 In
“Paragraphs,” a short piece she wrote for The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language
Association’s Spring 1995 special issue on “Identities,”204 Acker offers the reader fifteen
fragmented, separated paragraphs that, put together, form a sort of non-sequitur,
autobiographical self-portrait of Acker, all the more tantalizing since she slyly hints at the
connections between her public performance, fictional performance, and her “real” life,
while simultaneously combining all of these into an otherwise different formulation of
identity.205 I imagine Acker performing something between biographical and
autobiographical writing, a performance that could be placed over and against obituary’s
necro-biography; both share expressive, performative features, both work by accretion,
both rely on the anecdote and the incident. Mixing the speculative, the declarative, the
confessional, the historically retrospective, and the theoretical, Acker discusses among
other things Catholicism (she has “no genetic relation”), The Nation (they use “queer” to
mean “gay”), body building (a “language I could access, find”), Bataille’s Story of the Eye
(“some book”), “the whole system of dualistic thinking” (it is “messed-up”), and a debate
“The more that I write my own novels, the more it seems to me that to write is to read” (“Reading the
Lack” 66).
204
“Paragraphs” appears in the same issue in which she discussed Arendt in “Writing, Identity, and
Copyright in the Net Age.”
205
For instance, Acker claims her mother “didn’t think she could legally name me Kathy, so she gave me
this name she hated. I’ve never been called by my legal name. Only when very drunk do I mention that
name” (“Paragraphs” 88). What could this hated name be? Is this a true story? Or some metaphor for
deferred, private, abject identity?
203
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between Kristeva and Irigaray (“I prefer Irigaray’s position on the maternal”).
Throughout, Acker avoids specific claims of knowledge--“I’ve only started doing this
work so I don’t know” (“Paragraphs” 92)--and for this reason her piece on identity is
truly a piece on “identities,” reflecting the ambivalent uncertainty which a changing
conception of self, the unformed “I,” engenders: “there are tons of meanings and all of
these meanings collide. Meaning shifts” (“Paragraphs” 92). This statement describes all
of Acker’s work. However, despite Acker’s refusal to more directly limn her own
boundaries and identity once and for all, we can yet see in “Paragraphs” those key
landscapes of meaning which she is most interested in exploring.
One of these landscapes is of course “language,” and some specific ones Acker
discusses are dreams, body building, identity, and sex. For instance, she asks of herself,
“when I passed through intense sexual activity . . . what did ‘my’ language, which is not
just my language, look like?” (“Paragraphs” 92). I want to begin here with a point about
the way Acker refers to the two kinds of sexual language--“‘my’ language, which is not
just my language”--in order to compare it to the way Acker imagines the place of her
mother in her writing. In imagining what these two languages may “look like,” Acker
relies on punctuation to mark visually for the reader the distinction between them.206 The
scare quotes around “‘my’ language” suggest a claim to an identity not predicated upon a
coherent I (or as Acker would have it, an ironic “I”). Language belongs to Acker as it
belongs to everyone, but by focusing on various linguistic registers--personal, sexual,
unspoken--Acker distinguishes a shared project from her own multiple projects; there are
different languages which operate differently, and she learns through her texts to speak
them variously. Likewise, elsewhere in “Paragraphs,” Acker uses quotation marks
Avital Ronell says of “apostrophe,” the term for citation in rhetoric, “that it is a way of calling to the
other . . . that citation is linked to memory, to acts of bringing back, recalling. . . . When we cite and
recite, when we quote the other, we are calling to the irreplaceable one for whom there is no substitute”
(14).
206
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linguistically to call into question the mask-like labels of identity: “Bohemia,” “the norm,”
“meaning,” “this” and “that,” “self,” “mine,” “otherness,” and finally “my” language.
Acker is clearly being ironic with these usages, either pointing out the constructedness of
something like “the norm” or distinguishing between an assumed affinity between words
and things and an intentional catachresis, as in the case of “Bohemia.”
In the above list I omitted one other instance of Acker’s use of ironic quotation-“my mother.” She discusses her previous novel My Mother: Demonology (1993) and
how the narrator Laure was originally conceived as a cross between Acker’s mother Clare
and Colette Peignot, whom Bataille loved and who wrote under the pseudonym Laure.
This mixing was “part of the reason for the rubric ‘my mother’” in the section of that
book “Letters from My Mother to My Father” (“Paragraphs” 90). The quotations
around “my mother” in “Paragraphs” establish the falsity of the autobiographical
material; in fact, Acker goes on to claim that in writing My Mother: Demonology she
became uninterested in her mother, and thus had mistitled “Letters from My Mother to
My Father.” What is significant is that this claim comes on the heels of Acker’s most
candid description of the relationship between her texts and her mother. In making this
point, Acker relies on another typographical marker, not quotation marks but italics. In
the tenth paragraph of “Paragraphs,” she writes:
I’m probably concerned with my mother in my texts. I’m concerned with the
father and my mother. The majority of the autobiographical material in my books
concerns my mother. I don’t actually write all that autobiographically, but now
and then, there’s some direct autobiography. However, the section “Letters from
My Mother to My Father” in My Mother: Demonology is not autobiographical.
(“Paragraphs” 90)
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Acker’s italicization of “my mother” is striking in comparison to her other quotational
distinctions. “‘My’ language,” easily ironized by quotation marks, is very unlike “my
mother,” which for Acker has no ironic distinction. Or, more simply, for Acker language
is unlike the mother, in that the former word represents a class of things that can be
gotten outside of, or around, or entered into by the selfsame tricks of language, while the
latter is a class of things either possessed wholesale or forever abandoned: there is “this”
language or “that” language, but for Acker there is only my mother. Furthermore, in
Acker’s expression, the mother is formulated as an object in a relationship.207 We have
seen Acker continually ironize the personal pronoun, as in “whenever I use ‘I,’ I am and I
am not that ‘I’” (“A Conversation” 12) or “any other aspect of whatever’s called ‘me’”
(“Critical Languages” 83). This irony is in keeping with her questioning of the role of
language on identity, which she linguistically ruptures and changes willfully. With the
maternal, however, Acker’s italicized possessive adjective does not have the same
distance. Put into adjectival relationship with her mother, by stressing the possessive my
mother, Clare Lehman becomes in Acker’s texts a constitutive part of Acker.
“I’m probably concerned with my mother in my texts. I’m concerned with the
father and my mother” (“Paragraphs” 90). Second, rather than ironize two or more kinds
of mother, as she does with self-identity and language, Acker’s “concerned” repetition
tries to explain her novelistic relationship with her mother by comparing it to a
relationship with fathers. We get, with an italicized article and possessive, not only two
kinds of parents--mother and father--but also two kinds of mother and two kinds of
father--my mother/the mother, my father/the father. While there is no “my father,” no
“the mother,” these categories are implicitly suggested in Acker’s formulation. This
opens up much biographical space, and we are reminded again of the künstlerroman
207

In somewhat of the Irigarayan sense mentioned above.
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aspects of her obituaries--abandoned by the father, molested by the stepfather, possessed
by the grandmother, and refused by the mother. Yet Acker means not to distinguish
between an 80s American “the mother” and her own real mother; she is not making a
sociological claim about mothers or suggesting that her mother was even very much
different from a supposed, archetypal the mother. As such, her my/the distinction seems
less useful; most novelists and readers understand the difference between definite and
indefinite objects, and that the latter can (intentionally or not) be signified metaphorically
by the former. However, what is significant is what comes across in Acker’s discovery of
her earlier interests: that, in hindsight, the play between my mother and the mother seems
not to have mattered or existed for Acker at the time, as it must have for the reader.
The rest of her tenth paragraph, about the question of autobiography, gets picked
up, as we saw, by her critics and obituarists: “the majority of the autobiographical
material in my books concerns my mother. I don’t actually write all that
autobiographically, but now and then, there’s some direct autobiography” (“Paragraphs”
90). The nonchalant manner of “I’m probably concerned more with” and “I don’t actually
write all that autobiographically” (emphasis added) works against the emotional content
of Acker’s textual use of her mother’s suicide. Acker here repositions the readers’
autobiographical question: her use of “true” autobiography is less an intentional,
conscious, artistic act and instead something “probably” done; it is less either/or or
“true”/“false” autobiography and instead a question of degree, of “all that” much-ness.
Instead of writing autobiography, Acker suggests that she writes in the fashion of
autobiography--autobiographically--and without the constraint of consistency or realism
that the autobiographist faces. As with her abandonment of novelistic narrative
strategies, Acker does not feel compelled to stick to one genre, instead continually shifting
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“language” and “identity” around her mother. Barbara Johnson, in “My Monster / My
Self,” suggests that “the autobiographical reflex is triggered by the resistance and
ambivalence involved in the very writing of the book” (3), and this applies equally to
Acker’s work. Johnson terms the resistance and ambivalence that triggers autobiography
a “struggle for feminine authorship” (3). By placing feminine autobiography in
juxtaposition to the mother, it appears that the traumatized orphan role, which Acker
only later recognizes as a concern specific to her, is self-starting, it comes about by means
of itself, provoked into expression by the ambivalence of trauma. In a similar vein,
Roland Barthes, in Camera Lucida (1980), discusses the important Winter Garden
Photograph of his mother which contained “something like an essence of the Photograph”
(73). Barthes reads in this photograph, which he is unable to bring himself to reproduce
in his text, the realization of what he experienced during his mother’s death, which
occurred just before he found the photograph. Looking at the photograph, he found that
“ultimately I experienced her . . . as my feminine child”; “she had become my little girl,
uniting for me with that essential child she was in her first photograph” (Camera 72). He
understood that this experience was his “way of resolving Death” (Camera 72); with his
mother as feminine child, Barthes imagines, “I who had not procreated, I had, in her very
illness, engendered my mother” (Camera 72). Barthes, who calls himself in his
“autobiography” Roland Barthes the “being pour rien” (19), is like Acker confronted
after the mother’s death with having to wait for a “total, undialectical death” (Camera 72).
And Barthes, like Acker, suggests that writing may be the only way to “universalize the
particularity” of being, of escaping the totality of a death as the end of one’s life.208
So goes one understanding of Acker’s public prurience. Another possibility is to
Acker was, like Barthes, childless, although Jeanette Winterson tellingly suggests that “Acker may be
the true mother of Brat Pack writers like Bret Easton Ellis, but there is no disgust in her work” (ix).
208
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take seriously Acker’s claim that her books can be read at random; “even in Empire of the
Senseless, which is the most narrative book, you could read pretty much anywhere”
(“Devoured” 15). Writing a year after her death, Peter Wollen puts it like this: “parents
were the generative source of Kathy Acker’s private mythology, constantly bubbling up
into the public domain--the parents who died, abandoning her, leaving her an orphan”
(“Don’t Be Afraid” ¶3).209 The “public domain” of Acker’s life, including both her
published fictions and the published details of her life (the interviews on motorcycles,
tattoos, her shaved head), is percolated by another strong part of Acker we can label
“myth.” Wollen seems to see Acker’s parents as both relevant and irrelevant, part of a
personal mythmaking process that soon overwhelms her presence in the public domain.
“The parents who died, abandoning her, leaving her an orphan”--we know all this stuff, as
if it, like other myths, is old hat, neutered of real significance. Reading Acker’s texts
cover to cover will not necessarily inform a reader of the story of the myth any more than
skipping about awhile will. However, this is not to say that the reoccurrence of Acker’s
myths dispels their power. Asked by Ellen Friedman “what is the new direction you’ve
taken with Empire [of the Senseless (1988)],” Acker answers “the search for a myth to
live by” (Acker, “A Conversation” 12). Myths, like language, are things sought (this is a
key point). They also, like language, compete. The quest for “a myth to live by” is
confused not only by other myths but by the idea of the myth. Does Acker really not
know what Wollen suggests? Can we see, in her earlier work, that she really doesn’t
know how her own life, her own fictions, and her texts intertwine; that each really comes
out of Acker’s own myth of “my mother”?
That, in hindsight, the autobiographical material in her novels “probably” concerns
Wollen’s “Don’t Be Afraid to Copy It Out” was later reworked for the Lust for Life collection; this
sentence is one that was excised for the later essay.
209
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her mother seems to surprise Acker, and that surprise should surprise the reader. Earlier
in “Paragraphs,” Acker explains that “usually I don’t know what a text is going to mean
when I use it” (88) and “I don’t work entirely consciously” (89). This may help explain
her use of other texts--Dickens, Cervantes, Fanon, Kristeva--but not necessarily her use
of herself and her mother. Claiming not to know “what she was doing” earlier, in
“Paragraphs” Acker is able to clarify some of her earlier texts’ erstwhile hidden concerns.
The autobiographical question such an observation raises for the reader--do Acker’s texts
in fact give us more “my mothers” and how so--is one that explicitly comes to the
forefront of Acker’s later work, (such as My Mother: Demonology), which means that it
is now a question no longer interesting to her. Only after having worked through her
probable maternal concern is Acker able to notice what she was doing. For Acker’s work,
this mother trouble has everything to do with not only her subject matter, but also all of
the other critical questions asked of her: the plagiarism of “false” autobiography, the
experimental tone and the intimate subject matter, the place of childish and regressive
language, her use of radical narrative as a response to notions of historical progress, her
distrust of theory, and her nihilism and political engagement. In drawing out Acker’s
mother trouble, I want to demonstrate how Acker’s insouciance about the importance of
her mother’s suicide to her early texts is 1) something she can only see later, once she has
“dealt” with it and 2) is the reason why her texts use plagiarism, childish diction and
radical narrative. For instance, the mother’s suicide in Great Expectations, triggering all
the resistance and ambivalence in Acker’s “struggle for feminine authorship,” literally
brings together the four questions we began with. By conceiving of her later
comprehension of the truth of her work as about “my mother,” Acker makes plain the role
of not understanding, of the acceptance of a state of uncertainty, in the formation of
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identity. To Acker’s mind, uncertainty is not a defect; going into “not understanding” is
the only place to go. But if it seems plain that Acker’s texts are all about her mother,
what made this difficult to see then, and what makes her, even in 1995, avoid some of this
truth (not “all that autobiographically,” “I’m probably concerned”)?
In “Paragraphs,” Acker explains the significance of this state of uncertainty or not
understanding in more detail. After discussing her use of Julia Kristeva’s About Chinese
Women (1977) for My Mother: Demonology, Acker juxtaposes Kristeva and Luce
Irigaray’s “position on the maternal” (90). Acker says she “prefers” (for all texts have
their uses) Irigaray. Here Acker is thinking about “the abstraction named ‘otherness,’
‘otherness’ especially in relation to women” (“Paragraphs” 90). Simply conceiving
“otherness” as a discrete category opposed to the self is clearly facile, and so Acker
instead seeks otherness as a means of leaving behind the self, “to find a kind of freedom in
the non-space between texts, in the silence and emptiness between juxtapositions” (Glück
48). In reference to Kristeva’s work, for instance, Acker is disappointed in what she saw
as Kristeva’s failure to explore this kind of otherness; one needs to ironize “a so-called
white woman into Asia, a so-called democratic woman into a so-called communist state”
(“Paragraphs” 89). Rather, complicating “otherness” as an abstraction results in
movements, transformations, journeys, not labels, determinations, categories; moving
towards or from an abstraction like “otherness” allows the borders of the abstraction to
become clearer. As this abstraction of “otherness” is especially interesting in relation to
women (and her relationship to language and to the maternal), the important focus is on a
female character’s own understanding of her location in or out of a particular abstraction.
Thus, in the texts Acker writes and in the texts she uses, a woman’s “otherness” often
involves a quest which is a question: “I think I was curious about women traveling into
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strangeness” (“Paragraphs” 89). We see this curiousity constantly in Acker’s 80s novels;
they continually start and restart with a character crossing from one strange moment or
place into another. Acker’s valuation of this ex-centric motion is part of the reason why
she prefers Irigaray to Kristeva. Acker is “disappointed” by Kristeva, since Kristeva was
“unable to leave herself.”
Acker turns to Italian director Dario Argento as an example of a successful
movement towards “otherness” by way of traveling into strangeness. Acker is struck by
a scene in his horror film Suspiria (1977) which yields a “fabulous image” iterative of the
abstraction named “otherness”:
when the heroine walks upstairs, she thinking that there’s something that she has
to find out and then she realizes, as if suddenly, that she doesn’t understand at all,
that she’s in a semi-magic horror world in which she is not able to understand.
When she reaches the top of the stairs, the kitchen is the first room she sees. A
room, but it’s as open as a hall. And sitting on a chair is a huge, fat woman with a
cleaver. (“Paragraphs” 89-90)
Acker’s description of this scene focuses on the unresolved strangeness; the heroine (and
the viewer) expects to find out “something” only to be surprised to discover that the
notion of discovery is entirely given over to a more fundamental state of
incomprehensibility. This is not a matter of discovery or nondiscovery; the character is
in a “world in which she is not able to understand” (emphasis added). These kinds of
leave-takings excite Acker and characterize her texts. When her characters are not being
chained, trapped, or locked up, they are journeying, they are leaving themselves with the
expectation of “finding something out.”210 That these characters do not reach conclusions
For example, in Don Quixote we have a quest for love, in Great Expectations we have the Dickensian
quest for parentage, in Empire of the Senseless two characters quest for a way out of Oedipus.
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is not a problem; “traveling into strangeness” is a way of understanding “otherness,” and
entering that “semi-magic horror world” of incomprehensibility or nonunderstanding is
the point.
This journey into strangeness becomes especially important in relation to women
and even more so in relation to women’s mothers. To make this clear, we should return
to Acker’s theoretical question: Kristeva or Irigaray? Asking this question is another way
of asking about the distinction between my mother and the mother. Acker is not clear, but
she seems to read Kristeva’s position on the maternal through Kristeva’s concept of the
abject, that which is neither object nor subject, but that which is “radically excluded and
draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (Kristeva 2). Kristeva draws this
out of Freud’s notion of the uncanny, and the abject like the uncanny is based on the
familiar, and thus it constitutes an edge of familiarity, the edge of a destroying reality.
Acker seems to associate this familiarity with “the mother,” who stands in for the
subject’s dissolution of identity which provokes abjection, horror. In Suspiria, at the top
of the stairs is the fat woman with the meat cleaver, and suddenly abjection, or
unheimlich, or some other form of boundary-establishing recognition sets in.211 On the
other hand, “traveling into strangeness,” as Acker puts it, requires an open-ended
question. The problem with Kristeva’s formulation, which Acker sees Irigaray as
addressing, is that “being female in a patriarchal society [may cause] a double and
ambiguous relation to our mothers” (“Paragraphs” 90). As Acker explains it, the maternal
relation may be twofold: “on the one hand, my mother was or is my lover. On the other
hand, my mother was a victim in the male-defined society” (“Paragraphs” 90). A
daughter can either identify with the mother as lover or as victim, and thus the daughter
In light of Johnson’s comment on the repressed possibility for feminine unheimlich at home (10), it is
interesting to note that Suspiria, like many of Argento’s film, focuses on an American woman abroad.
211
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defines herself as either lover or victim. Irigaray’s solution is that “females, have to
reinstate the mother as another person” (“Paragraphs” 90). Easier said than done; how to
separate lover from victim, the trope from the particular, the individual from the idea, “my
mother” from “the mother”? “The mother” does not seem to offer us much use value;
culturally mediated, obscure, freighted with expectation, “the mother” is precisely the
useless secret to discover. On the other hand, “my mother” seems especially invested in
the problem of maternal identification and autobiography; in which texts does Acker see
or not see her mother as victim or lover?
Part of this sorting out of the maternal relationship with the absent maternal in
Great Expectations has to do with what Acker calls “movings,” which is one of her terms
for handling the abstraction of “otherness.” Acker puts the question of movings as a
philosophical problem related to narrative language, asking “how can I differentiate?”
(Great 58). To get to this, I want to compare the beginnings of the first two sections of
Great Expectations to demonstrate both Acker’s formulation of the mother in that novel
as well as her structural use of different philosophical modes to explain the child’s
relationship with the mother. In both cases (and in the novel’s conclusion), Acker utilizes
the concept of “movings” to model a paradoxically tragic and successful strategy for
locating the question of her mother’s suicide. We have looked at the first section of Great
Expectations, “Plagiarism,” so let us turn now to the middle, second section, “The
Beginnings of Romance.” The character Sarah who narrates this section starts as Peter did
in “Plagiarism” with a family history. Sarah’s mother became pregnant during World War
II and was abandoned by her father, leaving mother, daughter, and grandmother to turn to
each other. Here Acker, as she did in the first section, mixes narrative paragraphs about
Sarah’s relationship to her mother with more philosophical, theoretical paragraphs which
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describe (or parody?) how “movings” logically operate to explain an individual’s
consciousness in the world. Sarah first explains what happens after her father left:
Mother didn’t want me to leave her. . . . She craved my love . . . only so she could
do what she wanted and evade the responsibility. . . . I lived so totally in the
world bounded by her being her seemings, I had no idea we were a socially
important family. I didn’t know there was a world outside her. (Great 58)
The idea of an all-consuming relationship with a mother is repeated throughout Great
Expectations; for each narrator, it is true that “the whole world and consciousness revolve
around my mother” (14). In each case, Acker reads or theorizes this relationship by
different modes. Here, in “The Beginnings of Romance,” she uses philosophy. In a
complex, searching passage which follows Sarah’s description of her absorption by her
mother, Acker writes:
There is just moving and there are different ways of moving. Or: there is moving
all over at the same time and there is moving linearly. If everything is moving-allover-the-place-no-time, anything is everything. If this is so, how can I
differentiate? How can there be stories? Consciousness just is: no time. But any
emotion presupposes differentiation. Differentiation presumes time, at least
BEFORE and NOW. A narrative is an emotional moving. (Great 58)
This type of moving becomes momentarily frightening to Sarah; if the loss of absolutes
results in a supposedly liberating “moving-all-over-the-place-no-time,” then how is a
character, already lost or already journeying, meant to find her way? How can there be
such a thing as narrative--a linear moving that (for Acker) also moves all over at the same
time? While this moving is presented as a serious question, Acker also mocks the
agglutinative philosophical logic at work, getting out of one tautology by means of

another.
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Emotion presupposes, and hence generates, the possibility of differentiation,

which in turn presumes, hence generates, time. Therefore, rewriting Descartes,
“Something exists when it’s part of a narrative. Self-reflective consciousness is
narrational” (Great 58); I think I think, therefore I narrate, therefore I am. Acker explains
the trap elsewhere: “I feel I feel I feel I have no language, any emotion for me is a prison”
(Great 24). The imprisonment of language (of lacking a useful language) is for Acker
intimately related to emotion, which, since it requires a differentiation, and thus a past
and present, itself becomes yet another kind of inaccessible narrative language.
Trying to make Acker’s characters’ logic work may be a futile exercise, but at its
core is a concern with time. The question may be “how can a linear narrative move all
over in time at the same time resulting in no time”; this is set up by the first sentence of
“The Beginnings of Romance,” later repeated: “Timelessness versus time” (Great 57, 77).
Seeking some strategy for differentiating in order to reclaim narrative and emotion first
requires a workable conception of time, and especially of change through time. Acker
arrives at this idea through a determination of the present by means of the past (more on
this momentarily, but note that above Acker marks time by “BEFORE and NOW,” as
opposed to a “BEFORE and AFTER”). In short, what is posed as a problem of logic of
the present (how can I now have narrative, have emotion, how can I now differentiate) is
predicated on a concrete establishment of a historical, “timely” problem. The turning
point is Acker’s word “differentiate,” which means both to distinguish between external
objects and events, as well as to differentiate between past and present selves, and even
between present identities. How can one differentiate between love and abuse, and also
how can one differentiate between me and me (I and I, me and mine, my and “my”)?
Sarah Schulman identifies in such passages “the systematic Judaic way that she builds her argument,”
“the precision, explicitness, and clarity of feeling and idea” (¶9). Harryman says of this “that her practice
is additive, not subtractive. She doesn’t leave anything behind” (38).
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Structurally, here is the primary thrust of Acker’s novels: one or more character’s
“movings” as they attempt this bifurcated question of differentiating amongst others as
well as amongst their own selves. Acker’s characters continually enter new and strange
environments, and as the cycle repeats the reader sees more and more the innocence and
impending perversion of Acker’s characters. Often overlooked is the moment between
these scenes, the transitions wherein this critical “moving” and differentiating is decided.
As a problem of choice--how do we get to these places--most critics remark that Acker
follows Burroughs’s cut-up example. However, these between-moments, generally
elided, can also be traced back to the earlier problem of “how can I differentiate.” Shortly
after the philosophical passage on differentiation of time, Sarah self-reflexively asks
“Why is anybody interested in anything? I’m interested when I’m discovering. To me,
real moving is discovering. Real moving, then, is that which endures. How can that be?”
(Great 59). In the absence of a specific, universal answer to this question, characters
revert to their already formed obsessions, and since, as we have seen, the major obsession
for Acker is the mother’s suicide, it is this act which most clearly represents the difficulty
of Acker’s question. Acker’s “movings,” related to the philosophical problem of “how to
differentiate,” in turn come from the immediate, traumatic problem of representing and
thinking the mother’s suicide.
As in the above passages from “The Beginnings of Romance,” Acker develops this
idea in the first section of Great Expectations, “Plagiarism.” After the Dickens parody
and Peter’s brief appellative and matrilineal introduction, Peter is given a Tarot reading by
a friend Terence, which provides a “psychic map of the present” (Great 5). Actually, for
Peter the reading is “not so much a fortune--whatever that means--but a fairly, it seems to
me, precise psychic map of the present, therefore: the future” (Great 5). This state of
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affairs finds Peter orphaned, remembering his mother, tracing the connection between the
manner of her death and the manner of Peter’s life. How Peter considers his mother
determines how Peter considers himself, and that is why fulfilling the titular great
expectations is dependent upon moving beyond the current “image obsession” (6) that
Peter has been given by Terence’s “psychic map of the present,” which is less predictive
of the future than descriptive of the present. It is apparent that Peter needs to go
somewhere, to do something, if only to reestablish the ability to change “the present,
therefore: the future,” and so the “moving” that motivates the novel finds Peter literally
differentiating--into Sarah, Rosa, Cynthia, and other “I”s. Put this way, Acker’s Great
Expectations, like the Dickens novel, is concerned with possible futures and with past
motivations, with lineage, and with all the stabilizing and destabilizing functions of a
character with a mysterious, unrecoverable childhood. As in Dickens’s text, the reader
expects our protagonist to resolve and overcome his/her traumatic “BEFORE” in order to
successfully enter an adult “NOW.” Simultaneously, however, we are forced to confront
our protagonist’s adult “NOW” as marked inexorably by an unchangeable “BEFORE”--is
it possible for Peter to undo his “psychic map of the present, therefore: the future,”
which is marked so much by his mother’s suicide?
For Peter and Acker, this psychic map takes the form of an “image obsession,”
which is the primary stumbling block for “movings,” for narrative and emotional
differentiation. Throughout Great Expectations, this image obsession is connected to the
mother’s suicide. The Tarot reading suggests to Peter that
the image obsession I’m scum. This powerful image depends on . . . the image I
have of my mother. Before I was born, my mother hated me because my father
left her (because she got pregnant?) and because my mother wanted to remain her
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mother’s child rather than be my mother. My image of my mother is the source
of my creativity. I prefer the word consciousness. My image of my hateful
mother is blocking consciousness. To obtain a different picture of my mother, I
have to forgive my mother for rejecting me and committing suicide. (Great 6)
Again we see the complex, interrelated formulation of daughterly identity that Acker
develops. She is parodically logical; she must forgive her mother to “obtain a different
picture” so that this new image will replace the hateful image blocking the child’s
consciousness. The mother’s creative source, which the daughter imagines, is oddly based
on the mother acting like a daughter--wanting “to remain her mother’s child.” I connect
this to the “ventriloquy of childhood” discussed above; Peter and Sarah and Acker are
controlled by the image of the mother as child, and they replicate this confusing situation,
child acting as mother acting as mother’s child.
This confusing “image obsession” or “psychic map of the present” has as its goal
forgiveness, but a forgiveness necessarily unasked-for and unreceived. Acker relates the
impossible task of finding forgiveness towards the dead mother with “movings” and her
characters’ search for the abstraction of “othernesss.” Peter informs us at the outset of
what he is trying to escape:
The day after my mother committed suicide I started to experience a frame.
Within this frame time was totally circular because I was being returned to my
childhood traumas totally terrifying because now those traumas are totally real:
there is no buffer of memory. There is no time; there is. (Great 6-7)
As in the later passage with Sarah, “timelessness versus time” is the issue. The mother’s
suicide, which imposes a frame of circular time on the child, relates to the circle
Peter/Sarah/Acker’s mother experienced of trying “to remain her mother’s child rather
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than be my mother.” Within the circular frame of the mother’s suicide, “movings”
stopped, as does the daughter’s liberatory “traveling into strangeness” which would have
taken her into the “semi-magic horror world” of a nondualistic identity (“Paragraphs” 89).
Acker connects this circular frame with linear narrative, and Great Expectations’s journey
of forgiveness must move in a manner neither linear nor circular.
By novel’s end, when Acker returns us to the mother’s suicide which began the
text, she gives us a much shorter and more direct version of events:
My mother committed suicide and I ran away. My mother committed suicide in a
hotel room because she was lonely and there was no else in the world but her,
wants go so deep there is no way of getting them out of the body, no surgery
other than death, the body will hurt. There are times when there is no food and
those times must be sat through. I ran away from pain. (Great 127)
However, to say that Peter discovered something by the end of Great Expectations would
compromise Acker’s interest in “movings.” We find instead a figure stuck at a basic
truth, and a basic impulse to this truth. Despite the text’s journeys, despite the
significance or lack of significance uncovered, the reader finds only just so much running
from pain--not to any particular place, but just “away.” Like descriptions of the
mother’s suicide and funeral, this fearful running away is also structurally repeated; early
in the novel, the narrator thinks about the future and moving back to New York: “I’m
scared out of my wits. I’m a scaredy-cat. I run away from everything” (Great 19).
Later, midway through the text, the narrator interrupts the narration, saying of the author,
“I’m going to tell you something. The author of the work you are now reading is a scared
little shit. She’s frightened . . . scared out of her wits . . . she runs away from anyone”
(Great 70-1). This automatic kind of fright and flight, repeated throughout, explains the
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impetus to “movings,” but how are we to distinguish between a fearful “running away”
and “movings” which bring us closer to the useful abstraction of otherness? At the end of
Great Expectations, when Acker considers the flight prompted by her mother’s suicide,
she has her narrator consider the efficacy of the novel’s journey; has this been a
succcessful moving, or have Acker’s narrators just been running away, towards suicide
like the mother? The novel’s final lines suggest a negative answer to this question; we
cannot decide which works, but can only say which does not: “I don’t know if the world
is better or worse than it has been I know the only anguish comes from running away.
Dear mother, End” (Great 127-8). Acker’s final address to the mother is difficult to read;
is this her way of turning back to face the absent mother, to bring an end (not “the end”)
to the only anguish she knows?
Part of the difficulty is that endings for Acker are too often traumatic and flightprovoking. Here is Sarah, in “The Beginnings of Romance”: “I realize that all my life is is
[sic] endings. Not endings, those are just events; but holes” (Great 64). Are we meant to
read “my life is in endings,” as in “all my life is in holes”? Acker’s characters are
generally resilient--enslaved, raped, traumatized, aborted, wounded: they continue
existing, moving on to the next tragedy. The endings which occupy Sarah, which occupy
Peter, which occupy Acker, are dismissed here as “just events,” although Sarah’s
precision means more than just the past is past. Marking time, “just events,” accumulate;
however, the holes build up so long as life does. Alternatively, we can read the stuttering
“is is” as proleptic-- looking forward to the holes. Life is not in the holes, but is the
holes. Perhaps, then, we can read the stuttering “is is” as a description of dependency,
yet another collaboration between the past and the identical present to define the future.
Unsurprisingly, to explain “life is is endings,” Sarah offers a maternal example: “For
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instance when my mother died, the ‘I’ I had always known dropped out. All my history
went away. Pretty clothes and gayness amaze me” (Great 64). The history that drops
away and the lost matrilineal connection shifts Sarah into a different conception of “I.”
Acker suggests that the history of the woman writer is founded upon her relation to her
mother. Lost after the mother’s death, Sarah is amazed by pretty clothes; absent is the
wonder of the mother, and without this wonder Sarah literally loses focus, doubling into
an “‘I’ I” who “is is” “endings/holes.”
But this trauma, the painful hole at the center of the daughter’s self after the
mother’s suicide, is also recuperable in Great Expectations. At the beginning of
“Plagiarism,” Peter describes the Tarot reading which happened “ten days ago (it is now
almost Christmas 1979),” and we there learn that the mother committed suicide Christmas
Eve 1978 (Great 5). Shortly after, there is a scene which we can read as either a flashback
or a dream. “Today is Christmas” (Great 10), and playing with her mother in the virgin
snow under the 59th Street Bridge, the narrator wants to remain “in this magic snow with
the beautiful yellow sun beating down on me as long as I can until a voice in my head (me)
or my mother says, ‘Now you know what this experience is, you have to leave’” (Great
10). If a flashback, this maternal advice has missed its mark; the virgin snow, the beating
sun, the child’s play will all ruin the experience if they do not leave. The narrator’s
Christmastime tableau is a moment of being, and so this memory may also be a dream.
“(Me) or my mother,” which may be the same thing, knows that being has to give way to
becoming, that the moment gives way to time, which by history or memory wants to
return us, circularly back to the moment. This is what dreams do in Acker’s novel, what
the “ventriloquy of childhood” does, what the “running away” from trauma does: it tries
to return a character back to “what the experience is,” while the character must work to
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leave, to move outside of the linear or circular conceptions of time (of history, memory,
and narrative) that are set up to manage anguish.
And how does this all allow us to say “engaged withdrawal” and “Kathy Acker”?
Was Acker neither a nihilist nor an orphan, but yet in both cases still an artist
constructing herself as artist, trying to achieve what Sartre calls “the most complete
consciousness of being embarked”? Is not Acker’s “ventriloquy of childhood” another
version of Pygmalion, portraying another artist who yearns but still does not know what
to expect from this yearning, an artist who fell in love with something like a statue? Is
not the letter of address which ends Great Expectations, like Poe’s purloined letter, a
concealment of a truth attendant upon the expression of a truth, or in the case of Acker,
and an expression and suppression of the mother’s end? Barbara Johnson argues that,
“simultaneously a revelation and a coverup, autobiography would appear to constitute
itself as in some way a repression of autobiography” (4). Finally, in the case of the
woman writer, and of women’s history, and of Kathy Acker, we can also ask as Johnson
does, “is autobiography somehow always in the process of symbolically killing the
mother off by telling her the lie that we have given birth to ourselves” (4)?
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